Strange Developments Near Beijing Are Raising New Questions About Xi

Added: 2026-06-05

[00:00:00]So today I want to walk you through several recent developments that in my view point to the fact that Xiinping is losing the PLA to his opponents. Uh the first two developments center on the city of Baoing which is located about 90 miles southwest of Beijing. Now Baing has long been a strategically important city for the CCP leader. It's not only the outer defensive ring of Xiinping's signature Shongan project or what do you call that? Shan, the the new capital Shan, but also a key gateway protect protecting Beijing's uh southern southern flank. More importantly, one of CCP's most politically sensitive and strategically important military formations uh the 82nd group army is headquartered there. So, let's start with the sudden removal of Baing's party chief. Uh his name is Dang Xiaolong. So he is from Fuing County in Shangi province. Now in today's Chinese political environment, the words Shangi fuing carry special meaning or significance. They are associated with associated with Xiinping's hometown networks, political patronage and personal loyalty because Fuing is Xiinping's ancestral hometown. Uh so not only this Dang Xiaolong is from Fuing, he also went to Chinua University, the same college as as she he has long been regarded as a trusted political ally.

[00:01:33]And in some circles he has even been referred to as Shicha as Xiinping's political godson. Um in Chinese we say so basically he is someone entrusted with the responsibility of guarding the strategic city of Baing. And there's another reason why this Daolong's removal has attracted so much attention.

[00:01:57]He also served as the first secretary of the party committee of the Baud military subd district. That role placed him within the political structure overseeing one of the PLA's most sensitive regions. After all, the 82nd group army uh is headquartered in Baldin. And this is why some believe his position was far more important than his formal official rank may suggest.

[00:02:24]However, despite his background, authorities suddenly announced his removal. First, it was announced in the middle of the night, as if the authorities couldn't wait. Second, there's no mention of his next move. Uh, in CCP's political vocabulary, officials who are removed are often given a face saving phrase uh such as he's assigned to another position uh without elaborating what it is. This time there is no such explanation at all. there's no mention about anything about his reappoint or reassignment.

[00:03:02]Um and then even the most intriguing part of his removal is the identity of his replacement. A man whose name is called Jaong. A view of this Jaong's career reveals a striking pattern. His most significant promotions coincided with the decade during during the time that the the late premier Nikang exercised influence over China's economic and development um apparatus or bureaucracy. So Jao this Jao Wong emerged from the national development and reform commission system and is widely viewed as a technocrat uh rather than a member of Xiinping's traditional political camp. So in many ways he represents the bureaucratic legacy of the state council associated with Lie Ko Chang's era. Now, you know that Liko Chang was Xiinping's premier for 10 years, but the pair didn't see eye to eye. There are widespread rumors that accuse Xiinping of being responsible for Lee Kochan's mysterious death after his retirement. Observers quickly noticed the implications. The CCP organization department has replaced Xiinping's political godson with a figure who has strong ties to the Liang era technocratic system in one of the most strategically sensitive positions.

[00:04:32]This does not look like a routine uh local personnel reshuffle. Instead, it suggests that control over the areas surrounding Beijing may be undergoing uh a broader reorganization in the direction that doesn't favor Xiinping.

[00:04:48]And that bring us to the second development. So, let's talk about Baoing. Um the reason Baing matters so much is very simple. The 82nd group army is headquartered there. Now this 82nd group army occupies an extraordinarily sensitive position because of its proximity to Beijing. Uh its importance is such that no faction can afford to allow it to become anyone's private army. Even a small informal network of political loyalties within such a unit could have profound implications for the balance of power at the highest levels of the party. Now the 82nd group army uh use it traces its lineage to the famous 838th group army one of the most elite military units in the PLA's history and when Xiinping took over the regime he his military reforms renamed the 38th to the sec to the 82nd although the although the PLE has undergone repeated organ reorganizations over the years this unit continues to occup occupy a position of exceptional strategic importance. Its special operations units possess the ability to rapidly secure key areas around the capital and also in the capital and most and one of the examples um that that we saw was during the September military parade last year.

[00:06:14]The 82nd group army played an extremely important role in securing security inside and also around the city. So, whoever commands the loyalty of the 82nd Group Army possesses one of the closest concentrations of hard military power near China's political center. According to reports in the PLA Daily, a brigade within the army has introduced a new system requiring full transparency in sensitive administrative matters. So, to Westerners, this may sound like routine bureaucracy. In reality, it's a big deal because it strikes at the heart of how power networks traditionally operate inside the PLA. Some of the most important forms of power within the military have involved promotions, personnel assignments, budgets, right, and equipment allocations. Who becomes a company commander? Who receives funding?

[00:07:14]Who gains access to desired projects?

[00:07:17]And these decisions often form the foundation of uh of this patronage networks. Over time, such networks can evolve into personal political factions.

[00:07:29]Let's look at what the 82nd group army is doing. So according to the report, sensitive decisions such as promotions and appointment now require votes and open ballot counting on the spot. Sealed votes are opened and read publicly. In addition, the entire process is recorded on video. As if videotaping the event isn't enough, uh military discipline supervisors are onsite monitoring the process and must sign off the voting results in person and the data is then transmitted directly to higher level disciplinary authorities.

