Mark Sleboda | Oreshniks Unleashed: Retribution Strike Leaves Kiev in Flames

追加: 2026-05-26

[00:00:01]with the one and only Mark Labota, international relations security analyst. Mark, how you doing, my man?

[00:00:07]You're doing okay today?

[00:00:09]>> I'm alive. Jamar, how the hell are you?

[00:00:11]>> I am alive. I am okay. I am kicking. Um, more than I can say for others. So, I do appreciate it. Um, Mark Sabota, international relations security analyst. You can find Mark on Boosti.

[00:00:26]Um, if you put in real politic or Mark Sabota or if you just put in his name, his content would appear. Everything that he does is on that website. And Mark is fantastic guest. Um, one of my favorites or at the very least one of my favorite people to talk to. Mark, obviously a lot has taken place over the weekend in Russia. So, let's start there.

[00:00:46]Um, let's start at the beginning.

[00:00:48]Ukraine murders 21 people, the majority of which were kids who are sleeping in a dormatory. I think the name is storebas.

[00:00:58]>> Thank you. Thank you for that. Um Putin is asked about this, turns to his military and say, "Hey, I need you to come up with a response to this." And within a day or so, we see this overwhelming attack on Kiev and Swan areas last night, including the use of what Russia says or nicks, which means more than one. Um, but this is also Zirkcon uh land-based systems. This was apparently the new reality. Apparently, these were shipbased missiles at first.

[00:01:31]Um, but obviously Russia unleashed on Kiev and I was showing some of the footage um with Kiev basically in flames.

[00:01:39]Was this already planned? This seems very fast turnaround for them to unleash an orchestrated attack on this magnitude. Give me your take on this.

[00:01:49]Yeah, probably most of the attack was was already, you know, in the pipeline.

[00:01:55]Uh they were they were targets that were already selected and were already allocated to be hit sometime in the near future. Uh it seems likely that it was only the may maybe an addition of one or possibly two Orreshnik strikes uh on top of that that were shall we say the the icing on the cake to make this a a uh you know more demonstrative response uh to what is uh being uh presented in Russia as you know a war crime and uh a tragedy. Um the KV regime claims that they hit a what it was functioning as a barracks for the Russian uh Rubicon group. Uh the Rubicon is Russia's uh well one of their elite drone units. Um uh and when I say unit, it's that's it's it's very expansive, right? they have uh a very large uh footprint uh both on the battlefield and and off. Um uh and I was willing to to consider that because I don't uh trust, you know, without uh any confirmation everything that the Russian government says. Although I have, you know, through the the course of this conflict, I've certainly uh found uh to be the case that the vast majority of the time that the Russian what the Russian government says is uh truer or you know much closer to the truth uh than than what the KV regime claims. Um however um all the indications that I have seen uh is that this was not a Rubicon Center group. Uh that it was uh a uh college dormatory.

[00:03:59]Uh and of the 21 people killed I believe 17 of them were young women. Uh so that that that pretty much um indicates to me that that this was not a uh Rubicon group uh barracks that they hit. Now it's this cannot be the case that the KV regime, you know, hit this by accident. A drone that went off course. They hit it three time. They hit it with 16 drones in three different waves. right? You know, so it wasn't just a double tap, it was a triple tap.

[00:04:39]So, as people showed up to try to start uh you know, uh pulling the um wounded out of the wreckage, you know, um they they hit it again and again and again.

[00:04:54]Um and because this wasn't any type of military or, you know, infrastructure target, there simply wasn't air defense present. This was the softest of soft targets.

[00:05:08]Um, now this is all the more chilling, I guess you could say. Uh, on top of, you know, the the fact that by everything we can tell, this was a college dormatory of of mostly uh young women.

[00:05:28]uh these this is in Lugansk which means that a few years ago or you know at least certainly before the westbacked Maidon push in 2014 um these people would have been considered Ukrainians and certainly the Kev regime uh still considers them as such and claims they have the right to rule over such people. Now the fact that these people now are Russian citizens and feel that they are Russian and identify as Russian and a Russian doesn't mean anything of course to the west or to the KV regime as far as they're concerned. All of these people are traitors and deserve to die. That's that's the way they they view the situation. So um that is should be a a chilling lesson you know to everyone that that if Russia you know just gave up and gave all the you know the territory uh that the K regime claims back and everything what would happen uh to the people there? Um now they could I guess you could say they simply had bad information. I mean that is the most suen reading of of what happened in starter Bilsk that they simply believed that it was a Rubicon group and and attacked it in thus waves but um that that would be some pretty bad information.

[00:06:57]>> So uh there is every possibility that this was in effect a terror attack. We know that the Kev regime has deliberately since 2014 shelled the cities of the Donbos, dropped uh pedal mines over their streets. All of this was done as as part of political terror and hate and and spite. You know, as far as they're concerned, these people chose wrong.

