In civil litigation, when parties fail to timely respond to Requests for Admission (RFAs) within the 30-day statutory period, those matters become conclusively established as admitted under OCGA 9-11-36(A)(2), and cannot be withdrawn or contradicted without a formal motion to withdraw. This principle means that missing procedural deadlines can have substantive consequences, as the admissions become dispositive of factual issues and may be fatal to claims. The court in this hearing ruled that the plaintiffs' failure to respond to RFAs about informed consent and independent contractor status meant those admissions remained valid, and the defendants were entitled to partial summary judgment on those issues.
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They're not hunting any. They're just enjoying the property for the Memorial Day weekend.
But I was I hadn't heard anything, so I imagined it was pretty hot cuz I was figuring I was going to get a This is ridiculous.
>> Morning, guys.
>> Hello again.
Y'all don't look like y'all have moved.
So, >> changed my tide, judge.
>> I'm not willing to to admit or deny that. That alone.
>> So, you'll see we have a number of uh additional boxes on here. Um I have um this late this week and into early next week are my um interns that are starting from I have undergrads from Georgia Tech. I have law students from Mercer. I have law students from Emory. Uh, and so that's who you see here, um, that are on here observing this proceeding. And so I'm really excited for them to get to see some good lawyering. And madam court reporter, I'm going to go ahead and call the case and put us on the record uh, formally. Uh, this is going to be a hearing on a motion for partial summary judgement in the matter of McCoy versus Nyall Women's Healthcare and WellStar North Fulton. The case number is 25 CV00005487.
I'll note for the record that this matter is taking place by video uh with everyone's consent. Um and with that we're here on um the hospital's motion. Um I am going to start before I hand it over to him with just general announcements. So uh for the court reporter's benefit and everyone's of who's here starting with council for the plaintiff.
>> Yes. Bonnie Nean on behalf of the plaintiffs.
>> Thank you, your honor. Alan our and Mattie Bell on behalf of Wellsar North Fulton.
>> Morning everyone. This is Eric FR. I'm here for ISIS Obstetrics and Gynecology LLC doing business as Nile Women's Healthcare.
>> Okay. Excellent. Thank you. Uh Mr. Orur, I believe it's your motion.
>> It is your honor.
>> Please proceed.
>> Thank you. May please the court. Um the overriding question here is what is the point of having deadlines if there's no consequence when you fail to meet them?
That's what we'll be addressing today.
Uh the consequences of plaintiff's repeated failures to meet lawful deadlines.
To be clear, we're not arguing about the actions of the nurses uh in in this motion. Um you know, if the nurses were employed, we haven't raised a summary judgement motion about that at this point. Um and so pliff's case isn't completely going away uh if the court were to grant this motion. But WellStar did not employ the doctors or the midwives and that's what this motion is about. They claimed that Dr. Dunson Allen, Dr. Yakris, Lynn Fischer breached the standard of care in their care and treatment of Miss McCoy during her labor and delivery. and and some of the language uh in count number two against WellStar, they also claimed that defendants uh breached their duties by failing to obtain informed consent um about the suspected congenital diaphragmatic hernia, the role of the non-nile providers. And so because of some of that language like defendants providers including but not limited to uh it's a little unclear whether the plaintiffs are alleging liability for WellStar for the actions of the Nile providers too. And so that's why we sent uh some of these requests for admission.
So, we asked him to admit that Miss McCoy signed the informed consent and request for vaginal delivery, that she opport had the opportunity to read it, that she did read it, that she signed it, uh that it had the statutory language from OCGA 5125.1, that some or all of the health care professionals performing services in this hospital are independent contractors and are not hospital agents or employees. Independent contractors are responsible for their own actions and the hospital shall not be liable for the acts or omissions of any such independent contractors. That's the statutory language and that language is quoted verbatim in the informed consent that she signed.
Uh we asked them to admit that midwife Cook, Dr. Chef, Dr. Frederick, Dr. Dunen Allen, Midwife Fischer, and Dr. Yakris.
I'm I'm I'm referring to them and we refer to them in our brief as the independent providers because that's a lot of names. Um, we asked them to admit that they were not employees of WellStar North full. We asked them to admit they were not actual agents of WellStar North full. Uh, because there's no apparent agency under the hospital liability statute any longer. Um, they we also asked them to admit they had no evidence of any of those factors that may be considered in the event of an unclear contract uh under 5125.1 G1. uh like reserving or exercising the right to control time, manner, and method. Uh belief that they were creating an agency or employment relationship. The party's belief uh no evidence that they had received employee benefits, that they directed their work step by step, terminable at will and without cause uh or that the hospital was required to withhold taxes. So that's what we asked them to admit and by operational >> not for nothing, Mr. or but why I mean setting aside the fact that there was no answer why in the world would they have any of that information right why why would I mean some of what you said yes admit you signed a form admit that you read the form um but admit the form says XYZ but now we're talking admit that these people never received employee benefits from this hospital why in the world would Miss McCoy have that information and and and if there's no reason to believe that there's a frame of reference for some of those uh types of questions is it legal legally or factually proper for the court to uh penalize or charge Miss McCoy for admitting something that in truth had she timely responded, she has no frame of reference to answer the question in the first instance.
>> Well, your honor, two two responses to that. Number one, uh asking for those legal conclusions is perfectly permissible under Georgia law so long as they relate to the facts of the case. Uh plants also sent discovery uh they sent discovery with their first their original complaint. They asked for three requests for production of documents.
They asked for the hospital hospital records. They asked for the billing records. Um and and one other thing I can't remember at this time. Um they absolutely had the opportunity to ask for this information. They didn't. Um and so that's their choice. uh had they wanted to send those requests for production, had they wanted to send those interrogatories, they absolutely had the opportunity to do so. Um but then they completely failed to participate in our discovery. Um and so that's why we ask these questions to say, well, what do you have? What you're making all these allegations in your complaint that these independent providers um were our employees, were our actual agents. They're alleging that they were our apparent agents. we have the right to investigate that. We have the right to ask what evidence do you have to support that claim.
