Survival on the Great Lakes depends on five interconnected factors: seamanship (captain's decisions and timing), ship design and construction (hull flexibility, hatch cover integrity, freeboard height), position (location relative to wave patterns), maintenance (addressing known structural weaknesses), and luck (random factors like wave angles and crack behavior). The video demonstrates this through contrasting cases: the SS Arthur M. Anderson survived the same 1975 storm as the SS Edmund Fitzgerald due to a softer hull, better hatch covers, and slightly different positioning; the SS Townsend survived the 1966 storm that destroyed her identical sister ship SS Morell because her crack stopped growing at 13 inches while the Morell's crack spread completely through in 15 minutes.
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The last anyone ever saw of the Edmund Fitzgerald, she was a green dot on a radar screen 15 mi ahead of another freighter pushing east through the worst storm Lake Superior had thrown at anyone in years. It was just 7 in the evening, November 10th, 1975.
A snow squall rolled across the lake.
The radar went blank for a few minutes, and when it finally cleared, the dot was gone.
There was no mayday, no flare, no warning of any kind. Only the last thing the Fitzgerald's captain, Ernest Msali, ever said over the radio 10 minutes before she vanished, calm as a man reading off the weather forecast. We are holding our own. All 29 men aboard were dead before the night was over. But the freighter behind her, the one that had been watching her on radar, kept grinding east through the same wind, the same 25 ft waves, the same howling November dark. And by sunrise, she was tied up safe inside Whitefish Bay. Her name was the SS Arthur M. Anderson. Same lake, same storm, two completely different endings. And that's the thing.
Almost nobody ever stops to ask. We've heard the wreck stories a thousand times over the ships. These lakes have swallowed the bodies that never came back up the songs we wrote afterward to remember them by. But on every one of those nights, in every one of those storms, there were always other ships out there. Two ships that took the exact same beating and somehow lived to tell about it. So, are the Great Lakes really the ship killers of legend? Or have we just been listening to the dead all this time and forgetting to ask the survivors?
So, let's answer that question by going back to the night that started all this November 10th, 1975, and the two ships that set out together across Lake Superior.
One of them became the most famous shipwreck in Great Lakes history. The other one made it home and almost nobody remembers her name.
The Edmund Fitzgerald left Superior, Wisconsin on the 9th, loaded with 26,000 tons of tachinite pellets headed for Detroit. A few hours later, the Arthur M. Anderson pulled out of Two Harbors, Minnesota with the same cargo headed for the same destination. The Fitzgerald was faster, so she took the lead 10 to 15 mi out in front. And the two captains, Ernest Msori and Bernie Cooper, agreed to stay in radio contact the whole way across. They both knew a big storm was coming, so they planned to hug the Canadian shore where the Highlands would give them some protection from the wind.
By early afternoon on the 10th, the weather had gone from bad to brutal winds, gusting past 50 knots seas, stacking 12 to 16 ft and climbing.
Around 3:30 that afternoon, Msori radioed Cooper with the first sign of real trouble. Anderson, this is the Fitzgerald. I have a fence rail down two vents lost or damaged, and a list. I'm checking down. Will you stay by me till I get to Whitefish?
Cooper asked if his pumps were running.
Msley said yes, both of them.
Msley slowed the Fitzgerald down so the Anderson could close the gap and keep her in sight. For the next few hours, Cooper kept checking in. How are you doing? Are you holding up? Do you need anything? And every time the Fitzgerald reported back that they were managing, they were pumping, they were okay. Then sometime around 5:20, a massive wave smashed the Anderson's starboard lifeboat clean off the deck, and Cooper knew they were in serious trouble. The wind was screaming at 70 knots. The seas had climbed to 25 ft.
Just after 7 that evening, Cooper radioed the Fitzgerald one more time to check on her. The reply came back calm and steady, the voice of a man who'd been sailing these lakes for 30 years and wasn't about to panic. We are holding our own. 10 minutes later, a snow squall rolled across the water and blanked out Cooper's radar. When it cleared a few minutes after that, the Fitzgerald's green dot was gone.
Cooper called the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard called him back and asked him to do the thing every captain dreads. Do you think there's any possibility you could turn around and go back there and do any searching?
You can hear the hesitation in Cooper's voice on the radio recording. Oh god, I don't know. That sea out there is tremendously large. If you want me to, I can, but I'm not going to be making any time. I'll be lucky to do 2 or 3 m an hour going back out that way.
