Carly Gregg's Lawyer Claims Mom Killer's Rights Were 'Trampled On'

Added: 2026-05-28

[00:00:00]before the court shall come near and give their attention.

[00:00:05]God say the United States, Mississippi.

[00:00:19]>> Mr. Clerk, would you sign the docket, please?

[00:00:23]2024 KA 1178 SCT Carly Madison Greg versus the state of Mississippi.

[00:00:33]>> What says the appella?

[00:00:37]>> What says the state?

[00:00:40]>> Okay, we'll hear from you. Thank you.

[00:00:55]>> Good morning, justices. May it please the court.

[00:00:59]My name is James Murphy, and it is my honor, and it is my privilege to be here on behalf of Carly Madison Greg. Here at co-consel table with me is Lance Bixon, and we're both honored to be here as appellet counsel for for Miss Greg. Now, this case is ultimately about whether a 14-year-old child received the fundamentally fair process the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Mississippi requires before a juvenile can be sentenced to the most severe punishment given the harshest sentence that the state of Mississippi can impose on a juvenile and that is life without the possibility of parole. Counselor, let me stop you there. I've read the sentencing order. The sentencing order in this case says that she's been sentenced to life imprisonment, which under the statute, and I think this is consistent with the argument you make on the sentencing issue, the statute in subsection two of the sentencing statute for for first-degree murder gives two options. the jury can do life can give you know life imprisonment and if the jury doesn't then the judge can assign a term of years.

[00:02:13]I don't I don't know that I agree with you that this is a life without the possibility of parole sentence. The jur the the sentencing statute in subsection 3 seems to say there's life imprisonment. It doesn't seem to say it does say there's life imprisonment and then there's life without the possibility of parole or a term of years. So, I'm reading this sentencing order and to me it's life in prison, not life without the possibility of parole.

[00:02:38]So, why do you take the position that that the sentencing order what the sentencing order says is not what the sentence is?

[00:02:45]>> Well, we we we would agree with your honor on that point. And if the state would concede that, I think we could make an easy argument of our sentencing argument here today. Uh but I think the state's position is going to be that that life uh sentence that was imposed by virtue of the parole statute imposes life without the possibility of parole.

[00:03:03]Uh the the the jury in this case was given a sentencing instruction that gave them the option of sentencing Carly to life imprisonment or life with the possibility of parole. Now, by virtue of those two options, if they're not giving her life with the possibility of parole by giving her life imprisonment, they are they are giving her life without parole. Those those are just mutually exclusive options.

[00:03:27]>> Well, I understand there's a separate parole statute in play here. And uh I can't remember the style of the case, but I know this court's issued an opinion that addresses the interplay between that parole statute and life sentences like in other in other contexts.

[00:03:42]But just strictly speaking or leaving I mean leaving the application of the parole statute out for a second there are two options in that sentencing statute life imprisonment and a term of years and this sentencing order says a life life imprisonment. So I don't see an inconsistency between the sentencing order or the the legal sentences under the statute. And since that statute doesn't mention life without the possibility of parole as a legal sentence for this crime. I'm still I'm right where I am. I'm struggling to see why why this is being interpreted as a life. Other than the the jury instruction, which admittedly doesn't match the sentence, but what we have in front of us, which is the order of the court sentencing Miss Greg, this is a life imprisonment sentence, which is consistent with the statute and doesn't seem to be without the possibility of parole.

[00:04:30]>> And we would, yes, your honor, we would agree with with with your honor's interpretation of that. And again, if the state would concede that, we would certainly move on from that argument.

[00:04:39]But the state has argued in their response to our brief that by virtue of the parole statute that that life imprisonment uh judgment is in effect a life without the possibility of parole. And as as I'm sure your honor and the court is aware, the legislature amended um the uh the the the first-degree murder sentencing statute 973-21 amended that statute effective July 1st, 2024 and added a juvenile specific sentencing structure for both first-degree murder and capital murder and subsection 2C which deals with uh capital murder for juven juvenile now convicted of capital murder after July 1st, 2024. It gives the jury two options as as I think your honor would would would concede. It gives the jury the option of sentencing a convicted juvenile to either life imprisonment or life without the possibility of parole.

