Hantavirus: The NEXT Big COVID Plot?!

Añadido: 2026-05-19

[00:00:00]Okay. So, here are your odds of uh dying from hivirus.

[00:00:06]1 in 30 to 35 million.

[00:00:10]That's your odds of dying from the antivirus. You can compare that and I suggest you do to your odds of dying from being struck by lightning.

[00:00:18]1 in 15 to 20 million. So, you are more likely to die from being struck by lightning in the United States than you are to die from the Hanta virus. Your odds, by the way, of dying in a car accident, 1 in 8 to 9,000. Your odds of dying from a medical error, 1 in 1,000 to,400.

[00:00:37]By the way, dying from a medical error is the third leading cause of death in our country after heart disease and cancer. So, if someone is telling you to be frightened of the ha virus, they are lying to you. If someone is telling you to be more worried about a 1 in 30 to 35 million odds chance of dying from the antivirus while ignoring the approximately 350,000 people in the United States who die from a medical error from doctors messing up every year, you should mute them. You should block them. You should stop following them. In the United States, there's an average of 30 cases of antivirus per year that result in approximately 8 to 12 deaths per year.

[00:01:20]So that is a fatal a case fatality rate, by the way. That's extremely high.

[00:01:23]That's 35 to 38% case fatality rate, which is a frightening statistic.

[00:01:29]There's no doubt about that. 94% of Havirus cases in the United States occur west of the Mississippi River in a very concentrated region. Um, and they all happen around spring cleaning time when people in uh the southwest, you know, clean out a shed that has the feces of the deer mouse, for example. That's where the deer mouse is in the southwest. The dust, they inhale the dust and they contract the antivirus from it. That is basically the extent of the hivirus in the United States. And you never hear, despite the fact that there are an average of 30 cases of this in the United States every year, you never hear any, "Oh my goodness, it's a pandemic. Everyone's going to get this.

[00:02:03]Asymptomatic transmission, masks, lockdowns." You never hear that even though this is an annual experience in the United States. Now, here's an interesting point from a woman named Emma Hilton. She is a biology PhD who is married to a verology PhD. So, you could say she might know what she's talking about when she, and this is regarding, by the way, the fatality rate. She says fatality rate alone does not determine outbreak risk. A virus that kills 30% of the people who contract it but barely spreads to anyone else is less dangerous to society than one that kills.1% but infects everyone. She's of course comparing it to CO. She goes Ror is the average number of people one infected person passes a virus to in a susceptible population. Remember talking about Roro during COVID? This is like PTSD flashbacks of breaking down all of the studies and the epidemiology of COVID as we were being lied to by the experts back then. So, Emma Hilton reminding us that RORO is the average number of people that one infected person passes a virus to in a susceptible population. It is a predictor in epidemiology of pandemic potential. She says the measles RO is between 12 and 18. So, one infected person typically infects 12 to 18 more.

[00:03:17]In COVID, it was between two and three.

[00:03:20]One infected person infected two to three others. flu is like 1.2. You have the flu, you infect just over one person. For the Andes strain of the antivirus, which is the specific strain of antivirus that is transmissible human to human. Um, for the Andes antivirus, the RO estimates from the 2018 Argentina humanto human outbreak, and we'll talk about the Argentina outbreak in a minute, was between one and two. She later says possibly just over two. above one Emma says means it can sustain transmission but only just so the RORO of the hivirus is not within the window of pandemic possibility speaking as epidemiologists would analyze it. So let's go back to the ship for a moment. Let's go back to patient zero if that's what you want to call him. ornithologist. His name is He's a Dutch ornithologist named Leo Schilperude.

[00:04:20]Leo Schilperude.

[00:04:22]Leo Schilperude. Before he boarded the cruise ship, visited a dump, a landfill that was contaminated with rodent feces.

[00:04:31]He went there, as an ornithologist might, to bird watch despite the fact that local residents avoided the area because they knew it to be contaminated.

[00:04:39]They knew it to be dangerous to health.

[00:04:42]He did this anyway. And I know this may sound harsh and I truly don't mean this harsh harshly.

[00:04:49]We should have societal recognition of decisions made by individuals that are bad decisions.

[00:05:02]for example, no one I I know this man died and so maybe people don't want to talk about his decisions because he's dead, but are we avoiding the personal responsibility entirely? He did something unwise. He did something imprudent. He hurt himself. He hurt his wife. He hurt other people. Are we just abandoning the idea of any kind of I know he's dead, but accountability?

[00:05:26]meaning think about the consequences of your behavior before you take those actions.

