The June 17, 2026 Iran-US memorandum of understanding, signed by President Donald Trump and Iranian President Masoud Peseshkian, created a 60-day window for nuclear negotiations and sanctions relief, but by June 20th, 2026, the agreement was already being violated and contradicted by the parties themselves. Iran declared the Strait of Hormuz closed while the US stated it remained open, with 55 ships transiting on the same day. The deal's survival depends on Switzerland nuclear talks while a new Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) insurance mechanism quietly establishes Iranian control over the strait, potentially making Western shipping illegal by mid-August. The fundamental contradiction—where Iran claims the strait is closed while the US claims it is open—represents the structural fault line that will determine whether this agreement survives its first month.
Deep Dive
Prerequisite Knowledge
- No data available.
Where to go next
- No data available.
Deep Dive
The Iran Deal Just COLLAPSED In 72 Hours — Hormuz Is CLOSED Again
Added:On June 20th, 2026, three days after the United States and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding meant to end nearly 4 months of war, Iran declared the Strait of Hormuz closed again.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps announced that the waterway was no longer open to vessel traffic. IRGC navy boats fired warning shots at ships in the strait. Iranian state television broadcast that the closure was the first step in response to Israeli attacks in Lebanon, and that subsequent steps have been planned if what it called aggression continues. United States Central Command issued a flat denial within hours. CENTCOM stated, "Iran does not control the Strait of Hormuz.
Traffic continues to flow, and US forces are monitoring the situation to ensure this remains the case."
CENTCOM confirmed that 55 merchant ships transited the strait on Saturday carrying more than 17 million barrels of oil. And then, on Sunday morning, June 21st, Vice President J.D. Vance landed in Switzerland anyway.
He arrived at Emmen Air Base outside Lucerne just before 6:00 in the morning local time to formally launch negotiations with Iranian leaders over curbing Tehran's nuclear program and building out the fragile interim deal.
Iran's delegation, including parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi, was already there. Pakistan's Prime Minister and the chief of the Pakistani military were there. The talks began at the Bürgenstock Resort as scheduled. So, you now have Iran declaring the strait closed while the United States says it remains open.
You have 55 ships transiting on the same day. Iran broadcast warnings telling vessels not to approach. You have Israeli strikes in Lebanon continuing despite a ceasefire that was supposed to be holding.
And you have nuclear negotiations proceeding in Switzerland even as the foundational agreement those negotiations are meant to build on appears to be fracturing in real time.
This is the story of an agreement signed on June 17th that by June 20th was already being violated, reinterpreted, and publicly contradicted by the parties that signed it.
An agreement that reopened the Strait of Hormuz for exactly 3 days before Iran declared it closed again.
An agreement whose survival now depends on whether talks in Switzerland can produce a comprehensive nuclear framework while the Lebanon ceasefire continues to break down and a new Iranian insurance mandate quietly creates a sanctions trap that could make Western shipping through Hormuz illegal by mid-August. The memorandum of understanding signed on June 17th between President Donald Trump and Iranian President Masoud Peseshkian was supposed to do three things.
It was supposed to reopen the Strait of Hormuz to toll-free commercial traffic for 60 days. It was supposed to end Israeli military operations in Lebanon and it was supposed to create a 60-day window for technical negotiations on Iran's nuclear program and broader sanctions relief. The Strait did reopen.
On Thursday, June 18th, 25 commercial vessels crossed the waterway marking the highest number since mid-April.
But that was still a fraction of the 100 to 120 tankers that sailed through the passage between Iran and Oman daily before the war. Nearly 500 ships, including 220 oil tankers, have been trapped in the Persian Gulf since the start of the war in late February.
Around 20,000 crew members have been stuck on those vessels for months. And even before Iran announced on Saturday that the Strait was closed again, ship operators had already begun pulling back on sailings through the channel.
The number of ships crossing dropped on Friday. Industry experts warned that it could take months for traffic to fully normalize due to safety concerns, insurance costs, and the fact that approximately 80 mines remain in the central route of the Strait uncleared and unmapped.
The second provision, ending Israeli military operations in Lebanon, never held at all. On Saturday, June 20th, Israeli strikes in southern Lebanon killed at least 16 people, including two children, according to Lebanese authorities.