[00:07:31]So um now Russia's response um like like I said it is almost certain that that most the majority of these strikes were already in the pipeline and were probably scheduled. Maybe the scheduling was moved up or at least on some of the strikes uh and the addition of uh the archnic strikes definitely one possibly two. Um now it it was a multisspectrum strike. There was somewhere between 600 and 700 drones as well as well as as dozens of missiles the archnik zirkons and for the first time Russia used a uh uh a groundbased a ground launched zirkcon where previously uh the zirkcon has always been a naval launched cruise missile hypersonic cruise missile. Now evidently they've been working on the groundbased version. So that was used. But again that was almost certain to be used at some point anyway.

[00:08:33]So there's no indication that that was something special as a response part of the response. Uh but also um there were uh reports of other KALS uh hypersonic air launched cruise missiles being fired as well and plenty of Iscander M ballistic missiles. and uh the there were targets uh all over particularly central Ukraine but obviously the majority of the hits hit in and uh around Kiev. Now if you if you watch uh film of the skylines right you will see a number of of hits but there were um some total um 40 strikes in and around Kiev uh with with uh missiles.

[00:09:26]Kiev is a big city like you know on on a scale with with with Moscow more or less. And to say that Kiev is in flames is okay an exaggeration, right? Uh but there were certainly areas of K and the Kiev region that got hit. Now these were military targets. Uh and um they hit uh the the arric was >> uh it appears used to hit an airfield uh outside of Kiev Bella.

[00:10:04]Um it is likely that the Kiev regime was storing something supplied from the west probably recently there perhaps some missiles perhaps some storm shadow scout missiles perhaps.

[00:10:18]There's a possibility that there were some aircraft, some F-16s or something, although that seems less likely. Usually they keep them way back in western Ukraine or in Poland. Um, so uh that they're kept safe. Um, but they hit something there with with the archnic and there was I mean you could tell even from the, you know, the films of the the separation of of the different multiple independent re-entry vehicles as they're hitting boom boom boom one after another uh in uh the videos that were released from Ukrainians filming them online on social media. Something of course which is a crime in Ukraine and many people will probably be punished from it. Uh but we know that also uh facilities of the Ukrainian military intelligence were hit. The GUR uh facilities of the Ukrainian intelligence, the main intelligence director at the SBU was also hit. Uh we know that um uh some drone assembly uh facilities were hit.

[00:11:21]Uh one of those uh within a um suburban um shopping mall. uh the K regime regularly you close they're closed down and they're used to uh do uh drone production uh you know they the the structure of the facilities makes them ideal for that sort of thing that's something that that happens regularly um uh so and and some other uh mostly uh military industrial hits but it is important to note that um I have seen a total casualties of these strikes. Uh, initially it was one. Now I believe the death count is up to four >> with a couple dozen wounded. Now Russia launched somewhere between 600 and 700 drones and they launched dozens of missiles.

[00:12:21]missiles, hypersonic missiles, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and this archnic weapon. Uh the other archnic hit, we don't have a a a confirmation of it, but the reports unconfirmed that I have seen suggest that it was hit on a target much closer to the front line in the Donbos. Uh so possibly a uh a military storage facility there whereas the the other one was you know uh most of the strikes were in the area of Kiev.

[00:12:53]But if Russia is firing hundreds of drones and dozens of missiles and only four civilians four people, we don't actually know that they were civilians, but four people were killed. Let's assume they were all civilians were killed as collateral damage and a couple dozen wounded.

[00:13:14]How the hell do you achieve a such a low collateral damage? We've seen when the US strikes anywhere, whether whether it's in Iran or or um Yemen or or Ethiopia, wherever they're bombing, um there are dozens and dozens of dead and injured or uh god forbid when when Israel uh bombs uh cities in uh Gaza or Lebanon, right? you know, again, uh, very high death counts of civilians, although certainly in Israel's case, that might actually be the intention.

[00:13:53]>> Um, >> yeah. Um, so it's quite obvious that Russia's response, yes, was at military targets, you know, uh, military mil and intelligence targets, and they there is no possibility of claiming otherwise.

