IRAN’S MISSILE CAMPAIGN AGAINST U.S. BASES MAY BE MORE SERIOUS THAN IT APPEARS

追加: 2026-06-03

[00:00:00]edit. The question facing defense planners, military analysts, and anyone following this conflict in June of 2026 is straightforward. How is Iran still able to do this? How can a nation that has endured one of the most intense aerial campaigns of the modern era, a campaign that severely damaged its air force, crippled much of its naval capability, shattered major command structures, and eliminated two senior IRGC commanders within 9 months, still retained the ability to launch ballistic missile attacks against United States military facilities during an active ceasefire? Not once, not twice, three separate times within 5 days.

[00:00:34]Understanding that answer changes the entire way this conflict should be viewed. It also provides insight into why the situation remains far from resolved despite claims suggesting otherwise. The sequence began on May 27th, 2026. United States forces carried out strikes against Iranian drone control facilities near Bandar Abbas after confirmation that a United States MQ9 Reaper had been shot down over the Strait of Hormuz. From a military perspective, the response followed established rules of engagement. An American asset was destroyed and the systems responsible were targeted in return. Iran responded quickly. Within 24 hours on May 28th, an Iranian Fate 110 short-range ballistic missile was launched toward Ali al-S Salam air base in Kuwait. Patriot missile defenses operated by Kuwait successfully intercepted the incoming weapon.

[00:01:21]However, an interception does not automatically eliminate all consequences. Fragments from a ballistic missile descending at extreme speed can still carry enough force to damage equipment and injure personnel. Five Americans were wounded, including four service members and one civilian contractor. One MQ9 Reaper was destroyed entirely. Another suffered major damage.

[00:01:40]The result was roughly $60 million in drone losses caused by a missile that was officially intercepted. That outcome was not insignificant. It represented both a military and financial setback delivered through a partially neutralized attack. On June 1st, United States forces conducted additional strikes against Iranian military positions near Bandar Abbas. That same day, Iran shot down a United States MQ1 Predator drone. Later that Sunday evening, at 11 p.m. Eastern time, two additional ballistic missiles were launched toward Ali Al Salam. The target was unchanged. The intent was clear.

[00:02:13]United States Central Command reported that both missiles were intercepted successfully, producing no casualties and no significant debris damage.

[00:02:20]Sentcom later posted a statement on X saying that United States Central Command remains vigilant and will continue protecting American forces from Iranian aggression while also supporting the ceasefire currently in place. Those two realities now exist simultaneously.

[00:02:34]Military defenses remain active against ongoing attacks while diplomatic mechanisms continue operating in parallel. On that same day, the IRGC Navy launched a cruise missile attack against the MSse A5, a Panama flagged container vessel operated by Mediterranean Shipping Company near Bazra, Iraq. Two projectiles struck the ship. The first impact occurred while the harbor pilot remained on board. The second hit the crew accommodation area, creating a breach and igniting a fire.

[00:02:58]Remarkably, every crew member evacuated safely. Iranian officials described the attack as retaliation for an earlier American action against an Iranian tanker at sea. During that operation, a Hellfire missile reportedly struck the vessel's engine compartment with exceptional precision, leaving the hole intact while rendering the ship immobile. That 5-day period included military strikes, retaliatory attacks, ballistic missile launches during a ceasefire, a cruise missile strike against commercial shipping, and the suspension of diplomatic discussions by Iran on June 2nd. Reports indicated that tensions escalated further following a phone conversation involving strong objections related to Israeli military actions in Beirut. rather than decreasing. Regional pressure continued to rise. The suspension of negotiations carries significance beyond diplomacy alone. Iranian deputy head of Central Military Command Muhammad Jafar Assadi publicly declared that the United States was demanding complete surrender and that Iran would never surrender. He added that without surrender, war would be unavoidable. Beyond the rhetoric, the statement revealed an important reality.