Lebanon's state-run national news agency said seven people remained trapped beneath rubble in Nabatieh and nearby villages following the attacks.
The IDF spokesperson, Brigadier General Effi Defrein, said Israeli forces would continue to operate in southern Lebanon and do whatever is necessary to protect Israeli civilians. Five Israeli soldiers were killed by Hezbollah attacks in the same 48-hour period, according to Fox News.
During the ceasefire period that had been in effect since April 17th, nearly 3,900 people have been killed in Lebanon, according to NBC News. US foreign spy agencies assessed that Israel would likely continue to launch attacks against Hezbollah in Lebanon, potentially jeopardizing the tentative peace deal, according to a source with knowledge of the intelligence assessments. Israel's continued strikes on Lebanon have worsened a widening rift between the Trump administration and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his far-right allies, who have criticized the Iran deal as not in Israel's interest. And that brings us to Iran's closure declaration. On Saturday, June 20th, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy issued a formal statement.
The IRGC's military headquarters said, "It is hereby announced that the Strait of Hormuz will be closed to vessel traffic. It is noted that this first step is a response to the enemy's breach of promise, and if the aggression continues, further steps will be planned and taken to force the enemy to comply with its obligations." The IRGC's conditions for reopening were explicit.
"Israel must withdraw from Lebanon. The United States must completely lift the naval blockade, and American forces must depart the Persian Gulf in the region."
The statement said, "Since Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon, the complete lifting of the naval blockade, and the withdrawal of American terrorist forces from the Persian Gulf and the region are among the main conditions of the agreement between Iran and the United States, the Strait of Hormuz will remain closed until these conditions are met."
At 12:29 in the afternoon UK time on Friday, June 19th, the IRGC broadcast a warning on marine channel 16, the international distress and hailing frequency monitored by all vessels at sea.
Intertanko, the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners, confirmed the broadcast.
The message said, "The Strait of Hormuz will remain closed until these two conditions are met.
All vessels have been instructed not to approach the Strait of Hormuz for their own safety and security. Any vessel that violates this order will be targeted."
IRGC boats followed that broadcast by firing warning shots at ships in the Strait.
And then the United States Central Command issued its denial.
CENTCOM spokesperson Navy Captain Tim Hawkins said, "Iran does not control the Strait of Hormuz. Traffic continues to flow and US forces are monitoring the situation to ensure this remains the case."
CENTCOM added that it had not tracked any movement from Iran to actually close the Strait. CENTCOM confirmed that 55 merchant ships transited the waterway on Saturday carrying more than 17 million barrels of oil. So, what is actually happening?
Iran does not have the naval capacity to enforce a full blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.
US Central Command Commander Admiral Brad Cooper reported in early March that at least 17 Iranian ships had been destroyed during Operation Epic Fury, the opening salvo of the war.
Cooper stated that there was not a single Iranian ship underway in the Arabian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, or Gulf of Oman as of March 3rd. Iran's closure declaration is not backed by a naval interdiction operation. It is a political and legal claim.
Iran is asserting control over the waterway. It is warning ships that transit at their own risk, and it is establishing the groundwork for a new mechanism that may prove far more effective than a naval blockade at controlling who uses the Strait and under what conditions. That mechanism is called the Persian Gulf Strait Authority.
On Friday, June 19th, Iran issued a formal document to the global shipping industry. The document announced that all vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz must now obtain mandatory insurance coverage approved by Iran's newly created Persian Gulf Strait Authority.
The insurance is currently provided free of charge.
But the PGSA document explicitly states that after the 60-day MOU window closes, the PGSA reserves the right to introduce insurance fees in the future. Ships must submit requests to the PGSA to receive a passage permit. The PGSA says it will typically respond within 48 hours.
The permit authorizes one single transit through the Strait and is valid for 5 days from issuance. The PGSA has published a map of the routes Iran considers safe. The document states that any deviation from the PGSA's fixed corridor will be treated as a violation.
The memorandum of understanding signed on June 17th guarantees safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge for 60 days.
Iran's insurance requirement carries no fee during that period. So, on its face, the PGSA mechanism does not violate the MOU's toll-free provision. But, there is a problem.
