Global Faultlines podcast | Has Israel’s bid to reshape West Asia hit a road block?

Ajouté : 2026-05-27

[00:00:00]This is one of the most consequential conflicts that is unfolding before us.

[00:00:05]The roots of this, the ongoing conflict, you can trace it back to the Palestinian question.

[00:00:11]>> So unless you address that, we are not going to get peace and stability. The social relations in Lebanon is too stretched at this point of time and it could start fracturing >> that would lead to lead to civil strife.

[00:00:23]When we look at West Asia today, are we looking at a completely new and permanently volatile um balance of power?

[00:00:31]>> Jolani clings on onto power. Some kind of balance is there that keeps him on the throne, >> right?

[00:00:37]>> But it doesn't mean that Syria has stabilized itself.

[00:00:47]West Asia has rarely stood still, but the region we see today looks markedly different from the one that existed before October 7th, 2023.

[00:00:57]Wars have expanded beyond borders. Old alliances have been tested. New power centers are emerging. Gaza remains devastated. Lebanon is under immense strain. Syria is navigating a new political chapter. and direct confrontation between Israel and Iran has shattered assumptions that once defined regional conflict. For a few years, the dominant conversation in West Asia revolved around normalization, economic transformation, and strategic realignments. But today, security, deterrence, and the possibility of wider escalation once again shape the regional landscape. But are these temporary crises or are we witnessing the emergence of a completely new West Asia?

[00:01:41]Hello and welcome to another episode of Global Fault Lines, the Hindus International Affairs podcast. I'm Sharma Winken Subramanyan and in this episode we take a step back to understand how West Asia has changed since October 7th and what these shifts mean for the future of the region.

[00:01:58]Joining me once again is Stanley Johnny, the Hindu's international affairs editor. So, welcome back to another episode of Global Fault Lines. Uh, this is our 20th episode. Thank you for uh joining us again. And to our audience, thank you so much for uh your support through this uh journey. We look forward to doing much more along these lines.

[00:02:18]So, thank you.

[00:02:19]>> Thank you. No problem. No.

[00:02:20]>> Yes. Uh so to start with since October uh 7th which is considered to be a turning point for West Asia >> the region has um seen simultaneous wars, economic strains, political realignments um leadership crisis and shifting alliances. So if you had to describe the uh transformation that this region has been through in the last 2 years, >> what would you say has been the biggest um strategic shift?

[00:02:51]>> Yeah, in many ways October 7 was a major let's say watershed moment uh in West Asia's contemporary history. Yes. Right.

[00:03:00]>> Israel hasn't seen this kind of an attack on its soil.

[00:03:04]>> Yeah.

[00:03:04]>> Israel had fought many wars in the past.

[00:03:06]>> Mhm. But this happened on Israeli soil and roughly,200 people were killed, 250 people were abducted and then Israel after that started this very vengeful war in the region.

[00:03:20]>> Yeah.

[00:03:20]>> So I think if you look at the major strategic shifts that happened in West Asia since October 7th >> I would identify three developments, >> right?

[00:03:32]>> One, a further expansion by Israel.

[00:03:35]>> Mhm. Because if you look at Israel's map in October 2023 and now, >> yeah, >> so Israel is now controlling half of Gaza directly, right?

[00:03:46]>> Yes.

[00:03:46]>> Some roughly 55% of Gaza is now directly ruled by Israeli military. I mean, there are no people, not many people to rule, but still the territory is controlled by the Israelis. The entire southern Lebanon.

[00:03:59]>> Yes.

[00:04:00]>> From uh northern Israeli border to Leani River. Yeah.

[00:04:05]>> are directly or indirectly controlled by the Israeli forces now.

[00:04:09]>> Mhm.

[00:04:10]>> And they have I mean like much like what happened in northern Gaza because Israel has turned northern Gaza into dust, >> right?

[00:04:18]>> And rubble.

[00:04:18]>> Yeah.

[00:04:19]>> And they are trying to do the same in Lebanon. In southern Lebanon. Yes.

[00:04:25]>> Right.

[00:04:25]>> So southern Lebanon the Israelis are controlling.

[00:04:28]>> Mhm.

[00:04:28]>> And then if you look at Golan Hates which the Israelis took over in 1967.

[00:04:33]>> Yeah. So they had expanded their control of Golan Heights which is uh historically a Syrian territory.

[00:04:40]>> Yeah.

[00:04:41]>> Uh and the Israelis were controlling Golan from 67 and now parts of Golan were with Syria.

[00:04:48]>> But then Israel had what the Israelis call it security buffer zone etc. They >> comes up with these names.

[00:04:55]>> But what does it mean uh is that the Israelis have extended their territorial control in Syria.

[00:05:01]>> Right. So half of Gaza, southern Lebanon and then uh in Syria and in the West Bank they have deepened and tightened their occupation. Right.

[00:05:13]>> Yes.

[00:05:14]>> They are now setting up more settlements >> and the settlers themselves are attacking the local Palestinians. They are being driven out of their homes.

[00:05:22]>> And their territories, their lands are being uh taken over by the settlers. And then the Israelis are now allow allowing more settlements to come up in the West Bank.

