Why Consciousness Does Not Determine Personal Identity | Arnold Zuboff

Ajouté : 2026-05-31

[00:00:00]Arnold, assuming universalism is true, uh which you have espoused uh famously, uh where universalism says there is one subject of experience, one underlying all conscious beings, what would be the implications for that for the nature of consciousness, which is of course a very hot topic in today's world uh from everything from religious ideas to AI consciousness. So, just getting to the nature of consciousness is an important both scientific, philosophical, and indeed, if you're into it, theological issue. Uh and so, what what is the contribution that universalism can make to consciousness?

[00:00:46]Yes. The first thing to emphasize is that universalism is neutral with regard to all theories of what consciousness is.

[00:01:02]Okay. The only thing it says is if consciousness is immediate in character, and I'm not so sure what it could be if it isn't, Mhm.

[00:01:13]it's my consciousness for that reason alone.

[00:01:17]That's all it's saying about consciousness. It steers clear of all the >> Okay, you're saying that's all it's saying. If there's an immediacy and a first-person uh experience of that immediacy, then it's all mine. You're saying that's all it's saying. But that's saying a whole hell of a lot.

[00:01:36]Yeah.

[00:01:37]I mean I mean that that is a radical kind of claim, and I would say that it uh you may say it has it's neutral respect to consciousness, but if you're putting that precondition on what consciousness is, that if there is consciousness there with the immediacy of the first person experience, then then it's all mine.

[00:02:00]That reflects on what consciousness is.

[00:02:05]The doesn't somebody who who wants to make a theory of consciousness I want to make up a new theory of consciousness. That's what on my goal is.

[00:02:15]Yeah. Wouldn't I if universalism is true, wouldn't I have to take that into consideration?

[00:02:21]Only with regard to personal identity.

[00:02:24]I say only, but it's so big. You know, it's so important.

[00:02:28]>> Yeah, I mean it's so fundamentally related to personal identity, of course.

[00:02:33]I mean if there is if there's any view of consciousness, and there might be one you could point out to me where counting as being you somehow uh shapes the rest of the idea of what consciousness itself is. Yes, yes. Then this does have a relevance to that.

[00:02:57]Um there's there's no doubt cuz it'll take that away from it.

[00:03:02]All right?

[00:03:04]So so insofar as someone's reasoning about what consciousness is and mixing that with what makes a thing be me Yes.

[00:03:14]there could be points of conflict with that thinking.

[00:03:19]Insofar as it it makes it you know, it it's defining what's yours very differently.

[00:03:27]So it could be conflict, but could it also be a support or coherence?

[00:03:32]In other words, could different theories of conscious My my my only my my Yeah.

[00:03:38]>> just simple question is if I'm making a theory of consciousness, do I have to take into consideration the implications of universalism assuming universalism is true?

[00:03:50]I don't think so. I mean I've thought a lot about the mind-body problem. Right.

[00:03:54]Okay. And I published on it.

[00:03:57]All right?

[00:03:58]Uh and uh I have a particular view.

[00:04:02]And um and I know about other views as well.

[00:04:05]I've had to teach the subject.

[00:04:08]Uh so um I've never had to bring universalism into it in discussing what I understand that the issues are.

[00:04:21]So I've um uh But if if all first-person um ex- uh uh the immediacy of first-person experiences are are mine, if all of them are. And if all of first-person experiences also are uh require some kind of consciousness, I think we would assume that to be the case. I don't I don't think you can have a first-person experience if you didn't have consciousness. I think that's almost a tautology. It's almost a total- not not a total, but almost. So if that's the case, and if all such first-person uh experience immediacy of first-person experiences are part of consciousness, and if if all of them are mine, that puts a a a kind of limitation on the kinds of ideas about consciousness that there is. I mean, from one extreme that uh uh limitativism or illusionism, where consciousness is a trick of the brain, it really doesn't exist in some sense, to idealism, where you know, consciousness is the only only fundamental. Um and so in creating your theory of consciousness, if universalism is the case, where all instances of first-person experiences uh uh uh uh uh uh are mine, that seems to put some kind of of of parameters or constraints around what your theory of consciousness can be.

[00:05:56]Okay. I mean, let me just be a little more particular in in in in kind of dismissing this. Okay. There was a right >> I I don't I don't know I don't I don't mind being dismissed. That's okay.

[00:06:07]>> you're not being dismissed.

[00:06:08]>> [laughter] >> That no wait you know, earlier I did I did make I did concede that personal identity might play a role in somebody's idea of what consciousness is.

[00:06:22]Yes. But what I'm thinking is different.

[00:06:25]So, I'm thinking of the kinds of debates I engaged in in thinking of the mind-body problem.

[00:06:32]All right?

[00:06:33]So, um >> [clears throat] >> you know, whether uh a sensation is an epiphenomenon All right? Uh is not non-material in character, but generated by something material in the brain.

[00:06:51]All right?

[00:06:52]I can argue against that.

[00:06:55]Um I think that a sensation has a functional character.

[00:07:03]I'm a functionalist on the mind-body problem. All right?

[00:07:07]Either way it it has immediacy in it. The experience of pain.

[00:07:15]Whether it's an epiphenomenon or it's something that comes about because of the brain's readiness to deal with something as painful.

