How to have ethics without God in 3 easy steps

Añadido: 2026-05-04

[00:00:00]Hey, how's it going?

[00:00:02]>> Hey, going well. How are you >> doing? Well, how old are you?

[00:00:06]>> I'm 23.

[00:00:07]>> Yep. And what religion?

[00:00:09]>> Uh, Protestant Christian.

[00:00:11]>> Sure. What makes you think God exists?

[00:00:14]>> Yeah. Um, I think to me at least, the most convincing evidence for God existing is the impossibility of the contrary.

[00:00:21]>> Okay. Uh, why is the imposs why is the contrary impossible?

[00:00:26]>> Sure. So I think you would agree that um reality exists.

[00:00:30]>> I would that that we exist.

[00:00:32]>> Yeah.

[00:00:33]>> That we have sense perception um etc etc. And so my argument would be that um the Christian theistic worldview is the only worldview that can uh logically um hold all of these things together.

[00:00:46]>> And how would it why why would that be true? Why could none of the other worldviews hold these things together?

[00:00:52]>> Sure. Um well I guess we could maybe take your worldview uh for example. So do you think you could maybe uh tell me about your worldview? I'm relatively new to your >> That's fine.

[00:01:02]>> So I'm not familiar with >> maybe your whole >> Yeah. So um you know I I hold that uh supernatural things uh broadly speaking uh don't exist. Um and I think that the reason for that is because of the impossibility of the contrary. I mean we have you know things like reality exists. We have sense perception. Um and uh the world views that that you know reject and think that supernatural things do exist. Um you know they are they're they're contradictory. Um >> got it. So would you say that you're then a materialist?

[00:01:41]>> No, I'm a platonist.

[00:01:44]>> Okay. Can you draw that out for me a little more?

[00:01:47]>> Yeah. Um, I hold that abstract objects exist like like mathematical objects >> exist.

[00:01:55]>> So I think that there's like certain material things.

[00:01:58]>> Uh, yeah, maybe >> I don't know if I hold that proposition existing exist.

[00:02:03]>> No, I think that the laws of logic exist, but I don't know if the laws of logic exist platonically. The laws of logic, for example, could be like a necessary precondition or like an abstraction of like the the requirements to have thoughts that are about something as opposed to nothing.

[00:02:20]>> Got it. Okay. I'm somewhat following I would say. So, so I guess um under your world worldview the laws of logic may exist. So, okay, let me let me u maybe parse this out a little more. When I talk about the laws of logic, I would um describe them as immaterial, unchanging, and universally applying. Would you agree?

[00:02:45]>> Uh, no. They're trivially not universal.

[00:02:48]They only apply to propositions.

[00:02:52]>> Okay. Can you maybe parse that out a little more? I'm not um really a logician or a philosopher, but just a guy with some questions.

[00:03:01]>> That's okay. Yeah, I'm I'm happy to to help out with that. So propositions. So we have statements and these statements can be true or false. Um it's kind of it's it's a bit tricky to describe exactly what a proposition is, but a proposition is basically the thing that statements which are true or false refer to. Um that it's not just like the sentence itself or like the words itself, but kind of like like the meaning or like the picture that's behind the the statement that you're making. Um, so for example, you would want to say if I say snow is white and then I have like a German person who says vice there there'd be like the same proposition there. Um, even though like the words are are different. So propositions could probably be understood as like the thing that is referred to by statements that are true or false. Um, and the laws of logic govern propositions, but they don't govern like non-propositions.

[00:04:02]>> Sure. Right. But I would I guess maybe let me clarify what I say when I mean universally applicable. I mean that um A does not equal not A. And that is true universally.

[00:04:15]>> That's a proposition by the way. So I think that Yes. Yeah. I think that for all propositions, the laws of logic are going to apply.

[00:04:23]>> Okay. So, you would So, we agree then on on I guess the three tenants that I laid out about the laws of logic, assuming we're using similar language when we talk about >> universally applicable.

[00:04:33]>> The idea that they're immaterial, I think, is probably going to be contentious. I think that they're likely going to have the same onlogical status as uh whatever propositions end up being. And propositions could be completely like mind dependent.

[00:04:48]Okay. So then the laws of logic are mind dependent.

[00:04:51]>> Maybe if that's what propositions turn out to be. If propositions are are mind independent, then I would hold that the laws of logic are mind independent. If laws of logic are mind depend or if propositions are mind dependent, then I would hold that the laws of logic are likewise mind dependent.

[00:05:09]>> Okay. So, are you saying that that's something that you're undecided about or >> Yeah, I think either way it's no problem for the view.

[00:05:17]>> No problem for the atheist view.

[00:05:20]>> Yeah.

[00:05:21]>> Okay. So, how So, let's assume that the laws of logic are immaterial.

[00:05:26]>> Uh, >> how would you?

[00:05:28]>> Okay. Sure. Yeah. Let's Sure. Let's say they're platonic. That's fine.

[00:05:31]>> So, how how would you explain that in an atheist worldview?

[00:05:36]So, I would just hold that they're abstract objects.

[00:05:39]that they're abstract objects that are immaterial.

[00:05:43]>> Yes, abstract objects are immaterial.

[00:05:45]Correct.

[00:05:46]>> Okay. Interesting. Um >> like like numbers for example or like other abstract objects like the number one it's not like a material thing. So it would exist but it would exist like atmporally aspatially >> you know wouldn't have like causal influence. Yeah.

[00:06:06]So what would you apply to um to say that or I guess maybe let me ask this a little bit more directly.

[00:06:15]What authority would you apply to to say the laws of logic are are real things um that whether someone believes in them or not, they are objectively true. How how would you um argue that? Yeah, because in order to reject the laws of logic, you would need to presuppose them. So, for example, let's say that you're going to make the claim that the law of non-contradiction is not true. Well, in order to say that it's not true, you're presupposing that some things are not the case, which is going to commit you to the law of non-contradiction because you're going to have, you know, the things that are the case and the things that aren't the case. And there's going to be like a distinction between them. The things that are the case are the case. They're not the things that are not the case.

[00:06:59]Mhm.

[00:06:59]>> Um, so the laws of logic are inescapable. You can't deny them because to do so would presuppose them.

[00:07:08]>> Yes, I would agree with that. I guess my argument would be that to presuppose the laws of logic would also be to presuppose the Christian theistic worldview.

[00:07:17]>> Why?

[00:07:19]Because you cannot have um immaterial and uh univer maybe instead of universally applicable and say universally binding um principles in a worldview in which um there is no God, there is no um creator sustainer of said universe in which uh we can reliably continue to use such laws of logic.