[00:05:39]However, subsection 2B omits that option and only gives the jury the one option of life imprisonment. And I think that goes along with what your honor is saying. The first-degree murder sentencing options for a juror a jury in a juvenile case only gives the jury the option of sentencing a juvenile to life.

[00:05:58]And by virtue of the the the legislature dividing defining uh uh life without or including life without parole in subsection 2C and not defining life as life with parole. Uh the only other option is that life imprisonment means life with the possibility of parole. So we would concede your honor that that that is the case. In fact, if the court interprets the amendments that way, we would concede that argument.

[00:06:31]But from March 19th, 2024, when the incident occurred until the verdict and sentencing order were rendered on September 20th of 2024, this entire case, the entire case, from investigation to indictment to psychiatric litigation to motions filed to motions argued to expert evaluations to discovery to trial to sentencing.

[00:06:56]It proceeded in approximately six months, 183 days to be precise.

[00:07:01]In a medically and psychotropic medication, evidence and dissociation case of this nature, that pace was extraordinary and the accelerated pace of the proceedings affected virtually every aspect and major issue now before this court. And and my first issue I was going to begin with was the sentencing issue. But as the court, I think we've discussed that. If there are any additional questions about that, we would argue certainly that the amended statute does not give a jury the option of sentencing a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder after July 1st, 2024. We would argue that that the new amendments do not give a jury the option of sentencing nor does a judge have the option of sentencing a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder. Does not give them the option of sentencing her to life without parole.

[00:07:52]Now I will transition to the Miller issues. Again, we would argue that the new amendments, they uh pretty much make Miller obsolete in the context of sentencing a a juvenile after the amendments. But assuming that the Miller progyny of cases is still in effect and is still uh the controlling law when it comes to determining what's proper sentence for a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder, uh we would we would uh we would propose that uh the Miller framework was not met in this case. The Miller Miller requires individualized sentencing before a child may be condemned to die in prison. And again, we're operating under the assumption that the state's position is that Carly Greg was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.

[00:08:39]The proceedings here never became ne it never became the careful indiviidualized juvenile sentencing hearing contemplated by Miller. the sentencing phase of this case. And again, this case occurred uh went from the occurrence of the event on March 19th, 2024 to the trial on uh Mayh September 16th, concluding on September the 20th of 2024.

[00:09:02]Uh the sentencing phase, and I'm going to use that that term loosely, the sentencing phase of this case consisted of the court announcing the verdict of the jury and then transitioning immediately to asking the state whether they wanted to call call their first sentencing witness to which the state responded that they basically wanted to rest on the evidence that had been previously presented and proceed with argument only. and the defense did the same thing. The defense elected to rest on the evidence that had been previously presented and proceed with argument only. Now, we would argue that this immediate pivot from the announcement of the verdict to the sentencing phase was wholly inadequate in light of Miller.

[00:09:50]There was no meaningful mitigation development process. There was no opportunity given to the defense to marshall mitigation witnesses. They were given no opportunity to call witnesses.

[00:10:00]uh family members, teachers, as and as a matter of fact uh as part of the pre-trial uh process, the defense listed as one of the potential witnesses the grandmother of Carly Greg, Miss Vicky Bregland, who was also happened to be the mother of one of the victims, Ashley Smiley. She was listed as a potential witness and she was not allowed to be uh she was not allowed to testify at the trial. So it it stands to reason if she was not allowed to to testify at trial, then the question then becomes, would she have been allowed to testify during the sentencing phase? And again, I use that term loosely because there there was no meaningful opportunity to conduct a Miller compliant sentencing hearing.

[00:10:39]There was no PSI, pre-sentencing investigation conducted, no report.

