UAE vs Saudi Arabia Rift Explained: Iran War Aftermath

Añadido: 2026-05-09

[00:00:00]But moving on to our next guest, another because we're going to be talking about another aspect of this and that is the situation uh with the Gulf States. You know, as the fallout from the USIsraeli war on Iran continues to reshape this region, major cracks are emerging inside the Gulf block itself. Um while countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman are trying to avoid another catastrophic regional war. The UAE appears to be moving even closer to Israel, exposing growing divisions over normalization, over how to deal with Iran, and over the future of US influence in the Middle East. And in another shocking development, um the Saudis and Kuwaitis have actually suspended US-based access over the straight of Hermuz action, which is unprecedented. So to help us unpack how the Gulf monarchies are recalculating after this war, we're joined by Giorgio Cafiro, CEO of Gulf State Analytics and a frequent frequent contributor to responsible statecraftraft and other outlets covering Gulf politics and a frequent guest of breakthrough news.

[00:01:04]Giorgio, it's good to see you and >> good to be with you guys.

[00:01:09]>> So I think a good place to start is with this latest news. How significant is this Saudi and Kuwaiti suspension? And I'll add to that, you know, the Gulf monarchies, Georgio, they've spent decades relying on US security, this US security umbrella, but this war has exposed just how vulnerable they actually are. Have Gulf views of the US changed in a fundamental way? Do you think there's now maybe a growing sense, at least among some of these countries, that Washington either can't or won't guarantee their security anymore? And how does that relate to this recent Saudi and Kuwaiti decision? Sure.

[00:01:46]Obviously, the United States has been the security guarantor for the six GCC members for decades. Um, I think really the the key lesson that the GCC members took away from the 1990 1991 crisis with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is that close military uh relationships with the US is essential for ensuring security of the GCC states. However, what we have seen over the years is a decline in the GCC state's confidence in the United States.

[00:02:21]Um, I think definitely in 2019, there were a few episodes involving acts of sabotage off the UAE's east coast. Also in September of that year, the Aramco attacks and the sense in the GCC was that the United States failed to provide adequate security for its partners in the Gulf. Then of course there were the Houthi attacks on Abu Dhabi in early 2022 which led to countries in the GCC increasingly doubting the effectiveness and the credibility of of the US as a security guarantor. But there's no doubt that this war that began in late February did so much to significantly increase the extent to which the GCC states have real problems with even just the idea of the US being a stabilizing force or a security guarantor. Uh in the leadup to February 28th, the Gulf States along with Turkey tried very hard to persuade Trump to take advantage of um diplomatic offramps that the Omanis were working very hard to provide. Washington and Tehran. They urged Trump not to bomb Iran. They knew exactly what the dangers would be for the Gulf States if the US and Israel would bomb Iran. Trump did not take their warning seriously. He seemingly had no concern for their um security concerns and he aligned the US with Israel's ultraright-wing government at the expense of GCC states security interests. And as everyone knows, we've seen what's happened to the Gulf States since February 28th. Um so it's it's very difficult for them, as I said, to look at the United States as a credible or effective security guarantor. Now, which country could possibly replace the US as a security guarantor is maybe another question to address later, but they definitely have lost so much confidence in the US. Certainly viewing Washington's foreign policy is totally erratic and very aligned with Israel's government. Um, now to your question about Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

[00:04:30]Well, I think the Gulf Arab states for the most part, I think maybe UAE is an exception, but at least the majority of the GCC states want to see the Pakistaniled diplomatic efforts succeed.

[00:04:41]And I think their view was that supporting um the uh project freedom, quote unquote, project freedom was going to undermine Islamabad's efforts to bring the US and Iran to a deal. And they're very much invested in seeing Pakistan succeed as the mediator here.