On May 27th, 2026, the US Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control formally designated the Persian Gulf Strait Authority as a Specially Designated National linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
That designation means that any payment to the PGSA, including future insurance premiums, would constitute a prohibited transaction with a designated terrorist-linked entity under US law. On May 1st, OFAC issued an advisory warning that payments to Iran for passage through the strait expose both US and non-US persons to sanctions risk. The advisory specified that the risk applied regardless of payment method, including cash, digital assets, in-kind transfers, and charitable donations to Iranian-linked entities.
Non-US firms facilitating such payments were warned of potential secondary sanctions. So, here is the trap. On approximately August 17th, 2026, the 60-day MOU window expires.
At that point, the PGSA can begin charging insurance fees for vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz.
Western shipping companies that pay those fees will be engaging in transactions with an OFAC designated entity linked to the IRGC.
That makes the transaction illegal under US sanctions law. Shipping companies that refuse to pay the fees will not receive PGSA permits.
And without PGSA permits, Iran says vessels cannot legally transit the strait. The practical implication is that normal Western commercial shipping through Hormuz may become categorically impossible without sanctions relief, because the only insurance the PGSA will accept is insurance obtained from the PGSA, and the PGSA is itself sanctioned.
Iran's neighbors have rejected the PGSA's legitimacy. They have told ship owners not to interact with the body.
The International Maritime Organization's Secretary General, Arsenio Dominguez, confirmed receipt of the PGSA document and said discussions are ongoing. He has previously warned that allowing transit fees would set a dangerous precedent for other strategic waterways.
That principle applies equally to mandatory insurance requirements. But the PGSA is already operational.
As of June 4th, 2026, over 300 shipping companies had applied for PGSA permits, mainly for Asian destinations, especially China and India.
The main incoming destination was the United Arab Emirates. Iran is using the 60-day goodwill window to establish a legal and commercial precedent. Iranian approved insurance is now a condition of transit through the Strait of Hormuz.
That precedent will still be standing on day 61. And that means Iran may have more control over the Strait after the war than it had before the war, regardless of how the Switzerland negotiations conclude. US allies led by the United Kingdom are pushing the Trump administration not to accept or normalize Iran's attempts to introduce fees or insurance mandates for passage through the Strait, according to a senior official.
But, as of June 21st, there is no indication that the United States has formally challenged the PGSA mechanism or demanded its removal as a condition of continued negotiations. Now, let's talk about what is actually happening in Switzerland. Vice President J.D. Vance landed at Emmen Air Base outside Lucerne on Sunday morning, June 21st, just before 6:00 in the morning local time.
He was there to help formally launch negotiations with Iranian leaders over curbing Tehran's nuclear program.
Tehran's negotiators include parliamentary speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, and Central Bank and oil officials.
Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and the Chief of Army Staff, Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir, are also participating in the technical-level talks at the Bürgenstock Resort. Vance said the talks would likely last a couple of days.
He said US officials would be focusing on making progress on discussions about Iran's nuclear program and the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon.
He told reporters before departing for Switzerland, "Despite the headlines, things are actually getting better there."
He acknowledged that sporadic violence remains a challenge, but argued that the focus remains on preventing further escalation and preserving the ceasefire.
"The big problem is that somebody will shoot, then somebody will respond.
You've just got to stop the shooting for long enough to get the ceasefire to hold." Vance struck an optimistic tone on Fox News Saturday morning saying talks were advancing despite Iran's latest threat to shut the strait. He said Jared Kushner, Trump's son-in-law and special envoy Steve Witkoff were already in Switzerland working through the agreement's technical details. He added that discussions were going well.
Vance also said on Fox News that there was no evidence that the strait remains closed, though he acknowledged that mines in the waterway may continue to affect commercial routes.
It was unclear if Vance was aware of the latest reporting on the strait during that interview. Earlier in the week, Vance had taken the relatively unusual step of appearing at the White House to defend the deal. He argued that while it offers concessions, Iran first has to comply with US demands.
"As they dial up their good behavior, we can dial up the economic relief," Vance said. "If they dial down their good behavior, we can turn it off." Vance told reporters that negotiators were focused on securing Iran's enriched uranium stockpile to make it effectively impossible for Tehran to rebuild its nuclear program while emphasizing that the United States retain significant economic leverage if Iran failed to comply with the agreement. A top Trump administration envoy told US lawmakers in a private briefing that Iran will invite the UN's nuclear watchdog agency to inspect its nuclear sites. But the core issue remains unresolved.