[00:14:10]Now if there were hundreds of uh people killed as collateral damage, well then you know there might be a question uh even even said hundreds is still relatively low. you know, certainly when the US or Israel conducts strikes for a strike of that magnitude, but it has to be said that Russia routinely does strikes maybe not quite this high, but many time you know almost this high once or twice a week um at least and and several smaller strikes as well and gets similar amounts of collateral damage. Uh so it is it is you know whatever the western propaganda says to the contrary Russia is not targeting civilians in this conflict quite obviously uh and far less so than the Kiev regime it must be said uh and uh you know that that tells even in in the casualties of uh civilians or or people you know civilians or not that are put out in by the Ukrainian by the KV regime in Ukraine by by the uh you know the totally um regime controlled media that that exists in the country. So that >> Russia is still operating at a if you want to call it a moralistic plane or a legalistic plane of international law and the conduct of war at a much higher level than the Americans or the Israelis or certainly the K regime ever operates at. They still refrain from targeting the the politicians of the KV regime, right? You know, the the decisionmaking centers as the US or or Israel would call it as they regularly target and assassinate foreign leaders. Russia still still and there's a lot of some push back on that from within Russia uh and certainly from supporters of Russia outside Russia that that perhaps Russia's um restrained conduct of of the war whether you consider it a manner of honor or law or morals or whatever is uh uncalled for at this point. But the Russian government obviously still persists in that. So >> I'm curious, do you think that the use of and I guess there are two questions on this. One about the Russian, the second is about Battle Roose.

[00:16:54]>> What does it mean that these missiles are now being used in rotation? And are we going to see more of these used? And I guess does that mean that the restraint is being loosened or is this a one time thing?

[00:17:07]>> No, no, I don't. I think Well, I was saying I I'm I'm asking a question and I guess I'm wondering if this is something that is knowable to you. That's the way I'm trying to explain it.

[00:17:18]>> I think uh one yeah, it does not mean that that we will, you know, once or twice a week or whatever we'll see an archnik, but we'll definitely see them more than once a half a year or something like that. uh and I don't think it necessarily has any anything in particular to do with any change uh in the rules of engagement that Russia is operating under. It's simply that Russia has uh you know put these things and they are already in mass production and deployment and more of them are simply available. Now it doesn't mean that they will always be using them.

[00:17:59]Um, and that's not just with the Archnik. Um, Russia has two entire reserve armies at this point uh of volunteer contract soldiers, people who sign up specifically, you know, for the special military operation and uh that are still being held in reserve that are not in Ukraine or even necessarily immediately near Ukraine.

[00:18:31]uh and um they occasionally rotate units into the front line and then they're brought back, right? But that is a a temporary thing. There's still two entire reserve armies kept there. Now, by all accounts, and I've seen this reported in not only the Russian media, but the Western mainstream media as well, these reserve armies actually have far better kit and gear, far newer, far, you know, um, than many of of the troops that are fighting on the front line against the KV regime in Ukraine.

[00:19:13]Um and that you know may puzzle a lot of people and evidently the um opinion of of the Russian military, the Russian Ministry of Defense is no need to waste our best stuff on the KV regime when at some point in the endgame of this conflict we may need to to fight NATO direct that you know NATO directly may may step into it. Uh so that is still the reason and when it comes to the archnik the use of it I believe it almost certainly operates under the same principles. They have many more obviously available now than than I think some people suspect and they're not regularly using them only because they figure it's not worth using on the Kiev regime, right? uh that they may need them for something else before this is all said and done. And uh that that is something that holds with other weapons as well. They're not going to use an arshnik for demonstrative purposes when a drone or you know even a iskand or ballistic missile now produced in much larger numbers than before can do the same job. uh you know uh that so again we will see increased use of them but don't expect to see one with every Russian strike or something like that they are still something reserved for you know special uses >> basically at the larger war that is expected because I had this thought that a lot of people were saying that Putin should be more aggressive. Yeah, >> I I took it from the perspective of if you are if you find yourself needing to intervene into a for a special militia operation and you're aware that NATO countries are dumping all sorts of money into the conflict and dumping weapons, etc. into the conflict and you're not at the moment prepared to take on NATO, then you may do this. Basically, you waged the war that you can wage while you're preparing for the war that's coming. Yep.