[00:07:50]>> Why? What would be the problem with holding that they exist as abstract objects?

[00:07:56]>> So, I guess my problem would be that um you're describing them, but you're not necessarily proving them in a way. Um, and I would also say that um without there being any sort of um Christian theistic worldview in play um excuse me um you wouldn't have the logical foundation to presuppose um the laws of logic. So you would not be able to say A does not equal not A. And that is objectively true and everyone must hold to that. Um because under the atheist worldview um A could maybe equal not A. Um and maybe that could be true tomorrow or the next day.

[00:08:46]>> You know, maybe I'm you know, maybe evolution gave us senses that don't properly track. You know, maybe I misheard you, but I could have sworn that a couple of seconds ago you said that you agreed with my proof of the law of non-contradiction. But then just now you said that you don't think you can prove it. Like you can't prove like the laws of logic. So which one is it? Can you prove them or can you not?

[00:09:06]>> Yes. So I I agree with I think what we a I think we've agreed on the laws of logic.

[00:09:13]>> Yes. But you substance or do you disagree?

[00:09:17]>> So hold on. So what I'm saying is we are agreeing but my argument would be that our agreement um is only on the common ground of the Christian theistic worldview and not on the common ground of the atheist worldview. Does that make sense? No. Um, do you think that the proof that I gave earlier is successful or do you think it's not successful?

[00:09:40]>> Um, can you restate it?

[00:09:41]>> Yeah, it's just that if you were to make the claim that the laws of logic do not exist, >> then to make this claim, you're going to have some sort of conceptual distinction. You're going to have the distinction between the things that are and the things that are not. And you're going to say that the things that are not, you know, they're they're not the things that are, which commits you to the law of non-contradiction because it would be false to say that the things that are um are the things that are not. You know, when you say that something is not the case, you're committing yourself to specific logical operators >> that then commit you to the law of non-contradiction, which demonstrates the truth of the law of non-contradiction.

[00:10:27]Yes. So I agree that you have to presuppose the laws of logic. I'm with you.

[00:10:32]>> Are we in agreement on that point?

[00:10:34]>> Yeah. What that does though is like prove it, right? It's like a transcendental proof of the laws of logic, >> right? Yes.

[00:10:43]I think that we're in agreement on that.

[00:10:45]>> Okay. Sure. So then it sounds like under the atheist worldview you could prove that logic exists.

[00:10:56]>> Sorry, I'm just taking a minute to think.

[00:10:57]>> That's okay. Yeah, take your time.

[00:11:16]Um, okay. I mean, I I will um concede that for uh I guess the sake of me not having a what I would consider to be an adequate response.

[00:11:26]>> That's totally fine.

[00:11:28]>> Yeah.

[00:11:29]>> So, I guess another question or or um maybe piece that's kind of adjacent, I would argue, to the laws of logic would be um things such as um morality.

[00:11:41]>> Sure. So would you say that in the same way that the laws of logic are are immaterial um and universally binding that um morality is is similarly immaterial and universally binding?

[00:11:50]>> I don't know if I'd say that it's immaterial, but I would say that it's universally binding. I think that there are like certain objective moral because there are certain reasons for action that everybody has.

[00:12:04]So for example, you know, everybody is striving towards a life in which they are successful. Um, but you know, this sort of life is going to be the sort of life that you can rationally approve of.

[00:12:18]But in order to rationally approve of your life, you would need to be virtuous for various reasons that we can get into. Therefore, everybody ought be virtuous in order to achieve the thing that they're trying to achieve more than anything else.

[00:12:31]>> Okay. So can you maybe parse out for me a little more why everyone ought to be virtuous?

[00:12:36]>> Yes, because everybody has a goal uh that requires being virtuous. Um and if you have a a goal and then there's something that is necessarily required for it, then we would say that you have a reason to do that thing that is to say that you ought do it. So we would say everybody ought be virtuous.

[00:12:54]>> Okay. So everyone has a goal >> that is being virtuous. Everybody has a goal which is to live a good life. You know, live a a life that is successfully lived.

[00:13:07]>> Um and then in order to achieve the goal of a life that's successfully lived, you would need to be virtuous for reasons that I'm happy to get into.

[00:13:16]>> Sure. So, for example, I mean, I hope that we would agree, for example, that that Hitler had a goal >> um that was not virtuous.

[00:13:24]>> Yes. And he did not live a good life.

[00:13:27]>> Right. I would agree. But how do we how can you say that?

[00:13:31]>> Yes, he doesn't live a good life in so far as he doesn't value lives properly, which means that he can't even rationally evaluate his own life because he hasn't developed the proper dispositions to make one a good judge of lives in general.

[00:13:48]So in order to evaluate that your own life is a good life, you would need to be disposed towards being like an accurate judge of lives and how they're going. and Hitler was just categorically not that in so far as he failed to properly value other lives. He failed to properly treat like cases alike. Um there's nothing that makes him ontologically different than the Jewish people he tortured. Um, and that fact means that he is not a good judge of of lives, which means that he can't judge his own life in a way that could possibly have justification, which means that, you know, he can't have a good life because he can't even know his life. He can only know like delusions of his life.

[00:14:34]>> Okay. So he must value Are you saying he must value human life in order to um evaluate his own life? Is that what you're claiming?

[00:14:48]>> That's certainly going to be a part of it. My claim is more so that you need to be a a fair judge of lives in order to be a fair judge of your own life. And Hitler was not a fair judge of lives in general. So he could not be justified in any judgment that he makes about himself.

[00:15:07]>> Sure. So how can we then again under under the atheist worldview how can we say who is and is not a good judge of life >> people who treat like cases alike.

[00:15:22]>> Okay. That's okay. So that's interesting. So uh like cases alike. Can you maybe parse that out for me a little more?

[00:15:30]>> Sure. So I think like the Hitler example is a great example. There's nothing that makes him different, nothing that makes him better, nothing that makes him like more special than all the Jewish people that he tortured. So, you know, he doesn't want to be tortured. If you tortured him, you'd think, "Wow, that's like really wrong." But because he doesn't fairly evaluate who deserves what. He's not He didn't like fairly evaluate what the Jewish people deserve and he didn't fairly evaluate what he himself deserves. He doesn't treat like cases alike. He makes unfair evaluations which means that he just lacks the ability to evaluate his own life because he lacks the ability to fair fairly evaluate lives in general.

[00:16:10]>> Okay, that's very interesting. Um >> that commits him to the the virtue of justice by the way is like the virtue that's there, you know, treating like cases alike, giving people what they deserve.