[00:05:35]>> Uh so they even passed new legislation uh handing death penalty to only Palestinians who commit terror quote unquote >> which is an apartheide clearly an aparthide legislation. So they have tightened their grip in the West Bank.

[00:05:49]>> So you see an expansionist Israel. I'm not saying this is going to be permanent. Okay? I'm not saying that Israel has >> made great achievements. That's not the point. But the point is an expansionist Israel. Israel expanding its territorial hold is one major development.

[00:06:03]>> Right.

[00:06:03]>> And the second development I think it was not directly linked to October 7, but still the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad government in Syria.

[00:06:10]>> Yes.

[00:06:11]>> Was a major geopolitical shift.

[00:06:13]>> Yeah.

[00:06:13]>> Uh you know it is not a direct result of October 7.

[00:06:18]>> Yeah.

[00:06:18]>> But it is linked to u the chain of events that unfolded post October 7.

[00:06:25]>> Right. Because if you look at what happened after October 7, Hezbollah, which is a Lebanese group, >> uh, which was uh, heavily present in Syria >> defending the positions of the Azad government. So they had to pull back their troops from Syria to defend their positions in Lebanon when they came under attack from Israel.

[00:06:44]>> So that weakened the defensive lines of the Azad government. That's one thing.

[00:06:48]>> Secondly, the Israelis themselves had carried out thousands of air strikes against the Syrian government.

[00:06:53]>> Yeah. So that had also weakened the Syrian army very you know further.

[00:06:58]>> Yes. Yes.

[00:06:59]>> And then the third factor is that once ESBA was out once the Syrian army was weakened Jolani forces started an offensive probably with support from Turkey because Turkey wanted to get rid of Assad >> and have their own ally in power in Damascus.

[00:07:15]>> Yeah.

[00:07:16]>> But you know what happened when Assad fell was that Hezbollah's support system collapsed. Right.

[00:07:23]>> That support system came from Iran.

[00:07:25]>> Mhm.

[00:07:25]>> So as a result of the collapse of the Assad government, both Iran and Hezbollah, >> they got weakened relatively.

[00:07:32]>> Right.

[00:07:33]>> That gave the green signal for Israel to go after the Iranians. We we talked about it in detail in our previous episodes.

[00:07:39]>> Yes.

[00:07:40]>> The third development is the war on Iran. So you have seen two attacks. Yes.

[00:07:44]One in June 2025 when you had the 12-day war and then >> the ongoing conflict. Okay. you have a ceasefire but the conflict is not yet over.

[00:07:53]>> Yes.

[00:07:53]>> Uh this I think is among the three the most important development is the the most important strategic shift is uh the ongoing conflict on Iran.

[00:08:05]>> Mhm.

[00:08:05]>> Um I think nobody has fully understood the real impact the lasting impacts of this conflict.

[00:08:13]>> Right. I think we all will take time but we are making you know our own assess assessments based on the facts we have >> right >> but even if you look at the facts that are available for us um this is one of the most consequential conflicts that is unfolding before us >> right um we're going to discuss about all the countries you've mentioned um in this episode but before that before 2023 many believed that this uh region was moving more towards relative stability >> with um you know um economic diversification, normalization talks and uh Gulf reconciliation you know dominating the conversation >> but now it all seems to be centered once again around conflict and security.

[00:08:58]>> So um on a broader context what changed so dramatically and um is normaly completely derailed or would you say it's just delayed now? See, West Asia has always been prone to conflicts, right? Uh you just look at the history of the region, the postwar history of the region.

[00:09:17]>> Uh and there were multiple conflicts in the region, right? You I mean immediately after >> state of Israel was created, you had the 1948 war.

[00:09:25]>> And then in 1956, you had the Su, 1967, you had the six- day war.

[00:09:30]>> 1978, the first Lebanese invasion, 1982, the second Lebanese invasion, 1989, you had the first and the father. uh and then 2006 you had the second Lebanese the third Lebanese war and 1973 in between you had the Yam Kipur war so the region had always seen many many conflicts right >> so I mean it's part of West Asia's history >> uh but at the same time recent in recent years before October 7 people thought >> that a new security equilibrium was taking shape in the region >> right >> and the reason for this argument was that they thought Arab countries started looking at Iran.

[00:10:11]Arab countries means basically the Persians Arab countries, >> Persian Gulf monarchies. They started looking at Iran as a greater threat, >> right, >> than any other country in the region.

[00:10:20]>> Mhm.

[00:10:21]>> Which also means that the Israelis were open or these countries were open towards each other >> uh to improving their relationship.

[00:10:30]That's what you saw in the Abraham Accords, right? The UAE signed >> UAE Bar and Morocco Sudan. forget about Sudan but all the other three countries the agreement >> still stands. Uh so you had some a new normal in the region where >> the Arab countries and Israel these two are the two pillars of the US policy towards the region.

[00:10:50]>> Yes.

[00:10:50]>> So these two pillars are coming closer against a common enemy. The common enemy is Iran.

[00:10:55]>> Yeah.

[00:10:56]>> This is what Jake Salivan wrought in September 2023 in foreign affairs.

[00:11:00]>> Right.

[00:11:00]>> He even claimed that the Middle East because the Americans call the region the Middle East.