>> And and to that end, back just a moment ago, um about the issue of agency versus apparent agency, right? So, um I mean, I would assume certainly that Ms. McCoy's argument is going to be some variation of even if I signed the form, the form says some or all. So, I don't really know who. Um, and these were all people that were capable of making decisions about my health care and directing others to take actions about my health care. So why doesn't why does even admitting these people didn't work for the hospital, why does that negate um the idea or the possibility of a parent agency or a parent authority on the on the part of these individuals?
>> It's the statute that negates it, right?
because it's in 5125.1b.
Uh it says notwithstanding the provisions of section 5125, no hospital which complies with the notice provisions uh that they have in there >> in your consent form. Right.
>> Right. Uh or or posting a notice uh in a conspicuous place uh shall be liable for the acts or emissions of health care professionals unless there exists an actual agency or employment relationship.
apparent agency, plaintiff's belief, plaintiff's reliance has nothing to do with it anymore.
And that's since 2005. Uh that's since the enactment of this statute, which we mentioned in our brief. Um so whatever the plaintiff believed, it's governed by the contracts, right? It's governed by the relationship that the independent providers and the hospital had, not by what the plaintiff believed. The point which we pointed out in the preamble was to change that law. Um it was it was to clarify this is governed by what the actual contracts say. Um not what the plaintiff believe. That's the old law. That's the law that plaintiffs relied upon uh in in their uh response to the uh dispute of material facts. um that those were all cases from before 2005 before the general assembly changed this law uh to eliminate a parent agency to eliminate what the plaintiff believes or not because if that's the standard uh which is the problem that they were running into. If that's the standard then everybody who comes into hospital just may automatically assume they work for the hospital. Well, that's not reasonable. That's you know they may not uh have coverage. They they probably don't work for the hospital. Um and so we have to respect those corporate forms. Uh we have to respect the fact that Nile that Providence who has that call coverage arrangement with Nile, they have their own businesses.
And so that's why they've taken out what the pliff relied upon. Um and so we sent these RFAS asking them, you know, hey, show us what you got. Admit that you have something or if or if or if you do have something, deny it and tell us what you have. Um, so we sent them on January 16th. Uh, 30 days in the 3-day rule came and went. February 18th, uh, no response. At that very moment, these all stood admitted. A month later, Mr. Fish followed up saying, "Hey, we got outstanding discovery. Planners said they'd respond by March 19th." They did not. On April 6th, we filed this motion.
Only after that, 82 days after the RFAS were submitted, did plaintist file late responses to the RFAS, >> which there has have never been accompanied by a motion to withdraw deemed admissions. So >> that's correct, your honor. And OCGA 91136A2 is very clear. Each matter is admitted unless responded to or objected within 30 days. um it's conclusively established under subsection B unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admissions. So all of them are conclusively established and they can't withdraw it unless they file a formal motion. That's the citation we mentioned in our brief, the Adawumi versus Amelia Grove case. It holds that matters deemed admitted are solemn admissions conclusive and cannot be contradicted by other evidence and with withdrawn on formal motion. Plants didn't file a formal motion here. They filed a response brief to our partial motion which was late filed just like their RFA responses.
>> Now, the response motion I I don't necessarily need I don't think we have to get down too far into the weeds of the timeliness of that motion and whether it matters for the court to review it. That's because that's one of those, as we discussed yesterday, where, you know, you've got two rules that are routinely applied, but then you it gets a little squishy when it gets into a particular area. And this being that even if the court were to ignore her response brief because it was untimely filed, the parties requested a hearing, we're at a hearing. And so, Miss Naven can essentially argue all those things under rule 56 uh and still present all those arguments. And so I don't know that we have to get too far down to the weeds other than the fact that yes, the court is aware that that response brief was filed well after the time for it to be filed. Um but here we are.
>> Yes, here we are. And and and your honor is absolutely right. They can make all the arguments they want. They just can't present any evidence.
Uh and so and that's very clear under Georgia law whether it be a total failure to respond to the motion for summary judgement or a late filed response to the motion for summary judgement. That's Sherman versus Thomas Lane American Legion Post 597 uh 330 Georgia A 618 from 2015. If the non-movement chooses to respond, unless otherwise ordered by the trial court, which there's no order here, any response has to be filed and served not later than 30 days. And in that case, plaintiffs filed a response brief that was more than 30 days after the motion. Trial court exercises discretion said you wave the right to present evidence. You wave the right to present evidence in opposition to the motion even though you filed a response brief, but it was late. Uh so we request that the court exercise that same discretion here uh and hold that plaintiffs are not allowed to present evidence in opposition to the motion.
You can make the argument um we still have to prove your honor that we are entitled to summary judgement.
Absolutely. Um and we believe we've done that because the admissions are still admitted to this day.
Now, plaintiffs have informally asked to withdraw those admissions. Um, again, not a formal withdrawal because they eventually responded and said, "Look, your honor, we we're demonstrating an intent to withdraw these admissions.
We're demonstrating an intent to contradict the motion." So, and and we know we filed it late, but but no harm, no foul, right? Um, but that would eviscerate the purpose behind lawfully imposed deadlines. Again, what's the point of having them if there's no consequence for missing them? Um but even if the court were to consider those arguments that they've raised um the the the plaintiffs would have to show that the presentation of the merits would be subserved by the withdrawal and and just wanting a trial just saying well it goes to the merits it goes to the ultimate question that's not enough that's not enough uh there really only argument is that Georgia law prefers resolution on the merits and the admissions go to the liability issues but they don't have any evidence and they're prohibited from presenting evidence in opposition to the motion.
What do they point to? They reference the RFAS themselves saying that they call for conclusions of law. That's perfectly permissible under the Adawumi case. U they ask about the employment relationships between the parties, the fact witnesses, what their involvement was. They relate to the facts of the case. They referenced their late filed responses, but this court should not consider those because they were filed so far out of time and there was no withdrawal motion to withdraw the admissions. They reference their pleading. Pleadings are not evidence.
They say we allege we dispute uh we we're you know we're contradicting that uh things were just you know were reasonably explained to them uh plants justifiably relied on them. Well, that's not the standard anymore. For 21 years, that's not the standard anymore. Um, and so what's the only evidence that they have submitted? Well, it's the informed consent form that she signed, which shows uh that she had the opportunity to read it. It explained all of the things that are required to be explained under the informed medical consent statute.