[00:05:34]So that brings us to this question. Is this strain that this ornithologist contracted in the landfill from the rat feces in Argentina before he boarded this cruise ship and spread this to other people, is this new? Is this some kind of new, you know, deadly mutated strain that now jumps more easily from person to person versus requiring that you do what he did, you know, inhale rodent feces or have prolonged physical contact with someone who is symptomatic with a hand virus? Well, according to the science, it is not a new strain. It is not a new mutation.

[00:06:08]You can analyze the DNA structure of a specific virus and you can compare that to the specific DNA structure of a virus say from a year before, two years before, three years before to see how significantly that virus mutates because different mutations just like during COVID um different mutations are less serious or more serious, less severe or more severe. I mean the delta strain of co um was a lot more significant than some of the other strains that just it's just manifested as a cold. So what is this strain of the antivirus looks like look like? Is it something new? The reason we're asking this by the way is because there is a ton of fear-mongering. In fact I just right before we went on air saw a headline from the Daily Mail. Let me pull this up.

[00:06:55]Uh and this is just classic gaslighting. This is what the Daily Mail said. First suspected generation 3 antivirus case as Italian who sat alongside the woman on the Dutch KM flight before she died developed symptoms amid fears that the virus has mutated. D. So has the virus actually mutated? Well, according to the science, according to an analysis of what the DNA looks like, the answer to that is no. In fact, it's very very similar to the strain of antivirus that caused an outbreak in Argentina in 2018. So eight years ago, in the space of 8 years, this DNA of this antivirus, this specific Andes strain of the antivirus has only mutated 1%. So it is 99% similar to the 2018 Argentina strain of the Andes antivirus. That is not a m new mutation.

[00:07:48]That is not a new strain. That is not something that gives an indication that it has been enhanced, that it has been tampered with, that it has been subject to gain of function experiments as far as we know. In fact, the stories that are accompanying this this amid fears of a new strain that's more transmissible to human is this question that's being posed by the by the fear-mongers about whether prolonged close contact um is the standard for this is how it's transmitted or whether you can get it just by passing by someone in a hallway and saying hello. The story that they've used to uh present this question to you is the story of the flight attendant. So there was a woman from the cruise ship who got on a flight home and she did not have symptoms at the time. She tested positive or she she tested positive for the hivirus but didn't have symptoms.

[00:08:43]She was removed from that flight before the flight happened. The flight attendant who was part of that flight, who you might assume doing the job of a flight attendant, had some contact with this woman, although not prolonged close contact, developed immediately thereafter uh symptoms. Now, the symptoms of the antivirus, to my understanding, develop like the flu. They're not they're not some remarkable symptoms at the beginning. They they kind of present the way that any kind of crud that you would get would present. You know, a fever and chills and not feeling well. and um classic flu symptoms. This flight attendant developed symptoms and because this woman who had tested positive with antivirus had been on that same flight, the narrative immediately was how did this flight attendant contract antivirus if transmission requires prolonged close contact and she barely had any engagement with this woman? Are we facing a new deadly strain, a mutation that allows transmissibility to happen be by what? aerosolized respiratory particles, not just, you know, these these bigger droplets.

[00:09:48]Well, we didn't know whether she had the antivirus when this was first reported.

[00:09:54]She had symptoms, but the symptoms are kind of ubiquitous symptoms. So, what illness actually was it? We also, by the way, before we get to that, and we know, by the way, what she has now, she has been tested. We don't know what kind of contact she had with the woman. A flight attendant can have anything from basically a wave and just walking past, which is not prolonged close contact.

[00:10:13]But if this woman was sick, if she was, you know, helping her with a little what, one of those air barf bags or, you know, if she was spending a lot of time right in her face talking to her, we don't know what kind of contact she had.

[00:10:25]So, she could have actually had prolonged close contact. Does she touch her in any way? Well, it turns out that the answer to those questions, which we don't know, which would have been significant if the flight attendant had contracted Hivirus, are moot because it turns out the flight attendant tested negative for H virus. She just has a standard cold, a regular old cold. And yet, the media did not wait. The public health officials did not wait. The online influencers did not wait for the facts before they use this flight attendant as the reason, the justification for this are we facing amid fears of a new deadly strain.

[00:10:58]that's transmissible by aerosolized particles.

[00:11:02]In addition to that, Professor Joseph Allen from Harvard, the one who talked about the Trump administration not communicating properly to the American people about how the antivirus is actually transmitted. This is what he posted. This is what he posted on Acts.

