الحرب عادت؟.. إيران تطلق صواريخها على هرمز وأميركا ترد بقوة - في الواجهة

Added: 2026-06-07

[00:00:00]Between military escalation and political negotiation, the Strait of Hormuz returns to the forefront of confrontation.

[00:00:09]Iranian drone attacks are met with American strikes on radar sites in Qeshm, while Washington speaks of negotiations that have reached their final stages without guarantees of success. Is an agreement nearing, or is war approaching a new round of discussions? Joining me from Washington is Dr. Aqeel Al-Abbas, an expert on American affairs, and from Cairo is Dr. Muhammad Mohsen Abu Al-Nour, head of the Arab Forum for Iranian Policy Analysis.

[00:00:42]Welcome to you both. I will begin with you, Dr. Aqeel. The numerous statements by the American president regarding the course of the negotiation process, in addition to what is happening on the ground—what I would call military skirmishes between the Iranians and Americans—open the door to much speculation.

[00:01:12]Do you believe that the American president's statements actually contribute to resolving the impasse for both sides, as the current situation seems to suggest, or do they further complicate matters with the Iranian side?

[00:01:28]Thank you for this opportunity. First, greetings to you and your esteemed guest. The problem with President Trump is that he makes statements both as president and as his spokesperson. He makes many statements, and in his statements, there is a provocative tone towards the Iranians. Although I believe there is some truth in what he says, along with some exaggerations, there is a fundamental truth in his words. He is making things difficult for himself because the Iranians take his words very seriously, particularly regarding their national pride and their desire to retaliate and confirm that the narrative he presents is not accurate. This may delay the implementation of some steps towards ending this war. However, setting aside all of this, both sides, despite the verbal skirmishes and the high-level rhetoric, want to end the war. They have a shared interest in ending it, each for their own reasons.

[00:02:33]I believe we have reached the final stages. The points of contention are decreasing, but they remain important and require some concessions, especially, in my view, the issue of financial incentives for Iran. Trump cannot allow any financial incentives for Iran, giving them money during this period. It is necessary to come Consequently, as a result of something Iran offers, otherwise, he will be accused in Washington of making a worse deal than the 2015 agreement. He needs to go beyond the 2015 deal and has obtained what he needs on the nuclear front: freezing the partial or complete removal of enriched uranium. He can say that Iran does not have, cannot develop, a nuclear weapon and will not enrich uranium for a long period. The 2015 agreement allows enrichment, while Trump says, "I have stopped enrichment." We know this is an exaggeration. However, there is a low-level war raging around the Strait of Hormuz. There is no bombing in Tehran, no bombing in Isfahan, and no bombing specifically around the Strait of Hormuz. This is partly related to the fact that the United States is working to facilitate the passage of commercial ships.

[00:03:52]Iran is trying to retaliate, and the United States is bombing boats that also carry mines. Ultimately, when Iran retaliates, it cannot target American forces, either because they are far away or out of fear of their reactions. They are located in the Gulf of Oman, within range of Iranian fire, but any Iranian attack on them... The US will respond with a stronger attack, and thus both sides will slide towards war. What is Iran doing?

[00:04:20]Targeting the Gulf states?

[00:04:22]Yes, it's to maintain negotiations, hoping to reach a solution without provoking the United States and pushing it to reignite the war.

[00:04:33]Okay, if I want to be frank, Dr. Aqeel, everything you've said is a true description of what the US president and the United States are doing, and how Iran is responding. But if the US president is talking now, if he wants to portray this as a victory, the previous agreement allowed enrichment, albeit limited, and Iran forcibly violated it. Now he will accept a freeze. This means that what he was talking about before is now a freeze, and now the freeze is the victory. If they don't get a nuclear bomb today, they can get one in ten years. The US president might consider this and market it as a victory. Also, the Iranian side might exploit it to portray it as a victory because they haven't given up on this issue. Secondly, regarding whether I agree or not, the ceilings before the war were high; now the ceilings are starting to decrease, and the president is trying Finding a way out, however, means we must pay attention.

[00:05:44]He needs to resolve the Strait of Hormuz issue because of the significant economic pressure. But we should also be aware that even with the signing of this deal, which, if finalized, will provide him with a way out and resolve the core issue of the past, the fundamental problem for him is resolving the past issue of the past and the economic pressure. Trump will have two months, which may be extended to another two, to capitalize on this.