[00:11:05]>> Yes. So the Middle East or West Asia >> uh West Asia had not seen peace and stability the kind of peace and stability that it was witnessing in September 2023 >> in in two decades. This was his argument. I mean he published the article in foreign affairs.

[00:11:21]>> And it's interesting that within a month everything started collapsing.

[00:11:24]>> Yes.

[00:11:24]>> What is the reason? This is a very interesting question. What is the reason? Why West Asia seemed all fine or at least >> seemed better stable?

[00:11:32]>> Yeah. uh in September and why everything is now falling apart today.

[00:11:37]>> Yeah, >> I think the fundamental problem here is that those who thought stability was established in the region completely underplayed the importance of the Palestinian question.

[00:11:50]>> Right.

[00:11:51]>> Right. Because in September 2023, everybody thought the Palestinian issue was happily buried.

[00:11:58]>> Yeah.

[00:11:58]>> Uh under under the history.

[00:12:00]>> Mhm.

[00:12:02]uh everybody was I mean the Arab countries were very willing very open to having a new chapter in their relationship with Israel >> right >> uh they thought that anyway Israel was controlling West Bank Hamas has been pushed back into Gaza Strip >> and Israel is very powerful so that they can continue their occupation without any consequences what Israel wants to do continue occupation without consequences right but then on October 7 you had a major explosion by >> I mean Hamas carried out this attack.

[00:12:32]They massacred >> a lot of people in Israel.

[00:12:36]>> What Hamas also did >> on October 7, 2023 was to bring the Palestine question back to the four of West Asia's geopolitics.

[00:12:46]>> Yes.

[00:12:47]>> So, Israelis sidelined the Palestine issue, right?

[00:12:52]And Hamas re-regionalized it.

[00:12:54]>> Right.

[00:12:54]>> Hamas back brought it back to the region. Right.

[00:12:57]>> Right. By carrying out the attack. Yes.

[00:12:59]And the Palestinians had to pay a heavy price for that. There's no doubt about it. And Hamas carried out uh indefensible brutalities on October 7.

[00:13:08]No question about that. But >> you take a step back, look at what happened in the region, >> this is what happened.

[00:13:15]>> Those who thought stability has come.

[00:13:17]>> You know, those who thought the Israelis and the Arabs can live happily ever after. Mhm.

[00:13:22]>> They I mean they all underplayed or overlooked the importance of the Palestine question.

[00:13:28]>> Right.

[00:13:29]>> So my argument has always been even in the book original sin. Yeah.

[00:13:32]>> My argument has always been that >> I mean the Palestine issue it was not born on October 7th.

[00:13:38]>> Right.

[00:13:39]>> There is a deep layered history behind it.

[00:13:42]>> Yeah.

[00:13:43]>> And the Palestine issue unless you address the Palestinian question. How do you address the Palestinian question?

[00:13:48]You give equal rights to the Palestinians or you give them their land.

[00:13:51]>> Yes.

[00:13:51]>> You give them their country.

[00:13:53]>> The Israelis are not ready to do that, right?

[00:13:55]>> Yeah.

[00:13:56]>> So unless you address the Palestinian question, you're not going to get peace and stability in the region, >> right?

[00:14:01]>> So that's how October 7 changed. That's why today we are talking about all these conflicts because all these conflicts now I mean Iran has it's a major war, right? Everybody is suffering.

[00:14:11]>> Yes, >> we are also suffering in India.

[00:14:14]>> Petrol prices are going up. Netanyahu is not happy. He definitely wants the war to be restarted. Netanyahu is not bothered about Indian economy, right? He might be your great friend, >> but his priority is not uh you know the Indian economy. His priority is to deal with the Iranian threat and he wants to resume the war.

[00:14:31]>> Yes.

[00:14:31]>> Uh so you see what's happening in the region now. There is you know the the Persian Gulf security architecture has collapsed.

[00:14:39]everything you can the roots of this the ongoing conflict you can trace it back to the Palestinian question. So unless you address that you are not going to get peace and stability >> right and um let's talk about Israel u Israel seems to be more militarily assertive now than before the um war before October 7th not just in Gaza but across the region in Iran Syria of course now Lebanon and the Red Sea. So uh would you say the country has emerged stronger after the conflict or is it more isolated diplomatically and politically?

[00:15:14]>> I know there are a lot of people who argue that Israel has emerged stronger.

[00:15:19]>> Uh I don't belong to that camp. I mean I have a different way of looking at the region because for example I wrote in December 2023 just a few months after October 7 that Israel is fighting in the dark. Right. The >> article is in the Hindu >> and last year again I thought that I wrote that Israel is facing a strategic defeat.

[00:15:38]>> Mhm.

[00:15:38]>> And after the June war of 2025, I had written that Israel had failed to solve the Persian puzzle.

[00:15:45]>> Right.

[00:15:45]>> I mean I mean about the Iranians if you had solved the Persian puzzle back in the day. The Israeli ambassador had responded to me uh Israeli ambassador in Delhi >> uh saying that we were facing a great Iranian threat. So we would rather live with a bloody nose than with a nuclear Iran. This was the ambassador's response at that time. I mean I have consistently argued that the war is not making Israel stronger.