[00:04:01]Such messaging does not reflect confidence derived from military advantage. Instead, it reflects a government attempting to avoid appearing politically weakened. While military pressure continues to increase within the IRGC and the broader clerical establishment, visible concessions can create internal risks. Different factions watch closely for signs of weakness, and political survival can become as important as military calculations. That internal dynamic helps explain why missile launches continue even during ceasefire periods.

[00:04:29]The logic is not solely military. It is also tied to maintaining regime cohesion. This leads directly to the central issue. The IRGC has lost two supreme commanders in less than a year.

[00:04:40]General Hussein Salami was killed. His successor, General Papur, was killed on the first day of Operation Epic Fury.

[00:04:47]Yet, Iran continues firing ballistic missiles at American facilities, targeting commercial shipping and sustaining pressure across multiple operational domains throughout the Persian Gulf region. The explanation lies not with individual commanders, but with the infrastructure built over decades to survive precisely this type of campaign. Iran approached ballistic missile development differently from many other nations. Missiles were not stored in exposed locations. They were not concentrated in vulnerable surface facilities. They were not dependent upon fixed launch sites that could be identified and destroyed during the opening phase of an air campaign.

[00:05:20]Instead, Iran spent nearly three decades constructing an extensive underground missile network designed specifically for survival. The lessons came from observing earlier conflicts. Iran studied what happened to Iraq in 1991.

[00:05:32]It examined Libya in 2011. It watched how military forces lost strategic capabilities when key assets remained exposed to air power. The response was adaptation. Facilities went underground.

[00:05:44]Systems became redundant. Protection became a central principle. That is why ballistic missiles are still being launched from Iranian territory in June of 2026. Despite months of sustained attacks, the geographic heart of this strategy lies within the Zagros mountains. The range stretches approximately 1,500 km from northwestern Iran through the country's western regions and toward the straight of Hormuz. The terrain is harsh, mountainous, and filled with natural formations that military engineers transformed into hardened underground complexes. These installations are not temporary shelters. They are purpose-built facilities containing reinforced entrances and internal transportation routes capable of moving transporter erector launchers commonly called teals rapidly between protected areas and launch positions. A launcher emerges. A missile is prepared. The doors open. The weapon is fired. The launcher returns underground. All of this occurs before surveillance and strike systems can complete the full sensor to shooter process. The timeline is intentionally compressed. This is not coincidence. It is doctrine. The Institute for the Study of War and multiple Western Defense Analysts have noted that Iran's underground missile city concept presents one of the most difficult hardened target challenges facing United States planners. Iranian state media has repeatedly showcased portions of these facilities, and IRGC officials have conducted public tours highlighting elements of the network.

[00:07:06]Open source analysis using satellite imagery, including work associated with the Mbury Institute of International Studies has identified dozens of suspected tunnel entrances throughout the Zagris region and nearby mountain systems. Yet another layer complicates targeting. Iran has reportedly built numerous false entrances and decoy launch facilities. These locations are intended to attract attacks away from operational assets. Some generate radar signatures, others produce thermal patterns resembling missile preparation activities. Viewed from above, many appear nearly identical to active facilities. Every GBU57 Massive Ordinance Penetrator, or GBU725,000lb bunker buster directed at a decoy, is a weapon not used against an actual missile site. Since penetrating munitions exist in limited quantities, such deception can create meaningful strategic effects even after some decoys are identified. The Fate 110 missile used in the May 28th attack against Ali Al- Salm illustrates another important element of Iran's approach. The missile has an approximate range of 300 km and has achieved increasing accuracy through successive variance. Its most important feature is solid fuel propulsion. Liquid fueled ballistic missiles require fueling procedures that consume time and generate signatures detectable by intelligence systems. Solid fuel weapons operate differently. They can be launched with far less preparation, dramatically reducing warning time and shrinking the opportunity available for detection and preemptive action. That characteristic remains a key reason these systems continue to pose a challenge even after months of sustained military pressure. For years, Iran has manufactured FAT series missiles within its own borders. Even after significant damage to missile production facilities, evaluations published by Defense Specialists referenced in Air and Space Forces magazine and Janes Defense Weekly indicate that large inventories had already been positioned in advance.