[00:16:23]>> Mhm. And that's something that is um objective. Yes, everybody has a reason to treat like cases alike, which means everybody has a reason to develop a disposition towards justice.

[00:16:41]>> Okay. So, he ought like cases alike is what you're saying.

[00:16:44]>> Yes. In order to live a good life according according to who?

[00:16:47]>> According to himself, there would be a contradiction in his own worldview if he disagreed with that. Everybody ought to treat like cases alike because otherwise you aren't a fair evaluator of of lives which means that >> you wouldn't even be able to live a good life yourself because you can't even evaluate your own life or how it's going.

[00:17:12]So I think I would agree on the point that if we do not treat like cases alike, we're not going to be able to fairly evaluate even our own lives. I think where I'm struggling is >> I think I'm struggling with the ought behind it. Like when you say ought, there's this idea that >> um there's a there's a foundational moral truth behind that that is true regardless of what what other people think.

[00:17:48]>> Yep.

[00:17:49]>> And I'm struggling with the idea that this ought is based on the person themselves.

[00:17:55]>> Mhm.

[00:17:56]>> I don't really understand how uh an absolute ought can come from a non-absolute person. So the the way that I'm deriving as for this ethical system is I'm pointing to sorry I should back up. So >> the way that as in general are derived is is based on evaluation of of practical rationality. You have a certain set of goals and then there's like certain actions that you can take in order to achieve those goals and it's a question of matching the the correct action to those goals. We would say that for example if you have the goal of graduating college and in order to graduate college you need to go to your classes. There's no way to graduate if you don't go to your classes because I don't know let's say the teacher will fail you in all of them. Um at that point you have a reason to to go to all of your classes and all is saying is that you have a reason to do a specific thing if that makes any sense. So we have >> sure >> if if there's a goal and there's some sort of like necessary means to achieve that goal then you ought do that thing.

[00:19:01]So everybody has this goal of living a successful life. The successful life is going to be one if it's a if it's a rational goal then a successful life is going to be the sort of life that you can rationally evaluate as as going well. But if you can't even evaluate your own life, then you can't rationally evaluate it as going well.

[00:19:24]>> So everybody is trying to live a successful life which requires being able to evaluate your own life. So then everybody ought evaluate their own life.

[00:19:33]But then further in order to evaluate your own life, you know, you would need to be a fair evaluator of lives.

[00:19:40]Otherwise, all your judgments are unjustified. You know, you're delusional. you you could know like a delusion about your life but you can't you can't really know like your own life in any sort of like justified way. Um >> which means that everybody ought treat like cases alike. They must they ought develop a disposition towards that.

[00:20:01]>> Okay. So is the ought a moral ought then or is it just a rational ought?

[00:20:06]>> I think that these things are the same.

[00:20:09]>> You think that they're the same?

[00:20:10]>> Yeah. I think that I think that in order to say that somebody ought something, there needs to be a reason in their own worldview to do that thing. Which means I think like I actually think that Christian ethics really struggles in this regard because I think that in order to have universal ethics, ethics that are universally binding, there needs to be universal reasons for action. Everybody must have a reason to do the thing. And I think that in order for there to be some sort of universal ought to listen to what God says, everybody would need like a reason to listen to what God says. But if you don't care what God says, it's not really clear what reason you would have.

[00:20:58]>> So okay, can you sorry can you repeat that last sentence one more time?

[00:21:03]If if you have universally binding ethics, then everybody has a reason to follow it. But it seems like a person who doesn't care what God says. They say, "I I simply do not care. I'm not going to listen to you." Um >> somebody like Satan, for example, >> you know, it doesn't seem like Satan has a reason to do what God tells him to do.

[00:21:29]Mhm.

[00:21:31]Sure. But I guess in the Christian theistic worldview, we have an a lawgiver, right? We have someone who we're basing our au off of.

[00:21:41]Whereas I'm struggling to understand how if you apply the same logic to the the atheist worldview. Well, clearly Hitler didn't care like whether or not um he ought to have done something or not. So, I guess I'm just trying to understand how that makes it um >> how you don't run into the same contradiction.

[00:22:03]>> Yep. Because I would argue that everybody is striving to live a successful life. That if you you can take like any action that you're taking like rationally and intentionally.

[00:22:13]You're taking a specific action in order to achieve like some specific goal.

[00:22:17]>> And you can kind of like you can kind of zoom out the picture. You can say, "Okay, I'm walking to the gym so that I can work out." so that I can be healthy so that I can live long or you know get into like a relationship so that I can be you know broadly speaking like happy throughout my life and I can live like a long life but in each step of like the the why why why you get broader in terms of the scope and how it affects like your life overall.

[00:22:44]>> So we we went from like walking to the gym to like health to like happiness. Um so the the ultimate thing that's at the top of this must be something that encompasses the entire life. You're trying to succeed with respect to the entire life which means that everybody's ultimate goal is to live a successful life which is going to if it's you know a rational goal is going to be a life that you yourself can rationally evaluate and rationally approve of.

[00:23:14]So the reason why why my argument gets around this is because I argue that everybody has this goal whereas I think that if you don't have the goal to listen to God then you simply wouldn't have a reason to.

[00:23:27]>> So your argument is that everyone has um the goal of living a successful life.

[00:23:33]>> Yeah.

[00:23:34]>> And how would you define successful? I think that we can leave it like pretty I think we can leave it like relatively nebulous, but it just needs to be something that you yourself could rationally approve of. So, and I I agree like from person to person, this is going to be different, which is why the goal is not the objective thing. The objective thing is the means to achieve that goal. Everybody has a reason to to take the means to achieve the goal.

[00:23:59]Which is why it's a universal ethic is because there's these universal reasons to be virtuous despite the fact that each person's idea of like a successful life is going to differ from person to person. But that's kind of the nature of the argument is that rationally you can live any life you want as long as it's virtuous. But if it's not virtuous then it's no longer rational.

[00:24:24]Okay. And how would you define virtuous?

[00:24:27]>> Um, I'd probably cash it out as like the four major virtues. So, like kind of like the like the copout answer is that a virtue is like a disposition to do the right thing for the right reason, uh, towards the right goals with the right feeling, etc. Um, and then the way that we the way that we would characterize this is going to be I can I could probably break it up into like the four classic virtues. courage is going to be, you know, you experience like the right amount of fear and you weigh like risks correctly um >> in in like the things that you value. Uh wisdom is going to be understanding the value of everything. Uh justice is going to be treating like cases alike. And then temperance, [ __ ] it's been so long since I've defended virtue ethics. Um temperance is hard to define, but it's like you don't take too much pleasure.