[00:21:25]>> Is that the way you look at this? Like basically that Russia was in a position where this is not the moment to have this larger war with NATO. Fast forward four years though where you've built two additional militaries. You have a huge amount of hardware that you're expecting to use for the conflict and it's basically a waiting game of preparation for the larger conflict that you're expecting to take place. Is that what's going on? Give me your >> Yeah. Okay. So, there's always multiple reasons for decisions made like that, and you could argue that that's one of them. I I don't actually think that exactly the way you're presenting it is true, though, because right now the the Russian military is demonstrabably more powerful and better prepared with more experience and and so forth than anything in Europe. All indications are that the Europeans are preparing for war with Russia and in four or five years they may actually be better prepared than they are now. Now what what you could argue well what state will the Russian military be in four or five years from now? Probably you know uh you know maybe better as well but then it's a game which one is is better. Um, >> I think that Russia still does hope maybe maybe or or at least some people in the Kremlin uh hope against hope even if they they have a declining possibility that there might be some type of diplomatic settlement at the end of this. If not with the Kiev regime, certainly not in its current incarnation. uh but at least that at some point some same sane leaders may emerge in Europe. I myself am extremely skeptical uh of of that possibility. But you know um >> anything is better than a direct conflict with NATO that at some point is almost you know it's it's likely to turn nuclear at some point if you have a direct conflict and Russian missiles are raining down on European cities. um to a much higher degree than the other way around simply because Russia has many more missiles and much better air and missile defense then you know the desperation will will lead people to do things that they might you know not otherwise do. So uh in any direct NATORussian confrontation particularly one that the Americans are either not involved in or are shall we say later to arrive than they might be under other administrations. you know, um, uh, I believe that that Russian at this point conventional superiority with long range strikes and and on the battlefield, uh, whether we're talking strike drones or missiles, uh, will will lead the Europeans to such a desperate situation that yes, they would very possibly jump to some type of demonstrative nuclear use, tactical maybe to start or >> they They continually talk just just again uh in the last week, the Lithuanian foreign minister, this, you know, little rabid yappy dog that that they have there in the Baltics, um was um saying that it's it's time to attack Kinenrad, right, Russia's exclave there. Time time to to break that fortress as as he called it. And I'm like, you do know that we got nuclear weapons there, right? I mean, and we you attack Russ because that is Russia, right? If you attack a Russian city, you know, with first of all, I'm not even sure the Europeans, certainly not on their own, not without the Americans can muster the conventional because Keningrad is pretty heavily defended, right? Um, it would take a lot. But let's let's say that you manage to gather up a mly force among the European, the the British, the Germans, the French and whatever, Polish and put together a force that might be able to of overcome the conventional defenses of Kiningrad in a short term. They will use nuclear tactical nuclear weapons, right, to defend at that point if they're faced with that because it is a Russian city with a Russian population. And when they say things like this, I mean, do they even have any idea what they're saying?

[00:26:12]I don't know. I mean, are they >> is it political posturing for a domestic mad base or are they that militarily and strategically illiterate when they say things like that? I don't I don't know. Uh but they continually talk about this all the time. So, Russia always has to consider that. And again, it's quite obvious as as has been said by by many people on on the Russian side uh and and within the alt media, the Europeans in particular, the West, but particularly the Europeans because they're the ones, you know, at least on the the front line with this, they have lost their fear of nuclear weapons and nuclear war because of, you know, the yearnip polar moment and several decades of of uh you unrivaled power and projection of it around the world growing up with you know without expecting anything like that. They they have reached that point. Um and I I do not believe that that is an argument for using nuclear weapons. Um I think that Russia has uh if Russia needs to teach the Europeans a lesson. We just had another European leader uh the the president of of Czech uh in the last week also said we need to show we we we need to uh show Russia NATO needs to show Russia its teeth and I'm like what dentures are you talking about buddy >> and that you're in the middle of a war now >> European militaries are in such a sad state in general you know unless you're managed to call in the Americans on it and you know they they are trying at least under the Trump ad afterwards we you know we can talk what happens after Trump okay but at least for the next few years presumably um the um Trump administration uh you know is is very uh much of the belief in this division of labor um option uh uh you know with with regards to Europe that they should uh take care of the situation. with Russia, which they are not capable of doing any more than Israel is capable of taking care of the situation with Iran in a division of labor. Um, but I mean, when they talk like that, it's it's, you know, Russia has to take precautions. They have to they have to be prepared for that. Now, part of it is the reality of war uh of a modern war with drones and 247 satellite and drone reconnaissance. Maneuver warfare is no longer possible, right?

[00:29:01]Unless you're fighting an opponent, state or non-state that is of such an antiquated, you know, nature or capabilities that they can't feel drone forces. And at this point, even Hezbollah is uh devastating the Israeli uh military, you know, in the occupation of southern Lebanon with fiber optic cables, which Russia has pioneered and used to great effect. Just saying. And there's, you know, this seems fairly likely to me that Russia um gave that tech and tactics to uh Iran and Iran handed them off to Hezbollah. Uh so there is that. But you can't to standard maneuver warfare, right? you get together a big mass of uh armor, you know, tanks and and and vehicles, right?

[00:29:50]And men on your side of the border, and then you punch through their defensive line or, you know, circle around, you know, that sort of thing. You move beyond your defenses such as they are into enemy territory. Now the problem is in the modern day anytime you start building that critical mass of forces that is immediately seen by drones and satellites and everything else and then it's hit with precision strikes before it ever gets close to the contact line.

[00:30:19]And we've seen that on both sides uh in the Ukraine conflict repeatedly. So the rules of war have have drastically changed and uh the ubiquitous of drones, FPV drones and other drones on the front lines, drones for logistics, drones for reconnaissance, uh drones uh uh you know uh to guide artillery, you know, everything. Drones, drones, drones. Um in order to not attract the attention of drones, that requires the use of very small units of infantry on foot.

[00:30:53]uh assisted by drones of your own uh that uh basically filter through poorly or not even defended, you know, the contact line into a very large indeterminate gray zone in between the two forces. Um and then you start assembling for a critical mass well within the opponent's rear.