President Trump said publicly that the deal with Iran ensures that Tehran will never pursue or acquire a nuclear weapon.
He threatened military action if Iran did so.
"If they do, all hell will rain down on them and they're not going to do that," he said. Iran has never agreed to permanent irreversible renunciation of nuclear weapons capability. The memorandum of understanding signed on June 17th creates a 60-day window for negotiations.
It does not finalize the nuclear question.
As of May 7th, the United States and Iran, via Pakistani mediators, were formulating a one-page, 14-point memo on parameters for ending the war. That memo calls on Iran to commit to a moratorium on nuclear enrichment. But a moratorium is not the same as permanent renunciation. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei told the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar that the memorandum determined that the United States and Iran will negotiate exclusively on the nuclear file and the lifting of sanctions.
Iran's position is that the MOU covers only those two issues. The United States and Israel say the MOU also requires an end to Israeli military operations in Lebanon and the full reopening of the strait.
Iran's Foreign Minister says those are separate conditions that the United States and Israel have violated. Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei issued a written statement on June 18th endorsing the talks while reserving his position.
He said, "It is obvious that the face-to-face negotiations that will be held in the future will not mean accepting the enemy's opinion."
Khamenei has not appeared in public since assuming office on March 8th, 2026, following the death of his father, Ali Khamenei, in the February 28th airstrikes. He was reportedly injured in the same strike. His statement was distributed through state channels, not delivered publicly. So, the Switzerland talks are proceeding, but they are proceeding against a backdrop of fundamental unresolved contradictions.
Iran says the strait is closed. The United States says it is open.
Iran says the MOU requires Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. The United States and Israel say the MOU has nothing to do with Lebanon. Iran says the nuclear negotiations will cover only enrichment and sanctions. The United States says Iran will never be permitted to have nuclear weapons. And all of this is happening while a new insurance mechanism quietly establishes Iranian control over the Strait in a way that may survive long after the 60-day window closes.
There is also an internal contradiction inside Iran itself that has received limited attention in most American coverage. On June 19th and 20th, the IRGC declared the Strait of Hormuz closed. Iranian state television confirmed the closure.
And Iran's own civilian foreign ministry simultaneously denied it.
Iran's foreign ministry spokesman denied reports of any tensions in the Strait of Hormuz and said shipping traffic remains unaffected. Three official Iranian institutional voices, the IRGC Navy, Iranian state television, and the civilian foreign ministry issued contradictory public statements about the same event on the same day.
That is not the behavior of a government operating from a unified position.
That is the visible signature of a dual authority structure where the military and civilian branches of government are making conflicting claims about what Iran's actual policy is.
There's also a detail about Iran's negotiating posture that deserves attention. On Saturday, as he departed for Switzerland, parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf posted a photo of himself walking beneath the Mirage Airlines jet. The plane was emblazoned with a hashtag Minab 168.
It is a reference to the number of lives lost when an airstrike hit a school in Minab, a town near the Strait of Hormuz.
US intelligence agencies concluded long ago that American forces were to blame for the strike, according to multiple reports.
But the Pentagon has never publicly acknowledged responsibility. Ghalibaf was signaling very publicly that Iran has not forgotten.
He was walking onto a plane to negotiate a peace deal while displaying a hashtag referencing an unresolved grievance against the United States.
That is not the posture of a delegation arriving in good faith to finalize an agreement. That is the posture of a delegation reminding the other side that there are unresolved debts on the table.
Now, let's talk about what the financial provisions of the MOU actually include.
The framework includes discussions on sanctions relief and the possible release of up to $25 billion in frozen Iranian assets, depending on future compliance, according to ABC News and the Associated Press.
Some congressional critics have cited a potential $300 billion rebuilding fund as a separate concern. There has been confusion about these figures. Some reporting referenced $6 billion in frozen assets from a Qatar-held account.
That $6 billion figure appears to reference an earlier, separate financial mechanism from 2023 Doha framework discussions.
The $25 billion figure is what multiple credible sources confirmed within the past 72 hours as part of the current MOU framework. The structure of how those assets would be released has not been fully disclosed, but based on prior sanctions relief mechanisms, it is likely that any release would be phased, controlled, and tied to specific compliance benchmarks.