[00:25:17]Like you take like the right amount of enjoyment out of that's that's the definition. You take the right amount of enjoyment in things.

[00:25:24]>> Okay. And that's so that in your view is is virtuous and that's >> success. And so that's what everyone is striving towards.

[00:25:32]>> Yep. If you lack even one of those uh then you're going to be there's going to be things to be rationally desired in your life.

[00:25:42]>> Okay. So it's not necessarily that everyone is actually striving towards that. It's that they rationally should be.

[00:25:50]>> It's that there's a contradiction in your view if you're not striving towards something that would require virtue.

[00:25:58]>> Okay. Uh sorry, I'm just taking some notes.

[00:26:01]>> Okay. No, no worries.

[00:26:02]>> Curious to um dig into these things further.

[00:26:07]>> Y this is um this is like a very like arisatilian like udeimmonious uh model of ethics if you're if you're interested in looking into it further.

[00:26:16]Yeah. Wait, sorry. Can you say that one more time? Tell you what. Now, >> it's it's uh this is um like Aristotle's ethics and of course it's been like built on and expanded and argued for by lots of thinkers that came after him, but the the originator of well, I don't know if I'd say that Aristotle is the originator, but um actually h yeah. Yeah, there's there's like a bit more nuance. Aristotle isn't like the first virtue ethicist, but um the specific model that I'm defending is definitely there's like a direct line from Aristotle to the ethics that I hold to.

[00:26:54]>> Okay, that makes sense. And this is called virtue ethics. Is that correct?

[00:26:58]>> Yes. Yeah. If you want like a good um it's I it's not like per se like short, but if you want like a really good resource on this, uh Stanford has um like an internet resource called the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Um and it's like it's fantastic for like introduc ah introductory philosophy texts um or like introductory philosophy articles. So there's this great article on Stanford Encyclopedia Philosophy for virtue ethics that will cover um different types and the the one that I defend is this like section 2.1 which is UDI monist virtue ethics and it has more resources if you want to read even more.

[00:27:40]>> Yeah. No, I I appreciate it. I'll definitely um look into that. Um, and so I think as I've been kind of taking notes, I'm I'm curious so to maybe so I I think I um understand kind of these abstract principles that you're laying out.

[00:28:00]>> Um I'm curious in your worldview, you say justice is treating like cases alike, right?

[00:28:07]Um, so would you then apply that or let me see how I want to word this?

[00:28:16]Um, would you say that you would consistently apply that throughout your own life?

[00:28:21]>> Um, are you asking me like as like me as Ian, do I live up to the principle of treating like cases alike?

[00:28:28]>> Or would you at least say that you strive to?

[00:28:30]>> I strive to. Yeah. Um, and and the claim that I'm making here is that I I should.

[00:28:34]Everyone should.

[00:28:36]>> Yes, you should. Okay, I'm I'm with you.

[00:28:38]Um, so would you say that you are pro-choice?

[00:28:44]>> Yeah.

[00:28:45]>> Okay. So, can you explain how that fits within your definition of justice?

[00:28:49]>> Yeah. The reason why this fits within my definition of justice is because I think that the the thing that I value is going to be something like like consciousness.

[00:29:00]And as an extension of that, because I value consciousness, I also value the things that are required for consciousness. Um, and I value autonomy.

[00:29:09]So I think that I think that a fetus has some value. Um, but I think that it's substantially less valuable than like a conscious fetus. Um, so I think like a conscious fetus has has substantial moral value. Uh, and I don't think that there should be like I don't think anything that results in like the death of a conscious fetus would be permissible. Um, but you know, I mean at the at the stage where that would be like we're talking like 6 months into pregnancy like at that point basically you just get like a C-section or something.

[00:29:40]>> Um, if you if you like need the pregnancy to end. So >> So your argument would then be um that abortion after 6 months is is not okay.

[00:29:51]If if the abort if by abortion you mean like like killing like the the conscious fetus, then I'm not okay with that. But if by if by like abortion you mean just like termination of pregnancy, well, I think that you can terminate the pregnancy in in ways that don't kill the the conscious beings, that's fine.

[00:30:09]>> Okay, that is interesting. I don't know that I've heard that argument before.

[00:30:13]Um, so you said that the the unconscious fetus has in your mind some value.

[00:30:23]>> Yeah.

[00:30:23]>> So how do you assign value to this fetus? And how would you quantify that?

[00:30:33]>> Um, I don't know if I'd be able to like quantify for you like the value. Uh I think that virtue ethics commits you to something called like ethical particularism which just holds that there's like lots of things that you ought value and then it's about weighing them and creating like or like you know acting upon the the correct decisions with respect to this like variety of values. Um I think a really good analogy here is chess. If you've ever played chess, >> there is like an objectively best move to make in each situation, but >> it's going to be based on like all of the particulars that are there on the board. There's just like a lot of relevant features when you're making a chess move like the position of their king, the position of the queen, you know, pawn structure. There's so many relevant factors to consider and weigh and you need to take all of it into account. Similarly, I think that in most interesting moral scenarios, there's like a lot of things that you should be valuing and then these are going to weigh on the correct decision in various ways. You know, in the same way, the position of the queen might favor one move and then the position of like the rook and the bishop might favor like a separate move. Um, I I think that certain values are going to favor specific actions and it's a question of in the same way like you would evaluate the chess board and then pick the best chess move that you can and if you have a better understanding of chess, you're going to make better moves.

[00:31:57]>> If you have a better understanding of value, you're going to make more ethical decisions. If that makes any sense.

[00:32:03]>> So, I think that there's I think that the I think that like an unconscious fetus has some value. I just think that it's probably outweighed by the value of for example like bodily autonomy.

[00:32:17]>> Okay. So in the chess analogy though in order to make the objectively correct move you there also has to be an objective value to each piece, right? that you like whether you actually know it or not, there's some mathematically quantifiable um value to each piece, right? That would solve this mathematical formula that >> produces the best move.

[00:32:43]>> But you're saying that you don't necessarily have that for >> No, I I do think that there's like I do think that there are like objective values.

[00:32:52]>> There are objective values to human beings in different stages of gestation.

[00:32:56]>> Yes. Yeah. But you said you quantify that. Uh well yeah in the same way like I can't tell you like I can't quantify I might not be able to quantify for you how much value this chess move is going to to produce even though I could explain to you like why it's the right chess move. Um similarly there could be like an objective value that corresponds to >> the value of a of an unconscious fetus, the value of a conscious fetus, um the value of bodily autonomy, the value of bodily integrity. Um you know, >> right? So it's more of a rank order than >> it's just that there's like lots of um so a good way to evaluate it is by creating like analogies, which is why if you look to the field of applied ethics, that's exactly what they do. They pit values against each other by finding other scenarios that are analogous to the scenario in question.