[00:16:08]>> Right.

[00:16:09]>> The war is not making Israel safer.

[00:16:11]>> Mhm.

[00:16:12]>> Uh and why? Because yes, Israel has become militarily more assertive. There is no question about it. And Israel is also controlling more territories.

[00:16:20]Right.

[00:16:20]>> Like I just talked about the territories Israel is controlling.

[00:16:23]>> Yeah.

[00:16:24]>> Is Israel living in peace?

[00:16:26]>> Not really. You know >> it's not.

[00:16:27]>> Yeah.

[00:16:28]>> And you look at what were the declared objectives of Israel. Uh there were declared and undeclared objectives. And the declared objective was that Israeli leaders kept saying that they wanted to destroy Hamas.

[00:16:39]>> Right.

[00:16:40]>> Did they destroy Hamas? This is a simple question I asked Israelis. They haven't destroyed Hamas. And Hamas is controlling whatever is left of Gaza.

[00:16:47]>> Yeah.

[00:16:47]>> 45% of Gaza and Hamas are still there.

[00:16:49]>> Yeah.

[00:16:50]>> And Israel wanted to destroy Hezbollah.

[00:16:52]Come on. Hisbollah I mean Hisbah is now fighting Israeli troops with drones.

[00:16:56]>> Yes.

[00:16:57]>> So uh unlike 1980s what the Israelis thought that they will push the Hezbollah out of southern Lebanon push the Lebanese people and create a security parimeter. So they thought that they can control the territory.

[00:17:10]>> Uh but compared to 1980s and 1990s the warfare has also changed.

[00:17:14]>> Right.

[00:17:14]>> So back in the day they used suicide bombers. Today they are using suicide drones.

[00:17:19]>> Yes. Yes. So Hezbollah is today what they are doing is that they are turning Israel's security parimeter into into an insecurity parimeter. I mean it doesn't mean Hezbollah is winning but what it means is that Hezbollah is making occupation a lot more difficult for the Israelis.

[00:17:33]>> Right.

[00:17:33]>> So you wanted to destroy Hezbollah.

[00:17:35]Hebah is there.

[00:17:36]>> Yeah.

[00:17:37]>> You wanted to destroy Hamas. Hamas is there.

[00:17:39]>> Yeah.

[00:17:40]>> And uh you wanted to solve you wanted to solve the Iranian problem. Look what you have done. You have turned Iran stronger.

[00:17:47]>> Yes. At least from a regional point of view, right? Iran controls >> the Persian Gulf, the war has turned out to be completely disastrous.

[00:17:55]>> Even President Trump, I mean the United States, we are I mean it's the most powerful country in the world.

[00:18:00]>> But even the United States is now thinking twice or thrice.

[00:18:03]>> Yes, >> it it will before it goes to war with Iran again because they fought they bombed Iran for 40 days.

[00:18:09]>> Yes.

[00:18:10]>> And then what did they achieve? You know, so if you look at it from these point of views, the from the larger regional perspective, Israel has got more land, but at what cost?

[00:18:22]>> Right.

[00:18:22]>> And you look at Isra the reputational damage the wars has brought to Israel.

[00:18:26]>> Yeah.

[00:18:27]>> The country which uh uh Theodor Hazil, Israel's spiritual >> founder, the Zionist leader >> who he imagined Israel as a civilizational outpost in the land of the barbarians. Okay, that itself was a racist.

[00:18:42]>> Yeah.

[00:18:43]>> Comment, but still he imagined Israel as a civilizational outpost.

[00:18:47]>> And look at what happened to the civilizational outpost. This the the shining >> uh town on the hill which is now facing allegations of committing a genocide.

[00:18:58]>> Yes.

[00:18:59]>> UN uh committee says investigation committee says Israel has committed genocide. I don't know whether you saw that video which Beng released yesterday.

[00:19:08]>> Yes. Yeah. you know of how they are treating uh the activists who came who were arrested from the flirtillaa >> and this man shot it and proudly posted it on Twitter and saying that welcome to Israel.

[00:19:24]>> Imagine I mean uh and 75,000 people were killed in Gaza.

[00:19:29]>> Yes.

[00:19:29]>> Uh so I don't think Israel can easily paper this over. I know Israel's fans would say that this is fighting terrorism. Israel will do. I don't think so. I think a moral uh this has cost this will cost Israel a uh you know a deep moral uh dilemma.

[00:19:47]>> Yeah.

[00:19:47]>> Uh and Israel will have to deal with it one way or the other. It can't just paper it over and move on.

[00:19:52]>> Yes.

[00:19:52]>> And you look at the backlash Israel is facing in the United States. M >> in the United States even the American sections of the American rightwing okay the left were always critical of you >> but sections of American right wing including Taka Carlson and all of them are now turning against Israel >> right JD Vance doesn't seem to be a great fan of Israel >> or at least Israel's foreign policy right >> yes in the United States Israel still has considerable influence the lobby is powerful >> but it is also facing a lot of resistance even in the United States >> so if you look at the full spectrum Um, you failed to meet your objectives, right?

[00:20:30]>> You have caused a lot of reputational damage. You're losing even your allies.

[00:20:35]>> Yeah.

