أثيوبيا تتهم مصر بخنقها ومنعها من الوصول للبحر ..هل فعلا مصر تفعل ذلك ؟

Añadido: 2026-05-26

[00:00:05][Music] [Music] [Music] My friends, good evening to you all. Greetings to you all.

[00:00:28]Welcome to our channel, Al-Marsad Al-Khabti, and to the Wand Al-Daw’ channel, thanks to God.

[00:00:36]Today, God willing, we will have with us the esteemed professor and thinker, Professor Mohamed Saad Khairallah, the writer and thinker currently in Sweden. Before we welcome Professor Mohamed Saad Khairallah, we will discuss the topic of Ethiopia and the strained relations between it and Egypt, and the Ethiopian accusations against Egypt of trying to create obstacles and prevent it from having safe access to the sea, meaning to the ports, so that it can develop its economy. But before I talk about this topic, I want to reassure you, because yesterday we discussed the case of Irene, the Coptic girl who had been missing since last Wednesday from the Monastery of the Virgin Mary in Minya. She has returned safely. She is a child, as we say, 16 years old. Thank God, she has returned safely to her family. Of course, I won't say anything more than that people are thankful, as I said, perhaps because On my page, and to those who follow me on my page, I wrote to thank the police, but thank them for what? She protected the kidnapped girl and the kidnappers, because ultimately we've made it a family matter, a family dispute. Don't upset the police or anyone else; let's keep it a family dispute, not an attempt to influence. Some people ask, " How could she get engaged in a monastery?" I told them, " Even if it's an attempt to influence a 16- year-old girl, it's a crime. The perpetrator should n't be punished, but unfortunately, in our country, no one has held anyone accountable to this day for the kidnapping of Coptic women. Because of impunity, these crimes continue to be repeated." I don't want to dwell on this because we have our friend, Mr. Mohamed Saad Khairallah, with us. Let's welcome him so we can begin our program today.

[00:02:18]Good evening, Mr. Mohamed.

[00:02:20]Good evening to you, my dear friend, and to your esteemed viewers and the viewers of "Wamdh Al-Daw'a" (Glimmer of Light) from Khairallah. So, today, you might be following the news with us. There are Ethiopian accusations, as I mentioned at the beginning, that Egypt is trying to stifle it and prevent it from reaching safety, or something like that. I don't know how to put it.

[00:02:41]We'll learn about its natural right to the Red Sea in this episode, for the sake of its economic development—a peaceful objective. But before we get to that, I want you to know a little about Ethiopia: its size, population, ethnicities, rulers, and its historical relations with Egypt. You know Ethiopia's long history.

[00:03:01]Go ahead, Mr. Mohamed. So, we're talking about a country located in the Horn of Africa, as everyone knows. It's bordered by Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya. Ethiopia's area is 1,104,000 square kilometers, a very large area. Its population is 134 million, making it the second most populous country after Nigeria. Of course, its terrain consists of high plateaus and plains, and the most important thing flows from its lands: the Blue Nile, which represents a major part of the Nile's waters. Religiously, the majority are Christian, especially the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, alongside a large percentage of Muslims and ethnic groups such as the Oromo, Amhara, Tigray, Somali, and Afar. This diversity was... A source of strength, but at the same time, it often caused tensions and internal conflicts. The system of government, of course, went through many phases: an empire, then a Marxist regime led by Mengistu Haile Mariam, then a centralized regime led by the Eritrean People 's Liberation Front, culminating in the rule of Tessalin, the predecessor of Abiy Ahmed.

[00:04:44]Ethiopia used to have direct access to the sea, but after Eritrea's independence in 1993, it became a landlocked country. Therefore, it strives with all its might to gain access to the sea—it's doing the impossible, my friend. So, that's regarding Ethiopia, its situation, and its ethnicity. I agree with you, and I say that in Ethiopia—my estimates are that approximately 63 % or more are Christians, and about 36% are Muslims. So, these are roughly the percentages.

[00:05:33]Yes, I said the majority is Christian. That's correct. And the Tigrayans ruled for a long time, as you said, the Tigrayans who were in the north. This also contributes to the tensions between them and Eritrea. Let's move on to another topic: Egypt's relations with Ethiopia in the past. Before the time of Hadshepsud, there was talk that Egypt reached these areas. Then, during the time of Ismail—you may have read about Ismail's era—there was also an Egyptian campaign to Ethiopia. Then we move on to the time of Haile Selassie and the Orthodox Church, its intervention, and his relationship with Nasser. Then, when we move on to the time of Sadat and the Ogden War, the story is long. Tell us about all of this, historically, up to the present day. I'll give you a summary, of course, because this question itself deserves an episode. And the scenes might even be worth turning into a film or a series of dramatic episodes. Yes, we're talking about ancient times when Egypt was great, pioneering, and unique. There was a connection between Pharaonic Egypt and the land of Bond, which is believed to have been a friendly part in the Horn of Africa of the empire that sought to expand its influence.

[00:07:05]This was the era of Ismail. Expanding southward led to confrontations with Ethiopia. Perhaps some people don't know that there was a confrontation in a famous battle called the Battle of Gundet, and unfortunately, the Ethiopians managed to defeat the Egyptian state, and the Egyptian forces returned to where they came from.

[00:07:35]Relations between Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Egyptian government improved, thanks in part to the relationship between the Coptic Orthodox Church and its counterpart, the Egyptian Coptic Orthodox Church.

[00:07:49]This greatly reduced tensions, and there was a period of calm. But let's also say that this calm with one of the most prominent and populous countries in Africa was not utilized optimally by Gamal Abdel Nasser. Instead, he supported many tensions within Africa. Look, Magdi, things won't improve until we confront ourselves properly.

[00:08:29]Egypt, unfortunately, especially after 1952, adopted a policy that didn't aim to establish and solidify its African dimension through logical relations. Political and diplomatic relations, which fall within the frameworks and diplomatic norms of states, have been pursued by Egypt in a different direction.

[00:08:55]This approach is interventionist, characterized by supporting minorities, fueling wars and conflicts, and igniting confrontations. We have always, always, always been referring to the double-speak that the Egyptian state has been addicted to since 1952, claiming that the state is a factor of stability and peace everywhere. However, what is happening under the table is the complete opposite. The Egyptian state is always stirring up tensions and conflicts.