[00:33:48]>> Mhm.

[00:33:50]Yes, I understand that concept.

[00:33:53]>> Mhm.

[00:33:54]>> Um, okay. So, would you then apply the same level of value or would you value say someone who is brain dead?

[00:34:06]Would you say that they have less value than someone who's not brain dead?

[00:34:08]someone and they're not coming back.

[00:34:10]They're just brain dead.

[00:34:12]>> Well, I mean, I think kind of you don't know, right? Like that's that's part of >> Oh, well then I wouldn't know whether to value them. I mean, >> yeah, I think so. There's like a couple of things that I'd probably point out that's like disanalogous is that I think specifically >> one thing that I value is people's desires for themselves. And that's something that I value even after somebody's dead is like, okay, during their life, what did they value? What did they want? Um, were these values and desires virtuous? Were they not virtuous? Um, >> and then from there, I'm going to, you know, I'm going to respond to their values and desires. You know, if somebody desires to be cremated, I would think that it's probably wrong to like get them chummed and then like feed them to sharks. you know, that's that's that's kind of that's, you know, it doesn't seem to be properly valuing this person's desires. But, I mean, for for somebody who's brain dead, if if I know that they're brain dead, then I'm going to think that there's like there's like value. Like, you should still have like some value for like the, you know, the human form.

[00:35:20]>> Um, you know, you should have some value for their the things that they desired, >> assuming that all of that is virtuous.

[00:35:26]But, >> okay. Yeah. I'm sorry. I'm reading the comments and I'm getting flamed because apparently if you're brain dead, you cannot uh indeed come back. So I'll I'll change it to be you are in a coma.

[00:35:38]>> Okay. Yeah.

[00:35:39]>> And it's an indefinite period of time that you will be in in this coma.

[00:35:43]>> An indefinite period of time.

[00:35:46]>> Meaning you may or may not come out of it.

[00:35:48]>> Oh, okay. Wait. Um I think that in order to give you like the the true moral analysis, I would need to know which one. If I didn't know whether this per like I I guess I I I have zero indication as to whether this person is going to come out of this coma.

[00:36:05]>> Well, right. I mean that that that's a real life thing that happens, right?

[00:36:09]People go into comas and we don't exactly know when they're going to wake up.

[00:36:14]>> I thought typically like the doctor would tell you, you know, there's like this likelihood that the person will wake up. There's this likelihood they that they won't. You know, it's like probable and >> Yeah. Yeah. I mean, yeah, but I'm saying like you you can't know for certain when or if, right?

[00:36:32]>> Yep. I agree with that.

[00:36:32]>> And that person, does that person have consciousness?

[00:36:36]>> Uh, if they're in a coma, no, but they have the structures for it, which are things that I value. They have life, which is a thing that I value. Um there's there's like a good number of things that I would still value about them despite the fact that they don't have consciousness because I value not just consciousness but also the things that are necessary for it.

[00:36:57]>> So when you say they have the structures for consciousness do you mean they have a brain?

[00:37:01]>> They have the neurological structures for it like they have like the the neural paths to deploy consciousness.

[00:37:07]>> Okay. And why is that where you draw the line at that? That's where like okay, human life is valuable when they have those structures. How do you draw that line?

[00:37:17]>> Well, I think human life is valuable uh irregardless, but I think it's more valuable when you have those structures.

[00:37:23]I think that there's like value to human life, even the sort of human life that doesn't have those structures, you know, like let's say somebody was born without a brain. Um, and it's, you know, something has gone like horribly wrong here. I wouldn't think that that's okay to like I don't know. Like I don't think that you could like [ __ ] like toss I don't think that you could toss like that corpse into the trash can through like the the goddamn like basketball hoop. Like I think that you need to show like human life proper respect. But >> you know I think that I think that that thing that I described is like vastly vastly less valuable than like a conscious human baby. like there's some value there, but it's like minuscule compared to the sort of value that I'd give to like like a conscious person, >> right? But I'm I'm I'm asking why. Like I understand you're stating like okay, >> it's because life is necessary for consciousness.

[00:38:25]>> It's because life is necessary for consciousness.

[00:38:27]>> I value consciousness. I value agency and these things are necessary for it.

[00:38:33]>> Okay. So you're not so at the core of it, you don't actually value life, you value consciousness. Is that what you're saying?

[00:38:38]>> I think that I I think that you need to value life in order to properly value yourself because you are alive.

[00:38:45]>> So there must be something valuable about life in order to fully value yourself.

[00:38:54]Yes. But I guess I just go back to like I guess I'm maybe not fully understanding the argument. U but it just to me I'm still not feeling an adequate explanation of okay. So yes, you you need to value life in order to value yourself. Sure, I'm with you on that. That's fine.

[00:39:16]I'm trying to understand when it comes to again these edge cases that we've been discussing.

[00:39:24]How can you then assign some spectrum of value and say okay this because this person has this level of consciousness um they have this level of value versus this person's fully conscious so they get the full value of a human life. And I I mean I guess I don't even we and we can talk about this. I don't even know what that necessarily means in your worldview. The full value of a human life is that how >> I think that like the peak is like I I would probably say like the peak is like you know like the conscious human person. It's probably like the peak of value.

[00:40:00]>> And then there's still going to be value to like the unconscious human person but >> probably a bit less. And then you know as you keep on taking traits away you know the one who is brain dead you know less value. The one that doesn't even have a brain less value.

[00:40:17]>> Um like a single cell >> less value.

[00:40:21]>> Okay.

[00:40:23]So why why why is that the line that you or why is that the criterion that you're using to sign back? Because as you go up in the ladder, there are more things that are necessary for consciousness. I value consciousness. So I value the things that are necessary for consciousness.

[00:40:41]>> So I'm going to assign more value when there are more things that are necessary for consciousness or even like more important things for consciousness as opposed to >> less of those.

[00:40:51]>> Okay. Yeah, that okay. I think I'm understanding. I apologize if you're repeat yourself question.

[00:40:57]>> No, that's no problem. I'm happy to explain this. I love talking about ethics.

[00:41:02]>> Yeah. No, and I I think it's good that we are are having the conversation. I think um unfortunately conversations like these are more and more rare. So, I think it's good. But um okay, I'm I'm understanding your argument and it sounds like kind of the lynch pin in all of this is is the statement that you made that you said, "I value consciousness, right?"