[00:05:00]You know, Georgio, you bring up something which we want to ask you next, which is regarding this kind of growing rift within the Gulf States. You know, as you said, on one hand, there's kind of uh Saudi Arabia and Qatar and on the other the UAE. Um you written about this about how Gulf states are reassessing where things stand with the US and Israel because of their war on Iran. So can you explain this growing rift within the Gulf block and what's driving the two different approaches that you've outlined?

[00:05:34]>> Yeah, so this rift between Saudi Arabia in the UAE began uh to become a significant factor in the Gulf in the wider Arab world. Uh years ago, there were divergent policies and interests on the part of Riyad and Abu Dhabi that played out in multiple theaters. Yemen, uh, Sudan, Somalia, and I would also argue, uh, toward the end of the second GCC crisis, there were divergent views about the blockade of Qatar with Saudi Arabia, favoring reconciliation with Doha and Abu Dhabi at that time, not favoring it. Um, also the Abraham Accords have been an important part of the picture here. The UAE normalized diplomatic relations with Israel in 2020 and has really deepened its relationship with Israel significantly ever since 2020. The genocide in Gaza not only did not slow down the growth of um ties between the UAE and Israel in certain domains, but actually we've seen the UAE and Israel continue to get closer even in the post October 7th period. Uh the view from Saudi Arabia and some of the other Gulf Arab monarchies is that it is definitely a threat uh to have Israel emerge as a more influential actor on the Arabian Peninsula. They do not want to see an Israeli footprint form on the Arabian Peninsula. Um in some Gulf Arab capitals, there's definitely a view of Israel as a real threat to GCC countries. mindful of the fact that Israel actually bombed Doha in September of last year. I think it's obviously understandable that some of these countries continue to view Israel as a direct threat to their own countries and of course a threat to stability in the wider region which will always threaten the interests of Gulf countries. Um, so the fact that the UAE has really deepened ties with Israel and aligned with Israel, often at the expense of its alignment with other Arab countries, is creating friction between Saudi Arabia and some other regional actors on one side and the UAE on the other. After this war uh with Iran broke out initially and the Gulf states were being targeted by Iranian missiles and drones, I think the UAE and Saudi Arabia sort of put their differences aside temporarily to kind of come together and project an image of Gulf Arab unity. But that's very different from resolving their differences. Now I if slash when we move to a postconlict period, I think the differences between Saudi Arabia and the UAE will become more relevant again and probably heat up in certain ways.

[00:08:25]>> You know, Georgio, not to make everything about Lebanon, I mean, I am here, so for me everything is about Lebanon, but I'm raising this because it's related to the next question I want to ask you. Um there is an interesting role being played by Saudi Arabia and Lebanon right now in the sense that you know the Lebanese there's elements of the Lebanese government that are really excited at the prospect of some sort of orchestrated Trump orchestrated photo op with the Israelis and this like some sort of fake peace deal um and normalization with the Israelis even as Israel destroys massive parts of Lebanon, right? Um, and interestingly enough, the Saudis, who have historically played a pretty, I would say, destructive role in Lebanon in terms of the way they influence certain political figures in this country, have actually stepped in to reign in the Lebanese that they have influence over and say, "You guys, you cannot jump into bed with the Israelis. You have to enforce some conditions. Like, you're being crazy." And I thought that was interesting because I think it reflects how a country like Saudi Arabia is changing the way it views Israel in this region. I'm curious if you could talk a bit about the Gulf States and their views of Israel's a their view of Israel after this war. I would maybe say let's not include the UAE in this mix because you kind of already spoke to that.

[00:09:42]They've really entered into this like Israel axis. But for the other Gulf states, has Israel emerged as a stronger so-called potential security partner, or has this destruction in Gaza, the regional instability, especially with regard to Iran, has that made normalization politically and strategically harder uh for these countries? And in the case of a country like Saudi Arabia, are they seeing Israel increasingly as a threat to them?

[00:10:12]There's definitely a lot to respond to here and so many important points to make. Um I think yes in general there is a growing view in Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar and many other Arab countries that Israel is a growing threat to the security and stability of the region.