[00:09:30]You might succeed in deceiving many parties for a while, but you will never succeed in deceiving them forever.

[00:09:41]Currently, we are suffering because the Egyptian state has been exposed.

[00:09:50]Egyptian politics has been revealed as a major cause of all the conflicts and tensions occurring everywhere, not just in Africa. To continue, consider the relationships that were not utilized during Nasser's era, specifically during the Agadez War between Somalia and Ethiopia in the 1970s. Egypt supported Somalia politically and militarily, as I mentioned, indirectly. And then, of course, relations witnessed There was a lot of tension after the assassination attempt on Hosni Mubarak. The Egyptian state dealt with it in a way that made it seem like we shouldn't get involved in Africa. Of course, we were all against the Egyptian president being targeted, and we all condemned the attempt, especially since it was orchestrated by Islamists and Sudan's involvement. But that doesn't mean we should withdraw from Africa. It doesn't mean we should abandon places that are vital to our security. We should be present and active there, not withdraw. Since the assassination attempt on Mubarak, it's as if Egypt has completely left Africa, and Africa has become a playground for many countries. I don't blame them, but let's be realistic: these countries are working to increase their influence and presence, to be influential in international decision-making. Because today, if you're not influential in the public sphere, this needs to reach everyone who isn't influential in the global arena, with all the tools, influence, presence, dominance, control, and relationships they possess. Qatar, for example, is viewed with a certain "okay" or "fair" eye. It's not taken into account because we're in a new world. There's a new world, different from the one that existed 10 years ago. We're currently in other spheres of influence; alliances are being formed, relationships are being formed, all of this is completely outside of us, unfortunately. I mean, I want to tell you, maybe, if it weren't for Dr. Boutros Ghali—because we must acknowledge the credit due to him—he was there and maintained Egypt's African relations after the Mubarak incident. Egypt would have truly disappeared from Africa entirely. But he largely preserved Egypt's relations with Africa. The great Dr. Boutros Ghali, though, of course, being a Coptic man, if anyone else had done what Dr. Boutros Ghali did in Africa, and what he maintained as a result of his personal effort—you're talking about personal effort—because he was aware of the importance of Africa and tried in every way to maintain this level of presence. And he didn't receive the necessary appreciation from the Egyptian state. But what he did, if it were to be evaluated, if anyone else had done it, there would be squares and streets named after him today. But of course, he Of course, you know that he was the most deserving person to be in the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, given his knowledge, distinction, understanding, expertise, and culture. We keep saying you're talking about an exceptional figure in the history of Egyptian foreign affairs over decades. He belongs to the group of greats who founded the Egyptian Foreign Ministry. But of course, how could a Christian be the Foreign Minister of Egypt? It just wouldn't work.

[00:14:03]They brought in his students and put them in charge during the crisis, and when his students resigned, they brought in someone from the Ministry of Defense, Kamal Hassan Ali, to be Foreign Minister. Let's move on to another point, my friend, Professor Mohamed.

[00:14:18]Ethiopia had what you know before independence.

[00:14:21]Eritrea was annexed by force, and then it separated in 1993. Before the separation, Ethiopia had the two ports of Massawa and Assab in Eritrea.

[00:14:31]After the separation, or rather, Eritrea's independence, it was deprived of these two ports, and only Djibouti remained. Now, it's said that 95% of Djibouti... Ethiopia's trade passes through the port of Djibouti, and this is obviously dangerous for a country that relies on only one port and has many military bases in the country.

[00:14:55]Djibouti is a small country, and you can't guarantee what events will lead to over time. Any crisis could occur, and this evil could be eliminated. Don't you see that it's justifiable for Ethiopia to seek larger ports with more countries, or to have its own port? Do you see this, or are you not seeing it, or are you supporting the Egyptian fears?

[00:15:17]No, no, no, I'm saying this so we can talk objectively and logically, and so the viewer respects us.

[00:15:25]Yes, when I address an issue in writing or analysis, I set aside my Egyptian identity. I love my country, Egypt, but to be objective, I set aside my Egyptian identity. What the Egyptian state is doing, let me tell you with complete frankness and clarity, is a kind of bullying. Yes, the Egyptian state is practicing a kind of bullying, setting conditions, controlling, speaking, and issuing very, very strange statements. These statements are completely contrary to international norms. From A to Z, and I don't know what this is based on, but let me tell you that there is a kind of obstruction.

[00:16:16]Why the obstruction? Yes, of course what I'm about to say will upset the viewers, but this is the truth and clarity.

[00:16:24]I'll go back a bit and then give you an answer to the question.

[00:16:32]Egypt, on March 15th in Khartoum, signed, as you know, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) agreement.

[00:16:43]So, in 2015, the GERD agreement was signed. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi signed for Egypt, al-Bashir for Sudan, and Desalegn for Ethiopia. Regarding the articles that Egypt signed in the GERD agreement, there was talk and discussion in international circles.

[00:17:21]You know, Egypt's membership in the African Union was suspended.

[00:17:29]After that, we were supposed to have early presidential elections, according to the statement of the 37th.

[00:17:39]Yes, Egypt didn't go. People went to listen to the military spokesman's statement.

[00:17:44]Egypt didn't go to early presidential elections, and what happened, happened. The African Union, where is its headquarters? The African Union saw this as a coup and suspended Egypt's membership, and Egypt became a suspended member state. It's true that there was talk in the corridors, the gist of which was the following: [The text abruptly ends here, likely due to an incomplete source.] The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) agreement and the issue of things being finalized, or was it already signed? It was finalized before, but it was after, or a few days later, something like that. But there was an agreement. Okay, Egypt signed the ten principles.

[00:18:33]After Egypt signed the ten principles, is this signing considered a complete and blatant compromise of our historical rights to the Nile River waters?

[00:18:48]Or is it not just a compromise, but you have given Ethiopia control over the Nile River waters? Someone might say to me, " You're saying this because of a problem between you and the military regime in Egypt." I say to him, "Please, please, you shouldn't say this. I urge you to read Article 10 of the agreement." [Clears throat] And what does Article 10 say? It says the following. Here, Article 10 of the agreement says the following, and this is very important for all of Egypt to know so they understand where the problem lies, because what is supposed to happen is completely different from what is actually happening. What does Article 10 stipulate? The principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes: The three countries, which are Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan, shall settle their disputes arising from the interpretation or application of this agreement by consensus through consultations or negotiations, in accordance with the principle of... (This is a good point). Okay, the intentions are good.