[00:41:22]>> Yep.

[00:41:23]>> Why do you value consciousness?

[00:41:25]>> Yeah. Because in virtue of valuing anything at all, you would need to deem yourself to be valuable. In order for me to be something that confers value on other things, I would need to be valuable because the value that these things that I'm pursuing has comes from the fact that I value them. Which means that necessarily, you know, all things that value must themselves be valuable.

[00:41:52]And there's nothing that separates me from these other valuers. You know, there's no reason why I'm better than them. Uh which means that, you know, I must deem all valuers to have value.

[00:42:05]>> Mhm.

[00:42:08]>> Okay.

[00:42:10]Um >> and consciousness of course is required for that. So >> Mhm. Yeah. I I understand. I think according So I think according to your own worldview, you're being consistent and I appreciate that and I can understand where you're coming from. I think I would just object to the idea that we as human beings can be objective uh arbiters of value. Um, and I would say that it's um extremely problematic in the fact that like, you know, you say there's less value to um an unborn human life that doesn't have consciousness versus one that does. Um, to me that's it's problematic. I mean, I guess obviously from from a Christian theistic worldview, it's very problematic. Um, but I would also say that it just doesn't necessarily account for um reality. Um and especially the um >> you know the number of people who who have abortions even early term abortions and then feel extreme um sorrow and grief over that human life. Um, you know, I think that there we have to account for that in some way or another.

[00:43:27]And to say that, well, this this is an inferior >> uh human being because it's um not conscious. Like, I just don't know that that's uh that that actually plays out in in um how people perceive >> um >> okay, >> value in human life. There's there's kind of like the obvious question that I'm gonna you've probably been asked this many times before, but let's say that you're in an IVF clinic. It's burning to the ground. On one table, you have four frozen human embryos and like a petri dish, and then on the other end, you have like a crying, screaming human baby.

[00:44:04]>> Which one you saving? You can only save one.

[00:44:10]>> Um, I mean, I think that that's a bit of a a gotcha question. Uh, and I think it's also just kind of an unrealistic scenario to begin with. Um, and I guess to answer your question, that's not something I've been asked before.

[00:44:25]>> Oh, sure. It's it's pretty common in abortion debates. If you do more abortion debates, you'll definitely get asked it.

[00:44:30]>> But I think that this like demonstrates my point. It's not that the embryos have zero value. It's just that they're way less valuable than like the baby.

[00:44:40]>> Mhm. Yeah. So, I would disagree. I would say that all human life from fertilization to point of natural death has infinite value. And obviously that's based on the Christian theistic worldview that that all people are created in the image of God. Um that they're created intentionally um that they're not just uh products of time and chance and matter um but that they are actually created intentionally from a creator >> um who's given them infinite worth and value. So, from my worldview, I I would not agree.

[00:45:13]>> Yeah, it just I mean, you know, it just kind of does commit you. And I'm not trying to like humiliate you or anything like that. You seem like a totally nice guy, but um you do seem to be committed based on what you've said to the view that the right thing to do is to save like the frozen embryos rather than the baby.

[00:45:39]I suppose potentially.

[00:45:42]Um, but I guess I'm I I again I think that you like you can appeal to emotion and say that well that's obviously not right, but um I think that doesn't necessarily make it logically inconsistent.

[00:46:02]So maybe maybe this would be like a good piece of evidence against the existence of God is that you would think that our moral intuitions would better line up with moral reality on your view. Then if your view was the correct view, you'd think that God would give us the moral intuitions to know that actually um like to make it like very intuitive that the the four embryos like saving the four embryos is the right choice when that's just >> not the case at all. I think basically everybody has the intuition and in fact I I bet you probably have that intuition too. Um but like I understand you know you're committed to the view um sometimes there are like unintuitive moral bullet bites but >> so you think that for some for a worldview to be true it should be intuitive or at least like when making >> it's certainly I I don't think that's strictly necessary but I think it's certainly nice.

[00:46:58]>> Okay. Would you say that like your worldview is provides morally intuitive >> I think so >> ethical solutions to problems?

[00:47:06]>> I think so.

[00:47:08]>> Okay.

[00:47:08]>> I I I struggle to see like there probably some bullet bites. Um, but I think that probably like the places where I could think that there are like bullet bites from my view are going to be on topics where I think that our intuitions are going to be like woefully um I don't know like like I have an explanation for why we intuit it that you shouldn't do these things.

[00:47:35]>> Mhm. Right. But I guess to go back to um what the example that I gave about women who do have abortions and who are very regretful, right? Um to me that seems to kind of counter that, right? Because if it's if it's a just a morally lesser being then like why should we care whether or not it we just discard it or not?

[00:48:04]>> It still has like some value, right?

[00:48:06]Like I think that you need to give I think that you should give an embryo its due. Like you should give it the respect that it deserves. Um but it just so happens to be that the amount that you should be valuing the embryo is like vastly less than the value you should be placing on something like bodily autonomy.

[00:48:29]>> Interesting. Okay. So you would say the ember has less value than the value assigned to bodily autonomy.

[00:48:37]>> If it's not conscious then yeah like trivial. Yeah.

[00:48:40]>> Okay. Um yeah. So I think that I would just fundamentally disagree and I would say that that's um again going back to like this argument of moral is something morally intuitive or not. Um I would say that that is not morally intuitive because again we go back to well if it's this intuitive moral equation of well my my bodily autonomy um is greater than the value of this baby then um why should I feel any grief over killing it?

[00:49:16]>> Uh well because you probably want to still think that it has some value. you know, you still assign some value to things like future consciousness and you still assign some values to things like human life. So, it makes sense that you you assign like some grief even, you know, that's like a totally appropriate emotion. Um, but it's just that the the value that you assign to future consciousness and the value that you assign to human life gets like vastly outweighed by something like bodily autonomy. But if it gets vastly outweighed by those things, then why grieve?

[00:49:53]>> Because it still has value.

[00:49:54]>> Why even regret?

[00:49:56]>> Because it still has value, >> you know?

[00:50:01]Let's say that you and I were Well, okay. Yeah. Um let's say that I was alone in the woods with my kids and my dog and we get lost, you know, we take a wrong turn. Um we we can't find our way out of the woods. uh and it becomes clear that either I kill and eat my dog or we starve to death. I think the right thing to do there is probably to kill and eat the dog. Um but I think you should feel really bad about it. I think that you have a moral obligation even to feel awful about the thing that you have to do. And I think that if you didn't feel bad and you didn't feel like lots of regret about that that you would have done the wrong thing. I think that you can feel regret even when you do the right thing.