Um, so and and to argue that that WellStar isn't prejudiced by these delays uh is is untrue. I mean, we've had delays in figuring out who Bennett Golden has treated with. We've had delays in trying to get medical records.
We've had to spend time, money, and resources on getting plants to try to follow the law. We've had delays in evaluating the case. And so because they failed to respond to those RFAS, failed to file a formal motion to withdraw, responded late to the partial motion, none of their argument should be considered uh since there's no evidence and there's no contradicting the RFAS.
That's the first part. The second part is yes, we still have to prove we're entitled to summary judgement on those claims uh based on those admissions. So we got the informed consent and we got the indep independent contractor statute.
The Georgia informed consent statute 3196.1 patients have to be informed in general terms uh of the following specific items. diagnosis of the condition, nature and purpose of the procedure, material risks, likelihood of success and prognosis, practical alternatives, the consent form that she signed, and nobody's disputing that she signed it, >> right? And and that was actually that was actually going to be my question because I mean, you went through the request for admission, but regardless of those admissions, right? Uh nobody is arguing that I don't understand um Ms. McCoy to be arguing that she didn't sign the form. I do understand the argument to be that there might that the record could develop evidence, right? Whether it's here or not, I know is a is a different issue, but that the record could develop evidence um about the fact that uh maybe Ms. McCoy didn't understand what she was signing, that it wasn't that it was consent, but maybe not informed.
>> Well, and that's the problem with failing to respond to RFAS. they're conclusively established and plaintiffs are prohibited from presenting ar evidence against it. Um >> I guess that's that's my question is is your perception uh of the scope of the admission that was made that it covers the entire universe not just it was signed. I had time to read it. Um but but this I mean I think Ms. Naven some of the briefing I think was you know that under the circumstances active labor blah blah right and I don't mean that to be dismissive when I say that um but you know that that that is um that I guess here's my question you have in your briefing you point specifically to two requests for admission um that are specifically um whether or not certain providers worked for or admit that they did not work for uh WellStar, North Fulton, and admit that certain providers are independent contractors. Um a and I I think that the providers are independent contractors is really admit that you sign this part of the form that says this language. Uh and I guess my question is to your second point about the structure of your argument that let's assume the admissions are admitted and they stay admitted. Um, does the nature of those admissions cover all aspects of the um, factual basis that you would need to demonstrate is not disputed to get a partial summary judgement on the issue of vicarious liability and informed consent. And informed consent is the one I'm the most interested in, just to be clear.
>> Yes, your honor, it does. Um because by admitting she had the opportunity to read and did read and did sign the informed consent form um what what Miss Naven is pointing to is the second part about the independent contractor liability. But we got to look at the first page too uh which goes through each and every one of the Georgia informed consent uh advice that they have to give. It give goes through every single one of those factors. Diagnosis of this procedure is pregnancy. Nature of the procedure is delivery of the infant infant through the birth canal.
Possible use of forceps or vacuum. Uh possible aesiottomy.
The purpose is to deliver the infant. Uh I understand and acknowledge uh the risks associated here and the likelihood of this uh above success of the above procedure is good. It goes through every single one of those factors.
Now, we we we all know that that that physicians and mid-levels, not nurses, are the ones who have to explain the risks and benefits of the procedure.
Okay? U nurses can't do that. Uh because it's what a reasonable physician would consider to be a risk under the circumstances. Nurses aren't trained.
It's totally different. Totally different training. Um of course, yes, there is a uh there is a collaborative effort in caring for the patient. Uh but nurses can't can't give those risks and benefits. Um but the informed consent form itself says the following has been I understand all of these risks, benefits, alternatives. Um you know I've been given ample opportunity to ask questions. Any questions I've asked have uh any questions I have asked have seem answered or explained in a satisfactory manner. she signed this um and and so that is the presumption under Georgia law.
Uh and she's admitted she signed it. Uh and so therefore we'd argue yes, we have met all of the factors uh required to be considered for the Georgia informed consent as it pertains to the hospital.
Um and so then then the question becomes yes, what about the independent provider uh statute under 5125.1?
Um again, she signed the form. The statutory language is verbatim. Uh she's admitted that they're not employees or actual agents. There's no more apparent agency. There's no more justifiable reliance as it relates to the hospital.
And so for those reasons, uh, we'd argue yes, since she did sign this again, uh, and admitted there's no employment or actual agency. Uh, therefore, those claims for vicarious liability on the part of the independent providers must fail. Um, and so for those reasons, we'd ask the court grant our motion for judgment.
>> Okay. Thank you, Mr. Orur. Miss Naven, before you start, if I could impose on you, I I'm going to go get another cup of coffee and I will come back and you will have my undivided attention. And and just so you understand, Mr. Orur, Mr. Fr, I don't think has a dog in this fight, but um so I didn't expect I would hear from him. Um unless he wishes to to add in, but ultimately, Mr. Or, it is your motion. And so I will I'm always going to let you have the last word as the movement. So you will have an opportunity um for a rebuttal once uh Miss Naven goes and Mr. fresh adds his two cents if he'd like to. So, >> thank you.
>> Your your honor, um, I'd rather sit here and look stupid than open up my mouth and prove it to be true.
>> That is such a great quote that I try to remind myself of all the time.
>> I will remain silent.
>> Excellent. Thank you, Mr. Fresh. So, I'm just take a quick two-minute break to grab some more coffee and I'll be right back with you. Thank you.
Council, I'm freezing up just a tiny bit here and there, so I'm going to leave my camera off, but I am here. Just want to let you know. Okay. Sometimes leaving it up helps.
Madam court recorder, are you ready?
>> Yes, ma'am. I'm ready. Um, I'm going to leave my camera off if that's okay. My freezing up just a little bit. Sometimes that helps.
>> Not a problem at all. Just wanted to make sure we didn't start talking without you being ready. So, >> yes, ma'am. I'm ready to go.
>> Thank you, Miss Naven.
>> Great. Thank you, your honor. Um, I'm going to operate under the assumption or the belief that even if these requests for emissions are admitted, what does it mean under the motion for summary judgement with any genuine issue of material facts? First and foremost, the plaintiffs did request depositions of the defendants. We were told, "No, we want to do the plaintiffs first." It's totally fine. It's usually the way it goes. Um, they were offered depositions of the plaintiffs uh in April, May dates. They didn't set them, they didn't coordinate them, they didn't get them done. Um, and so I would take the position that this would be premature because there is discovery pending and it was requested and that is information that goes to the material issues here.