[00:20:07]If the parties fail to resolve the dispute through consultations or negotiations, they can jointly request conciliation, mediation, or refer the matter to the heads of state and government. This agreement was signed on March 23rd in Khartoum. Now, I asked three international law experts because I am a political writer, not a legal scholar.

[00:20:50]Yes, and they told me that this agreement, which Egypt signed, gives Ethiopia control over the Nile River's waters. The Egyptian state can never go anywhere without the Ethiopian side's approval.

[00:21:14]And if the Ethiopian side doesn't agree, the Egyptian state has no right to go to any UN body to file a complaint. Meaning, if I go today to complain to the UN, the UN will ask me why I'm here. I'll say, "Oh, there are disputes between me and Ethiopia about such and such." The UN is an international body, or any other body will ask you, "Can we see this agreement?" I'm telling you, of course, these people are familiar with it and know it, just like you and me.

[00:21:47]Yes, can I see their agreement? He says, like they say in Egypt, "A contract is the law between the contracting parties." He tells you, "Sir, I have no problem at all resolving this, but I have a condition." You ask, "What condition?" I reply, "Go get me Sudan's approval.

[00:22:08]Go get me Ethiopia's approval, that they agree to me being the arbitrator between them." You tell him, "Well, I can only get you Sudan's approval, but I ca n't, considering that Sudan... I mean, Burhan, the man is in the military's pocket." He says, "Okay, can you get me Ethiopia's approval?" You say, "No." He says, "So what do you want me to do?

[00:22:28]You're here [clearsing] talking to me? I have no right to do this. Even this international body, if it issues an unjust ruling, Ethiopia might not comply, and there will be a complaint. So, who is it that has given away the Nile waters? Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Who should be tried? Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. He should be tried, tried, removed, and tried according to what he signed.

[00:22:54]But you're in a republic of the military. The military does what they do. I mean, the military... Nasser's Egypt brought us '67, and we took He's being studied as one of the worst in military history through confrontations between countries, and it's normal that Nasser isn't held accountable.

[00:23:13]Abdel Fattah al-Sisi can go and do what he wants and sign the Renaissance Dam agreement, no problem, he's not held accountable.

[00:23:19]But they come out in their media and newspapers and all the military sewer platforms and insult me ​​and accuse me of treason, as if Mohamed Saad Khairallah was the one who signed the Renaissance Dam agreement. Well, why don't you hold Abdel Fattah al-Sisi accountable?

[00:23:38]I'm a man who dissects things for people, I sit and dissect them and interpret them and refute them and explain them. I mean, that's my role, that's my job, that's my job, my dear. I mean, I don't know anything, it's very strange.

[00:23:52]Okay, so to continue, let's continue their insults against you, Mohamed, and let me tell you something that just came to my mind while you were talking.

[00:24:03]We know that Egyptian television is under whose control? The security apparatus has been controlling the oxygen in the air of Cairo's skies since Nasser's era until today. All the coups that took place in all countries, whether Arab or Third World, were carried out by controlling the television. That's why the television station was controlled by the sovereign authorities. I want to say that maybe I made a mistake and Ethiopia exploited it. I don't know if you're starting to understand me or not.

[00:24:39]Oh, of course, the broadcast of Mohamed Morsi's conference, the scandalous conference, what is it, Magdi? Are we reaping the fruits of this? Who is responsible for the leak? It's all in the hands of sovereign authorities. The sovereign authorities were acting out of spite towards Mohamed Morsi and were behaving very childishly. I mean, this man—I'm sorry, with all due respect— he's dead, but what can we say? He's politically incompetent.

[00:25:11]Because what the whole world saw was this scandal.

[00:25:15][Clears throat] who brought people—I mean, three-quarters of those who attended the meeting—they barely work. A group of people gathered things, and then someone told him, "I don't know what," and then the atmosphere changed, and he spoke very badly. It's all the same, it's all the same.

[00:25:34]We are building the fruits of disasters, between the plague and cholera. In Egypt, we have a military plague and the cholera of Islamic terrorism and Islamic terrorist planes, and Egyptians are reaping the sum and accumulation of this and that. The conference, let's be logical, was a kind of exposure of Mohamed Morsi, a stripping away of Mohamed Morsi, and an episode in turning the street against Mohamed Morsi. But it completely destroyed relations. Yes, and it showed what the Egyptian state is pursuing. And again, to be logical, relations today are with Africa. Egypt insists on dealing with Africa as in the old versions. Egypt doesn't grasp that there is progress, that there is development, that there is information technology, that African youth have become successful and distinguished in many countries, and that there are now very democratic African countries that are among the indicators of democracy worldwide. But the old 1960s mentality in the minds of the military is dealing with Africa, not just Ethiopia, but Africa as a whole. If it's like the old versions, no story, a story, look, we are its guardians, we are its guardians, and a condescending and arrogant speech. You, you can do many, many things when you were offering peace, but look, my friend, I always say it, yes, we have not offered Africa anything but hatred, so we reaped thirst. I'm just saying, yes, yes, we reaped thirst.

[00:27:25]Look at the language Abiy Ahmed speaks, and the arrogance, I mean, in a humiliating and degrading way.

[00:27:36]Despite my stance on the military regime in Egypt, there is a picture that was taken a few months ago at one of the international summits, and Abiy Ahmed was sitting next to the Egyptian Prime Minister. I want people to see the body language. Imagine, the Egyptian Prime Minister is turning around completely, okay, and the other one is sitting exactly like me, and this one is turning around like that and talking to him, and he didn't even bother to look at him. Can you imagine, he is answering him while looking straight ahead, and the other one is talking next to Abiy Ahmed? for him? Because Abiy Ahmed knows that you've fallen, you've fallen, my dear friend.

[00:28:23]Egypt is acting arrogantly towards Ethiopia just so people know, frankly and clearly, as if there were a poker table, playing cards, and Egypt has risked everything it has and is now squashing you. So, I'll fix your car tires, and your car won't even leave the area. We've reached this point, and the whole world is watching. But who will stand by you? No one at all will stand by you. All the shuttle diplomacy of the Egyptian Foreign Minister—yes, the Egyptian Foreign Minister—to get the world to take a stand against the Ethiopian position, he visited about 17 countries around the world. Okay, bring me just one country, just one country, that said it would stand with the Egyptian side. Everyone tells you, "No, try to resolve this, try to do something, try to do something." It's all diplomatic protocol, because that's what they say. But in reality, all the countries are saying, "God is great." So, my son, the people... your president signed it, meaning me. I'm asking myself, maybe Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, for example, had a yellow drink in Khartoum or something. It's impossible that a sane person, Magdi, would sign this agreement. I mean, how could you sign it on your own?