[00:50:48]>> So I agree that you can feel regret even when you do the right thing. I think I would just if we take this analogy that you that you postulated um when you regret something you wish you had done otherwise. Would you agree or disagree?

[00:51:08]Cuz I think that's the difference between grief and regret, right? Or I mean one of the differences between grief and regret. Grief is hey this is sad but if I had to do it again I >> sure that seems true by definition then maybe my example um I mean okay if somebody like truly regrets getting an abortion I don't know like I think that's too bad then but lots of people don't regret getting an abortion.

[00:51:32]>> Sure.

[00:51:33]>> And I think that we should allow people to you know express their autonomy on the basis of you know their ability to evaluate properly what's going to happen for them as an individual, >> right? So, you would agree then that you you wouldn't in in your analogy, you would not regret killing your dog to save.

[00:51:56]>> Sure. Yeah. But you'd feel like very remorseful of it.

[00:52:00]>> Sure.

[00:52:00]>> So, I guess the question then becomes like how many people feel regret about their abortion?

[00:52:06]>> Yeah. And I would say that there are lots of people who do. Um, I mean, I'm obviously part of a church and we have a ministry that's just devoted to people who have who've had abortions and who are um regretting that decision.

[00:52:17]>> Do we have stats or something?

[00:52:20]>> I don't have any stats. I don't know that I think it would be impossible to to fairly gather um and survey statistics in order to >> Oh, yeah. Go ahead.

[00:52:32]>> Well, I'm looking at like stats right now from um what is this?

[00:52:38]uh UCSF the turnaway study that finds that the overwhelming majority of women did not feel regret 5 years after their abortion with 84% reporting positive or neutral emotions.

[00:52:55]Apparently the percent that does not regret the abortion is like 99%. That's apparently what the study is saying.

[00:53:00]>> So >> So it seems like the vast majority may say people don't regret it.

[00:53:07]So, it's interesting that you bring this up. So, my background is actually in the world of statistics and um I would be interested to see the study and see their survey methodology. Um I don't know how much weight I would necessarily place on such a survey uh without looking at it, I suppose.

[00:53:24]>> Sure.

[00:53:24]>> Only because I feel like it'd be incredibly when we say all people or all women who've had abortions, right? So, >> just like the ones.

[00:53:33]>> Okay. So that's the population of people are the ones in the survey.

[00:53:36]>> You don't have a pro if you have a stats background, you don't have a problem with that, surely.

[00:53:41]>> No. Well, the So there's a difference between a sample and a population though.

[00:53:44]>> Yeah.

[00:53:45]>> Right.

[00:53:47]>> Presumably for Yeah, go for it. Sorry.

[00:53:50]>> Well, yeah, you can make inferences about a population from sample.

[00:53:54]Absolutely. But my argument would have to be then that what is our target population? Um, and is the sample a randomized and representative sample of the population?

[00:54:05]>> We could look into it. Uh, let's see. Is there like a PDF of this or otherwise is this just like a I think this is like the summary. I wonder it's called the the Turnaway study.

[00:54:17]Um, let's see. of sample >> turnway study.

[00:54:32]>> I bet there's I bet that's probably just a summary. Um abort the turnaway study UCSF PDF maybe.

[00:54:53]Gosh, why can't I find the original study or not like the original study but like the PDF for it?

[00:55:02]>> I wish I wish it was just here on the website.

[00:55:05]>> Yeah, it would be great. It's probably behind a pay wall somewhere.

[00:55:10]Um, but I guess anyway, so in the case that and I think you would agree with me that we do have people who do actually regret such a thing as an abortion.

[00:55:24]>> Sure. I mean, we have people who regret like knee surgery. I don't think that that makes it like wrong to get knee surgery.

[00:55:33]So would you say that those people but okay do you think that a knee surgery is is a moral equivalent to an abortion?

[00:55:40]>> Uh no because I in so far as I think that the fetus has like some value but gets like vastly outweighed. Um I'd say that they're comparable though not like exactly the same. I think that you know you'd give like a like >> like a speck more weight to to regret for abortion than for regret for knee surgery. But I think they're like basically comparable.

[00:56:03]>> Got it. Okay. Yeah. So, I would just say that that just to me and I mean you can certainly disagree with this, but to me that just does not um comport with reality. Um to say that that that a knee surgery is is only a speck less uh morally significant than an abortion. Um I think that most people would probably agree with me on that point.

[00:56:26]>> Why?

[00:56:27]>> Yeah. Why is a knee surgery different than abortion? Well, so according to the >> I mean I think that like obviously I think that the fetus has like some value. But I think that if you you know if you get the abortion and or then you regret it, I think that that's too bad.

[00:56:40]I think that that's like really sad even. Um >> and the reason why I think that that's like sadder than like you know regret about like the knee surgery uh is because you know you you uh you have like a yearning for what could have been. you know, you value the things like their potential future existence.

[00:56:58]You value things like uh human life in general. Um but I just don't think that the difference there would be enough for me to think that the abortion, even an abortion that you regret, um is so bad that we should like restrict a person's bodily autonomy, especially when 99% of the people that get abortions don't feel any regret about it. Sure.

[00:57:23]Right. And so I think again that's and you asked me originally, well why um would I say that there is more moral weight to an abortion than a knee surgery? So if I could respond to that.

[00:57:36]>> Oh well, I agree. I agree that there is more weight. I just don't know why it would be like like way way way more.

[00:57:42]>> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Let me So let me clarify. So according again according to the Christian worldview, we're created in the image of God, right? And um because we're created in the image of God, we have uh not just a spectrum of value, but we have infinite value. Um and so that that's the reason why in the Christian worldview um we would say that uh abortion is much much much much infinitely more morally significant than than a knee replacement.

[00:58:14]>> No, I understand that. I understand that's why it would be true in your view. I just have no idea why that would have any like force in my view, >> right? And it wouldn't. And that's I think that's kind of uh and I think that's kind of the point of the conversation that we're having right now is it's showing that, you know, we both have different worldviews. They both make certain presuppositions about reality, epistemology, etc., etc. >> Sure.

[00:58:37]>> Um anthropology.

[00:58:39]Um and so under your um presuppositions, you would say that um killing a child in the womb is is only slightly more morally significant than a knee surgery. And you would be logically consistent in saying that. Um under my worldview, I would say that that there is an infinitely greater moral weight to an abortion um than a knee surgery. And I would also be logically consistent in my application of my worldview in saying that. Um, >> and so would you agree like at what level do you think do you think each organism is made in the image of God?