We should have a full and fair opportunity to to complete that as to the relevant issues. However, looking at the request for admissions and what they're relying upon, your question to council was correct. What does it mean if they admit it? What what does that just end the case? Because it's admitted and end of conversation. Well, under the request for admissions, each request must be separately stated here. They were comingled, lumped together. Are these eight physicians and nurse midwives and all these people, employees, what have you. And you're right. What information would we have?
which is why we we requested the depositions to obtain that information and fully anticipated those to take place after the plaintiffs were deposed as requested.
Looking at the evidence, they say, "Well, they don't have any evidence here." But we do because their request for admission they want you to rely upon goes to the informed consent form. Okay? So you have to have the ability to look at the informed consent form and see the content of it. So the reality of it is we pled in the complaint paragraph 36 that we did sign the consent form. Um that was and and the date and the time that it was it was signed. It was signed. The issue becomes the consent at full dilation of pregnancy. She can't leave. She can't. When they presented this consent form to her, this was a contract of adhesion. It didn't matter if she said, "Well, I don't want to do this." They she couldn't leave there.
Okay? They didn't present this consent form at her about 11:00 at night. Uh when she came there, they waited until she was fully dilated and then said, "Oh, by the way, number two, it's not even >> But I mean, but by that logic, no emergency room would ever be able to get informed consent from anyone ever, right? because hey, my arm's broken and the only way I can get you to treat my broken arm is by signing this form. But since it was emergent, then it doesn't really count and I can undo it later.
>> But it wasn't emerent when she walked in. She was only she wasn't in full labor. She was in the in the start of labor. She could have gone to any other hospital at that point. They admitted her. And so this is a difference between emergency room. I I don't want to get too far down into the weeds of the facts because I don't think we're here about the facts, but generally speaking, people who are under the care of a of an OB/GYN who are pregnant, um they know where they're going to go based on the direction of their physician or their provider.
And so I guess my point is again, I don't want to get down too far into the weeds, but did Miss McCoy know she was going to this hospital and was going to receive her, you know, birthing care at this hospital under the >> presented. She presented to this hospital as planned. She was admitted >> into the hospital by midnight. Admitted, not in the emergency room, but admitted.
>> The difference here is number one, you don't even have a form signed by a physician. This physician never even signed the form and informed consent is obtained through the and there's rebuttable presumptions and what have you. It's given late not signed by the physician. They say that she should have known by the comment at 15 that some are all healthc care professionals or independent contractors. She didn't put the name Frederick in there. Um that was done by presumably the hospital. And why didn't they write then? Okay, Dr. Frederick's an independent contractor.
What have you? They didn't put that there. Okay. So, and it wasn't signed by the physician whatsoever. So, they're the ones that put this in. They could have said right then and there, Frederick independent contractor, Yakris, independent contractor. Um, but it is has the sum or all of um I don't believe in the um aspect of the informed consent that just because there's a signature there, it ends. It's the end all beall. She admitted, "I signed it.
We put it in our complaint. That was not a hidden secret. We signed the the informed consent."
>> Right. But Mr. Our pointed out, that's what one of the reasons I asked in that question is that it's not the admissions aren't just that she signed it. The admissions are admit that you had a chance to read it, that you did read it, and that you did sign it. And that's different than just I signed the form.
I think the answer is admit that I had the opportunity to read the informed consent and of course it you know yes I mean she's there what have you deny and she denied it whether you accept that as being an admission or or what have you it still gives a rebuttable presumption as it relates to the facts and circumstances around how it was obtained. It still allows us to have that argument as to whether or not these disclosures were misleading or inadequate. Um, it still gives us the opportunity for her to know as far as it's not clear-cut. It says some or all of it. You know, at that moment that they gave her the form that morning, the hospital had to know he wasn't an employee. It didn't have to be some or all of. She was handed two different consent forms for two different hot two different uh providers.
>> Is there some case law that you can point me to that that says there's an obligation on the part of the hospital provider to when obtaining informed consent under 5125.1. And I know I'm being very particular and I wouldn't expect it to be that particular, but is there some case law you can point me to um that under the independent provider statute that each independ indiv excuse me that each independent provider has to be specifically individually identified to a patient so that they can then consent that they understand and acknowledge that that person is an independent contractor.
>> Um I don't have that here at this moment. Um, I also believed that I've been allowed to take depositions that have been requested of these doctors to learn their employment status or or how they were uh there at the hospital and as well as um and I certainly can supplement that to to you your honor to see if there is a specific case that goes directly to drilling it down to that level. Um, but I believe that um, with regard to the presentation and the time of the consent form, I do believe is a genuine issue of material fact to this case. Um, you know, at this point, you know, she can't walk away.
She's she's got to accept that consent form hook, line, and sinker. That there's no question about it. And then of course the question is going to be whether or not she knew that these folks were independent or not as it relates to all of the people that were listed in the informed consent.
>> The reason I asked the question about that is that I I abs I mean I think you heard me ask Mr. Our a question. I certainly understand this argument you're making that even if it is admitted that she signed the form and that she had an opportunity to read the form um that the the consent that was actually provided in the form is does not satisfy the requirements of Georgia law and Mr. or has said, "Yes, it does."
Right. It literally restates the statute verbatim. Why would that not minimally satisfy? Because I I think what I understand you to be arguing, Miss Naven, is we don't think they were admitted, right? We think you should allow us to substitute in our um substantive responses. But even if they're admitted, that consent is not sufficient. And how can it not be sufficient if it tracks the language of the statute verbatim?
because the the statute allows for and we can certainly supplement for the court the rebuttable presumptions that were permitted to raise to that actual um consent form if you will. Um it it and and I believe um with regard to how the consent and the evidence showing the consent and I can supply it. I believe the best probable case that I had found was the Tutin case which was the 238 Georgia app 350 of 1999. um talking about re rebuttable presumptions and creating a rebuttable presumption and showing evidence that the consent was not an informed consent.