The Coast Guard told him they were talking about life and death, now looking for survivors in life rafts or in the water, and they could only ask him to do his best without putting his own ship at risk. Cooper made the call.
He later said he thought to himself, "There's one ship on the bottom already, and there might be two if I go back."
But he turned the Anderson around anyway, and fought back into the storm.
When they reached the spot where the Fitzgerald had been, they found a life ring floating in the dark, some oes, a few galley storage containers, an empty oil drum. No lights, no voices, no people. Cooper believed the Fitzgerald had gone down so fast that no one even had time to get to the lifeboats, let alone launch them. The ship had just disappeared.
So why did the Anderson make it when the Fitzgerald didn't? Part of it was design. The Anderson had what naval architects call a softer midbody. The hull flexed slightly more in the middle, which meant she couldn't carry quite as much cargo as the Fitzgerald.
She carried about 1,500 tons less. That sounds like a disadvantage, but on a night when Lake Superior was doing its absolute best to break ships in half, a little flex in the spine probably saved her life.
Then there were the hatch covers. The Fitzgerald's cargo holds were sealed with massive steel covers that were supposed to be watertight, but the clamps that held them shut were famous for not being adjusted right. If even a few of those covers weren't sealed tight, every wave that washed over the deck would pour thousands of gallons of water straight into the holes. And the deck was getting washed constantly because the Fitzgerald's freeboard, the height from the water line to the deck had been reduced in the early '7s to let her carry more cargo. Lower freeboard meant more water on deck, which meant more chances for that water to find a way inside.
Cooper has a theory about what finally killed the Fitzgerald.
Around 6:30 that evening, about 40 minutes before she disappeared, he felt the Anderson lurch hard, then watched two absolutely massive waves roll across the lake, the biggest he'd ever seen in decades of sailing. They buried the Anderson's bow completely, and for a few seconds, Cooper thought his own ship might go under. He believes those same two waves caught up to the Fitzgerald 10 or 15 minutes later, hit a ship that was already listing and leaking, and just shoved her bow straight down into the water. If the hatch covers were already failing, those waves would have flooded the forward holds in seconds.
The Anderson survived the exact same storm on the exact same lake less than 15 mi away. Same gale force winds, same 25 ft seas, same November dark. The difference came down to a hull that could bend without breaking hatch covers that stayed sealed a few extra inches of freeboard and maybe, just maybe, being in a slightly different spot when those two monster waves came rolling through.
The Anderson survived because she was built differently. A softer hull, better hatch covers, a few critical inches of freeboard that kept her alive when the Fitzgerald went down. But what happens when two ships are built? Exactly the same. Same steel, same design, same year, same shipyard, and both of them caught in the same storm on the same night. Does luck even matter then, or is it just a coin flip to see which one breaks first?
Meet the Daniel J. Morell and the Edward Y. Towns End. 603 ft long, 12,000 tons, built in 1906 at the same shipyard in West Bay City, Michigan. Launched just months apart. They weren't just sister ships. They were twins, same blueprints, same rivets, same pre-1948 steel that nobody knew yet was brittle in the cold. For 60 years, they hauled ore and coal across the Great Lakes, often sailing together. And for 60 years, nobody had any reason to think one was stronger than the other.
November 29th, 1966.
The two ships were making their last run of the season together on Lake Huron.
running light. No cargo, just ballast headed north to pick up ore in Minnesota.
Around midnight, a massive storm rolled in with winds hitting 70 m an hour and waves climbing past 25 ft. The temperature dropped to 34° F, cold enough that the lake water felt like broken glass on bare skin.
Early in the morning, the towns captain made a call. The storm was getting worse and he wanted shelter. He turned his ship toward the Slair River to wait it out. The Morell kept going, pushing north toward Thunder Bay, trying to outrun the weather. By 2:00 in the morning, the two ships were about 20 mi apart, alone in the dark.
At 200 a.m., the Morell started to die.
The crew felt the ship lurch. Then they heard a sound like a gunshot echoing through the hull. The sound of 60-year-old steel snapping in half. The ship broke right in the middle, and men who'd been sleeping below deck suddenly found themselves standing on a tilting floor with freezing water pouring in.
Some jumped into the 34° lake and died within minutes. Others made it to a life raft that launched from the bow section as it started to sink.
One of the men on that raft was a 26-year-old watchman named Dennis Hail.
He was wearing boxer shorts, a life jacket, and a peacacoat. That was it.