[00:59:22]>> What do you mean each organism?

[00:59:23]>> So okay, let's say that you add like a single cell. Do you think that this like single cell is made in the image of God?

[00:59:32]>> Is the single cell a human cell?

[00:59:34]>> Yeah, it's a it's a single human cell.

[00:59:36]Is that made in the image of God?

[00:59:40]>> Like, is that the entirety of the person or is it like a skin cell on my skin right now?

[00:59:45]>> No, let's say it's like the embryo or it's like um [ __ ] I forget what the name for the first cell in in pregnancy is. Is it the zygote?

[00:59:56]>> Is it the Yeah.

[00:59:57]>> Yeah, it's the zygote. Yeah.

[00:59:59]>> Are you saying is that made in the image of God?

[01:00:01]>> Yeah. Is the zygote made in the image of God?

[01:00:03]>> Of course. According again, according to the Christian theistic worldview, of course it is.

[01:00:06]>> Okay. Sure. So, do you think that it's like the organism like the unique life form that is distinct from its environment? Do you think that being made in the image of God is the sort of thing that applies to like an organism?

[01:00:22]>> Assuming that by organism you mean human being.

[01:00:25]>> Yeah, I do. I do. Yeah.

[01:00:26]>> Okay. So I think that this runs into the problem that you're if if the thing that you're saying has value is the organism, then I think that you run into the problem of conjoined twins that you can have two conjoined twins um that are one organism. So you would have to say that it's just the one organism that's made in the image of God. Unless what you want to say is that it's like it's like the persons that are made in the image of maybe okay I I don't know I don't want to like I don't want to like blindside you maybe you do want to say it's like the persons >> but to me like the easy way to determine that is to say well it's two minds so it's two persons >> right so I would argue that um people again and this is >> I'm not expecting that you would accept this under your worldview but at least to explain mine um I would say that human beings are what we would call middle creatures. So under the Christian theistic worldview, we would have um all of creation um are created beings and then we would have u spiritual beings such as angels.

[01:01:35]Um and human beings are what we would call middle creatures in that we are both physical and spiritual. Um, so when you talk about conjoined twins, like yes, they might be um I suppose one organism in that they all of their cells are connected, but they are not one person because they're two separate spiritual people.

[01:02:00]>> What would you say makes them two persons?

[01:02:04]>> Well, they have two souls, of course.

[01:02:06]>> They have two souls. So you think God and >> each person has their own? Of course.

[01:02:10]>> Okay. Okay, wait. What's the um this is going to draw in like medical terminology. I wonder if like the the one I wonder if I wonder if uh the debate doctor is here. Um but I forget I forget what it's called, but like specifically when conjoined twins are forming there's like a specific split and I forget what the specific split is called.

[01:02:33]>> Before the split, do you think that there's like one soul or do you think that there's like two souls?

[01:02:40]What do you mean by the split? Like I guess I'm trying to understand like >> my understanding of conjoined twins is that there's >> you have like the initial zygote and then there's like a split where it's destined to become like two minds as opposed to like one mind where it's like destined at that point or it's like you know destined determined to become conjoined twins as opposed to like the single cell which otherwise wouldn't have.

[01:03:17]>> So from one cell you're saying comes two separate human beings or I guess come from one cell comes both conjoined twins.

[01:03:25]>> So you're asking okay >> do you think that it has like two souls from like the stage of like single cell?

[01:03:32]>> I mean is that true? Can we verify if that's true or not? I'd be very interested to know.

[01:03:36]>> It's like a it's like a very documented process like the forming of conjoined twins. Yeah.

[01:03:42]>> So you cuz I think I thought you were saying that you weren't sure if they did or not.

[01:03:47]>> No, my understand So I don't know if this is true for all of them because there's like lots of different types of conjoined twins, but my understanding is that there is a specific type of conjoined twin wherein what happens is that there's like something goes ary with cell division.

[01:04:02]>> Mhm.

[01:04:03]>> Oh yeah. Identical twins that don't fully separate. That's what I'm thinking of. Yes.

[01:04:09]Yep. Yeah. Chat chat has me for that.

[01:04:12]Yeah.

[01:04:14]>> Identical twins that don't fully separate. Um >> Oh, okay. I'm seeing this now. The fision theory. Interesting.

[01:04:23]>> Yeah.

[01:04:23]>> Um >> do you think that when it's just like a single zygote, >> do you think that this like single zygote has has one soul or two?

[01:04:38]I think that's a very fair question. Um, and I I feel like my argument would be that um, you know, the Bible speaks very clearly that that before we are even conceived, God knows us. Um and so when exactly uh the souls are are created and how that applies to um the at what point like the cells become two individuals. Um I would kind of I would say not feel uh super equipped to answer that. Um >> that's okay. But I yeah, but I would also again just say that according to the Christian theistic worldview um like God knows us even before we're conceived. And so regardless of at what point in that pro like regardless at what point in in our perception of time like that happens like it doesn't change the fact that they're still two distinct people.

[01:05:44]Um, so somebody in chat had something for me to look up to, which definitely raises like even more questions. So I think that you're probably I think that you may run into a dilemma. Um, if you're saying that it's going to be two souls. Well, there's this there's this other medical thing called fetus and fu uh which is >> there's one fetus will develop inside of the other and is like parasitic off of the other. Do you think the And I I think I'm not sure if there's like a documented case of them of of like the the parasitic one like living, but um like would you would you say that that's one soul or two or would you It's okay if you don't know. I like it's you know it's it's like a tough question. But >> so it's two distinct but you're saying it's two zygot. It's two different fetuses, but one of them is just inside of the other.

[01:06:45]>> Oh, interesting.

[01:06:46]>> Yeah.

[01:06:47]>> Um I mean to me and yeah, I would definitely say I'm not uh necessarily equipped to answer the question, but I guess on on initial analysis, I would say that yes, there are two distinct people, which would obviously include uh two distinct souls.

[01:07:05]>> Sure.

[01:07:06]>> In that case.

[01:07:07]>> Yeah. Oh. Uh, shoot. Look at the time.

[01:07:10]Um, I probably have to get going. I have I have a I have a date with my girlfriend. But I really appreciate the conversation. It was great to talk to you.

[01:07:17]>> Yeah, you as well. I really appreciate you uh being so open to discussion and uh yeah, maybe we can chat again sometime. I'll have to look into uh some of the resources that you pointed me to.

[01:07:28]So, >> yep. Hey, thanks so much. Appreciate coming on up.