[00:10:35]And while many of the at least a handful of those countries sense a greater threat from Iran as a consequence of how Iran retaliated to against the American Israeli war on Iran. A view in many of these Arab countries is that both Iran and Israel represent threats and I think countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman are very uncomfortable with the idea of turning to Israel as a security partner to protect Arab countries from Iran. Obviously, it's right to make an exception for the UAE, which is definitely on a different page here. I think within the GCC though, it's very possible that Bahrain will align with the UAE on this issue. Of course, Bahrain is a member of the Abraham Accords and Bahrain feels very vulnerable to Iran right now, but this view that Israel is a security partner that can be turned to is one that think it's not going to sit well with the majority of countries in the GCC. We also do need to keep in mind that domestic politics do matter in Gulf countries. There's sort of an orientalist view that oh these these monarchs have absolute power and they get to do whatever they want and they can ignore what their citizens think um or how their citizens feel. That's really not um true. At the end of the day, leaders, whether they came to power in democratic elections or not, they ultimately do have to have legitimacy to maintain power. And in these Gulf Arab societies, there are very strong views about everything that's happened in Gaza. Also strong views about what's going on in other parts of the region, too, including Lebanon. So for Gulf Arab monarchs to move closer to Israel, it definitely comes with political risks at home in a country like the UAE where the native population is a relatively small percentage of the overall population um and the government has a lot of control over the society and the country is geograph is relatively small geographically. It's much easier to control descent. But in some of these other countries like Saudi Arabia for example, the picture is very very different and the leadership does need to take public opinion into consideration. And so that's of course another factor that I think many people overlook >> you know Giorgio and it's hard to remember this because after October 7th our the entire region really really changed but another element another thing that happened in 2023 which a lot of people looked upon very positively um with a lot of optimism was the reproach mont between uh Saudi Arabia and Iran.

[00:13:31]Um 3 years later uh it's it is kind of hard to believe what has happened in you know these past years many wars and and attacks on the whole region generally but you know after this war because of course it does seem that uh whether it happens in these weeks or in the next months it does seem like there is a lot of pressure for this war to come to an end. So after this war uh is there still a possibility of of these two powers having ties? Is this uh relation where does this relationship stand after these three years of immense conflict in the region?

[00:14:13]>> Yeah, really really important question.

[00:14:15]As as you rightly pointed out, in March 2023, Saudi Arabia and Iran renormalized diplomatic relations through an agreement they signed in China that was um in many ways kind of a non-aggression pact and it did prove quite resilient for a number of years. Uh it this uh donant between Riad and Tehran weathered many regional storms including everything that happened in uh Gaza and the 12-day war between Iran and Israel last summer. Uh but it proved resilient until it didn't. It it really fell apart on February 28th, the day that America and Israel began bombing Iran. um the Iranians retaliated with attacks on the GCC countries including Saudi Arabia.

[00:15:06]So moving forward, I think it's clear that there's going to be a lot more tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran from the Saudi perspective. They're going to see Iran uh more suspiciously.

[00:15:21]They're going to be much more fearful about Iran. Um as I said, more suspicious about Iran's agenda, Iran's motivations.

[00:15:30]Um but at the same time I think the Saudis are going to be quite pragmatic for their economic transformation uh known as vision 2030 to succeed. They need to have stability and peace in the region and that's going to require some sort of an arrangement with Iran. It's going to be difficult for Saudi Arabia to engage Iran diplomatically. But I think the leadership in Riad understands that they have no choice but to find a way to reach some sort of a tense peace with the Iranians. They um have to be pragmatic. Um the Saudis understand that Iran is a permanent neighbor and that's always going to be a reality regardless of what they may think about the Islamic Republic. Now from the Iranian side, what's also interesting is that there's kind of an emerging Sunni axis involving Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. And Iran right now is very focused on having good relationships with Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt. And I think the Iranians know that if they're going to be hostile or aggressive towards Saudi Arabia, that could undermine Thran's relationships with those other three countries. So, I really think that moving forward, what uh the kind of Iranian aggression that we see against the GCC countries is going to be much more focused on the UAE and not Saudi Arabia. And I think that the Iranians are going to try to capitalize on the rift between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. And I think these are going to be some really interesting and and very important dynamics to watch in upcoming months.