The goal would be to prevent Iran from accessing large sums of unrestricted cash that could be redirected toward weapons procurement or proxy support.
But even a controlled release of $25 billion represents significant economic relief for a country that has lost billions in oil revenue due to the closure of the Strait and the US naval blockade. Trump advances come under sharp criticism from parts of their own party for the deal.
Republican hardliners have unfavorably compared it to the nuclear agreement signed by the Obama administration in 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which Trump and the GOP argued did nothing to actually terminate Iran's nuclear program.
The tentative agreement has drawn criticism from some in Congress who worry Washington seated too much to Iran with relief from sanctions and the potential rebuilding fund.
And there is tension inside the Trump administration itself. Vice President Vance publicly criticized Israel earlier in the week. Responding to widespread criticism from Israeli officials, Vance said, "Trump is your only ally left in world."
That public split between the Vice President and Israeli officials created confusion about whether the administration was operating from a unified position. US officials have repeatedly urged Israel to reduce its strikes in Lebanon so as not to derail negotiations with Iran.
Netanyahu's vow to occupy southern Lebanon and Israel's decision to strike both Iran and Lebanon while the initial deal was being finalized repeatedly delayed talks fueling frustration among US officials.
But the United States has not publicly threatened to withdraw support from Israel over those strikes. And US Central Command continues to maintain a significant naval and air presence in the region to ensure that the strait remains open. CENTCOM's statement on Saturday made clear that while the blockade enforcement has formally ceased, the military assets that took months to assemble in theater have not moved. Those assets remain positioned to ensure that Iran cannot actually enforce a closure of the strait regardless of what declarations the IRGC issues. Naval and air assets of this scale do not deploy or redeploy quickly. Bringing a carrier strike group into position from the other side of the world takes weeks to months of logistical coordination.
The fact that those assets are still on station means the United States retains the full coercive leverage it built up throughout this conflict. President Trump also issued his own threat on Saturday.
In a post on Truth Social, Trump said, "There will be no tolls in the Hormuz Strait for 60 days during the ceasefire period, and there will be no tolls after the 60-day period has expired unless they are imposed by and for the United States of America should the deal not be completed." He claimed that charge would be for services rendered.
Trump is threatening to impose US tolls on the Strait of Hormuz if Iran does not finalize the deal within 60 days. That threat has significant implications.
If the United States imposes tolls on an international waterway, it would set the same kind of precedent that the IMO Secretary General warned against when discussing Iran's PGSA insurance mechanism.
It would establish that a single nation can unilaterally impose charges on vessels transiting a strategic choke point. And it would undermine the US position that international waterways should be free of tolls, which has been the stated American policy throughout this conflict. So, where does this go from here?
The Switzerland talks are underway.
Vance said he would be there for a day or two. The actual technical negotiations will be led by Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff. Key issues, including the final status of Iran's nuclear program, remain unresolved and are expected to be discussed during the 60-day ceasefire period. Iran's conditions for reopening the strait remain active. The IRGC says Israel must withdraw from Lebanon, the United States must completely lift the naval blockade, and American forces must depart the Persian Gulf. None of those conditions have been met. Israeli strikes in Lebanon are continuing. US intelligence agencies assess that Israel will likely continue launching attacks against Hezbollah, potentially jeopardizing the tentative peace deal. The PGSA insurance mechanism is now operational and will remain operational after the 60-day window closes.
Unless the United States secures sanctions relief for Western shipping companies or forces Iran to dismantle the PGSA entirely, normal commercial traffic through Hormuz may face a legal and financial trap by mid-August. And the nuclear question, the single most important issue from Washington's perspective, has not been resolved.
Monday's oil market open will be the first major test of how seriously global markets take Iran's closure declaration.
If oil prices spike, that will indicate that traders believe the closure is credible and that supply disruptions are likely. If oil prices remain stable, that will suggest markets are treating the IRGC's announcement as largely rhetorical. The talks in Switzerland may produce a joint statement or preliminary nuclear framework in the next day or two.
Or they may not.
Vance said discussions were going well.
But Iran's public military posture, declaring the strait closed and threatening subsequent steps, suggests a government that is hedging its commitment to the agreement even as its negotiators sit at the table.