[00:11:17]He said, "Earlier today, I spoke with a doctor on the ship and he confirmed something. The CDC messaging continues to say prolonged close contact, but that contradicts one, what's in the literature, and two, what's happening on this ship. The doc told me a few who got infected and died did have direct contact with a very sick patient while treating them. But three who tested positive did not have direct physical or close contact, only shared time in a few spaces on the ship where people congregate, the dining and the lecture hall.

[00:11:46]So, this seems like evidence, doesn't it? That the transmissibility is a little bit different than we were told.

[00:11:52]Maybe they're lying to us. Maybe you can catch this more easily. Maybe it's going to spread like CO.

[00:11:58]But wait a second. It's a cruise ship.

[00:12:00]So, if you're in a dining hall, it's about this big. If you're in a lecture hall, it's about this big. It's a cruise ship. It has poor ventilation.

[00:12:09]Everyone's breathing the same air.

[00:12:10]Everyone's touching the same thing.

[00:12:13]They're packed close together. One of the most shocking things if you go on a cruise for the first time is that the rooms are about this big. It's funny to me that people go on cruises for vacations because sometimes you go on vacation for luxury and space and to get away from or to to experience something that you don't get to experience in your regular life and instead you're like it's basically it's like a trailer park on the sea.

[00:12:37]So I think on a cruise ship, prolonged close contact is defined just a little bit differently because of the circulation of the air in these very tightly packed quarters. But the real point of this is this Harvard professor fear-mongering about the transmissibility and did it change? Is it more easily contagious? Now the critical part is actually this follow-up comment that he made. He said, "We are now at 10 confirmed positive cases from the ship, which makes sense," he said, and align aligns with number one, prior dynamics from land-based outbreak, infecting many, no close contact required, and two, what a doc on the ship shared about this experience that later cases were not close contact.

[00:13:17]Okay. Okay. So what he's saying is even though he's presenting this frightening prospect that this this could be a new strain that transmits differently actually his analysis is the number of cases on the ship align with what we know from literature prior dynamics from landbased outbreaks. It is in complete alignment with the 2018 outbreak that happened in Argentina. So let's talk about that 2018 outbreak that happened in Argentina. We actually know already how this particular strain of the antivirus works, the Andes strain, the one that is transmissible human to human because back in 2018 in Argentina, there was an outbreak of antivirus that happened at a birthday party. It resulted in 34 cases of the hivirus and 11 people ultimately died. Again, it's the case fatality rate. That sounds very scary there because that's a lot of people who died. a big percentage of the people who contracted antivirus who ultimately died from it. And in Argentina in 2018, it began at a birthday party. There were 100 guests invited to a party. They were there for about in fairly close proximity. It's a party um for 90 minutes. They spent time together. Patient zero in Argentina was uh a man whose symptoms, his fever and other symptoms had begun prior to the party. So the party I believe was on November 3rd and he had developed symptoms uh on November 2nd. So he went to a birthday party sick, very sick. He had a fever and other symptoms. You probably shouldn't go to a birthday party if you have a fever. Again, personal responsibility uh for choices.

[00:14:52]Choices have consequences. But suffice to say, this man who was patient zero infected other people. other people, those seated at his table at the birthday party, the hundred people that spent 90 minutes together, those people that seated were seated at his table, they got infected.

[00:15:08]But then there were three of the people who got infected from patient zero who drove what they called the second wave.

[00:15:17]They, for example, um transmitted it at a funeral. One one man died and at the funeral his wife who had contracted it and was symptomatic but went to the funeral anyway passed it to other people at the funeral. It also transmitted through a doctor's visit. Now the way that this Harvard professor presents it is that this was not close physical contact. That this was people that were sitting a meter away from the man.

[00:15:45]Well, it depends on how you want to define close physical contact. If you look at the spreading statistics specifically, it's actually quite interesting. So, this is this is not the Argentina case, but this is another case study from Chile. Um, of 76 index cases, and they analyze just who who contracted this and how of 76 index cases, 476 household contacts were traced.

[00:16:12]3.4% of household contacts got infected.

[00:16:16]3.4%. That's not a That's not a very high number. But what's more interesting is um 18% among sex partners. So I think you could call that close proximity. 18% transmissibility among sex partners, but just 1.2% among other household contacts. So if you live in the same house, your brother, your sister, your parent, a roommate, you have a 1.2% 2% chance of even catching the antivirus if you are a household contact versus if you um are sleeping with someone you know assumably in the same bed um exchanging fluids and everything that goes along with that then you had an 18% chance of catching it.