[00:29:57]But the man has advisors. People have been working on this file for years. I mean, how did it happen? I don't know either.

[00:30:05]Abdel Fattah al-Sisi doesn't acknowledge advisors.

[00:30:08]Abdel Fattah al-Sisi appointed Ramzi Ezz El-Din as his political advisor several months ago, in April. Right?

[00:30:17]Exactly. Right. I read a single statement by Ramzi Ezz El-Din. I saw Ramzi Ezz El-Din at any political event, unlike the political events to which Dr. Osama El-Baz used to be sent. I saw a press interview. I saw—I'm telling you—I saw a press interview by Ramzi Ezz El- Din. I saw a television appearance by Ramzi Ezz El-Din. There's nothing.

[00:30:45]I'm saying this now. Someone tell me, someone bring me a man who came to obstruct implementation and came to appease certain parties within the power structure. What do you want? Okay, after the problem of the Gulf states and the ban on Gulf rice after Egypt stood with Iran in the currently suspended war against the six Gulf Cooperation Council countries, which were being attacked with drones and missiles, there was tension within the Egyptian establishment. This isn't analysis, it's information, not political analysis. There was tension, and the first of this tension was bringing in a political advisor to appease certain parties, as if to say to them, "What do you want? I'll bring in a political advisor for assistance and help."

[00:31:38]Well, I brought in Ramzi, and Ramzi sat there, but he has no purpose or job. Because the man himself admitted it two or three times, he said, "I am a politician." He is Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.

[00:31:50]So, what is he here to do? I don't know, unfortunately. When I read about Osama El-Baz's history, the man was involved in many things and unraveled many issues surrounding Mubarak. Mubarak, despite all of us calling him a dictator, learned from Osama El-Baz in an incredible way. And the result was that he became a charismatic figure.

[00:32:14]Let's say Mubarak learned from Dr. Osama El-Baz from the time he was Vice President for several years.

[00:32:24]Magdi taught him and made him understand what it means to be a statesman.

[00:32:30]Right, I understand that he understood the basics of political work, that running a country is one thing, and working in military barracks and saying "Yes, sir" or giving orders is something else entirely. But we're talking about someone they took from their place directly to the presidential palace. And, oh, oh, he's been in power for years, my friend. Today, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is running things in a real way. Forget about justice, Mansour; he was a man who handed over power, as Amin would say. Al-Mahdi used to say, "Adly Mansour just handed over power," and I was in Egypt during that period. I know that he would receive orders from the military, and he would sign whatever they wanted. He was just a puppet, someone who carried out their every wish. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has been in power from 2013 to 2026. We've been in power for 13 or 14 years. Even if he stayed in power for 130 years, he wouldn't learn because... you're talking about someone I deeply respect.

[00:33:47]Look at the situation; you're talking about someone who is completely incapable, not just limited in ability, but utterly incapable. Okay, let's move on to the next question, or the next point. The spokesperson for the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is saying that Ethiopia is accusing Egypt. The third question, Magdi, I want to tell you something about it before we move on to the next question: the lack of ports for Ethiopia costs them approximately 2.3 billion. You're talking about a huge amount! A very large sum, I mean, yes, of course, annually. Yes, this is a large sum, and for these people, this is a large sum because their governance is largely better than, yes, much better than, many, many Arab countries. I mean, in terms of transparency, Ethiopia is much higher than us. I mean, in terms of transparency, it's true, it's not just the fear of the cost, as I told you, the fear of what might happen in Djibouti and the 95% dependence on it. The spokesperson for the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs says that Ethiopia accused Egypt of seeking to strengthen its efforts to secure access to the Red Sea, and this came days after the signing of a maritime cooperation agreement with Eritrea in Cairo. This came in a statement by the spokesperson for the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at a press conference on Thursday, in which he said that Addis Ababa accused Egypt of trying to obstruct Ethiopia's access to the Red Sea. This is what he is saying. The spokesperson says that a few days later, Egypt went—I mean, the Egyptian Foreign Minister and Kamel El-Wazir went They signed an agreement with Eritrea, and Badr Abdel-Aati stated from there that they would only allow riparian states. Okay, exactly. This is statement number [cough]. I mean, I tried to research these statements and found that this is the same statement he made, maybe number 12 or 13. The same correction: we will not allow them, and it must be only for riparian states. And I mean, there's nothing—I want to tell you, there's no material to support this discourse. I mean, Cairo's red lines— yes, there's nothing to base them on. I mean, there's nothing at all that says we should say that riparian states—this was a custom. There's a big difference in how the Egyptian state always mixes customs that existed in a certain time period with established regulations and laws. So, what is there? There's a big difference. I mean, the custom that was supposed to exist 20 or 30 years ago—it certainly changes. What doesn't change when there are regulations and laws? So, if I were to base my decision on a specific matter and take a political stance, and I were to say, "No, it won't happen," and you were to ask me, "What are you basing your decision on, Khair Allah?" I would tell you, "Come here, I'm basing it on 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. These are international conventions and international laws, and no party is allowed to violate these laws. Not even the Egyptian state, the Egyptian foreign ministry, which was once so prestigious, but which has led us into continuous crises, because it has started to confuse custom with law.

[00:38:10]Yes, this custom tells you, 'Yes, indeed, look, the customs said this, the customs said that.' These are not binding, my friend, they are not binding.

[00:38:22]You cannot, cannot, and should not base policies on them. The proof is that there are different rules in many coastal countries that participate in securing this gulf, or even in the same region. Turkey has a base in Somalia, and Turkey tried to establish a base in Sudan.

[00:38:40]Go ahead, for example. You're talking to me for a second.

[00:38:46]Go ahead, Muhammad, we have a phone call; we'll take it later."

[00:38:49]Go ahead, you're talking, my friend. Today, where are the customs that were stable 20 or 25 years ago, with the presence and influence of Arab countries that have become part of the Horn of Africa? We won't name them, because these countries realized that these customs are changing.