The question is whether the 60-day window is enough time to resolve disputes that have been unresolved for decades. Iran would have to accept permanent, verifiable limits on its nuclear program that go beyond anything it has accepted in the past. That means not just freezing enrichment at current levels, but rolling back capabilities, accepting intrusive inspections, and providing credible assurances that it will not pursue weaponization in the future. Israel would have to accept a security arrangement in Lebanon that does not require the indefinite presence of IDF forces in the buffer zone.
That means either trusting that Hezbollah will be restrained by Iran or trusting that an international Lebanese security mechanism can provide the same level of protection that the buffer zone currently provides. And the United States would have to manage the internal contradictions of its own position, supporting Israel's security while also pressuring Israel to make concessions, demanding permanent limits on Iran's nuclear program while also offering sanctions relief that Iran can use to rebuild its economy and potentially its military capacity.
None of those trade-offs are easy, none of them are politically straightforward, and none of them are guaranteed to succeed, but the alternative is a return to the conditions that existed before the memorandum was signed. Continued low-level conflict in Lebanon, continued economic pressure on Iran, continued uncertainty about Iran's nuclear program, and continued risk of a broader regional escalation.
The financial and maritime provisions of the MOU have worked at least partially.
The strait reopened.
55 ships transited on Saturday. The controlled sanctions relief mechanism, if structured properly, could provide Iran with economic relief while limiting the strategic risk. But the political and security provisions have not worked.
Israel has not stopped striking Lebanon.
Iran has declared the strait closed again. The nuclear question remains unresolved, and the internal political dynamics inside both Iran and Israel suggest that neither government is operating from a position of unified strategic consensus. The ceasefire announced on June 19th between Israel and Hezbollah was supposed to reduce the immediate violence in Lebanon, but Israeli strikes continued. Hezbollah attacks continued.
And the underlying dispute about whether Israel will withdraw from the buffer zone remains unresolved. The Switzerland talks that began on June 21st are supposed to produce a comprehensive nuclear framework, but the talks are proceeding while Iran declares the straight closed while Israel continues striking Lebanon and while a new insurance mechanism quietly establishes Iranian control over one of the world's most critical energy choke points. This is not the end of the war. This is not even a stable ceasefire. This is a fragile heavily negotiated pause held together by contradictory statements, unresolved disputes, and a 60-day window that may not be long enough to address the core issues driving this conflict.
What happens next depends on whether the parties involved are willing to make concessions they have not yet shown any indication they are willing to make.
Whether the Lebanon violence de-escalates enough for the ceasefire to hold. Whether Iran's closure declaration remains rhetorical or escalates to actual interdiction of vessels. Whether the PGSA insurance mechanism is addressed in Switzerland or allowed to stand unchallenged. And whether the nuclear negotiations can produce a framework that both sides find acceptable. The MOU signed on June 17th created a window, but the window is closing fast. And the contradictions that were visible within hours of the signing have only grown sharper in the days since.
Iran declared the straight closed on Saturday. The United States said it remained open. Both statements were issued on the same day. Both came from credible official sources. And both cannot be true at the same time. That contradiction is not just a rhetorical disagreement. It is the structural fault line that will determine whether this agreement survives its first month.
Related Videos
This map shows where it's safe to be trans in America. It's shrinking. | w/ Erin Reed & Zooey Zephyr
MishaCollins
103 views•2026-06-18
Russia ABANDONED Iran in 24 Hours — 5 Secret Arms Deals CANCELED Without Warning
GlobalFlashpoint-u6k
992 views•2026-06-18
Why Can’t Mahama Stop This Growing Trafficking Crisis of Young Girls in Ghana
Ghanaboyni3
492 views•2026-06-21
Saudi, Turkiye & Pak FMs To Meet In Egypt | 'All Of Lebanon Must Burn' | WION Headlines
WION
283 views•2026-06-19
LIVE | TOM TV 8:00 PM MANIPURI NEWS, || 18 JUNE 2026
tomtvimphal
14K views•2026-06-18
How Did Trump "Trick" Anyone? He Wasn't Exactly a Mystery
tompowelljr
6K views•2026-06-18
EU Votes AGAINST Mass Immigration!!
COUNTYGAINS
2K views•2026-06-18
China Unveils Vision for a New World Order
chinaglobalsouth
220 views•2026-06-19