>> But what of Mr. Orur's uh point that the statute was amended in 2005 and so cases prior to the amendment wouldn't necessarily carry with it particularly persuasive value. Well, then you can look at the Thirstston case. Um, actually it's Roberts versus Connell in 2011.
And with regard to that, it still goes to the um informed consent and the rebuttal presumption and how was it obtained? And understand, I'm not saying that at some point after we do our depositions and they do their depositions that this issue may not reappear, right? because we have we have the opportunity for that discovery. Um but in those instances you would have the right for the rebuttable presumption and I do believe that the that a large you know issue of material fact here comes to the timing of the consent form because you want to rely on it but it's 12 hours after she's been there in a now an emergency because at this point she's fully dilated and can't leave and then it's not even signed or given to her by a physician. There's no physician signature here. There's no acknowledgement that the physician had any conversations with her or anything of the sort. Um, and you just heard Mr. Or say, only a physician can obtain informed consent. Um, and so once I take the deposition of the physician and ask where were you at 9:33 when this consent form was put together and presented to my client, you know, where were you? You did you give her this? Did you tell her you're an independent contractor? or whatever, but it none of that is here.
And it says here, I have discussed and answered the patient um or legal guardians related to the proposed procedure along with potential benefits, risks, and side effects. Well, that's not signed by a physician or dated. So, you're relying on a form that I believe has a rebuttable presumption. It doesn't even have the patient's name filled out on the top or her date of birth. Um, but I would argue that, you know, the plates's on the bottom. So, one could say it's one and the same, but this is a handwritten form that would have been presented to her without the plate and would have been scanned into the into the computer. Again, things that need to be talked about. So, I believe, your honor, that as it relates to the informed consent and the notice of the informed consent that it's premature, there are genuine issues of material fact. I should be permitted to have the depositions that I requested that they told me I could have after my plaintiffs are deposed. No problem. I've given them dates for my plaintiff to be deposed for multiple dates. They haven't secured them yet. Um and I believe that that would be enough for the court to either continue um this motion for summary judgement to another date until the discovery is done or deny it outright. in that regard.
>> And I So, Miss Naven, I I understand your argument. Um I think what I want to circle back to is sort of the inverse of what I asked Mr. Orur, right? I asked Mr. Ore, okay, let's assume the admissions are admitted. Do you have everything you need from those admissions to get you to demonstrate all of the elements that are necessary to prove um that there is no cause of action or liability here for either vicarious liability or that there was informed consent etc. And I guess my question to you is ex is the same in reverse. I hear you saying, "Well, I want to take depositions and I think I'll be able to do this, that, and the other." But if if the plaintiff has admitted that, let's assume, right, that if the plaintiff has admitted that she signed the form, um, and has admitted that she had an opportunity to read the form, um, what what evidence in the face of that kind of admission would you obtain through those depositions that would negate those adm That's the part I'm not quite understanding.
>> And I think the negate to it is I may have read it, but I number one, what condition was I in when I read it? What did I understand and appreciate um with regard to that consent form? I didn't I didn't get an opportunity to sit with the doctor and go over it. I may have signed it saying, "Hey, I'm ready to talk to the doctor now. Where's my doctor? He's not here. He'd ever show up."
>> Doesn't M. McCoy know that?
>> No. What?
>> I mean, Ms. McCoy was presumably there when these forms were presented to her.
She admits that she signed it. I mean, it sounds to me like that information is largely within your purview, right? It's it's in the control of your client.
>> Some of which it is and some is is in the um nurse who witnessed the consent form because she's a a employee of the hospital to take her deposition. You know, where were you where did you present this form? Was Dr. You know who Dr. Frederick there? Who put Dr. Frederick's name? Did you tell her he was an independent contractor? Did you tell her any of these things? Did you go over any of that with her? I don't know.
Maybe the nurse is going to say, "Yeah, I told her this." But, um, again, the form is complete. It's a contract. It's complete when the doctor signs it. He's got a sign saying, "I did all this with her." And I believe that that in and of itself is enough for me to get over the hump of the potential of the genuine issue material fact as it pertains to the rebuttable presumption as to what is in that and whether it she understood and appreciated it went to this group of doctors. Well, specifically Dr. Frederick because he's the only one on there. Um you would argue the second one which would be Yakris who's who's on there is is the nurse midwife. they not a doctor. Um, as it relates to them and as it relates to whether she knew I can't sue these people because they're independent contracts. It says some or all of them. So, at that point, >> I mean, I I I may not love that structure either, but that is the structure that's allowed, right? I mean, whether we like it or not, there are when you go to the emergency room these giant signs that say the people you're dealing with might be independent contractors and we aren't responsible for what they do. Um, >> but but it doesn't change the rebuttable presumption. It doesn't change the rebuttable presumption of did the doctor actually give the informed consent? Was he actually there at 9:33 or shortly thereafter? This baby wasn't born until the evening. So, you know, was he there?
Did he do this informed consent with her? Um, because that's what they're relying on, you know, that that the doctor did this informed consent with her, not just the document itself. And that is the revotable presumption. Now, he may go come in a deposition and say, "You know what, Miss Haven, I was there.
Here's evidence I was there, and I forgot to sign the form. We'll deal with that." But I do believe that under the way that the law works and under the rebuttable presumption, which is allowed, I would have the opportunity to explore that further before it became a a summary judgement issue. You know, fine if Go ahead.
>> That's okay, Miss Nav. So, let me ask you, I I hear you saying I need more discovery to be able to respond. What I don't see in the record is a rule 56F motion, right? Or a a and the reason typically that I that I look for and see those types of rule 56F motions is that it specifically provides the court with this is the discovery that I need to do and this is the information that I would develop. But often times it also as a it is oftentimes also accompanied by I guess what I'm struggling with is your own client has knowledge that you could have generated in the form of an affidavit or and that's that's what I'm also struggling with a little bit in terms of a substantive response to the discovery and and and if there is one attached to your response and I overlooked it I apologize but usually they get filed in separately into the record as opposed to as an exhibit.
No, your honor, the the in that sense, we let them know very much so that she was available for the deposition because it's obviously not going to just be one question. The other option, the court has the right to allow us to submit an affidavit if that or to allow the deposition to go forward of my client and me of Dr. Frederick and then come back and revisit this.