[00:20:36]>> And your uh completely disastrous war has turned Iran into a stronger player in the region. Yes.

[00:20:42]>> So, I don't think this war is making Israel stronger.

[00:20:45]>> Right. Right. Let's uh continue talking about Iran who has faced uh significant uh challenges from um direct confrontation with Israel um and uh pressure from its regional allies to economic strains and also growing um scrutiny from Arab states.

[00:21:05]>> Yet still seems to hold significant in influence across multiple fronts. So if you had to assess the position of Iran um and compare it with before 2023 and right now, how would you assess it?

[00:21:21]>> Before the war began, Iran was on a very very sticky wicket, >> right?

[00:21:27]>> Because uh the Syrian government had fallen. Iran lost its direct link with Hezbollah.

[00:21:33]>> Yeah.

[00:21:34]>> And Israel was becoming very militarily assertive in the region. Mhm.

[00:21:40]>> And Donald Trump became the president of the United States who had taken a very aggressive hostile >> approach towards Iran.

[00:21:48]>> Yeah.

[00:21:48]>> And inside Iran, the economic cost was mounting.

[00:21:51]>> Mhm.

[00:21:52]>> And in Jan 2026, Iran witnessed a massive protest.

[00:21:56]>> Yeah. and Iran crackdown, you know, heavily put that protest down leading to the deaths of, you know, no, I mean, you look at the Iranian official account, some 3,000 people were killed, >> right?

[00:22:08]>> So, Iran was facing a lot of challenges, internal challenges and external challenges, >> right?

[00:22:14]>> In the past, Iran had faced external challenges and internal challenges separately, >> right?

[00:22:18]>> But in Jan, it was facing both at the same time.

[00:22:21]>> Yeah.

[00:22:22]>> So, Iran was on the back foot. But then came Donald Trump's and Benjamin Netanyahu's war as a boon for the Iranians, >> right?

[00:22:30]>> You look at the New York Times had the story of uh the regime change plan.

[00:22:35]>> Mhm.

[00:22:36]>> Uh it was crazy because the plan was to kill the Ayatala Ali Kamay.

[00:22:42]>> Mhm.

[00:22:43]>> And then unleash the Kurds from the northwest and then run SCOPs >> Yeah.

[00:22:48]>> information campaign and trigger internal protest and instability.

[00:22:53]>> Yes. and then push Mouhammad Ahmed Nijad as the next leader of Iran, >> the former president.

[00:23:00]>> I mean, it reads like a Hollywood script for me.

[00:23:03]>> I don't know. But >> I mean, that shows us how desperate these guys were for a regime change in Iran.

[00:23:09]>> Yeah.

[00:23:10]>> Because I mean, we talked about it a lot of time. Without regime change, the Americans and the Israelis were not going to meet any of their objectives.

[00:23:16]>> Yeah.

[00:23:17]>> And they can't have a regime change only through the air attack. They should send troops. But sending troops to Iran, like Bob Gates said back in the day when Obama was the leader, he said that anybody who recommends the president to send troops to Iran should >> get his head checked, >> right?

[00:23:35]>> I mean, sending troops to Iran is not easy. Iran is a highly mountainous territory. You went to Afghanistan and then what happened? You fought 20 years and then >> and then fled Afghanistan, right? So you don't want to send troops to Iran, but you want regime change in Iran. You can't get regime change only through air attack. So this was the plan, >> right?

[00:23:52]>> And the plan didn't work.

[00:23:54]>> Yes.

[00:23:54]>> Right.

[00:23:55]>> Uh so but this tells us that they so badly they wanted regime change but the plan went bad.

[00:24:02]>> Mhm.

[00:24:03]>> And it allowed to the Iranian authorities to basically mobilize support.

[00:24:09]>> People rallied behind the flag because nationalism is a very powerful ideology.

[00:24:13]At the end of the day when your country is under attack, >> even if you don't like the government, you might rally behind the flag, right?

[00:24:19]That's what patriotic people would do and Iran has a civilizational and patriotic basically that nationalist legacy is >> definitely >> very strong in this country. Yeah.

[00:24:30]>> So, Iran was facing a lot of challenges, but during the war, the Iranian government mobilized a substantial support and their military response was also, I would say, highly effective.

[00:24:42]>> Right?

[00:24:43]>> They had a plan, >> right?

[00:24:44]>> They went after American radars.

[00:24:46]>> United States lost apparently 42 aircraft during the war in 40 days of war according to the latest congressional report.

[00:24:53]>> 42.

[00:24:54]>> That's a huge number. That's huge. Yes.

[00:24:56]Yes. Uh so I mean either damaged or destroyed. This is what the congressional report says that the report submitted to Congress says.

[00:25:04]>> So they went after the radar and they regionalized the war started attacking the Arab countries and every time Trump would threaten escalation. The Iranians would escalate. They always tried to take the escalation dominance, >> right?

[00:25:16]>> Forcing Ronaldo Trump to declare the ceasefire.

[00:25:18]>> Yeah.

[00:25:19]>> So they were militarily effective politically. They mobilized a support.