[00:39:13]Yes, the law is what's constant today. I'm basing this on what I'm saying to you. No, there's an agreement, there's a law, okay, but there's a custom, that's it. This custom is subject to change, and consequently, interests change. The pursuit by countries of control, dominance, and influence is logical competition. I mean, today I can't say this country or that country. I can't say to Turkey, "How can you, Turkey, be striving to have influence here, here, and here?" What would they say to you? Well, why don't you do what I did? The closest example is that I'm comparing my friend to a student who's a complete failure, while others are studying day and night, memorizing, reading, adding to their knowledge, taking lessons, and so on. I want to force everyone to be a dull student like me.

[00:40:11]You have a problem. Why are you so insistent on things proceeding within your own context, your own narrow-mindedness, and your approach of simply fueling strife and conflict? The example is clear. You could have done so many things in Sudan, too many to count or repeat. Okay, your problem is that because you don't want democracy and because you refuse any form of government other than military rule in Sudan, you've completely lost the other side.

[00:40:52]Now the other side is saying everywhere that you're a biased mediator. You forgot your lack of integrity, which got you out of the Sudanese equation. It's the same lack of integrity that gets you out of every place in Africa because you're operating with the same conspiratorial mindset. Turn Abbas against Khalil and benefit the fewest people. Have you memorized it yet? The soldiers of this policy are outdated, and it's time to draw up strategies and policies related to Egyptian national security based on wise and rational policies that reject all outdated ideas. They don't want that; they're still acting as if we're still in the past, and they insist on that in 2026.

[00:41:50]Unfortunately, unfortunately, unfortunately. Let's take this phone and then we'll continue with you. Good evening, sir.

[00:41:56]Please, go ahead.

[00:41:58]Good evening. I'm very grateful for your participation.

[00:42:01]My respect to the Egyptian thinker, Professor Mohamed Saad. Good evening, sir. The last thing you said was that we lack wise policies and actions from the regime, from the days of Nasser until now. Now, the current regime has become a religious ideology.

[00:42:26]Okay, you say my right to the water is a historical right, and my right is 55 billion cubic meters, and this is a historical right according to an agreement that happened in the days of... where England even signed it. Okay, we agree.

[00:42:46]Okay, let's go back historically. The first migration that took place wasn't The city had a Muslim migration.

[00:42:56]Yes, it wasn't to the city, it was to Ethiopia for the love of the Negus. [Clears throat] Yes, love.

[00:43:02]Yes. Well, would anyone migrate to the eastern bank of the Red Sea, a country [clears throat], or was it there? I mean, we're talking logically and historically.

[00:43:16]No, Ethiopia has always overlooked the Red Sea. And even the issue of Abraha's army, what was Abraha's army?

[00:43:27]Ethiopian, yes, I mean historically Ethiopia is a country that has the right to access the sea, or yes, yes, [clears throat], historically, basically in your Islamic history, the army buried it, and the first migration, which was before the migration to Medina, yes, it was for the Mashshi, and he was a just ruler and a Christian ruler, and exactly, so if we come to do wisdom, the actions that are happening, you are even against your religion [clears throat], against your religious history when you say no, Ethiopia is not and this is true, you are really a type, and when I say a type of thug, it means that I am not patriotic. No, I am patriotic, I love Egypt very much, I adore it [clears throat].

[00:44:18]Okay, the second side, regarding the Renaissance Dam and the organization of the Renaissance Dam, well, you have the Emirates, one of the major funders [clears throat].

[00:44:30]No, Ahmed, and the Emirates is your friend, you just sent him the shelf, or are they coming to the Emirates?

[00:44:37]Yes, why don't you go to the Emirates to sort things out, even if we won't say officially, and reassure you.

[00:44:47]Umm, thank you very much, thank you, sir, thank you Regarding your participation, goodbye.

[00:44:53]What do you think of what the esteemed viewer said? I commend the esteemed guest because his words reflect a profound understanding, and his analysis is exceptionally insightful and profoundly perceptive. It confirms what we're discussing.

[00:45:11]Look, Magdi, there's a serious problem: the Egyptian state is suffering from political stagnation. Today, we're 74 years into military rule, prioritizing loyalty over expertise and competence, and sidelining anyone with self-respect or a connection to knowledge. Everywhere you go, you bring in the lowest and least competent individuals to create a sense of distinction and uniqueness. Can you imagine having military personnel everywhere, the kind we see around us, like Kamel El-Wazir, El-Hayatmi, Hamdi Bakhit, and others, even Abdel Fattah El-Sisi?

[00:46:02]When these military figures seek assistance, they rely on copies, even civilian ones. These civilian copies are the ones they feel are truly distinguished, wiser, and possess more accumulated knowledge. Imagine that!

[00:46:17]Imagine if this minister didn't finish his term and went to get someone else. The entire minister has to feel like he's Kapka, Schopenhauer, or Nietzsche. Yes, what would that be like? It's something, I mean, something very miserable. And you can apply this to everything else everywhere. It's true, it's true.

[00:46:40]When we come to drawing up Egyptian policies for the next 15 or 20 years, outlining priorities, we have a question that's always asked in every country in the world. For example, when you come here, you find Sweden holding societal dialogues every so often. They say, "Sweden, for example, 20 or 50." Yes, where will that happen? What will go on?

[00:47:04]Societal dialogue? Bring in community representatives, bring books, bring this, bring that, bring that. Say, present, discuss.

[00:47:11]I'm talking to you about things that are still decades away. Yes, all countries work in the same way.

[00:47:19]You might tell me, " Even Saudi Arabia is talking about 20 or 30." I'm talking about 20 or 30. You might tell me, "What are the policies of the Egyptian state?

[00:47:26]20 or 29?

[00:47:28]Not 20 or 297?

[00:47:31]Or is it a country that's just surviving?" In daily life, a country living day to day means the esteemed guest on the phone is talking about the UAE's [clears throat].

[00:47:43]Yes, I'm urging people to go and read what the Acknowledgement has recently written about the UAE, the Egyptian-Emirati dispute, because Abdel Fattah al-Sisi imagined that the truce ( or what's between parentheses) announced by the Emirati side would bring him the rice he wanted. It didn't happen.