[00:31:22]It's the contact line is a big amorphous gray zone with small numbers of troops compared to what you probably are thinking and large numbers of drones.

[00:31:34]And that's a mess. I mean that that is what the contact line in modern combat looks like. And now Russia is still advancing. Whatever the western propaganda may say, Russia is still advancing all along the contact line at that infiltration level but speed as well, right? slowly, but every week um you know a few um dozen square you know kilometers well adds up to about a hundred you know or so all along the contact line and you know six 7 8 10 settlements you know towns and villages that were once part of kev regime controlled Ukraine are now part of Russia and that happens all the time right even during the last few months of the very annually slow rasputs of the mud season, right? That was still going on. And now that Russ the Russian spring offensive has started, that that movement will will be a bit faster but still restrained by the technology. So that is one restraint of why things are happening. It's just that war that has changed. Another is that Russia is probably the one of the another reason is that the Kremlin has probably decided that with the the risk of direct of provoc intentional provocation by the Europeans and the Kev regime to break out of the attrition and proxy war where Russia is comfortable winning to try to force that direct Russia NATO war where things are much less certain and then there's the possibility of nukes being used and all of that. Russia wants to stay in that box and whenever you see all these hits that the K regime does manage to get through, you know, they always manage to get a few through and oil storage tanks or refineries or dormitories full of school girls or whatever it is they are capable of hitting.

[00:33:42]As far as the coldblooded calculus of the attrition and proxy war goes, it's all still in the box. It's all still in the math. The terrible math of an attrition war where losses are expected and as long as the math still coming coming out where Russia is comfortable, uh they don't want to go outside of that box. Uh, however much a kneejerk emotional reaction be, oh, they blew up an oil storage tank in Promoresque.

[00:34:20]Let's go nuke Kiev, right? That it's just not something that that they're going to do. Now, of course, there are always lines that are crossed that demand some form of escalation one way or another, but Russia's even usually very smart about that. So, what you could see with the slow pace is also Part of the logic is is the logic of what is called salami slicing. And the US is an expert in salami slicing elsewhere in the world. The idea that if you're only taking a little bit of territory, you know, even if that's, >> you know, all you're without taking unacceptable losses that you're take capable of taking a day. But there's also a a political and a geopolitical reason for limiting it, not doing it too fast, not because then you're not incurring that type of emotional response, the necessity to do something on the other side. You know, it's the the the proverbial frog in a kettle of water that you're slowly turning up the heat on. US uses Salabi slicing tactics all over the place. You could certainly make the argument that that's what the thinking of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Kremlin is any here. We want to avoid that direct conflict with NATO particularly with the US as part of NATO uh at some point you know in the endgame of this. And we just had the uh Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk in the last week say again, you know, from the European side that we are coming to the point in this conflict, meaning that the the K regime is doing so badly and is is is facing so many problems that NATO may he he didn't say we may need to do something, right?

[00:36:16]Which means NATO interveneed directly.

[00:36:19]that that was said he said that he and other European leaders are are reaching that decision. Okay. Well, then the salami slicing only worked for so long and and and so forth. But that's part of the rationale. But when Europeans make these provocations, Russian often tries to respond smart and a lot of times I'm going to tell you, you're simply not going to see it. There is a shadow war going on and has been since the beginning of this conflict at a level below the direct conflict. And every time you see an ammunition factory somewhere in Europe or the United States going up in flames or something similar happening in Russia there it's not certain you know accidents do happen. Uh but there's also a strong possibility that that is a result of covert action. there is cyber action and what happened most recently in the Baltics has has so shook Europe that governments have fallen over this and and now uh governments and leaders are cowering in fear. So while constantly looking for weaknesses in Russian air and missile defense to get the Kiev regime drones through produced by Europe, right? Uh but but you know fired by the Kiev regime ostensibly. Uh they they discovered yeah a big weakness uh up here way away from the contact line in the Lenenrad the St. Petersburg area. There's not a lot of air defense because it's impossible for the K regime normally to get forces there. But if we let them strike right through Baltic airspace, NATO airspace, uh then they can conduct those attacks and Russia's weak there. So that's what they were doing. It had been done a little bit over the years, but then they opened a big air corridor and the Kev regime was launching drones uh at port and oil refinery facilities, not actually doing that much permanent damage. Um and what there was a lot of calls that Russia needs to do something right that under international law and the rules of the war allowing your airspace or your territory to be used to launch attacks out of that's an act of war right that makes you a legal prison.

[00:38:41]So Russia would have been perfectly within their rights to start kinetic strikes, you know, missile strikes or drone strikes or whatever against the Baltics. However, that the problem is is that's direct conflict with NATO, Article Five and all of that. So Russia found a very very intelligent, very coldblooded way of responding.