[00:25:22]Right. Uh so uh and basically and by regionalizing the war, Iran expanded the scope of the conflict and put pressure on the Arab countries to tell the Trump administration that this war cannot go on like this because if you look at the latest statement from Trump when he took his another latest U-turn, I lost count. I don't know how many U-turns he has taken. But still when he took the latest U-turn he said he is doing that at a request from the UAE Qatar and Saudi Arabia >> right >> I don't know whether the UAE actually made the request but the Saudis and the Qataris definitely would have because they don't want the war to be resumed right >> so that shows us that Iran's approach of regionalizing the war was effective I'm not calling it successful at least effective right >> uh so the Iranians managed relatively well >> from from a political, geopolitical and military point of view.

[00:26:18]>> Right?

[00:26:19]>> But I should also say that Iran is also it doesn't mean I mean there are there are scholars who argue that Iran has become >> the fourth power fourth center of power after the United States, China and Russia.

[00:26:30]>> Yeah.

[00:26:30]>> For example, Robert, Professor Robert Pap says I don't subscribe to such views because Iran is inherently Iran is facing a lot of contradictions and weakness. its economy is in deep deep peril right and I don't know how long Iran can continue okay during the war time Iran still commands support among uh the public but once the war settles down if Iran doesn't get sanctions relief and other kind of guarantees you never know this domestic crisis might reignite again right so Iran also faces internally Iran also faces a lot of challenges so so that's why the Iranians are how I mean despite the rhetoric they stay engaged in the diplomatic process right they exchange proposals they talk to the Americans they have their red lines >> they don't want to breach the red lines but >> they are not walking out of uh the talks >> which means they want to get something out of this conflict >> right >> they want to get real sanctions relief >> because only then they would be able to rebuild the economy and the country >> and they want to get security guarantees >> and security guarantees would mean that 6 months down the line the Israelis would not start bombing them again.

[00:27:41]>> Yes.

[00:27:42]>> Right. And they also know that they made certain uh certain gains advances in the war and they want to turn those advances those gains into lasting benefits >> right >> in the region. Okay. So >> I mean a lot would depend on what kind of an agreement if an agreement >> comes out of this crisis.

[00:28:03]>> Right. Now let's uh quickly address the situation in Lebanon because the country has uh proven to be the biggest example of a state collapsing under the weight of regional conflicts, economic u strains and uh internal political paralysis. So um how significant um is the influence of the recent escalation on the future of Lebanon and also the position of Hezbollah within the country?

[00:28:30]>> Yeah, Lebanon is a tragic story. right?

[00:28:32]>> It got caught in this war, >> right?

[00:28:36]>> Uh and it doesn't have any easy way out either.

[00:28:39]>> Mhm.

[00:28:39]>> It's a divided country. It's a divided polity.

[00:28:42]>> And it's also a country that became a victim of West Asia's geopolitics, >> right?

[00:28:48]>> It's it's Lebanon is basically a victim of geopolitics, >> right?

[00:28:52]>> Because the Saudis would exert its influence through the Sunnis.

[00:28:56]>> Yeah.

[00:28:57]>> The French would exert their influence through the Marined Christians. And Iran even if the direct link is broken would retain its influence through Hezbollah >> right >> and the Israelis would try to do that through the dus and >> certain Christian elements >> right >> uh and also through direct attacks direct uh military intervention >> so Lebanon is kind of stuck and its government is not highly functional it doesn't have a proper military so hisbah is stronger than the Lebanese military so I I mean, I don't think that Lebanon has an easy way out.

[00:29:35]Lebanon, at least the Lebanese government is now attacking Hezbollah, or in a sense, criticizing Hezbollah for dragging, quote unquote, uh, into this war with Israel. But a lot of Hezbollah supporters are saying that it is Hezbollah that stands between the Israeli troops and the Lebanese villages.

[00:29:51]>> Right.

[00:29:51]>> If Hezbollah has gone, Israel is going to take more territory.

[00:29:54]>> Yeah.

[00:29:55]because the Lebanese army is not capable of defending itself, defending the country. So it's Hezbollah that's doing. You look at Israel's borders, right? Israel wants itself to be surrounded by countries like this, >> failed states, >> right?

[00:30:07]>> So Lebanon, which is at war with itself.

[00:30:10]>> Yeah.

[00:30:11]>> Assyria, which is led by a former jihadist, but >> uh you know, with multiple factions and militias.

[00:30:16]>> Yes.

[00:30:17]>> The new Syrian government doesn't want to pick a fight with Israelis, and Israelis keep bombing them, by the way.

[00:30:22]But they I mean they're fine with that.

[00:30:24]I mean >> they're happy with Israeli bombs and a Jordan who only issue statements who won't do anything >> um because they don't want to upset the Palestinians and they also don't want to get >> drawn into a war. So you look at Israel's neighbor and and of course Palestine which is under occupation direct military and under occupation.

[00:30:44]>> So this is Israel's policy.

[00:30:46]>> Yeah.

[00:30:46]>> So it wants itself to be surrounded by failed states so that it can make military interventions political. ical interventions it can control maneuver in that region. So Lebanon is is in a very difficult spot, >> right?