[00:48:08]Or you'll find that he's sorry, or rather, you'll find that he's exploiting the Emirati-Saudi dispute. A statement from Turki Al-Sheikh comes in saying that Egypt... I don't know what... a statement for political maneuvering, exploiting Egypt with the UAE. So the Egyptian state—the Egypt that was a state, the Egypt that had democratic elections more than 102 or 103 years ago, around 1800—there was a Consultative Assembly during Ismail's time.

[00:48:56]Yes, this Egyptian state, imagine that it has become an arena for bargaining between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

[00:49:10]Unfortunately, unfortunately, if the Egyptian Foreign Minister participated in any international forum and I went to him and said, " Tell me four main points related to Egyptian policy in such-and-such place," I swear to you, he wouldn't be able to answer. I swear to you, he wouldn't be able to answer. It's all just vague talk, not coherent.

[00:49:37]But if you ask any other foreign minister the same question, he might sit there and say, "Okay, answer me," and then, after getting the answer, he'd say, "Come on, let's go to a café together, and I'll tell you everything." I'll tell you, "We're in a very miserable, difficult, and catastrophic situation all at once, and what's coming is even more ridiculous, absurd, and worse."

[00:50:06]As long as the Egyptian state refuses to admit that the way things were managed in the past is no longer working, it's no longer working. I was just on my channel hosting writers and activists from all over the world. Look, my friend, what can I tell you? What can I tell you? And others, and others... we'll go to Somalia later, but... Let me ask you about something specific. I don't know if Egypt preempted Ethiopia out of fear that Ethiopia might try to reach the Red Sea. Did Egypt preempt Ethiopia and, following the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) issue, preempt Ethiopia and then make an agreement with Eritrea and another with Somalia, signing bilateral agreements with both? Then, in September 2023, they signed with Eritrea, in January 2024 with Somalia, and in October 2024 with Eritrea and Somalia, they provided military equipment to Somalia. Do you see this as preempting Ethiopian moves, or is it a consequence of what happened with the GERD? What exactly is Egypt doing in this regard?

[00:51:23]Egypt is deluding itself into thinking it can encircle Ethiopia.

[00:51:30]Egyptian policy is based on the delusion that it can encircle Ethiopia, except for the base in South Sudan, which you know about.

[00:51:43]These delusions, my friend, only bring us trouble. For example... Today, I'm talking to you about day 21 or 22 of the detention of eight Egyptian sailors who were kidnapped by pirates. Who do they belong to? For Somalia, Somalia, Somalia, who is Somalia?

[00:52:16]Who is Somalia? You mean every day?

[00:52:19]We remember the scene back then, the one about Nimeiri and Sadat. What were you? Sometimes we felt that Nimeiri, what do you mean? You say, one of the people of the house, sitting in Egypt, every now and then with Sadat, going here and there. Imagine, we became the president of Somalia. This Hassan Sheikh, we see him every now and then, we see him on occasion and without occasion, we see him. And the Egyptian state asked him to intervene.

[00:52:54]I mean, until now, until now, I haven't even touched the eight Egyptian sailors. They were released, and there were pleas for help from three of them, humiliating. I mean, the pleas for help were at the same time that the Egyptian army was doing exercises in the city of Obour, okay, and the Thunderbolt forces were running in the city of Obour in Qalyubia, May 14, as a reference to the declaration of the establishment of the State of Israel, May 14, and they were running after each other, training, running after each other.

[00:53:29]I mean, at that time, I would get up and feel refreshed, so I would go and run. I mean, okay, so this running was presented to people as if it were the Egyptian Thunderbolt Forces. You're doing a great feat, man! They're running, come on!

[00:53:43]People here are 90 years old and they're running for prayer. So what's so miraculous about them running? I don't know! And of course, they're chanting, "6th of October!

[00:53:54]Israel is a fantasy! When will Israel be under our boots?" And to be both ironic and ridiculous, these chants are happening while you have poor, helpless, kidnapped sailors, and people are firing bullets overhead, and you haven't lifted a finger. The Assistant Foreign Minister is in contact with the Somali Foreign Ministry, and if they respected you or gave you any consideration, this incident wouldn't have happened. And this is happening for about the fifth or sixth time.

[00:54:30]So, my friend, the story is that Egyptian foreign policy is delusional. It thinks it will encircle Ethiopia. This won't work because these are delusions that will never succeed.

[00:54:47]You're even managing this issue in a way that contradicts logic. The Egyptian reality, because of this whole Somaliland thing, imagines that it's an integral part of Somalia and has no right to it. If it gained independence, by the way, this was declared in '91, so it's been 35 years and they'll eventually achieve international recognition. I'm telling you this on my own responsibility: in the end, Somalia will achieve international recognition, and therefore everything you're doing as the Egyptian state will be in vain.

[00:55:29]Somalia, the Egyptian state, Somaliland. This was a state before Somalia, I think, right? Of course, of course, Magdy, of course. You're talking about a state that actually gained independence. It was a state occupied by Britain, and Somalia, which is the Somalia of Sisi's beloved Hassan Sheikh, was occupied by Italy. Okay, Somalia gained independence first. Pay attention, this is very important and makes a huge difference in international law and customs. The real customs, not the customs of resistance in the Republic of Honey.

[00:56:07]Yes, the established approach.

[00:56:10]This state gained independence and came willingly when Italian Somalia seceded.

[00:56:17]They said, "Let's unite."

[00:56:21]Okay, but all they found from this unity was ruin, destruction, and a close relationship. 200,000 dead, massacres, civil war, the fall of Siad Barre, Farah Hadid, and others, and more than a million or a million and a half displaced people, terrifying numbers. Okay, so what did these people tell you? They told you, "No, no, we're wrong.

[00:56:44]Thank you, goodbye."

[00:56:46]So, on what basis are you telling people that these people have no right to open an embassy in Jerusalem?

[00:56:57]You issued a statement the day before yesterday, shouting about the alleged recognition and the alleged embassy. My son, you're a normalizer, damn you! Are you that stupid?

[00:57:09]You normalized relations in 1979 and made an agreement. By what right do you refuse to let them have an embassy? This is politics of stubbornness and oppression, my friend. I mean, I received information that I wouldn't rule out at all: that Badr Abdel-Aati is nothing more than a figurehead within the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, and that generals in the Egyptian Foreign Ministry are the ones running things. Badr is just a mouthpiece, speaking only what the generals who have infiltrated the Foreign Ministry approve. The Egyptian situation has worsened dramatically since 2013. I'm telling you this as fact, not analysis. I knew this when I was a member of, or rather, when I organized, a delegation to travel to the European Parliament to discuss June 30th.