[00:10:44]The jury was exposed to confusing and incon inconsistent parole rhetoric by the prosecution at one point. Uh and again I'm I'm going back to the sentencing uh hearing which consisted of and it's confusing. The record is confusing as to whether each side was given 7 and 12 minutes 15 minutes total for their sentencing argument or whether they were each given 15 minutes. At one point it looks like the judge gave one side seven and a half minutes and then the other side was given 15 minutes. So I'm not it's not clear to me from the record whether they were given seven and a half minutes to argue the sentencing phase or 15 minutes to argue the sentencing phase. But at one point during the state's argument during the sentencing phase, the state told the jury that if you give her, and again this is going to the sentencing instruction that they were given, they were given the option of life or life with the possibility of parole. The prosecutor stood in front of the jury and told them that if you give her life with the possibility of parole, we don't know when she's going to get out. She might be out, and I'm paraphrasing here, she may be out in as little as a year, which I I think we all know is is outside the realm of possibility for a life sentence, but she may be out in as little as a year. And again, I'm paraphrasing, but you may see her at the supermarket or you may see her at church. Uh you may run into her at any place outside in public. And again, we would argue, and we argued in our brief, that that is improper golden rule rhetoric. It's it's appealing to the fears of the community. and that is improper. And I understand the state's going to argue and has argued in their brief that the defense failed to object to this. But notwithstanding that failure, we would ask this court to analyze that under the plain error doctrine and or uh pursuant to the ineffective assistance of council claims that we've made in our brief. We can see no strategic reason why a defense a competent defense council would not object to that type of rhetoric argued in a sentencing phase.

[00:12:47]And in addition, even taking into consideration if the Miller progyny of cases is still the law and still applicable to juvenile first-degree murder and capital murder cases, the record is is is replete with examples of why there were mitigating factors and and we would we would submit that the juries and again assuming they sentenced her, they elected to sentence her to life without parole. And by the way, let me back up. I digress just a little bit.

[00:13:16]after the the the prosecution's statements about parole eligibility and when she might be out within a year and you might run into her at the supermarket. After the jury began their deliberations, almost immediately after they begin their deliberations, we know that parole was on their mind and how long she's going to spend in jail if she gets uh granted parole eligibility because they submitted a question uh and I'm going to paraphrase this too. If Carly is granted parole eligibility, if she's given life with the possibility of parole, which is one of the two options, she was given by the court, if she's given life with the possibility of parole, how long will she serve years wise? So, we know that was on their mind. We absolutely know that was a question that they had in their mind going into deliberations.

[00:14:08]Nothing minimizes the horror of what happened to Ashley Smiley or the trauma suffered by Heath Smiley. Nothing minimizes that. But Miller requires courts to distinguish between irreparable corruption, incorable uh youth and transient immaturity before condemning a child to die in prison. And again assuming that the state's position is correct that she was sentenced to life without possibility of parole that is exactly what she was done. She was sentenced to die in prison because if she's not eligible for parole at any point then she will eventually she will pass away in prison and that's in effect a death sentence.

[00:14:49]And I want to read Mr. Murphy let me brief Mr. Murphy let me just interrupt you there for a second. I want to clarify something. For purposes of the I know this court has written that for purposes of the application of that parole statute, the one that forbids parole for people guilty of first-degree murder. Uh we have held in in the Miller context that that is the same as a life imprisonment. So uh but you've still got I think you conceded not not just as to those comments that were made by the prosecutor, but also as to the hearing itself and the brevity of the hearing, etc. There were no objections made uh by defense council that would have preserved that issue for appeal, were there?

[00:15:28]>> No, your honor. There were no objections.

[00:15:32]>> And as to that issue, your honor, uh a case that we cited in our brief, uh Presley v. state, which is 474 Southern Second 612.

[00:15:43]A a case that was decided by this court in 1985, a case where the sentence was vacated.