[00:17:14]Lastly, Giorgio, um just very briefly because I know we're we're running out of time here, but um I and I know you alluded to this earlier and you said we could talk about it later, but I I just was kind of curious your initial thoughts because you're we're talking about confidence, golf confidence in the US eroding and that leads to the question of what are the alternatives, right? So, do you see the Gulf States moving towards a more multip-olar strategy? Some of them have already been sort of doing that in recent years. And you and I have talked about that in lengthier discussions on on dispatches um in recent years, but this seems to at least accelerate that to some degree.

[00:17:50]And if so, like how does that change that sort of balancing act that these Gulf States have been playing uh sort of balancing between the US and China um and Russia? Um does that maybe, you know, push them closer to to those countries? I'm not saying they're just going to suddenly have Chinese bases instead of American bases, but I imagine there's a lot of conversations in these countries taking place around this very issue.

[00:18:16]>> Yeah, the Gulf countries are obviously having to recalibrate their security policies because their strategies of relying on the American security umbrella clearly failed. Granted um having American military bases and having these close uh defense partnerships with the US did work for these countries for quite a long time.

[00:18:37]Uh for example in Qatar there was a view that having US sentcom's forward headquarters in Aluade sort of provided ironclad security for Qatar. And granted up until last year I mean Qatar was very secure. There were not foreign countries firing missiles or drones at it. Um but clearly there's a new environment now and the US security umbrella is not capable of protecting these countries and protecting their economies from all from the danger within the region. We've clearly seen the regional conflicts spill into the Gulf like never before.

[00:19:18]Um, so to get to your question, I don't think these countries are going to abandon their uh military ties, their defense ties with the United States, but they're going to work very hard to become a lot more autonomous from the United States. I think on one hand, they're going to try to build up sort of more indigenous capabilities um and sort of militarize more on their own to try to sort of stand strong uh with their own militaries. And at the same time, they're going to try to diversify their partnerships with other countries around the world. What's actually very interesting is that Ukraine is now a country that they're looking to because as a consequence of everything that's happened in Ukraine since February 2022, uh the Ukrainians have really mastered drone warfare. And uh we're actually at a point right now where um Ukrainian drone experts are going into the Gulf and training um military officials in GCC states on how to counter Iranian drones. There's these drone deals that Ukraine has signed with uh Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. I think also Turkey is a country that GCC states will move closer to. Probably China has a role to play in this greater uh diversification agenda. In the case of the UAE, they see Israel as a country they can turn to to become more independent from the United States. I think they're going to go about this in different ways. I don't think all six GCC states will be on the same page. Um, but nonetheless, this definitely seems to be the trend where all of them do want to become more autonomous from the United States. Uh, I'll sort of wrap this up by saying the decision made by the Trump administration to wage Operation Epic Fury. That was really seen in the Gulf as just a total disregard for the interests of the GCC countries. They made it clear to Trump that if the Americans and Israelis would start bombing Iran that they would be the targets of Iran's wrath. And that's exactly what happened. As soon as this war started, the economies in the Gulf have suffered from the Iranian missile and drone attacks on the GCC states, the closure of the Straight of Hormuz, uh the tourism industries have suffered in these countries. And they have, as much as they rightfully blame Iran for um their security crises, they also blame the United States for putting them in this situation to begin with. And I think they're going to look at the United States very very differently um for the years and perhaps decades to come.

[00:21:59]>> Well, I think we're going to have to leave it there this time around. Giorgio Capiro, CEO of GF State Analytics, thank you so much for your very incredible analysis on all of this. Uh we really appreciate you.

[00:22:10]>> Thank you so much.