[00:58:17]Some of the staff, who are quite prominent figures in the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, told me there was a state of internal strife within the ministry because, unfortunately, things were moving in circles. This is a picture of the Somaliland ambassador with the Israeli president.

[00:58:49]Somaliland is the first country to officially recognize it.

[00:58:52]Ethiopia didn't precede them, even though everyone expected Ethiopia to exploit the situation and recognize Somaliland in exchange for safe passage and the construction of a port.

[00:59:02]But keep in mind that Ethiopia has very special relations with them, and yes, it has n't recognized them yet. The Egyptian apprehension—and we want to remain neutral—isn't about the port, Mohamed. The Egyptian apprehension is that Ethiopia... It was announced that it will not only take a port, but will take a piece of land or an area of approximately 22 meters, which is a large area on the sea, which is Swaland, and it will build a base and a port, a military base and a port. So the Egyptian fear is said not because of the port, but because of talk about the military base that has not been confirmed yet. I mean, I have not read that there is talk about a military base that has been confirmed in reality, and this talk, let me tell you, is contrary to logic. Why?

[00:59:55]Because if a country is seeking international recognition, and other countries recognize it, it won't necessarily establish a military base. The port issue is settled; it's been agreed upon and is now public knowledge. People are discussing it openly, and there's nothing in international law that prohibits it. However, the idea of establishing a military base hasn't been discussed or proven. It's just talk; it's not proven. It's neither logical nor wise to adopt policies unless they are based on tangible realities. It's also illogical to stand in the way of history. Today, this country possesses everything that necessitates international recognition. Let me be frank and clear: once Israel is recognized by the UN, many, many more countries will follow. You should observe the situation from the 26th to the 30th of this four-year period and see what happens, my friend.

[01:01:19]I hope our viewers will revisit this episode; it's available on YouTube.

[01:01:27]What is this other Egyptian fear? That the growing relationship between Somaliland and Israel frightens Egypt.

[01:01:36]Israel's control over the southern entrance to the Red Sea is a concern for Egypt. I don't know if Egypt's fear is justified, especially considering what the Houthis are doing in the Red Sea. Yet, Egypt is still afraid of an Israeli presence. And do n't just talk to me about the Israeli presence; talk to me about the ambiguous Emirati presence. They have clear economic relations with Egypt, but an ambiguous role in Somaliland, an ambiguous role in Sudan supporting the Rapid Support Forces, and an ambiguous role with Ethiopia, reportedly even in the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. This Emirati role is what we can't seem to understand.

[01:02:10]Talk to us about it, clarify the picture a bit.

[01:02:14]Okay, Magdi, go ahead.

[01:02:16]You know I like to be very frank and clear. Right, right, right.

[01:02:21]You, the Egyptian state, are fed up with the Emirati role, which is focused on resources.

[01:02:28]Right? From Yemen to Somalia, every single country, every single one of them is telling you, "I have become a leading nation." And I'm capable of managing ports like no one has before. I mean, I'm currently among the top four or five in the entire world in resource management. This is according to all the specialized bodies that speak through respected reports. So, today you're trying to convince me that you're upset about the growing influence of the UAE regarding maritime ports everywhere. Well, first of all, why are you warning the UAE about Egyptian ports?

[01:03:17][Laughter] Guys, I'm just laughing because the whole thing has become a joke. I mean, Magdy, you're sitting there complaining and telling me, "I won't allow it, I won't allow it to grow, I won't allow your hand to extend to the Horn of Africa, and extend to the Arab world, and extend to I don't know where else." Well, first of all, my dear friend, why did you let me into your home and start giving me your resources? I mean, isn't this a question that should be asked? It's a logical question, of course, but what does the Egyptian state want? I'm truly astonished, Magdy. I'm speaking logically, not because I have a problem with... The system is completely different. I have a problem with the system. The system was a system that ran the state, but Egypt is my country. I swear I'd give my life for it, literally. But we have to talk logically.

[01:04:22]Today you're arguing, and today you're giving the whole world a headache, and you're talking in some circles about the [clearing of throats] growth of the Emirates.

[01:04:32]Okay, my dear, the Emirates control almost all your ports. So, shouldn't national security be the priority? You're talking about national security, but shouldn't national security be the priority, my dear, my dear, great, revered, and venerated leader, the one who has never been anything like it? Shouldn't your internal national security be the priority? Of course, there should be more security than external security, or am I wrong?

[01:05:03]Right, why did you willingly let the Emirates have a long reach over almost all Egyptian ports?

[01:05:12]It's not just the ports.

[01:05:15]We're talking about the topic of the episode. Yes, it's better.

[01:05:19]Okay, that's a question. Why?

[01:05:24]How can I believe you? How can I believe you when you're talking about national security if your national security is confined to the walls of your bedroom? Okay, I imposed it, and I'm here. I don't blame the Emirates at all. I don't blame any country in the world, my dear. In politics, you're not at Mama Najwa's place today.

[01:05:44]Politics is always about interests, not just favors. And how can you act today? How can you be a country that's a difficult number in the equation?

[01:05:55]Look, today the Emirates has a reference point in the international equation, my friend. In international decision-making, it has a reference point.

[01:06:02]Where are you?

[01:06:04]Where have you left us?

[01:06:06]You have made us underground. You adopt something and restrict it. The world does not respect you at all. I am talking to a princely person who specializes in your writings and research in this field.

[01:06:21]Yes, he told me, who can believe Egypt?

[01:06:24]Or who can believe Egypt?

[01:06:27]Yes, Egypt comes and speaks, and people listen from here, and the words come out from here. He told me, who can believe you if you are of course giving up the ports to the Emirates internally? So how can I believe you? But you tell me I don't want Israel here, that it comes for influence.

[01:06:46]On what basis? Wasn't Israel the one that attacked once, twice, and three times? Al-Hawsi, right?

[01:06:53]So you approached Al-Hawsi?

[01:06:56]No, even though he threatened us more than he threatened Israel.

[01:06:58]So, did Al-Hawsi threaten you more or did he threaten Israel? I say more than Israel. Al-Hawsi, Suez, oh state, we are supposed to be among those with no external income. Okay, we are talking about resources. You say external resources and dollar returns. This is remittances from Egyptians abroad, number one.