[00:16:57]The hivirus has a long incubation period fairly long if you want to believe the PCR test. It's between 5 to 15 days that a PCR tests positive before symptoms show up. Suffice to say, what Professor Joseph Allen is presenting to get attention is this scary idea that somehow this Andes strain on the Dutch cruise ship now from April and May 2026 is transmitting differently than we've seen in other Andes antivirus outbreaks before, which isn't true. and he admits that in a following post by saying it actually tracks how this was how humanto human transmission has happened in the past.

[00:17:39]So in the past we have seen a low level of transmission with people who are in the same vicinity in an enclosed area with an infected symptomatic person. But you are most likely to get it if you have very close physical proximity like a spouse, a sex partner of an infected person.

[00:18:00]So what is different about this Andy's strain? What is what is the different what is different about this behavior?

[00:18:07]Well, nothing is different about this behavior. And both of those outbreaks that have happened in the past that have been published in medical journals were contained because the RORO, the number of people who were infected from one infected person is very low.

[00:18:26]It's very very low. It's not within the realm of pandemic risk because it is so low.

[00:18:34]So then we have a biophysicist and a molecular epidemiologist like big nerd area we're talking here named Dr. Martin Zezy and I want to read to you what he says. He says my scientific and medical opinion as a scientist who did research on antivirus is that an inquiry into Dr. Burks is warranted. He said first and foremost we studied antivirus in my lab for many years and published about it.

[00:18:57]So what follows is accurate by someone who did this.

[00:19:03]By the way, you got to love X because it allows citizen journalists, people who are actually knowledgeable about a topic to um to be the voices that people listen to. Without X, this would not h be happening. We'd have Megan Mardle at the Washington Post telling us that in her opinion, the rational thing to do is lock down. This guy actually studied antivirus. This is what he says. Hivirus is a um zunosis monitored by many defense depth and I was one of those army scientific officers.

[00:19:38]Type my name he says and antivirus and you'll see nonclassified peerreview research. This woman Dr. Burks is guilty as charged because she was one of the architects of the SARS COV2 debacle where she forced with her friend, Professor Neil Ferguson of Imperial College London the policy of zero COVID aka as a suppression policy. He says zero COVID for a zunosis. It was not possible, not even a policy, only a ploy to bring about a technology that was not ready to the market. The RNA vaccines one can never eradicate meaning zero COVID a zunosis when 600 plus mamal 600 plus mamalian species cles all our pets zoo animals deer even minks share a virus with us and may play pingpong that is getting it from us and giving it back to us now he says she's at it again with the same old lies and misconceptions viruses humanto human contamination is very rare for the EU strains of this this is the nonandes strains he says one gets disinfected, crawling in the woods and literally inhaling rodent poop and urine, a bit like snorting coke. He says the operational army personnel is at risk because that is part of their training and their job. And it essentially has no lethality, but one can get sick and can get complications if not treated, like a bacterial colonization of our lungs. He said for the US strains, the Numbre um Andes, there is a slight increase in humanto human transfer, but it remains rare and requires continuous contact with symptomatic people for a while, like in a family or like a confined room with the HVAC of that cruise ship, for example, where they kept people in their cabins for a while, which was the ultimate stupidity. So, think recycled air. So, even if you weren't technically in the same room as the infected person, you were breathing the infected air from that infected person because you were forced to stay in your cabin. Maybe they should have all gone up on the deck where they could breathe fresh air. But the experts knew better, right? He says just passing by someone who coughs or giving a hug like in the case of a flu will not do it. Mortality nearly only when non-treated. That is an important point, a very important. He says why no PCR to find out. He said, "PCR testing can never be used for a fishing trip.

[00:21:52]It's because, and it is known for ages, it has a very low pre-est predictive value. After symptoms, however, in order to ascertain and or to differentiate between different pathogens, PCR can be perfectly legit. But symptomatic PCR will create fake cases like the 80% false positives obtained for SARS COV2 during COVID. He said hivirus has a long incubation period, a few weeks, but can only be contagious with symptoms. These appear um in general after 15 to 18 days on average, and they're flu-l like. So before any symptom, no contagion. This is from a scientist, a molecular epidemiologist who studied antivirus in his lab. He said, "What about vaccines?"