Three other men made it onto the raft with him, but one by one over the next 38 hours, they died from hypothermia and slipped off into the water. Hail held on. He later said he slipped in and out of consciousness, hallucinating that his dead mother was there, that he was back on the Morell's deck talking to the third mate. When a Coast Guard helicopter finally spotted him on the afternoon of November 30th, he was lying next to the frozen bodies of his crew mates, barely alive.
Meanwhile, the Townsend had ridden out the storm in the shelter of the S Clair River and steamed into port at Sue St. Marie on December.
Her crew walked off thinking they'd gotten lucky. Same storm, same ship as the Morell, but they'd made it home.
Then the Coast Guard inspectors came aboard.
What they found was a 13in crack running across the deck starting at the corner of cargo hold number 10. The crack was in almost the exact same spot where the morell had snapped in half. The inspectors measured it, photographed it, and then delivered the verdict. The towns inspection certificate was revoked immediately. She was condemned. She would never sail again under her own power.
Here's the thing nobody wants to say out loud. The Townsend didn't survive because she was stronger. She survived because her crack stopped. Both ships were breaking. Both had the same brittle pre-war steel that got fragile in the cold. The same stress points in the hull. The same 60 years of metal fatigue.
The Morel's crack spread all the way through in 15 minutes and she broke in half. The town's end's crack stopped growing. Maybe because the waves hit her at a slightly different angle. Maybe because she ducked into shelter 10 minutes sooner. Maybe just because. If the storm had lasted another few hours, or if she'd stayed out on the lake a little longer, the Coast Guard would have been searching for two missing ships that night.
The Towns End was docked for almost 2 years while lawyers and insurance companies argued over what to do with her. Eventually, she was sold for scrap and towed across the Atlantic. And here's the darkest part of the whole story. On the way to the scrapyard in another storm, the town's end broke in half. 60 years of sailing the Great Lakes, one brutal night in November 1966.
And then 2 years tied to a dock. And in the end, she snapped just like her sister because that crack had always been there waiting.
Sometimes survival isn't about being tougher or smarter or better designed.
Sometimes it's just about being a few hours slower to break than the thing next to you. The Morell and the Town's End were the same ship. One of them killed 28 men in the middle of the night. The other one made it to port and died 2 years later in a scrapyard. And the only difference between them was timing.
But here's the question we actually need to ask. If both ships were identical, if both were breaking at the same time under the same conditions, why did one crack stop and the other keep going? The answer isn't as simple as luck, even though luck was definitely part of it.
There were a handful of very specific things that kept the towns end afloat just long enough to make it to shore.
First, there's the decision itself.
Around midnight on November 29th, the towns captain looked at the weather reports, looked at the waves climbing past his wheelhouse windows, and made the call to turn toward the Sinclair River, and wait out the storm. The Morell's captain decided to keep pushing north toward Thunder Bay, trying to make his delivery deadline. That decision bought the town's end about 2 hours in calmer water. 2 hours where the waves weren't slamming into her hull at full force. 2 hours where the crack in her deck wasn't being flexed and twisted and pulled wider with every swell.
Second, there's the way the crack itself behaved. When old steel gets cold and 33° F is cold for pre-war ship steel, it doesn't bend. It shatters. Engineers call it brittle fracture. And it happens fast, like dropping a frozen water pipe on concrete. The Morell's crack started at a stress point near cargo hold number 10, spread across the deck, raced down through the hull plating, and within 15 minutes, the ship was in two pieces. The Townsend had a crack in almost the exact same spot, but for reasons nobody can fully explain, it stopped spreading after 13 in.
Some engineers think it had to do with loading. Both ships were running in ballast. No cargo, just enough weight in the holds to keep them stable. But ballast distribution isn't an exact science. If the Townsen's ballasted tanks were filled slightly differently, even by a few hundred tons, the stress on her hull would have been distributed differently, too. Maybe that small difference meant the crack hit a rivet line or a seam weld that was just strong enough to stop it from spreading further. Maybe it didn't. We'll never know for sure.
Then there's wave direction. The storm on Lake Huron that night wasn't just wind and water. It was chaotic.
Waves coming from the northwest cross waves from shifting wind rollers bouncing back off the Canadian shore.
The two ships were 20 m apart, which doesn't sound like much, but on a lake during a gale, 20 m can mean completely different wave patterns. If the morel caught a series of waves that hit her broadside just as her hull was already flexing, that could have been enough to push the crack past the point of no return. The town's end in a slightly different position might have taken the same waves at a slightly different angle enough to stress the hull, but not enough to finish the job.
And finally, there's the thing nobody likes to talk about, but everybody knows is true. Randomness.