[00:07:27]In other words, functional in character.

[00:07:30]Um it's got that same terrible pain you know, experience character, which is immediate for whatever's having it.

[00:07:39]And of course, I'm claiming that since the immediacy is in all the things having all of them uh they're all mine.

[00:07:48]Right? But But the It doesn't matter whether it's epiphenomenal or whether it's functional in character.

[00:07:57]Um They're all yours. Universalism's, you know, it's not concerned with that.

[00:08:02]But it is concerned that all of those uh instant uh all of those places that it instantiates are mine.

[00:08:11]Yes.

[00:08:12]That's right. Uh and and and that's a very radical claim. I mean, you know, one consciousness theory is an extended mind theory that the the mind is somehow extended into the into the environment uh either some in some metaphorical sense or some literal sense or an activism or it's with the environment exchange. There's a lot of all these different theories. Well, let me just say that you exist would be immensely improbable if this were not true.

[00:08:47]Uh okay. And and what follows from that about the nature of consciousness?

[00:08:53]Nothing. Just that um you exist in the world and have your self-interest because of that immediate first-person character in whatever consciousness there is.

[00:09:08]Whatever the hell it is. Epiphenomenal, functional, doesn't matter. Illusion illusionism?

[00:09:16]Illusion You see, uh the illusion is enough uh if it it depends what they mean by illusion.

[00:09:23]>> Yeah, of course, you know. Right? I mean, I'm not claiming it's part of the physical world or something. Uh and maybe that's all they mean by illusion like an afterimage. An afterimage is had with immediacy. Yeah. But the afterimage isn't something out there in the physical world, Right. right?

[00:09:40]>> Right.

[00:09:40]Um uh if that's what they mean by illusion, fine. In a way, I agree with that. Uh um if instead what they mean is you never have any experience of afterimages or or anything else, I mean yeah. right? Then I do say good luck to them.

[00:09:58]Uh I I hope they I hope they're okay. I hope they don't stumble around and fall on the floor.

[00:10:09]>> [laughter] >> Okay. Um and so um from the perspective of universalism, could you give any advice to those people who are trying to understand consciousness? What kind of advice would you give them from as from a universalist perspective?

[00:10:30]Yeah.

[00:10:31]Uh from the perspective of universalism, I can pro I I don't think I can give them any advice. Except for those who might be working personal identity into it in some way that universalism would, you know, reject. So, I can give them a bit of advice.

[00:10:51]So, what would what what would that be?

[00:10:52]What would be uh It would be uh don't do that cuz >> [laughter] >> it being you is completely a matter of the immediacy. Okay. So, what what would be an example of of a theory of consciousness that would work a a contradictory idea of personal identity?

[00:11:08]>> Okay. There's not all that much to it, but like think of Descartes's theory of consciousness. Yeah. Right?

[00:11:16]So, an end interactionist dualist theory of consciousness, um so what he he thinks that what I am is as a mind is an immaterial substance. Yes.

[00:11:34]interacting with a physical brain that's distinct from it.

[00:11:38]Okay.

[00:11:40]So far, universalism is is the over there in the corner attending to its own business. Nobody care about it.

[00:11:49]But if he says and my self-interest, my being me is dependent on the identity of the immaterial substance Yes. You know, like rather than the brain. Right.

[00:12:04]Then universalism steps out of the corner, comes over and says you don't know what you're talking about. It's so improbable you exist in that case.

[00:12:14]Right?

[00:12:15]So that that's that's the only interference I I I would imagine. But it's I I think he did believe that. He Look, I think in the classic debate on personal identity there there were two views.

[00:12:32]One is the sameness of thing made it the same person. Yes. And you could either be an immaterialist about that.

[00:12:41]And I think that's what Descartes was.

[00:12:43]Yeah. Although he didn't talk about personal identity at all as such. Right?

[00:12:48]Um or you could be a materialist and think it's the brain or whatever. Right?

[00:12:54]Uh but then the opposing view is no, it's the pattern of experience.

[00:13:01]And so if you could like put all your memory pattern into a different brain, you would be there. I mean, certainly whatever was over there would think it was you. Yeah, sure.

[00:13:13]Right? So I'm over here. I used to be over in that body.

[00:13:17]That's what you would hear from the lips.

[00:13:20]Right?

[00:13:21]Um so uh and that seems very convincing, you know.

[00:13:26]Uh but um uh, you know what universalism would say here. Actually, both views are best [clears throat] when they're saying, "Hey, you can have the person continuing without what the other one thinks you need."

[00:13:44]All right. So, I I can be the same thing with amnesia.

[00:13:49]And it's still me. I'm the one who experiences the amnesia.

[00:13:53]Whereas the other people are saying, "I go over to the other body if the mental process is continued over there."

[00:14:03]All right.

[00:14:04]So, >> [clears throat] >> that's where each has something going for it. You know, that it can seem to continue a person even though the other's criterion is completely absent.

[00:14:21]So, it's the positive thing each is saying. It's the same person even without the same mental process.

[00:14:29]It's the same person in a different body as long as the mental process is the same.

[00:14:36]You put the positive things in each together and it's universalism.

[00:14:43]You're the same with different bodies and with different mental processes.

[00:14:47]And it's easy to conceive of yourself as continuing on in either way.