[00:22:34]He said, "No matter what they tell you, antiviruses are zunosis." So no offering so offering a mass protection unless as I just explained via a vaccine is useless and ineffective. This is true for any zunosis because to really mitigate such transmission vaccinating humans only would be useless because as he mentioned it can be transmitted between different species, different mammals. So vaccines are non-needed he said and besides especially not those RNA based ones and then he says treatments do exist. First of all, we have when confronted with symptoms, treat those like for any flu-l like syndrome. If and when bacterial sir infection arises, antibiotics are in order. His specific molecules do also exist. And then he names one. He said riboiron is an enzyme blocker of the enzyme of the ha virus. But he said there is better. any medication and drug which interferes with the acidification of late n uh endoomes will prevent ha to reach the biochemical interior of the cell. And he goes and here we find hydroxychloricquin. Yep. And it has been published see here. And he shows a study about chloricquin which is a close sister drug of a of hydroxychloricquin um as an antimmalaria drug as effective prevention for antivirus infections. He says, "Look at the author list on this study. The author list is ironic. This comes uh from a lab of one of Dr. Burks's friends."

[00:24:05]He said, "I want you all to understand the next sentence. This bug he's talking about the antivirus is a nonpro. It's pure media manipulation." He says, "In Belgium, for example, we have each year between 150 and 350 cases of antivirus patients. We do not lose them," he says.

[00:24:21]and no one has ever heard about it because it is a nonpro. He said in the US with the Andes strain, one has more chances to die from a lightning strike than from a antivirus infection. In the US, roughly 30 cases a year and 10 deaths. Lightning strikes 20 deaths per year and several hundred cases per year too. And he said, "No, gain of function research of this germ is not an easy act. It is not a new ha. The cerology, not the PCR, will prove that." So he then calls out Dr. Dr. Burks and says, "So, I hereby request that an inquiry into Dr. Burks's statements be made, her full list of conflicts be researched, and that HHS refers her to the Department of Justice for the spread of false information with ill intent as outlined in this post." And signs it, "Professor Dr. Martin Zz." He is not only a medical doctor, he is a PhD, as I said, in molecular epidemiology. He was a former UN bioweapons inspector. He is a person who actually has dealt with the hivirus before. So that brings us back to the beginning, does it not? Is hivirus a deadly mutated SCOP? Well, let's deal with this in in individual pieces. Is antivirus deadly? Yes, it is.

[00:25:33]It has a high case fatality rate if you contract it. One out of every three people who contract it in the United States die from it. It doesn't mean it's inevitable. It means you actually have a higher chance of surviving it than dying from it if you contract it. But that's a high case fatality, right? So yes, it is deadly. Is it mutated? Well, it does not appear to be mutated. No, it has a 99% This particular strain from this Dutch cruise ship in April and May of 2026 has a 99% DNA match with the 2018 Andes strain of the antivirus that caused the outbreak in Argentina. If it was a new mutated deadly because of increased transmissibility strain of this virus, it would not have a 99% um similarity to that to that Andes strain from Argentina from 8 years ago.

[00:26:23]So, no, it does not appear to be mutated. Deadly, yes. Mutated, no. Is it a SCOP?

[00:26:30]Well, the answer to that, I think you know the answer to that is yes. It is a scop by the media and the public health officials and perhaps the big pharma shills and some government officials who want you to fear it so that they can control you. For example, this is not an organic grassroots effort. This is not a story that has gone viral because everyone is interested in it. This is a constructed effort to make you focus on the antivirus to instill fear in you about the antivirus. Dr. Peter Corey noted that in the past several days all around the world there have been 100,000 articles written about the antivirus from as it relates to this cruise ship.

[00:27:22]Listen to what Dr. Corey says. Take a listen.

[00:27:25]really kind of intrigued me more tell you about what you said is is a colleague told me that there was like a 100,000 articles written around the world on haunt virus in the last couple of days and that's not typical for a haunt virus outbreak. Certainly there's always attention and people get scared, but like that's the other thing with co it was co co 24/7. And then when you told when you said in your intro about how it seems to be driven by influencers, I I'm sorry if I'm getting too like uh I don't I actually never want to use the word tin hat cuz I'm not a tin hat, but I I these patterns are are anomalous. Why? With just this little outbreak of a few cases suddenly like it's consuming the world's media cycle. Like for instance, Amman talking about it today. What you know it's because it's being driven by something.

[00:28:17]>> Yes, I think it is being driven by something. So, is it deadly? Yes, it can be.

[00:28:26]Is it a mutated strain? No, it does not appear to be a mutated strain.

[00:28:30]Therefore, we know how it behaves. And it includes no pandemic potential because it's transmitted human to human through prolonged contact, not a quick respiratory transmission. Is it a SCOP?

[00:28:44]I think most definitely it is a scop.