Metal fatigue isn't uniform. A ship that's 60 years old has been stressed and flexed and loaded and unloaded thousands of times. And every one of those cycles creates microscopic cracks and weak points scattered throughout the hull. Some sections are weaker than others, and you can't predict where until it's too late. The Morell and the Townsend were built from the same blueprints, but they weren't built from the same atoms. One hull had a weak spot that gave way. The other had a weak spot that held barely.
When the town's end was finally inspected and that 13in crack was discovered, the Coast Guard didn't just condemn her because she was dangerous.
They condemned her because she was lucky. And they knew the luck had run out. The crack had stopped, yes, but it hadn't healed. It was still there, waiting for the next storm, the next wave, the next cold snap to pick up where it left off. letting her sail again would have been like sending a man with a half severed artery back to work and hoping it didn't finish tearing.
So, the town's end survived in the narrowest possible sense of the word.
She made it to port. Her crew went home to their families, but she never sailed again. And two years later, when she was being towed to a scrapyard across the Atlantic, that crack finally did what it had been trying to do since November 1966.
It spread and the ship broke in half and sank just like her sister. The only difference was that when the towns went down, there was nobody aboard to die.
This is what survival looks like sometimes on the Great Lakes. It's not about being stronger or better. It's about making the right call at the right moment, catching the waves at a slightly different angle, having your crack stop at a rivet instead of tearing through it and getting to shore before the countdown clock hits zero. The Morell's clock ran out at 2:15 in the morning on November 29th. The Townsin's clock ran out 2 years later in the middle of the Atlantic. But on that November night, with Dennis Hail freezing to death on a raft and 27 other men already gone, the Towns End's crew walked off their ship and went home. That's survival. And it only takes a few hours difference to decide who gets it.
So far, we've talked about ships that survived because they were built differently or because they got lucky with timing or because their crack stopped growing one rivet before it was too late. But there's another kind of survival that nobody talks about. The kind where you live, but you watch someone else die, and you spent the rest of your life wondering if there was something more you could have done.
November 18th, 1958, Lake Michigan. A German freighter called the Christian Sartorii and the largest shipwreck the Great Lakes had seen in 30 years.
The SS Carl D. Bradley was a 638 ft limestone hauler. the queen of the lakes for 22 years, the longest ship on the Great Lakes from the day she launched in 1927 until 1949.
On November 18th, she was running empty across Lake Michigan, heading home to Rogers City for the winter layup, carrying just ballast to keep her stable. Most of her 35man crew were from Rogers City, a small town where the quarry and the ships were the only things keeping the lights on and where everybody knew everybody.
Around 5:30 that evening, the Bradley was about 12 mi southwest of Gull Island when the crew heard a sound like a gunshot echoing through the hull. The same brittle steel crack that would kill the Morell 8 years later.
The first mate got on the radio. Mayday, mayday. This is the Car Bradley. We are in serious trouble. We're breaking up.
Within minutes, the ship snapped in two.
The bow rolled over and sank. The stern followed and when the water hit the boiler room, it went up in a flash of flame and smoke.
Four miles away through binoculars, the crew of the Christian Sartorii watched it happen. They saw the lights on the Bradley's bow go dark while the stern stayed lit. Then the stern lights went out too, leaving just a faint silhouette against the black water. And then they saw the explosion, a column of red and yellow and white flame shooting up into the November sky debris spinning through the air. Captain Paul Mueller of the Sartorii didn't hesitate. He turned his ship around and headed straight back into the storm.
The wind was hitting 65 m an hour. The waves were running 20 to 25 ft, stacking up in sets of three, what the old sailors called the three sisters waves that came one after another with no break in between. The Stori was only 4 miles from where the Bradley had gone down. 4 mi on a calm day. That's 15 minutes. That night, fighting into the wind and the waves, it took Captain Mueller an hour and a half.
When they finally reached the area, the German crews started firing flares into the dark, sweeping their search lights across the water, looking for anything.
Rafts, lifeboats, men in the water wreckage, anything. They found a steel tank floating, a raincoat, nothing else.
The visibility was so bad they could barely see 100 ft in any direction. And the waves were so high that even if there was something out there, it would disappear into a trough and be gone before you could get to it.
What Captain Mueller didn't know, what he couldn't have known was that the Sartorii had passed within a 100 yards of a life raft carrying four men from the Bradley. First mate Elma Fleming and watchman Frank Maize were on that raft along with two other crew members who would die from hypothermia before morning. When Fleming saw the Sartori's lights cutting through the dark, he reached for the last flare they had left and tried to light it. The flare was soaked. It wouldn't ignite, and the Sartorii sailed past her crew, staring into the blackness, seeing nothing.