>> Okay.
Anything else? Uh, Miss Naven, >> I I would rely on our papers as it relates to that and as it relates to um the informed consent and the rebuttable presumption and also with respect to the request for admissions, the ones that they are relying on as it relates to all these physicians and doctors are all lumped together versus sending them separately one after the other after the other. You know, doctor this, doctor that, nurse, midwife this, they just jumped them all together. And um even if they're admitted, they're admitted in a way that the admissions are are lumped together for us to, you know, put the whole kitchen sink in. And I believe the more appropriate thing would be would if they um that we they're not deemed admitted that they have an opportunity to um re send those separate to each provider so that we can answer specifically to each of the providers that were contained um in their request.
Okay, thank you. Mr. Fresh, still observing your right to remain silent?
>> Not really, Judge. Sorry. Um I I I'm I'm trying here, but um we keep using the term informed consent, and that is a statutory issue in Georgia, strictly limited by the Georgia Supreme Court to certain surgical procedures done under certain types of anesthesia and re and radiological procedures done with die only. And the Georgia Supreme Court has clearly said that informed consent has nothing to do with general presentations to for routine procedures like this. So I maybe it's just a misuse of the term, but what we're talking about is consent, not the statutory informed consent. And I do not want to spend the next 18 months litigating that issue. Mhm.
>> You're right to point out the distinction. No problem.
>> Well, and I just would point out the distinction. The form says informed consent.
>> Hang on. Hang on. Okay. First of all, y'all talk to me, not each other.
>> Um, but but also I I think that's one of those times where a legal term of art that has a specific meaning runs into the natural logical meanings of those words. Um, and and I don't disagree with you that the form says informed consent and that the purpose of the form is to seek the informed consent of that patient for what their health care they're about to receive and from whom they're about to receive it. That's not the use of that phrase doesn't automatically bring it into the purview of something that it is not. So thank you Mr. Fresh. Mr. Orur, your rebuttal, sir.
>> Yes. Thank you, your honor. Um, so kind of addressing things in in backwards order just as I was taking notes. Um, Miss Daven has talked about the fact that the RFAS were all jumbled together uh and and compound. Well, there was no objection file. There wasn't anything filed. And even in the responses that they >> Let me say who's in trouble. I've read the request for admission and I didn't think that they were overly inclusive or ambiguous. I thought they were capable of being fairly admitted or denied. Go ahead.
>> I appreciate that, your honor. And and even in the responses that they submitted late, they didn't file objections on those grounds. Um, Miss Nathan talked also about uh having the opportunity to submit affidavit.
Georgia law is very clear. You have to submit any affidavit before the day of the hearing.
You can't do that afterwards. Um, yes, Miss Naven has offered dates for uh her her her clients. um has requested deposition dates, but as she said, uh she's offered depos she's requested depositions and offered deposition dates in April and May. When did that occur?
After we filed the motion.
All of this is being precipitated by the fact that she's now trying to uh do things that she should have done before this motion was filed um many many months ago. She's trying to argue a standard that isn't real. Nothing in Georgia law uh and and Miss Damon admitted she doesn't have any any case law. Uh says that you have to list out every single provider who might treat um in the informed consent. Call coverage arrangements are very common.
Uh they're they're in the prenatal records from Nile Witz. Miss McCoy has those records. She has the call coverage arrangement. Um there's also no standard in Georgia law that says you got to get the informed consent uh the the the minute that she hits the door. As your honor pointed out, that would eliminate pretty much every single emergency situation. Um, as Miss Daven pointed out, the consent form was signed at 9:33. Uh, this child wasn't born for many, many hours later. Uh, so it's it it's a false equivalency to say, oh, she's, you know, signing it on the operating room table or something like that. That's not what happened here. Um, we also discussed the request for admissions in the context of that she had the opportunity to read and she signed. Um, but that's not all. Um, request for admission number three says she had the opportunity to read the informed consent. Request number four says she did read the informed consent.
So, not only did she have the opportunity, she did read it and then signed it.
>> To that end, Mr. Orur, um, what about Miss I mean, Miss Naven's focus is on the revotable presumption that is created by those admissions. Um, but I think I understand her argument to be that even if the admissions remain admitted or not substituted for some denials or qualifications of those responses, um, that given the relatively early stage of discovery that we're in, she could develop evidence that could rebut the presumption that is created by those admissions. What What of your thoughts, sir?
The response to that is she's prohibited from presenting argument against it.
She's filed a late response to the motion for summary judgement. The the time's already passed to do that. She can't present evidence in opposition to the motion. She can argue, but she can't present evidence. She's disallowed from doing that. Um, and so there haven't been any affidavit.
She absolutely had the opportunity to get an affidavit from Miss McCoy saying, "Hey, Dr. Frederick wasn't there. Hey, Dr. Frederick didn't explain these things. Hey, nobody explained these things to me. She didn't she didn't submit any affidavit in response to the motion. All she is doing is resting on the allegations and the pleading and that's not evidence.
Um and so there's there's a there's also sort of a symbiotic relationship, right, between that informed consent and the independent provider statute. Um because because the doctors are the ones that have to explain um and and give the risk benefits alternatives. Well, because we've met the language of the statute, what the general assembly says we have to do, we can't be held liable for any actions of the independent providers.
Um, and so there's where that there's where that sort of uh interweaving of those two principles comes into play.
Um, and so Miss Damon continues to argue again that you know what what the the things that she might uncover in the deposition. Well, what did what did Miss McCoy know? What did she believe? Right.
And again, it's employment or actual agency. It's not a parent agency. Um, and so we we do believe that because she had the opportunity to read, did read, did sign, uh, and because the informed consent form, it says, "I had the opportunity, uh, to ask questions, any questions asked. Uh, we're given satisfactory answers. I read and and I understand the risk, benefits, alternatives of laboring in a hospital, delivering in a hospital. We do believe that she with that that uh Wellstorm North or Fulton um has has complied for any informed consent uh claims that the plaintiffs may raise. Uh and those would have to be brought under what the independent provider did. uh whether you're talking about the statute or or general informed consent law, either one. Um and so for those reasons, we'd ask the court grant our motion.