[00:08:54]Those stockpiles were not concentrated in one place. They were distributed across underground storage complexes and protected locations long before the current air campaign began. Missiles that have already been produced, hidden beneath mountains, and scattered throughout a region spanning hundreds of thousands of square kilometers cannot simply be eliminated through attacks on factories. The FAT 110 is only part of the concern. A more serious issue currently confronting United States air defense planners involves Iran's use of maneuvering re-entry vehicles on selected ballistic missile systems.

[00:09:24]conventional missile defense networks including Thiad in the upper defensive layer. Patriot PAC 3 batteries in the middle layer and SM3 interceptors launched from Arley Burke class destroyers during early flight phases were primarily designed to defeat targets following predictable ballistic paths. The behavior of a standard ballistic missile is well understood.

[00:09:43]Its projected flight route can be calculated. Interception points can be determined with considerable confidence.

[00:09:48]Engagement sequences can be planned before the missile enters its final phase. A maneuvering re-entry vehicle changes that framework. During terminal descent, aerodynamic control mechanisms allow the vehicle to alter its path. As a result, an interceptor may arrive at the location where the missile was expected to be while the actual target has shifted elsewhere. This capability is not merely theoretical. Iranian state media has repeatedly stated that maneuvering re-entry technology exists on several systems, including variants within the FATA and IMAD missile families. Officials from the United States defense community speaking to publications such as Defense News and Breaking Defense have acknowledged that these systems create growing challenges for layered missile defense structures operating in the region. This is why the current interception rate estimated between 90% and 92% across the broader defensive architecture represents an impressive achievement but not a complete solution. The remaining 8% is not simply statistical background. It is the area where Iran's most advanced missile systems are intended to operate.

[00:10:48]The strike on May 28th that injured five Americans and destroyed $60 million worth of drone assets demonstrates this reality. The Kuwaiti Patriot battery successfully intercepted the incoming Fate 110. The interception occurred. Yet debris generated by a high-speed ballistic missile engagement at low altitude over the protected installation still produced damage and casualties.

[00:11:09]That outcome reflects the physical realities of missile defense. Iranian planners understand those realities as clearly as military analysts in Washington. Their focus is no longer centered exclusively on overwhelming defenses through sheer volume as might have been envisioned several years ago.

[00:11:24]Instead, they are examining vulnerabilities. They're evaluating engagement geometry. They are searching for specific circumstances where advanced missiles possess the highest probability of delivering a warhead through defensive layers. Underground reserves within the Zagros mountains provide enough capability to continue that effort. The reason Iran remains capable of launching missiles should now be clear. The explanation includes extensive tunnel systems, dispersed stockpiles, solid fuel missile technology, maneuvering re-entry vehicles, and a deception network developed throughout Western Iran over nearly three decades of deliberate planning. Yet, capability alone does not tell the entire story. The second half of the equation concerns the American response. It involves the defensive systems currently deployed, the strengths and limits of those systems, and the offensive options prepared in the event that the ceasefire collapses in large-scale combat resumes. Those discussions are taking place now. They are occurring inside operational headquarters across the region, from Ford forward sentcom facilities to the Pentagon's joint staff. Choices made during the coming weeks could influence the direction of this conflict for years. The current missile defense structure across the Middle East is among the most extensive and resource intensive air defense networks ever assembled by the United States military.

[00:12:33]The outer defensive ring consists of SM3 standard missiles launched from Arley Burke class guided missile destroyers stationed in the Persian Gulf and nearby waters. These interceptors are intended to engage ballistic missiles during boost and midcourse flight stages before terminal descent begins. The SM3Block 2A variant can engage targets at altitudes exceeding 2,000 km. That capability allows interceptions while ballistic missiles are still ascending. Earlier in the conflict, at least one confirmed SM3 engagement against an Iranian ballistic missile occurred over Turkish airspace.