The Sartorii stayed on scene until after midnight, searching before the Coast Guard told Captain Mueller he could stand down. Other ships had joined the hunt by then Coast Guard cutters, freigherss, aircraft dropping flares from above. Around 8 the next morning, the Coast Guard cutter Sundu found Fleming and Maize barely alive after 15 hours on the raft in 36° water. Of the 35 men on the Bradley, only those two survived. 33 families in Rogers City lost someone that night to father's brothers, sons.
Here's the thing about the Christian Sartorii.
She survived.
Her crew went home. But survival isn't always victory. And sometimes the ships that live carry a heavier load than the ones that sink. The German sailors on the Saturi spent the rest of their lives knowing they'd been a 100 yards away from four men freezing to death on a raft that they'd sailed right past them in the dark. That if the flare had lit or the visibility had been just a little bit better, or the raft had drifted 50 ft to the left, they might have saved them. The Great Lakes don't just kill the people on the ships that go down.
They haunt the ones who watch it happen.
We've talked about ships that survived because they were built differently or because the crack stopped one rivet too soon or because the waves hit them at a slightly better angle. We've even talked about the ships that lived but carried the weight of watching others die. But sometimes survival comes down to something simpler and harder to quantify. Skill, not luck, not design, not timing. Just a captain who knew exactly what his ship could do and more importantly what he could do.
November 7th through 10th, 1913.
The Great Lakes Storm. Some people call it the White Hurricane. Others call it the Big Blow or the Freshwater Fury.
Pick a name, it doesn't matter. What matters is that it was the worst storm in Great Lakes history before or since.
Winds hit 90 m an hour. Waves climbed to 35 ft. And for four straight days, a blizzard so thick you couldn't see 10 ft in front of you turned the lakes into a white hell where up and down stopped meaning anything.
By the time it was over, 12 ships had gone to the bottom and more than 250 people were dead. Most of them on Lake Huron, where the wind and the waves came from exactly the wrong direction for exactly the wrong amount of time. Eight freighters sank in a single 6-hour stretch on the night of November 9th.
Not damaged, not grounded, gone, vanished into water so cold and violent that most of the bodies were never found.
Captain S. Alliance of the Steamer.
Sheided had left Fort William, Ontario on November the 6th with a load of grain headed down through Lake Superior and across Lake Huron toward the lower lakes. He knew a storm was coming. The barometer was low, but it had been low and steady for hours, and the wind seemed manageable. So he went and for 2 days he played cat and mouse with the weather anchoring when it got bad moving when it cleared watching the barometer the whole time.
By the morning of November 9th, Lions was on Lake Huron heading southeast toward Thunder Bay near the foot of the lake. And then the wind shifted. It went from northeast to straight north. And within an hour it was screaming at 80 m an hour with snow so thick he couldn't see the bow of his own ship. Lions checked his soundings and realized he was getting pushed toward shore toward rocks that would rip the bottom out of his ship in seconds. He had two choices.
Drop anchor and hope the ship held or turn around and run back the way he'd come.
Dropping anchor in that sea would have been suicide. The anchors might not hold. And even if they did, the waves would have beaten the ship to pieces.
So Lions made the call. He was going to turn the Sheided around, a 600 ft freighter loaded with grain in hurricane force winds and 30ft seas with visibility near zero. Turning a ship that size in calm water takes planning and room. Turning it in a storm is the kind of thing that gets captains killed because if you catch a wave wrong halfway through the turn, it'll roll you over.
Lions gave his engineer advanced warning, made sure the engines were ready to respond instantly, picked his moment, and spun the wheel. The sheet came around and then hours later when he realized he still couldn't make it to safety going that direction, he turned her around again and she came around again. Lions would later say he didn't consider it safe to anchor. So as long as his ship was seaorthy, he was going to keep her moving and under control.
The Sheidle made it home.
Not far from where Lions was fighting to keep the Shedle afloat, another captain was making different calls, the SS Charles S. Price was a 524 ft bulk freighter loaded with coal trying to make it to the St. Clair River. The Price didn't make it. Somewhere in the blinding snow and the mountain high waves, she capsized, flipped completely upside down, trapping air in her hull that kept her floating belly up. On Monday morning, November 10th, observers spotted a massive steel hull drifting north of Port Huron bow sticking 30 ft out of the water. No masts, no smoke stack. Nobody could tell what ship it was.