[00:15:50]A and in that case, a pre-sentence investigation report had been prepared and submitted to the court. The trial court offered defense counsel the same as as apparently the trial court did in this case. Gave defense council the opportunity to present mitigation and defense council nevertheless failed to meaningfully meaningfully develop mitigation evidence and the court in that case vacated that sentence based on the uh the rationale and the holding that and I'm going to quote from the from from the Presley court. We recognize that there are cases even where the appellant and his attorney failed to prepare and complete a sentencing record as was done in this case or not done as as the case may be where the trial court must consider all facets background and record in a sentencing hearing in order that a just and proper sentence may be imposed.

[00:16:53]So we would submit to to to to your honors that this court has the power to impose that duty on the trial court just as it would impose the duty on the defense council. And even barring that plain error submission that that we are offering here today to give the court the authority to review that. Again, I think we've we've offered uh the Strickland v. Washington ineffective assistance of council claim. Uh we we can fathom no strategic reason why defense council would not want to ask for time.

[00:17:23]>> Is this court in a position on this record to evaluate the prejudice prong of Strickland not knowing what mitigation evidence might have been discovered had had that work been allowed to proceed.

[00:17:35]>> I believe that we could evaluate the prejudice prong based on what we know what we know about what had been had been presented earlier in the case. We had two two forensic psychiatrists who testified in this case and I believe even the state's forensic psychiatrist opined opined that Carly was not a psychopath that she was not evil and that she came close and I'm paraphrasing here that she came close to the evaluation needed to reach the McNolton standard. Even the states on psychiatrist stated as such and then you had the uh the defense uh psychiatrist who who fa found that she did meet the monolton standard. So the failure of the the defense council to at least recall those witnesses to testify in the context of a sentencing phase uh would would clearly be prejuditial to bring out those points that they had made earlier in the proceedings to specifically apply to the sentencing phase. I believe that's absolutely uh prejuditial, your honor. In addition, the the issues that I brought up earlier, the witnesses, the lay witnesses that could have been marshaled and and provided, the family members that I believe are here today and that were prepared to testify on behalf of Carly in the sentencing phase, uh, teachers, friends, all of those things, as far as we are aware, and as far as the record reflects, they would have all testified on behalf of Carly and would would have provided positive mitigation evidence on her behalf.

[00:19:09]So yes, your honor, we would submit that the record is sufficient to to evaluate the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis.

[00:19:26]Now, outside of the sentencing issues that we've discussed, your honor, um the trial court announced at the very first interaction between the trial court and the litigants in this case announced not once but twice that this court does not continue cases.

[00:19:49]And it even mentioned that y'all have heard me say this before today that this court does not continue cases. Now that posture shaped the atmosphere of the litigation from the very beginning. Now you may ask is that in and of itself is that an abuse of discretion and we would offer and we cited Leonard B. Leonard where a discussion was had of whether a court can can issue blanket denials of continuences and that court held that it is abuse of discretion to prejudge and pre-ruule that there are no continuences allowed under any circumstances and that we would we would submit that is exactly what the trial court did in this case announced from the outset that there are no continuences going to be granted.

[00:20:32]Now, the state offered in their uh in in their uh response brief that this was not a blanket denial of continuences.

[00:20:39]This was just an attempt by the trial court to prevent dilatory tactics of the litigants. But your honor, uh looking at the four corners of the transcripts, we saw no caveats issued. There were no uh no continuences unless so and so happens. No continuences unless there's a darn good reason. There was none of that. It was a blanket denial of continuences. Well, then the state's going to submit to the court. Well, the defense never asked for a continuence.

[00:21:07]So, there's no harm, no foul. It's harmless error. Even if it's error for the court to issue a blanket denial of continuences, that error is harmless.

[00:21:17]But to that, your honor, we would offer a plethora of cases uh including Mississippi Rule of Evidence 103C that says no further objection or offer of proof is required where the court's ruling is definitive. Smith v. State, which we cited 724 Southern Second 280, preservation rules do not require actions that would serve no practical purpose.