[00:31:00]>> Uh Hezbollah is not going to give up its arms. They are not going to throw up their arms and then say we are surrendering. It's not that's not going to happen. They're not going to disarm themselves no matter what the Israelis are saying, what the Lebanese government is saying. No, if the Lebanese Lebanese government is pushing too hard, I mean um you you never know there could even be another round of civil war in the country because the social relations in Lebanon is too stretched at this point of time and it could start fracturing >> that would lead to lead to civil strife.

[00:31:31]Right.

[00:31:32]>> Uh so it's a tragic story.

[00:31:33]>> Right. Right. And uh now Syria has seen one of the most dramatic shifts uh in the region >> from years of civil war and diplomatic isolation to now um renewed um regional talks and like you mentioned continued Israeli strikes and also uh >> major leadership change that u affects the country's political future.

[00:31:56]>> So how significant is this leadership change? Let's talk a bit more about that. um for both uh Syria's internal politics as well as the wider balance of power in the region.

[00:32:07]>> The old Syria is gone, >> right?

[00:32:09]>> The old Syria was uh secular >> but dictatorial.

[00:32:13]>> Yeah.

[00:32:14]>> Um ruled by let's say a very ruthless administration but at the same time that government had protected the country's minorities.

[00:32:22]>> Right.

[00:32:23]>> Uh and that Syria fell into a civil war.

[00:32:25]You saw cycles of violence.

[00:32:27]>> Yes.

[00:32:27]>> Uh and that Syria is gone. Uh now the new Syria is not secular but also dictatorial >> right.

[00:32:38]>> Okay.

[00:32:38]>> Yeah.

[00:32:38]>> I mean don't believe that Syria has become a garden of democracy. Not at all.

[00:32:42]>> I mean you look at Emanuel Macarron statements looks like Syria has become a Paris commune. No. No. Syria is ruled by al-Qaeda. Former al-Qaeda.

[00:32:50]>> Yes. Yes.

[00:32:51]>> That old Syria is gone. New Syria is ruled by HTS. HDS is formerly al-Qaeda.

[00:32:56]Its leader is an al-Qaeda commander. Was an al-Qaeda commander.

[00:32:59]>> Yeah. Syria has very complex, you know, dynamics like Lebanon.

[00:33:05]>> Yeah.

[00:33:05]>> I think it's too early to say where Syria is headed >> to.

[00:33:10]>> Uh because right now there is some kind of a balances there right now.

[00:33:16]>> Right.

[00:33:16]>> Uh but you also saw occasional outbursts of violence, right?

[00:33:21]>> For example, last year in Latakia, there was a massacre >> against the Alawite community, >> right? And again last year in the south in the Dus region there was another massacre and both Alawites and the Dus were minorities >> right >> and the current government is a majoritarian Islamist government led by the Sunnis right >> and then you have the Shia in Syria and you have the Christians eastern Christians and >> uh so they all had their own worries you know >> but at this point of time especially in western Syria in Latakia the lavites they have armed themselves they have their militias, >> right?

[00:33:57]>> And the Kurds there, yeah, there was another conflict between the Kurds and the Syrian government. And the Kurds say uh in the northeast uh the Kurds say that they are not going to abandon their uh their autonomy.

[00:34:13]>> Right.

[00:34:13]>> Right. Right.

[00:34:14]>> They say that they would defend their autonomy. Earlier this year, there were fightings between the Syrian troops and the Kurds in the northeast.

[00:34:22]>> Yeah. Yeah. It is what do we call Syria today is a tinder box >> right >> you know it's it remains highly inflammable but there is some kind of yes Jolani clings on onto power some kind of balance is there that keeps him on the throne >> right >> but it doesn't mean that Syria has stabilized itself >> right so um before we conclude today's episode one of the most uh striking developments over the last couple of years has been the erosion of former uh red lines from direct Iran Israel strikes, drone warfares, targeted assassinations and uh crossber strikes.

[00:35:01]Um all of these have become um increasingly common across the region.

[00:35:06]>> So when we look at West Asia today, are we looking at a completely new and permanently volatile um balance of power or is this a temporary disruption before a new order um you know stabilizes eventually? You know the sands are shifting pretty fast in West Asia.

[00:35:24]>> Yeah.

[00:35:25]>> Like Lenin said, uh there are decades when nothing happens and then there are days when everything happens.

[00:35:32]>> Yeah.

[00:35:32]>> So if you look at West Asia today, I mean there are massive shifts in the region.

[00:35:36]>> Yeah.

[00:35:37]>> Before I would say before February 28th, West Asia looked a different mean Iran was on the back foot.

[00:35:43]>> Yes.

[00:35:44]>> The United States looked more aggressive. Israel looked more aggressive. Yeah.

[00:35:47]>> And after the 40 days of the war the I mean again it is shifting now. Iran is trying to project itself as a new major power.

[00:35:55]>> Yes.

[00:35:55]>> Israel I think is clueless on how to go forward.

[00:35:58]>> Right.

[00:35:58]>> It faces international isolation, ICC criminal cases.

[00:36:02]>> Yeah.

[00:36:03]>> Uh and losing support in the United States.

[00:36:06]>> Yes.

[00:36:06]>> And Iran remains an unresolvable problem for the Israelis.

[00:36:12]>> Yeah. when they want to take care of Iran's nuclear program, but they are unable to do that. Imagine what happens if the Iranians make a bomb tomorrow.