[00:39:06]And Russia has some very advanced electronic warfare systems like the Merman BN and a whole lot of other probably, you know, newer systems that have developed through the course of the war. And they definitely have the ability to both jam guidance signals and in certain situations, you know, maybe not end mass, but to replace that with a signal of their own. Uh, and uh, I was already arguing that that is what Russia did in Latafia >> with a drone. They found a drone and government. This was this is what happened in uh the Telegraph reported the same thing as well. So they took control of one of these Ukrainian drones uh flying over Latafia that was supposed to fly on and hit a Russian oil facility and instead they dived it straight down into an actually empty or or no longer actively used uh um Latafian uh oil facility. And this caused all kinds of, you know, they realize, well, this wasn't just an accident. This was intentional. And if the Russians do this here and now, they can do it in other places as well. And suddenly they got scared. The um Latafian government collapsed. Now, supposedly they they were also planning to have the KV regime launch attacks actually out of their territory as well, which Russian intelligence. So, that probably the the threat of exposure of that uh probably had something to do with the complete collapse of the government as well, but that may >> so the defense minister >> Well, I'm sorry to interrupt. They threatened to effectively attack them.

[00:40:58]Yes, >> I read the readout. The readout was very clear. We believe that you are going to launch drones from Lapin soil and we will basically your NATO membership will not protect you.

[00:41:07]>> Yes. Yeah. We know where you're going to launch them from. We know that Ukrainian troops are already there. If you do that, you know, your NATO article 5 won't save you, >> right?

[00:41:16]>> Um but that came, you know, at the same time as this fallout over the hijack drone was doing. And again, this isn't now the Telegraph is saying that this is what happened as well. the British newspaper and and other sources.

[00:41:32]>> So, uh they're suddenly afraid. Uh the uh Latvian defense minister was fired.

[00:41:37]Two days later, the Latvian prime minister, she fell on her sword and resigned. Didn't want to be questioned about these things quite obviously. And suddenly the other Baltic states are not only saying, "No, no, no, no, no to Ukraine. Don't fly your drones through our space." But they started shooting them down and now there uh over the last few days there have been drone warnings all across Lithuania and Estonia and I presume Latvia as well. uh when an occasional Ukrainian drone was seen, the whole country warnings, people are sent into bunkers and and uh underground metro systems and governments or you know the the leaders are hidden down and why because they're afraid that Russia could hijack those drones uh that you know the regime was was flying and uh drive them and use them as weapons against the Europeans who built those things in the first place and we're allowing the Ukrainians to to to use them against Russia through their airspace. So, it's it's all such a brilliant I mean I you could even say elegant response um by Russia. They still stayed in their box, right? They did not allow because the Europeans can't prove that that's what they they know that's what happened but they can't prove response clearly shows that and now these drone strikes through Bolar are all you know filtering off and ending in at least temporarily. We we'll see how long that lasts but Russia punched them back a sucker punch that they didn't see coming and now they're a bit afraid. That is it. It is a way that Russia can respond without going outside that crucial mathematical box of the proxy war and the attrition war not responding to provocations in such a way that uh they are they're forced outside of it. And um I I think you know again there is a need for an emotional knee-jerk response that people feel. Luckily for us the people in the Kremlin do not have blood running through their veins. They have ice water, right? Uh they are pragmatic and they think everything through and they certainly truly believe that revenge is a dish that must be served but is best served. Co. I'm curious about Barus.

[00:44:17]Zalinski has been bitching remorselessly about Barus and he seems to be afraid that the Russian military or the Bellarusian military is going to work with the Russians for some kind of attack and I guess this is close to Kiev which is putting him on edge there. I I don't get the sense that Russia is trying to include Bellarus into the war effort. I mean in the very beginning of the war Russian of course attacked out of Bellar Russian territory uh towards Kiev but that that was in 2022 and it has not been repeated since. Same thing with missile strikes out of of Bellarus and it happened in the very beginning and then it hasn't happened since. Um, now there's always the possibility that Russia could do that, but I have not seen any troop buildups that would indicate that. I I certainly wouldn't object to it if if the Russian government or military were to do it.

[00:45:09]Uh, not at all. In fact, I would be very much in favor of it if it's, you know, the right military thing to do. Uh, but, um, I haven't seen any signs of such a buildup. And what is almost certainly happening, one is that Zalinski is being paranoid about it because, you know, that's what he's really concerned about is himself in Kiev. Uh, and two, the mo what is most likely going on is that Bellarus is playing a little psychological game. They're closing some forests and moving some troops around of their own on the border. And the Ukrainians are then forced, right, out of a sense of of caution, right, uh, and contingency to put some more troops, and they don't have many of them to spare along the Bellar Russian border, which means that the Russians are facing less somewhere else, and that's thinning out their forces even farther. That is almost that is the most likely scenario of what is going on. Now, of course, if the KV regime doesn't respond at all, then Russia may say, "Well, then we can exploit that. And if we can rapidly move troops over there, if they're not going to do anything, you know, then then we might be able that's the idea now that you have to keep your forces fluid and have many plans that could or could not be put in action depending on what your adversary is doing or not doing. that is maintaining your forces fluid like water so that you can uh take opportunity of any uh weakness on the other side's defenses. Something that Russia with their excellent military logistics is is uh all too capable of doing.