[00:21:41]>> Mr. Sir, without any motion being filed, exactly what do we have in the record where we could say that it was an abuse of discretion not to grant a motion for continuence?

[00:21:54]>> Well, it was not necessarily an abuse of discretion to not grant a a motion for continuence because obviously, as we would concede, there were no motions for continuence.

[00:22:01]>> But but but are there any reasons for a continuence? I haven't even heard you argue whether there were any reasons for a continuence that were considered, contemplated, and not requested. You're just simply asking as a statement of law for us to find the the trial judge in error because he made a statement.

[00:22:21]>> Well, your honor, and again, going back to these these this this line of cases that basically says a litigant, a defense attorney, or any attorney is not required to ask for something he knows he's not going to get. in order to preserve air. That's exactly what Mississippi rule of 10 evidence 103C says. Further objection or offer of proof required with a court's ruling is definitive. There is no requirement. But counselor, further objection seems to indicate that there was an objection initially. So I think those cases that you're citing in those cases and the the text of that rule still seem to require an initial objection or motion that is denied. I know that Leonard versus Leonard there was a motion that was denied that that's what the court was reviewing for error was the decision. So I mean >> and I think the rules of civil at least the rules of civil procedure required that that any request made of the court be made by motion written motion before trial or during trial and oral motion.

[00:23:19]And so e even I hear your argument but I don't give you hear you say any reason why this was error. Well, your honor, it was error because it it it number one, it chilled the litigants. They they they um I hate to say afraid perhaps, but and going back to to Smith versus State, >> I'm not sure anybody was chilled in this in this case. read just reading the transcript it seems to me that that there was very active participation in this case by the lawyers and and certainly there's no reason a motion couldn't have been made but I'm just wondering you know g give me some basis for the continuence but your honor and this is getting into the uh the orders for psychiatric evaluations which we think were were premature and beyond the scopes of Mississippi rules of criminal procedure the the litigants, they were very active, your honor. They were, it appears that they were bending over backwards to abide by the court's uh for for lack of, and I put it in my brief, so I'm going to say it here today.

[00:24:23]Rocket docket announced that this trial is set for trial September 16th, and there's absolutely no reason that we see that this trial can't go forward. So, everybody was bending over backwards to accommodate that trial schedule. Um, >> as they should, though, isn't it? I mean, that's that's what we want is a speedy trial. We have so many cases come through here where it's delayed and delayed and delayed and now we have one that's moving quickly through the system which is supposedly the way it's supposed to work and there's no basis in the record to say a continuance should have been granted.

[00:24:56]>> Well, it was continuing in a speedy fashion at the expense of Carly's constitutional rights. The trial court ordered her to undergo competency and insanity at the time of offense evaluations before the 17.4 uh threshold of announcing the insanity defense had been met. And that is simply not what the rules contemplate. And in fact, the defense attorneys in this case filed a petition for interlocutory appeal to appeal that ruling. Um, her constitutional rights were were were we would submit trampled on because they they were ordered to turn over privileged information, medical records that they would not have otherwise have had to turn over to the state, but for the insanity defense, which at the time they were ordered to be turned over, had not been properly put before the court.

[00:25:47]Sure, the defense council at one point said that we uh we we intend to to assert an insanity of defense, but with all due respect to all of the attorneys that were involved in this case and even the trial court, none of us are psychiatric or or forensic psychiatrist.

[00:26:02]And so for me as a defense attorney to announce at the beginning of a case before my client has even been evaluated by a forensic psychiatrist and for me as a defense attorney to say we're going to assert the insanity defense uh I believe is malpractice uh because I don't know what an evaluator is going to say once that evaluator reviews all the records and interviews Carly and and and makes a determination as to whether she has met the monoton standard.

[00:26:29]So, they were forced, they were given a Hopson's choice uh to either turn over those records and wave the privileges that go along with turning over those records um or or uh or or wave the defense altogether. And they chose to preserve that defense. And until unless they file the 17.4 for notice of insanity defense.