>> Okay. Uh one last set of questions I have for you, Mr. or and this really has to do with the logistics of the case and what um because although I I will say I mean I have I have pointed out right we we have we have admissions that were not responded to we have a summary judgement motion that was not responded to uh we have an effort at the hearing to argue hey I can develop evidence and what what is really a rule 566F motion though not presented formally in that way. Um but logistically what I'm trying to figure out is let's say I accept your invitation, right? And say you're right, the admissions are deemed admitted. Um there's no taking them back because there's no motion to take them back at this point. Um and even if there was at this point the court, you know, let's say I tell you the court is not inclined to allow the substitution with substantive responses. Um I mean I think Ms. Naven's most impactful point here is the practical reality of the ongoing discovery in this case. Right? And so if I accept your invitation, presumably those parties would be no longer in the case. Is that is that right? Or would they still be in the case, but the nature of the claims against them would be limited?
>> That that's right, your honor. The parties would still be in the case. Miss N.
>> The hospital's still in, but it's going to be focused on the nurses. Yes, >> and the logistics of what I'm trying to figure out is that doesn't mean we're just going to stop talking about the doctors and what they did because for any jury to factually understand uh what went down here and make a decision about whether the doctors or the hospital were negligent in any manner, they're going to have to look at the entire picture. And so, how does that play out? And why or why does that not matter to the court's decision today?
>> Sure. Of course. Um so, you're right.
It's not taking parties away. It's not saying WellStar is getting out of the case altogether. Uh Miss Naven's claims uh for now against the hospital for vicarious liability of any nurses that were actual agents or employees um still survive. We're going to litigate that.
Uh Mr. Fresh's clients are still in the case. Um we're going to litigate that.
Uh the the real question is okay well when we're taking all of these depositions, right? um we have to know what claims are being pursued against what entities, >> right? And so the the whole point here is to say, look, Miss Haven and and and Miss McCoy uh and Mr. McCoy, their claims for uh vicarious liability of the doctors, the independent providers, the midwives, they're not against WellStar.
Now, that's not saying that those claims don't survive against the code of elements. Yes, we're still going to talk about them. Um, but claim definition uh and and what claims are appropriate as to what parties is really what we're here about today.
>> Understood. Thank you, Mr. Orur.
>> May I just um provide a small response to two issues? Small issues.
>> As long as you understand that Mr. or is still going to get the last word if he >> 100% 100%. I don't want to take that from him.
>> Go ahead, Miss David.
>> First of all, the depositions were requested in February. They requested the depositions of my clients. They said, "Yours go first." They requested it March 12th, long before the motion was filed, March 12th. And their words were, "Please give us dates for late April or early May."
And that was >> Well, to be fair, Miss Naven, I My issue is not that you haven't conducted discovery.
>> No, no, I understand. My issue is there's a way there is a format and a procedure under Georgia law to say they filed a summary judgement motion and I am not able to respond to it because I need X Y and Z discovery and that didn't happen here. I hear you saying a lot of those things.
>> I understand.
>> But that didn't actually happen here.
>> And I understand. And going back to the informed consent and the reason why it is informed consent under the statute and the reason why there is a rebuttable presumption and the reason why this has to be is because this the informed consent under the Georgia statute includes spinal anesthesia, which this informed consent says can happen with a C-section. So, they have to have this this informed consent form with the spinal anesthesia because that's what they're asking here for. It's not just here's vaginal delivery. It's it's talking about the need for the C-section, the anesthesia. So, this is not just that's what we're saying.
there's more to this discussion with the doctor about what this form is, what it's uh allowed for and under the statute because it encompasses a surgical C-section and um the intratheal you know anesthesia which is part of the patient's record that is spinal anesthesia for which an informed consent under the statute has to happen and has we get the right for the rebuttable presumption. So that was I'm just trying to explain there's far more information here that has to be talked over with the physician and what information he provided and he would have to do that that informed consent because that's what they're asking for under this consent form. I just wanted to add that just to make sure that was there. So >> understood. Thank you, Miss Naven.
>> Thank you.
Um >> and and she can continue to argue that your honor, just not against WellStar, >> right?
Okay. So, here is I think where we where we end up where we end up is that the there were not timely responses to the admissions. Um and even now, um months, not months, let's say the responses would have been due in February and we're sitting here now almost in June.
Um there is not a motion to withdraw those admissions. Um and under those circumstances, I don't think there's any basis for the court to say anything other than that the requests for admission were deemed admitted by operation of OCG 91137 and they remain admitted. Um and so to the extent that there's an effort to contest those factual issues and some of the legal conclusions um and I'm not saying some of them would be or some of them wouldn't be Mr. or by saying that. It's just that you know at the end of the day if the sometimes the legal conclusions can be an overreach and I'm not reaching that issue today. I'm just saying that as it stands right now, the requests for admission um are I I did not find them to be objectionable or incapable of a response. Um and so because of that, by operation of law, they are deemed admitted. And so the only issue that I still want to sit with a bit is to figure out if the full import I mean as I sit here now it seems to me that Mr. War's client is probably right and that the admissions factually when uncontested are fatal to the argument that Wellstar North Fulton could be liable for vicariously liable for the actions of these independent contractors um about whom informed consent was obtained excuse me about whom consent was obtained um that the and understanding that they are independent contractors or that you know independent contractors would be providing care. And so the only piece of it that I want to look at um a bit more is to make sure well let me let me finish. I will also point out as I think I have that there is a procedure by which the plaintiff could have said I don't have what I need and that didn't happen here either. And so, uh, I don't know that the the argument that there's more discovery that needs to be had, um, changes the outcome if the admissions are deemed admitted. Um, and they are.
And so, what I do want to spend some time with is to look a little more closely at the practical and legal effect of admissions like this.
that are dispositive on a theory of recovery. Um, and whether or not they full that whether or not one they are fully dispositive of that issue, I think my my inclination just in the interest of full disclosure is that they are um but I want to look at that issue and make sure I'm comfortable with that before I enter an order.
And then two, I I do think we have to meaningfully think going forward about what that means for the case in terms of discovery issues and other things. Um, I also do want to point out I think the operative scheduling order that you guys have that's in effect currently is the one from January the 30th of this year and it has your discovery period ending in January of 27.
um and looking at potentially a trial in June of 2027 based on those dates. I mention that only because there's obviously a lot of discovery for y'all left to continue uh including um expert designations and other things like that.