[00:46:57]>> Two more questions. One on power of Siberia. I'm very curious about this. So Zinping and Putin meet, Putin goes to Beijing. This is a serious meetings that Zi Jinping is effectively having. He had one with Trump obviously then Putin.

[00:47:13]Argoti was there. Um apparently I forget who's there today but long story short a lot of meetings.

[00:47:19]Power Siberia is something that is um from my understanding very important from a standpoint of Russian security.

[00:47:26]Security in the context of we want to make sure that we have we're selling our oil. We want to make sure there's a pipeline to sell that oil so nobody can mess with it. And yet they weren't able to come to terms on that deal >> yet. What is the hold up? Do we know?

[00:47:41]>> Okay. So that's first of all there's two pipelines, right?

[00:47:45]>> There is the power of Siberia one which is already constructed and supplying and then the question is the power of Siberia 2.

[00:47:54]>> Now the power of Siberia 2 is already being constructed. Those those agreements have already been settled. It is being constructed now. There still are some negotiations as I understand it being conducted on the final pricing of the gas. You know, uh exactly how many billion cubic meters are being moved through at what price and what relation to the market price and and the oil price that is still going on. But the the the physical infrastructure required for the pipeline that that has already been set in motion. Uh so that that's already >> pipeline will go through Mongolia.

[00:48:44]>> Oh, I'm sorry. There was a lag. Please continue.

[00:48:47]>> Yeah, that pipeline will go through Mongolian, right? That that that is uh you know what is going on there. So that is something that is you know it will still take three to five years to complete but it is already in process.

[00:49:01]So >> okay so basically no issue with that that's just a negotiation issue this is being built.

[00:49:08]>> I'm curious what do you sense a tension between Russian analysts and Chinese analysts and let me explain why I asked that question even though it's odd question and I don't need to linger on it but I am curious on your take about it as a Russian analyst.

[00:49:21]There is the sense that the Chinese Zinping and Chinese analysts in general have this belief that if nothing happens that China would coast to I don't want to say utopia but basically coastal position where the US can't touch it that our industrial base scientific base intellectual base etc will put us so far ahead that your plans and schemes will not be able to do anything to deal with whatever China ends up being not necessarily a hedge bond but obviously something similar to hedgeon >> and on some level that they can coexist with the US as this is being done now from my point of view this is insane because the United States is going to do everything in his power by hooker by crook to set the globe on fire prevent that from happening as we seeing neaked aggression in Iran and if you look at it the Ukraine war for example is being attacks directly upon the Russia >> or Venezuela or Cuba >> or Venezuela or Cuba All all wars are one war.

[00:50:23]>> Yeah, it's just neaked aggression in this case.

[00:50:26]Russian analysts who recognize their country is being attacked may look at this very differently and may look at it as you guys are trying to have this kind of co-equal relationship as the hedgeimon is setting the globe on fire with many people believing that they're setting it on fire to isolate you meaning you're the last guy standing which is the this kind of desperate play for hegemony how do you view this do you think that there's a friction between these two points of view from the Russian analytical point of view and the Chinese analytical point of view considering okay well we're already at war and you're pretending like >> yeah I don't want to say that it doesn't exist at all but and I mean there there's something there something small right national interests of a government of of a state and its people still take priority even over their most important geopolitical relationship And I want to be clear, the ChineseRussian bilateral relationship is the single most important bilateral relationship between any two countries in the world today. And if there is to be a multi-olar world at all, it is the Russian Chinese bilateral relationship that is the foundation that everything else will be built on. And I think by and large the foundation of that relationship is very strong and is stronger than it has ever been and is getting stronger. Now that doesn't mean there won't be some disagreements that there won't be, oh, we're taking the share of the burden here. Yeah. Well, we're taking the share of the economic burden and keeping you fighting there, you know, on on analysts, you know, on on both sides. But that's a lot of armchair quarterbacking, right? Again, there is still both states still operate under realist foreign policy, right?

[00:52:30]Where their state, their people are still their primary interest even over their most important allies, which I I mean it's must be something very hard for Americans to understand because Israel's interests and um you know uh in are far more important for the American government than their own people's interests. You know that that I know it's it's a a bit hard to to understand that. I'm not saying that there is nothing there, but it's blown out of all proportion often by Western media, be that the mainstream media or even some maybe too concerned voices in the alt media about it.