They called it the mystery ship, and for 6 days it floated there while the whole country tried to figure out whose it was. Finally, on November 15th, a diver named William Baker went down into the freezing water, worked his way around the hull, hanging onto the railings above him, and found the name plate, Charles S. Price. 28 people dead. The Price had been trying to do exactly what the Shield did. Turn around and run for shelter. She just didn't make it.
Here's the thing. Both ships faced the same storm. Both captains tried to turn around. One made it, one didn't. You could say it was luck. Maybe the price caught a wave at the wrong angle. Maybe her rudder jammed. Maybe she lost power at exactly the wrong second. But Captain Lions didn't think it was luck. When he wrote his report afterward, he talked about knowing his ship, trusting his crew, timing the turn, keeping the engines ready. Sometimes survival isn't about having a better boat or a softer hull or a crack that stops growing.
Sometimes it's about having a captain who can do the impossible and make it look like seaman.
So after all these stories, the Anderson and the Fitzgerald, the Morell and the Townsend, the Story, watching the Bradley sink, Captain Lions turning the Sheided around in a hurricane. You're probably wondering if there's an answer.
Is there a formula for survival on the Great Lakes? A checklist you can run through to make sure you come home? The truth is messier than that. Survival isn't one thing. It's five things, maybe six, all happening at once, and you need enough of them to line up in your favor or you don't make it.
First, there's seammanship. The captain, Captain Lions turned the Shidle around twice in hurricane winds because he knew his ship and trusted his timing. The town's end's captain turned into the St. Clair River and bought his crew 2 hours of calmer water that kept the crack from finishing its job. Bernie Cooper on the Anderson kept checking in with Msori.
Kept his hatch covers tight, kept his speed down. Sometimes the difference between going home and going down is a captain who makes the right call at the right moment.
Then there's the ship itself, the design, the construction, the things that were built in before she ever touched water. The Anderson had a softer hull that could flex without breaking.
The Fitzgerald's hatch covers weren't sealed right, and her freeboard had been cut down to carry more cargo. So every wave that washed over the deck poured water into the holds. The Morell and the Townsend were built with pre-1948 steel that turned brittle in the cold.
Sometimes you survive because you were built better. Sometimes you don't survive because 60 years ago somebody saved money on the steel.
Position matters, too. The Anderson was 10 mi behind the Fitzgerald in the same storm, and those 10 mi put her in a slightly different part of the wave pattern when the two monster waves came through. The Morell and the Townsend were 20 mi apart on Lake Huron. Same storm, same steel, same cracks forming, but 20 mi meant different wave angles, different stress points, different outcomes. on the Great Lakes during a gale. Being in the wrong spot at the wrong time can be the only difference that matters.
Maintenance counts. The Fitzgerald had been scraping bottom earlier that season, and her hatch clamps were known to be a problem, the kind of thing you fix during the winter layup. Except she never made it to the layup. The towns crack had been growing for who knows how long before the storm found it. Ships don't fail all at once. They fail slowly over years until the day comes when one more wave is one wave too many.
And finally, there's luck. Pure dumb, inexplicable luck. The town's ends crack stopped at 13 in for no reason anyone can explain. The Anderson's hull held when the Fitzgeralds didn't. The Stori passed within a 100 yards of the Bradley's life raft and never saw it.
You can be the best captain on the lakes with the best built ship and the best crew and still go down because a wave hit you wrong or a rivet gave way or your flare was too wet to light. Luck is the thing you can't plan for and can't control. And on the Great Lakes, it's never been optional.
So, let's go back to the question we started with. Are the Great Lakes really the ship killers of legend? Yes, they are. The lakes are cold, deep, violent, and unforgiving. And they've claimed more ships than most people will ever know about. But the real story isn't that the lakes kill ships. The real story is that the lakes test ships and sometimes through skill, through design, through timing, through luck, or through all of it at once, the ships win.
Every ship that made it home is proof that survival is possible. The Anderson is still out there, by the way, still sailing, still carrying ore across Lake Superior on the same routes she ran in 1975.
She's been renamed refitted. And she's not as fast as she used to be, but she's still working. Still proving that on the night the Fitzgerald went down, it wasn't inevitable. It was just her night and the Anderson's night to come home.
The Great Lakes don't give up their dead, but they don't take everyone either. And every captain who's ever brought a ship through a November gale and lived to tell about it is proof that the lakes can be beaten. Not easily, not often, but sometimes.
And on the Great Lakes, sometimes is enough.
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