[00:13:06]The incident highlighted the extraordinary reach of the system when positioned effectively. The destroyers supporting this mission have remained on continuous operational cycles that creates additional challenges involving crew exhaustion, munitions replacement, and maintenance requirements. These issues receive limited attention in public reporting but play a major role in determining how long such operations can continue. The middle layer of defense relies on Patriot Pack 3 systems. The battery photographed at Ali Al- Salam air base in Kuwait has operated almost continuously since tensions intensified. Patriot PAC 3 is designed to engage shorter range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and larger drone threats within a defined defensive envelope. Like THAAD, it uses hit tokill technology. The interceptor itself becomes the weapon. Destruction occurs through direct kinetic collision at extraordinary closing speeds.

[00:13:53]American and Kuwaiti Patriot batteries function within a coordinated engagement framework. The May 28th interception of the Fateesh 110 was carried out by Kuwaiti air defenses. The subsequent debris damage, including $60 million in destroyed American drone assets, should not be viewed as a failure by the crew involved. Rather, it reflects the inherent challenge of intercepting a fastmoving ballistic missile at relatively low altitude directly above the location being defended. Reducing that risk requires pushing interceptions farther from the protected facility.

[00:14:23]That may involve relocating batteries or increasing reliance on upper tier systems capable of engaging earlier during flight. Each option introduces its own operational compromises and planners continue evaluating those trade-offs. The highest layer of the defensive network is THAAD, the terminal high altitude area defense system. The AAD can engage ballistic missiles both inside and outside the atmosphere at high altitude. Its interceptor represents one of the purest forms of kinetic defense technology currently fielded anywhere in the world. There is no explosive payload. There is no proximity detonation. The system relies on a metal kill vehicle approximately the size of a telephone pole traveling at Mach 8 and colliding directly with the incoming missile. Physics delivers the destructive effect. As the conflict intensified, the United States moved THAAD batteries from Indoacific Command in the European theaters into Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. This creates a broader strategic concern. The global inventory of Thompad batteries is limited. Every battery transferred into the Middle East becomes unavailable elsewhere. A battery deployed near the Persian Gulf is a battery not positioned in the Pacific.

[00:15:26]It is not covering South Korea. It is not contributing to defenses against a potential North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile launch. It is not reinforcing European allies monitoring the war in Ukraine. Military planners in Beijing are following these deployments closely. Each THAAD battery committed to the Middle East represents one fewer asset available in a potential Taiwan scenario. That strategic cost forms an important but often overlooked element of the current posture. Attention then shifts from defense to offense. If the ceasefire fully unravels, and statements emerging from Thran on June 2nd have not inspired confidence regarding its durability, the strike package intended for Iran's remaining missile infrastructure already exists. The plans are prepared, the missions have been assigned. The B2 Spirit stealth bomber remains the primary platform for attacking deeply buried targets. Its low observable design, combined with its ability to carry the GBU57 massive ordinance penetrator, makes it uniquely suited for hardened underground facilities. The GBU57 is a 30,000lb bunker busting weapon specifically engineered to destroy reinforced structures located deep below the surface. Among current United States aircraft, the B2 is the only platform capable of credibly threatening the deepest tunnel complexes within the Zagros Mountains. The bomber was employed earlier during the conflict.

[00:16:39]Should major combat operations resume, assessments from analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies suggest that surviving underground missile storage and launch facilities would become priority targets.

[00:16:50]Supporting that effort is the FI15E Strike Eagle. Its role complements rather than duplicates the B2 mission.

[00:16:58]The Strike Eagle can carry the GBU72, an advanced 5,000lb penetrator developed to reach underground targets beyond the capability of older munitions. The GBU72 was confirmed in combat use earlier in the conflict around the straight of Hormuz region.