[00:53:12]>> Yeah. The last question I want to ask is about the Iran uh US war or the standoff. I have to I have been under belief that the US would do more attacks because I had a hard time believing that regardless of the consequences that a hedge fund could accept >> failure on the scale. I just could not see him walking.

[00:53:31]>> The the biggest strategic blunder in mo more bigger so than than the Iraq war.

[00:53:38]The biggest strategic blunder. I I can't believe how stupid they were to launch this war and to conduct it in the way they have.

[00:53:47]>> Well, I guess the question is now, how do they get out of this? I mean, I don't I I don't know how they get out.

[00:53:52]>> They don't know yet. They don't know.

[00:53:54]That's that's quite obvious. They're floundering around, right? The geoeconomic game of chicken continues with the Iranians in their economy and the US stuck driving the global economy.

[00:54:07]And you know they're hurtling towards the precipice and and uh you know the obviously even US intelligence told us two weeks ago you know and very interesting that they chose to leak that and what their intentions were doing so that that they the US intelligence believes that the Iranians can outlive uh the so-called US blockade that they can outlast it. Uh so they they the status quo is unacceptable to the US.

[00:54:36]They can't take the L and walk away and try to spin it into a victory because well first and most importantly Iran still has control of the straight of Hormuz and you can't pretend that that's not happening and then you could make the argument about nuclear enriched uranium and and so forth although even Trump himself has openly admitted that that is mostly PR or mostly psychological because that was never really the issue. It was always really about regime change. But, you know, if he was able to get that in negotiations, right, that's something that he could wave around like a victory.

[00:55:20]>> Yeah.

[00:55:20]>> But it's the straight of war moves that really matters. Let's let let's be honest there. and whether the Iranians have control of it and toll it uh at the end of this. Uh and the other option is to drop some more bombs in the hopes that another round of decapitation strikes or some more general damage will make the Iranians suddenly capitulate and give Trump whatever he wants and and and become another Deli Rodriguez in Venezuela or whatever, which is not going to happen. Uh, but you know, hope that that type of hope springs eternal and there will always be people whispering in Trump's ear that we just need to drop more bombs and drop them more this way and you know that sort of thing. Uh, and that will always remain an option for them. I like you. I'm surprised they haven't done it already.

[00:56:11]But the one thing that that tells me that they haven't and they're still floundering around is that the state of the US military to renew the war and continue it with anything that might give them the chance to clare to declare victory and going home at the end of it is they're in a much worse state than we thought they were. Otherwise, they already would have gone down that path.

[00:56:40]So that makes them desperate. But of course a desperate fading hegeimon is a dangerous beast and uh it is very Russia, China and Iran have the most weighty of geopolitical burdens for all of humanity at this point because Iran now joins Russia and China in this regard and that is how to manage the fading and decline of that belligerent hegeimon without it ending in a nuclear holoca you know apocalypse for everyone >> there's I have no no words beyond that that's perfect because it's it's they have taken on the fate of the world in a weird sense like meaning they're the pragmatic group whereas these other guys are lunatics that >> and be glad don't don't feel upset that they are that restrained.

[00:57:44]>> What do you Don't feel >> I'm not talking you, but I know there's a lot of people out there in THE COMMENTS AND OH UH PUTIN IS a P USSy or you know whatever and then you know I I read about it every day and and uh you know I'm like roll my eyes and say oh to be that type of knee-jerk call of duty child uh on on the computer trolling from across the world.

[00:58:11]>> Okay, come on. Let's encourage let's let's okay I'm going to let you go because the hour has passed but since you brought this up they do have a point right like meaning if I'm dealing with somebody that is a monster and they look at everything I do as pragmatic then the very act of me being pragmatic on some level encourages the monster to be more of a monster or do you disagree with that?

[00:58:36]It's all in the amounts, right? It's all relative. Yes, to a degree, right? They are the ones who have all of the intelligence that we don't have access to when they are making their decisions.

[00:58:50]And they are more aware of their strengths and their weaknesses and the limits of their geopolitical horizon than we are. So you can either choose to trust them or not to trust them. And we'll find out in a few years down the road. But myself, everything I've seen in since 2022 has convinced me that the the Kremlin and Beijing and increasingly Thrron are handling this. I mean, maybe not perfectly, but as best as can be expected. And anytime they aren't, then I'll be glad to call them on it. But with the understanding that that is still an armchair quarterback's call, >> Mark Sabota, international relations security analyst. You can find Mark on Booie, B O S Ty. Check him out. Um, all of his work is going to be there either under Real Political with Mark Labota or Markx Labota. Mark, you have a fantastic rest of your day, man. Thank you for this. I really appreciate it.

[00:59:59]>> Thanks for having me.

[01:00:00]>> Have a good one. Bye-bye.