[00:08:11]So the above is PLA's definition of full transparency in sensitive administrative matters. Think about what that means in practice. Uh commanders can no longer quietly push through his preferred candidates. They are created through votes. Commasars have much less room for behindthe-scene maneuvering. A phone call from a powerful patron becomes less useful because the entire process is not open and visible. Input from uh rank and file personnel is formally incorporated incorporated in the decision- making. In other words, the system is being designed to weaken personal influence and strengthen procedural control. And I must say this is not a reform that carries a a Shiinping signature. This is why I do not see this as a routine anti-corruption campaign. I do not even see it primarily as a dis disciplinary measure. I see it as a soft political coup inside the PLA or at least inside the 82nd group army because this represents a break from a system in which promotions were often tied to personal preference and political loyalty which are hallmarks of Xiinping's management style. And this new transparent process removes much of the space for favoritism to operate. Um, when you put this development together with the sudden removal of Baing's party secretary, a very interesting picture begins to emerge. The political gatekeeper outside Beijing, I should say the the political and the military gatekeeper outside Beijing is replaced.

[00:09:55]At the same time, one of the most strategically sensitive military formations surrounding the capital begins implementing uh procedures designed to weaken the informal loyalty networks that Xiinping has been trying hard to build. So we may be witnessing a broader effort to reshape who ultimately controls the elite forces protecting Jonah and protecting Beijing. Perhaps even more intriguing is the sudden shift in official messaging. So on May 27th, Shinua reported that the central military commission had issued a new document titled several measures on strengthening the education, management, and supervision of senior military officers. So some people may argue that well this doesn't this reflect Xiinping's continuing efforts to tighten discipline within the PLA? It's some people may argue well it's a sign that Xiinping is disciplining his generals. Uh after all the document was issued under the authority of the CMC Central Military Commission and he is the chairman of the CMC. But when you look more closely both the Shinua report and the subsequent PLA daily commentary repeatedly emphasized one particular phrase. It's called strengthening the collective leadership of party committee. Now, for most people, that phrase may not sound remarkable, but for a longtime observer of CCP politics like myself, it immediately raises eyebrows because during Xiinping's era, especially over the last decade, the dominant political language inside the military has always revolved around one concept. It's called the chairman's responsibility system of the central military commission. In plain English, that means authority ultimately flows upward to the chairman or to a single decision maker, the chairman aka Xiinping. So the phrase collective leadership leadership of party committee is something not associated with Xiinping. He never uses that expression because it was created during the Deniaing era and is a terminology suggesting party elders legitimate role in political process.

[00:12:17]It's a code name that many people believe to mean the central committees coordination and decision-making body the very organization that was created last June. So in this round of coverage, the reports made no reference to the CMC chairman responsibility system, but suddenly drops or dropped the phrase collective leadership. Right? So that term has returned to center stage. That change is difficult to ignore. It's not helping those who believe Xiinping is still controlling the PLA at all. in my opinion. Uh please note this is not a random PLA editorial that somebody just pushed. This is the formal announcement or or this is the announcement the Shinua announcement and then the PLA announcement of a formal internal PLA procedure and rules. So the language here really matters. the only remaining CMC member uh the the second vice chairman of CMC the newly promoted PLA's discipline discip discipline chief Jangming um he convened what was officially called a meeting on studying Xiinping's military thought that sounds like yet another political loyalty session right on the surface it looks like well it's something to glorify Shiin ions military strategic thinking in military affairs. But look closely at who attended. The room was not filled with theater commanders, service chiefs, or group army commanders. Instead, it was dominated by discipline inspectors, political work officials, personnel officers, and carters responsible for reviewing records and conducting investigations.

[00:14:13]Almost all of the military's top operational commanders were absent. Only one deputy lever commander was in attendance. So that raises an interesting possibility. So this meeting titled studying Xiinping's military thought was not getting the attention of the PLA's or CCP's military chiefs. It's not getting the attention of their frontline commanders. it has become more or less a political studies session for the PLA's political staff. Um, now there's another highly intriguing development that received not enough attention. On the same day of that editorial, which is May 28th, state media suddenly gave prominent coverage to an uh to an old general. His name is Julie, the founding commander of PLA of the PLA artillery force or the artillery unit. And he was the highest ranking military officer killed during the Chinese civil war. But he's best known for stepping down from a key military role into a teaching job, into a teaching position. So what was striking was not the discussion of his battlefield achievements. Instead, the focus was on something else entirely, this general's willingness to give up power and step aside when necessary. And that's what makes this coverage so interesting because the real message was not about military history. It was about political behavior. The subtext seemed remarkably clear. Know when to step aside. Retire voluntarily. Give up power gracefully. Leave with dignity while you still can. And in that sense, the article felt less like historical education and more like political signal signaling. Almost a form of psychological persuasion. transfer authority voluntarily and perhaps you can preserve your legacy and dignity. So the removal of a shiinping loyalist in Baoin, the full transparency of a key PLA unit guarding Beijing, the renewed emphasis on collective leadership, and the signal of a leader's voluntary stepping down. Taken together, all of these point toward a increasingly sensitive question. Is Xiinping still controlling the military?