Um so here's what I'm going to ask for.
U Mr. or can you please provide me with a proposed order uh that that grants your partial summary judgement?
Um because as I said, my ruling is there there's no order I'm going to enter that doesn't say that the requests for admission are admitted. Um, and what I really want, and this would be helpful, and this is why Miss Nav, I'm going to ask you to to submit a draft as well, is the portion of the order that I want to see and the case law that goes with it, to the extent that it is not already in your brief or that you would highlight it to me in a proposed order, um, is how and why those factual admissions are outcome determinative and dispositive uh as to liability against um WellStar for those providers.
Um and that like I said that's the only issue that is not fully closed up. The loop is not fully closed for me. Um but I'm I'm leaning in that direction and and so it would be helpful to me uh if the parties could send me and again you don't have to write me. I do not want another treatise. You've already written me a brief. Um but um what would be helpful is if the parties would send me a proposed order in word format. Um that I mean currently the motion before me is a motion for partial summary judgement.
And so what I would be looking for from Mr. or is an order granting the motion for partial summary judgement uh on the grounds that the admissions are deemed admitted and they are dispositive because there's no genuine issue uh no dispute of why can't I say that thing I've said it a million times but you y'all know what I'm saying >> um but in any event and then what I would expect from you Miss Naven that would be helpful to me u perhaps with reference to that Robert's case you were talking about um is would similarly be a motion for an order on a motion for partial summary judgement that acknowledges the admissions but makes the best argument you have uh about why the court should find that those admissions are not outcome determinative of liability as to wellstar based on the actions of those providers um as I understand it and realistically I know it's a holiday weekend so obviously I'm expecting like I'm not expecting this today or tomorrow or anything like that. Um, but realistically, when do you think you you each would be able to provide me with something like that? Because I was looking to just set a date and have you both email Mr. Freehoff with your proposals.
>> Maybe by the by next Friday. I mean, I'd like to presume it sooner, but by next Friday, a week, >> Mr. Orur.
>> Certainly.
>> Okay, that would be that would be great for me. Um, and I think that was all that we needed to take up today. Um, is there anything else that the parties need from the court or any questions the parties have for the court about the status of the case, etc.?
>> No, I think the only thing that I have is, you know, I understand pliffs go first, but I think it's going to be difficult here because my client's pregnant, so I want to be able to, you know, get to these depositions of the defendants and move on. And I don't want to be, you know, hamstrung and we we're not doing it until they go first because I think that's going to delay this by 90 days or so because, you know, she's pregnant, she's going to have the baby, she's got to be with the baby. you know, I can't, you know, I mean, I I know Mora, she would love to do it as quick as she can after having the baby, but um I'm just worried about that, you know, aspect of the timing issue and having the court's indulgence to allow the defendants to get started um so we don't delay this.
>> So, that's up to you guys um to figure it out. I will say um Miss Naven, not for nothing, you mentioned it yesterday uh about your client and not for nothing, but having been pregnant three times, uh I I feel like saying someone is pregnant really is not a sufficient explanation for why they might or might not be available. And that if that turns into an issue and and I do not, particularly given the difficulties that Miss Ms. McCoy faced in her first or I I think it was her first with this child. I I totally understand that and I don't mean to be dismissive of it. I'm only saying that because most of the time pregnancy is a relatively straightforward non-lifethreatening, you know, thing that can people still go out and work full-time and do all sorts of things. And so I'm only telling you this to say that if your client's availability becomes a problem, you should expect that I'm going to be looking for something for some particular type of explanation or justification as to why she in particular has limitations on her abilities to be present.
>> Well, to be and to be fair to be fair, we've offered dates as late as June 3rd.
you know, we're trying, you know, we've tried to offer dates, but if defense don't take them, then that could be a potential issue. So, I'll revisit those dates with them, but I'm not going to, you know, being that everything she's been through to ask her to be stressed out for a day, you know, and the fact that she's a few weeks from delivery, um, you know, I'm not going to put that on my shoulders. So, >> right. And again, I I didn't mean to be dismissive of that. I I I understand the difficulties. I was just letting you know that if it does become a problem, it would be like it would need to be something more than just I'm pregnant.
It would need >> No, no, no, no. We I totally appreciate that and I wouldn't ever come to you under any other circumstances. Um but I just wanted to let the court know that, you know, I want to try to work with everybody and get everybody where they need to be, but I can't keep giving dates and then nobody takes them, then I want to make sure we're fair then. But okay, I hear what you're saying and I appreciate it and um hopefully won't have an issue anyway.
>> Okay. Anything Mr. Fresh or Mr. or >> Mr. or first?
>> No.
What? That is that is a potential discovery dispute for a later date which we will absolutely uh follow the court's procedures on that. You can understand the defendant's interest in the outcome of the second delivery given the outcome of the first. Um, and so there's a there's a tangible interest there in making sure that Miss McCoy's second baby is okay as well. Um, so but that's that's not on the table for today. I don't want to call her twice.
>> Mr. Fresh.
>> Yeah, Judge. I I don't think the deposition issue is anything we need to talk about today. And if I violated my rule for opening my mouth and proving myself to be stupid, I accept responsibility for that. And I wish everyone a very happy Memorial Day weekend.
>> No worries. Thank you very much. And of course, I hope that I don't see any of you before Miss McCoy has a healthy, uneventful delivery and a healthy baby.
>> Um, so my best wishes to her on that front and I will for the proposed orders and I will get an order on file for you guys as soon as I can so that you understand what the universe is going to look like in for your case. Okay, >> great. Thank you, your honor.
>> Thank you all. Madam court reporter, we're adjourned. Uh law students or students, if you'll stay on for a minute, we're going to chat after the hearing.
>> You're not going to let us convince them that what they're doing is that they're never going to sleep again and never.
>> No, no. I'm telling you, I am I'm one of those people who I always wanted to be a lawyer and I never changed my mind and I still think being a lawyer is awesome.
Um and I hope that y'all feel that way as well. So, >> absolutely.
>> All right. Have a great day.
>> Take care. Have a great day. Thanks for
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