[01:07:24]Number two, the Suez Canal, number three, tourism and tourist groups. Doesn't the Egyptian state say this too? Or am I wrong? Okay, you're number two. You have what's happening through the Suez Canal. What have you done for the Houthis? You haven't done anything. So you haven't done anything for the Houthis, and you want people to believe that Israel has imperial dreams in the Horn of Africa and expansionist ambitions? That's talk that does n't even deserve a response, my friend.

[01:07:57]Okay, let me move on to something else. I'll ask you two more questions based on your answer. I'll tell you, isn't Ethiopia's presence in this area better? It could resist the Houthis, it could resist the Somali pirates, better than not being there. If it establishes a base in Somaliland, it's because it's a major power.

[01:08:20]Ethiopia is a major power, a large country, and it will certainly have significant strength. It can resist the gangs that are spreading. And I want to ask you, is there a Saudi-Turkish-Egyptian alliance against Ethiopia and the UAE? I wo n't say "Thamland," but Ethiopia, the UAE, and Israel are in this region.

[01:08:45]Okay, those two questions are enough because I've finished. That's all. One last thing, go ahead.

[01:08:50]Okay, the first question is, what's the point?

[01:08:52]I'm telling you, I see that we're criticizing and afraid of Ethiopia, and afraid of an Ethiopian military base in Somaliland. I'm saying that it might be a means of defending this region, from which the Houthis are attacking us or affecting our income from the Suez Canal. I want to tell you, the French too, I want to tell you that it's not Ethiopia's policy to deal harshly with any party, except for historical animosities resulting from secession and the like. That's true, yes, but other matters will be resolved logically and through agreements, without resorting to military confrontations and tensions, because it's a country that wants to build a sound future, wants to improve the per capita income, wants to progress and develop. And to be objective, I'm not Egyptian here, not Ethiopian, but I want people to go and see the rising figures for economic growth, education, and so on. It's a country And he took it, meaning the story is clear in the future, clear in a clear, upward line in all fields and in all places, very clear. So it's not part of the Ethiopian plans to have a harsh approach. The Flying Wolf's Head seems to be learning from it.

[01:10:35]You know, the confrontations that are between Iran on one side and Israel and America on the other, the Houthis are acting as if they didn't exist.

[01:10:49]Right, right, pretending to be asleep. Yes, exactly. People said, " What is this?" Because he learned from the Flying Wolf's Head. So, whoever learned from the Flying Wolf's Head now knows that things won't stay like this and that he's on edge. Therefore, don't forget that there will be Ethiopian-Israeli alliances, and the relations are very special.

[01:11:16]Don't forget the relations between Somalia and Israel, which are very special. So, the Houthis know that any confrontation with any proposal from these parties will have Israeli assistance, which was present and strong in the Emirates and which was with the Emirati success, just so they would be right. And the Emirati youth who accepted the trial, well done, in the downfall, meaning Approximately 95 or 96% of the weapons and drones being launched—that answers the first question.

[01:11:55]The second question is about Turkey, a Turkish-Egyptian-Saudi alliance against a coalition that could be described as Ethiopian- Emirati-Israeli, essentially operating in the south.

[01:12:10]Look, my friend who's betting on Turkey, well, he has a huge problem understanding what Erdogan wants. You're talking about someone who clearly wants, and his program is based on, restoring the Ottoman Empire.

[01:12:35]All his policies and his approach are based on this.

[01:12:39]He adopts this rhetoric, especially since, as you know, some electoral districts in Turkey have been canceled, and there are confrontations. The Turkish Central Bank has injected a massive amount of billions of dollars to prevent things from falling apart. He's selling his position, and so on. He's selling domestically, saying, "I'm going to bring back the empire that was, the Ottoman Empire that was." So, naturally, when someone adopts this approach, and he's already there, go see where he is today in Syria, cutting off territory. Yes, and how is it present? And it became the reference point in Syria, and it goes back to the meeting between Trump and al-Sharaa, which was attended by Mohammed bin Salman.

[01:13:32]The meeting only happened when Erdogan was summoned and he attended the phone call, and we all heard how the story unfolded.

[01:13:44]Well, if you go to Africa, then it's a whole other story. I mean, the Turkish presence in the Horn of Africa is what makes Egypt reconsider its calculations. I'm astonished, I'm very astonished that the priorities are nonexistent. I mean, who are you afraid of today? You're going there deluding yourself that the Turks might be with you, my son. These people are even your own worst enemies.

[01:14:13]How can they be with you? Just like you were deluding yourself that you could reach a specific agreement with them regarding Libya, for example. Okay, and that's another matter.

[01:14:25]Yes, in a case I don't know, Magdi, I'm astonished and saddened because this Egyptian Foreign Ministry, my brother, it's very frustrating that the performance has reached this dilapidated level, that you adopt very strange things, things that are in reality against your national security, just to spite, spite. So you want to spite so-and-so, this country, or perhaps you want to undermine something, I don't know what, by adopting things that are against your own interests? Truly, without a doubt, I don't know... I mean, unfortunately, unfortunately, it's true.

[01:15:02]I completely agree with you, and Ethiopia has the right, by the way, regarding the Nile issue.

[01:15:08]It has the right to development and the right to utilize the water to develop and have electricity. A country that didn't have electricity before has the right to all of this. And instead of cooperating and coordinating with it, the largest country in Africa, Egypt is losing it in a very strange way, as you say, unfortunately, unfortunately.

[01:15:29]Thank you very much, and thank you to all your viewers. You made us happy tonight. Thank you, Professor Mohamed. Thank you, my friend. Thanks to all the esteemed viewers.

[01:15:37]We hope and wish for a participation in the Qubti observation with our dear friend Magdi on his very distinguished channel, which is truly very important regarding the affairs of the Copts in Egypt, who are facing catastrophic conditions on all levels, even the proposed laws that concern their present and future.

[01:16:11]Disastrous means it kills the desire for subjugation, domination, Islamization, and control. I hope people will subscribe to the Coptic Observatory channel and, of course, my channel, "A Flash of Light from God's Grace," so that we can always bring you the latest. My regards.

[01:16:35]Thank you very much, Professor Muhammad, and thank you for your kind words. Good night. Thank you, goodbye.