[00:26:55]The court does not have the power.

[00:26:59]The court does not have the power to order Carly to undergo psychiatric evaluations at the behest of the state.

[00:27:08]The court >> do is that apply Okay. So, so the state made a motion as I recall. Correct me if I'm wrong on this because there's a lot going on in this record.

[00:27:16]>> Yes, sir. And the court granted the state's motion and sent Miss Greg for evaluation both as to competence to stand trial and the Mcnotton issue.

[00:27:25]>> Correct.

[00:27:26]>> But the the the psychiatrist counselor member witch that they to whom they sent the court sent Miss Greg for that evaluation decl reached an opinion as to competency to stand trial but declined to issue an opinion on McNottton. Is that correct?

[00:27:44]>> The initial states expert. Yes, that is correct.

[00:27:47]>> All right. Does the fact that that expert declined to address McNottton or issue an opinion on that ch affect your argument that it was wrong to send her for that?

[00:27:54]>> Well, the reason she declined to to render an opinion was because there were some issues with marijuana or some other >> whatever the reasons were. Does that affect your argument that it was that it was incorrect for the trial judge to order?

[00:28:06]>> It absolutely does not affect my argument. that was that was premature and that was incorrect and outside the court's power to order that that exam at that point in time.

[00:28:15]>> And you're saying that the harm that resulted from that is that it gave the defense's strategy up too soon and forced the defense to disclose documents it wouldn't have otherwise yet disclosed >> among other things. Yes, sir.

[00:28:26]>> But those documents would have been disclosed because the defense did pursue >> the insanity defense.

[00:28:33]>> Yes, your honor. If the defense had ultimately chose to pursue the defense of insanity, those documents would have been produced. But if the rules had worked the way they're supposed to have and the timing had worked the way the rules require, then the defense would have had Carly evaluated by their expert who would have reviewed all those records and interviewed Carly and made a determination. Yes, uh she she's she qualifies for the McN insanity defense, then you hand it all over. But if that by in contrast, if that evaluator and that expert had said no, she does not qualify, then the state does not get the benefit of those privileged documents, the state does not get to have their expert evaluate her. So by by jumping ahead and then ordering that the state gets to evaluate her ahead of time, it it it inverts the whole process. It gives the state access to documents that they may not have otherwise had access to.

[00:29:29]And with those privileged documents, of course, come come waiverss of communications uh that that Carly had with her uh her treating physicians and psychiatrists and counselors uh among other things. And and I think everyone would recognize I think we'd ask the court to take judicial notice that each evaluation of somebody would affect the next evaluation. And by virtue of the state having the first I believe the state had the first opportunity to evaluate Carly uh because the defense's first expert uh was was taking more time to evaluate her than was initially anticipated. And and going back to that, they certainly weren't outside of their time limit. According to rule 17.4, the defense has until the time for pro filing pre-trial motions to assert the insanity defense. And in this case, the court's pre-trial motions deadline was August 30th of 2024. The court started pressuring the the reports back in June or July of that summer. Well, well before the pre-trial motions deadline of August 30th. So, the court and the court rendered entered the order July 3rd that that she submit to a state uh expert evaluation.

[00:30:44]>> Okay. Mr. Murphy, are there any other questions of Mr. Murphy at this time?

[00:30:48]Okay. All right. Thank you, Mr. Murphy.

[00:30:52]>> Thank you.

[00:31:03]How much time do I have?

[00:31:07]They please the court.