[00:36:21]The Iranians have more advantage today to make a bomb than 2 years ago.

[00:36:24]>> Yeah.

[00:36:25]>> If they make the bomb, Israel's monopoly is over.

[00:36:27]>> Yes. Yes.

[00:36:28]>> So then you will have a new completely new balance of power system in the in in West Asia. Israelis don't want that.

[00:36:36]That's why they are hellbent on destroying Iran's nuclear program.

[00:36:39]Right.

[00:36:40]>> Right. But their war failed to meet its objective which turned Iran into a greater regional force. That's what we are witnessing.

[00:36:49]>> I don't know whether even that would last long.

[00:36:51]>> Mhm.

[00:36:52]>> Whether there would be another uh major change. You never know because changes are happening pretty fast, right?

[00:36:58]>> Yeah.

[00:36:58]>> Uh clearly we can say that what happened particularly after the Iran war uh the US security umbrella in the region is now broken.

[00:37:07]>> Mhm.

[00:37:07]>> Most of American bases are destroyed.

[00:37:09]Yeah, >> it would take time for the United States to rebuild those bases.

[00:37:13]>> Yeah.

[00:37:14]>> And to rebuild those bases, the United States would also need seamless access to the Persian Gulf waters, >> right?

[00:37:19]>> But unfortunately for the Americans, the state of Hormos is now controlled by the Iranians. Yes.

[00:37:24]>> Right. So Iran will have a say on which ship goes in and which ship goes out.

[00:37:28]>> Unless the United States goes to war again.

[00:37:31]>> So the US commitment, I mean, I'm I'm someone who doesn't who never >> underestimates American power, >> right? you know, the United States is the world's preeminent power. There's no question about it. America's uh power to force projection. Um, I mean, that's just great. Now, country can do that.

[00:37:49]Even the Chinese can't do that. Russians can't do that. But at the same time, even the greatest power >> will have a lot of limitations.

[00:37:58]>> Yes, of course.

[00:37:59]>> And the United States is now facing its limitations in West Asia.

[00:38:03]>> Right.

[00:38:03]>> Right.

[00:38:04]>> Right.

[00:38:04]>> It doesn't have any easy way to fix Iran.

[00:38:06]>> Mhm. And it stands diminished. Its presence stands diminished in the Persian Gulf region.

[00:38:12]>> Yeah.

[00:38:13]>> And in the Persian Gulf region, the Persian Gulf countries like UAE, Qatar, >> Saudi Arabia, Bahin and Kuwait.

[00:38:21]>> And these countries will ask themselves >> that the bedrock of their alliance with the United States was that the Americans would offer you protection.

[00:38:28]>> What protection they got when the Iranians were raining missiles and drones on them.

[00:38:33]>> So they might rethink. I'm not sure. Uh, okay. UAE man think UAE has a different understanding I think.

[00:38:39]>> Yeah, >> I may be wrong but I think the UA has slightly different understanding >> but I think the Saudis, the Qataris >> and definitely the Oman is uh would be ready.

[00:38:50]>> Yeah.

[00:38:51]>> To coexist with Iran. So which means the regional security architecture is changing. Right.

[00:38:55]>> Right. So Iran is kind of is trying to emerge stronger.

[00:39:00]>> Right.

[00:39:00]>> Israel is in a cult.

[00:39:02]>> Mhm. the Arab countries are basically they will have to renegotiate a new security architecture.

[00:39:09]>> Yeah.

[00:39:09]>> So, West Asia is is is at the cusp of uh massive changes, >> right? So what kind of changes will eventually uh you know take shape or how the region the whole region would be shaped etc etc we have to wait and watch >> right >> okay uh but definitely the region is facing massive changes and one more thing I want to add is when I say the United States stands diminished in the region that also means that the Chinese >> are going to become a much bigger player.

[00:39:42]>> Yeah. Yeah. Because uh uh you know Benjamin Netanyahu in the 60 Minutes interview he said in as many words that the Chinese are supplying some goods to Iran.

[00:39:52]>> Right.

[00:39:53]>> Right. The Russians are providing real intel with the Iranians.

[00:39:56]>> Yes. Yes.

[00:39:57]>> Uh so both great powers uh intend to play major role in West Asia. Right.

[00:40:03]>> A region >> that has been >> let's say an American backyard for decades.

[00:40:08]>> Yes. Yeah. I think uh that's all we have for this episode. Like you mentioned, a lot of uncertainties and we'll have to wait and watch what happens in the region, but I look forward to having you again on the next episode for joining us.

[00:40:21]>> Thank you. And thanks to all our uh viewers. Thanks for sticking with us.

[00:40:26]>> The past two years have shown us that West Asia is no longer defined by a single conflict or a single fault line.

[00:40:33]What we are witnessing is a region in transition where old assumptions are collapsing, new rivalries are taking shape and the search for stability remains deeply uncertain. Whether this moment ultimately leads to a new regional balance or a prolonged era of volatility is a question that will shape not just West Asia but global politics in the years ahead. Thank you for joining us on this 20th episode of Global Fault Lines. If you have any feedback or suggestions, write to us at [email protected].