[00:31:09]Um, I'd like to address a couple quick points if I may before I move on to some more substantive argument. Um, I believe it was Justice Sullivan who asked council whether the legislature could have whether it's possible that the legislature intended for life in subsection 2B as it applies to juvenile first-degree murder. Whether the legislature could have intended that that be life with parole irrespective of the parole statute and council responded possibly. I think that is is very telling in that I think at the very least while while we would we would assert that it very certainly does indicate that the leg legislature intended that we would uh we would assert that the state has now conceded at the very least that there is some ambiguity as to whether the state or the legislature intended that or not. And as I think the court is well aware, um the briefs that we cited, we included all of the cannons of construction when uh the court is interpreting uh statutory construction. And one of those rules is a rules of leniency. And the lenency rule uh states that if there is a distinction to be made, if there is an ambiguous statute and there are two interpretations, the interpretation that is most lenient to the defendant is the one that the court must adopt. And in this case, that adoption would be that the statute that was amended in effect at the time of the sentencing is that Carly sentenced his life with the possibility of parole. I'd like to make that quick point. And also, your honor, I'd like to address, your honors, I'd like to address uh the state's reliance on Johnson v. State. Two points I'd really like to make about that and why the state's reliance on that is misplaced. Number one, I believe uh I believe it was Justice Coleman who pointed out um that that that was decided well prior to uh the the the the amendments to the statutes and and uh in response possibly to Miller. Um but that case involved a very thorough Miller sentencing hearing and that is distinguished from this case because there was no Miller sentencing hearing.

[00:33:20]There was, and again, I've used that term loosely, there was a there was sentencing hearing, but that was very uh in effect, it was a sentencing argument.

[00:33:28]So, in the case at bar, unlike in Johnson, we had no sentencing hearing.

[00:33:33]And I believe Miller not only stands for the proposition that there are certain factors that a jury or a trier of fact or whoever is deciding the sentence must consider. You can't just throw all these factors that the jury must consider at the wall and assume that they're going to consider them. But the so there's a substantive aspect to Miller, but there's also a procedural aspect to Miller. In other words, are is the the defendant given uh adequate process, adequate notice, an adequate opportunity to address those m those Miller factors?

[00:34:04]And in this case, there was absolutely no notice that that we're moving into the sentencing phase. I'm not even sure prior to the court turning to the state and saying, "Present your first sentencing witness." I'm I'm not sure whether the litigants were even aware that that was going to happen. Uh I certainly don't see any thing in the record where the sentencing um uh the sentencing order or anything like that outlined that that was going to happen.

[00:34:27]Uh but certainly the the defense was not forwarded any due process to address those Miller factors. Um and so we would we would move or posit that Johnson is really in opposite to Carly's case.

[00:34:43]Another issue that we would point out um and and I'm just going to read from my from our brief. The state's reliance on Johnson v. State is misguided. According to the state, and I'm quoting from the the the the state's brief, this court held in Johnson that the trial court's application of section 4773 to sentence Johnson, who was 17 when he committed first-degree murder to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole after a Miller hearing, was not an abuse of discretion. Thus, in harmony with Miller, section 973212B allowed Harley Greg's jury to sentence her to life without parole, consistent with section 4773D, which is a parole statute, but only after it considered the Miller factors.

[00:35:27]However, the trial in Johnson occurred in 2000, as I think I think Justice Justice Coleman and Justice Sullivan and perhaps a couple other justices pointed that out. The trial in Johnson occurred in 2000 nearly two and a half decades prior to the amendment to 97321 from Senate Bill 2022 of our or 2022 of our legislaturator's regular session in 2024.

[00:35:53]And and now I', if I may, we we do not address this in the initial argument, but I would like to address one of the uh the the errors that we have alleged that the defense did object to, and that was the introduction of the uh crime and punishment summation by uh Rebecca Kirk, who was one of Carly's counselors. Um during the state's rebuttal case, the state elicited testimony from um Rebecca Kirk, who was again one of Carly's counselors, to summarize, well, first she was asked what books Carly had read or or was going to read. Uh and there were several books that were mentioned. Uh one of them was uh The Bail Jar. Another was The Castle. Uh and then there was Crime and Punishment.

[00:36:44]Curiously, the state did not ask Rebecca Kirk to summarize the castle or the bail jar. The only one that they asked Rebecca Kirk to summarize was crime and punishment.

[00:36:55]And this was over objection of defense council. And this was over objection of defense council after pointing out to the trial court that there's no proof that Carly even read the book at the time of the trial. Now, we would dispute whether or not that that was ever established. I think uh in in cross-examination, I think defense council got Miss Kirk to admit that maybe she said she was going to read it, but she hadn't definitively read it or not. But whether she had read the book or not is really irrelevant.

[00:37:25]The plot of that book was a sensational plot that as summarized by Rebecca Kirk, it was about a a hatchet wielding murderer who tried to assert the defense of insanity and then got away with it uh and was unreorseful and unrepentant.

[00:37:42]That was the summation of Rebecca Kurt.

[00:37:44]Now, not only would we uh uh assert that that was an incorrect uh recitation of the actual book, but at the very least it was it was the important points that Rebecca Kirk remembered about the book.

[00:37:59]It was not the important points that perhaps Carly Greg would have remembered about the book. But be that as it may, the only reason that the prosecution would want Rebecca Kirk to summarize that book is because the prosecution wanted that jury to hear those sorted uh details about that book and associate those details with Carly Greg. They wanted the jury to think, well, if she read that book, she must have been she must have had those thoughts and she must have hatched the plot to plead insanity after she read that book. That is exactly what the prosecution wanted the jury to believe and that was over the objection of the defense.

[00:38:38]Now I believe it was justice justice king I believe justice Coleman joined Justice King in an objection in Jordan v. state which is which was an onbunk uh split decision by this court rendered in 2016 which uh which was uh reviewing a affirmation of an appeal appellet court. The court of appeals affirmed uh a finding of of of guilt uh after the prosecution was allowed to introduce rap lyrics. Um the court of appeals affirmed the the conviction and then the Supreme Court uh was split evenly four to four. Again, I think Justice King filed an objection. Justice Coleman, I believe, joined in that objection. Um and there were several things that uh Justice King cited in his objection. Um and I believe that court cited with um with approval a New Jersey case state versus Skinner. In that holding in state versus Skard, uh, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that lyrics were high highly prejuditial and carried little or no probative value because they were expressive fictional writings and not tied by a strong nexus to the charged shooting in that case. Just as in this case, there is no nexus between uh what a what the writer of Crime and Punishment wrote and what was alleged that Carly did. There was no nex it was not even established that she had read the book. And I want to read a quote uh because I think it's it's it's it's extremely instructive from state versus Skinner.

[00:40:40]The difficulty in identifying provative value in fictional or other forms of artistic self-expressive endeavors is that one cannot presume that simply because an author has chosen to write about certain topics, he or she has acted in accordance with those views.

[00:40:56]One would not presume that Bob Marley, who wrote the well-known song I Shot the Sheriff, actually shot a sheriff, or that Edgar Allan Poe buried a man beneath his floorboards as depicted in his short story, The Telltale Heart, simply because of their respective artistic endeavors on those subjects.

[00:41:14]The defendants, in that case, lyrics should receive no different treatment.

[00:41:18]In some we reject the proposition that provative evidence about a charged offense can be found in an individual's artistic endeavors absent a strong nexus between the specific details of the artistic composition and the circumstances of the offense for which the evidence is being aduced. Uh and I would take that a step further that case and and these cases that uh we cited in our brief including Jordan v. state Brooks v state United States v Curtain uh involve artistic works that the defendant was alleged to have written or participated in in some form or fashion.

[00:42:01]In Carly's case, artistic work and issue is a book that she had absolutely nothing to do with writing. She did not write that book. she had absolutely no contribution to the themes that were found in that book.

[00:42:15]So we would submit that the that that the propositions cited in uh by Justice King and Jordan v. State by the the the New Jersey court and state v Skinner by the Ninth Circuit and United States v Curtain are even more applicable in the case at bar than they were in those cases and we would argue that the court aired in allowing the state to introduce that testimony. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Murphy.

[00:42:43]>> And if there are no other questions by by the justices.

[00:42:48]Thank you, your honors.