[00:06:08]Consequently, he will monitor the reactions to his signed deal.

[00:06:17]What has he gained from America? How will he negotiate with the Americans, especially considering the possibility that after the midterm elections, fuel prices will return to their normal or near-normal levels? This means we shouldn't rule out the possibility of renewed conflict, but perhaps after the pressure subsides. The main problem Trump faces is linked to this war. He is against engaging in wars, and his legacy and name—he's striving to be immortalized in American history, even to the point of having his image on the $250 bill, which may be issued permanently or only for a specific occasion—are relevant. I believe this... Even with a ceasefire and negotiations, this isn't the end of the round.

[00:07:15]If negotiations don't lead to the outcome President Trump desires after overcoming the political problems of the midterm elections, there's a possibility of a return to war or some form of pressure, like a naval blockade.

[00:07:35]This time, he has to prepare for the issue of the Strait of Hormuz. The main, bitter lesson Trump learned is that he should have been well-prepared. There are American plans in place for years regarding maintaining navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, and Trump went ahead with this war without paying attention to these things. He thought it would end in a week or two, either with the regime collapsing or with the regime making the required concessions. He learned from these lessons, and I don't imagine he'll be satisfied with this because his political legacy will be questioned a lot, and his political future will be at risk. He'll need to redeem himself after this war. Yes, now, starting from a very important point you mentioned, allow me to ask Dr. Muhammad what Dr. Aqeel said: that Iran cannot retaliate against the United States or the American bases it controls. It can reach... To them, and to respond to the Gulf states, which have good relations with the United States or are allies of the United States, don't you think that Trump himself, through the leaks that came out saying that he might consider returning to war if American soldiers are killed, has given Iran a free hand to bomb his allied countries, on the assumption that Iran now knows the key: whatever it does, the Americans will not respond with war as long as no American soldier is killed?

[00:09:22]Good evening to you, Jumana, and to Dr. Aqeel. I completely agree with this argument, and it is a strategic argument from President Trump's side, aiming to kill several birds with one stone. The first element is to avoid a backlash from the American public. The American public would be very supportive if American citizens were killed in a war in the Middle East, a war very far from American soil. This is one thing. The second thing is to draw Iran into this. The Gulf states have historical relations, historical neighborly relations with Iran, and they will continue to have neighborly relations with Iran even after the end of this war. Consequently, this creates what creates a historical enmity between Iran and these countries after this Iranian aggression against these countries, especially since Iran is attacking civilian sites, such as Kuwait Airport, and some hotels in Bahrain, the UAE, and other places. This puts Iranian foreign and Arab relations in a historical predicament that will continue after this episode. The third factor, which is very important, is the attempt to drag these Arab states into responding to Iran, thus igniting regional conflict. However, the Arab states were wise enough not to respond to Iran because they know that this is not an Arab war, nor a Gulf war; it is an American- Israeli war against Iran in which the Arab states have no part.

[00:10:46]Therefore, they were wise and astute enough not to fall for this American deception. I strongly agree with those who say that America gave Iran the opportunity and the pretext to carry out aggressive operations against the Gulf states so that America would remain somewhat safe from Iranian strikes. What is perplexing is that this American-Iranian war is currently in a state of truce, yet even in this state of truce, Iran is violating it with terrorist attacks on the Gulf states without any justification. The war between the two pillars of war, meaning the United States and Iran, is currently at a standstill.

[00:11:37]All of this raises even more questions and deepens the rift and animosity between the Gulf states and Iran. What does Iran gain, Dr. Mohammed, in short, from deepening this hostility with its neighbors? Geography is unchangeable, so why does it seek to escalate this animosity?

[00:12:07]Iran is obviously a loser in every respect, because it is losing out.

[00:12:15]Neighboring countries, countries that were supposedly on good terms before this war, had agreements with Iran, like Saudi Arabia, for example, brokered by China. Some of these countries had embassies and returned their ambassadors to Tehran after Iran attacked Saudi diplomatic missions, as is well known, several years ago.

[00:12:35]Therefore, the biggest strategic loser is Iran. However, there is a very important point, Dr. Mohammed. I will return to the point you wish to mention, but the connection with you was lost. I want to return to Dr. Aqeel. You spoke about ceilings. The high ceilings that were never reached, and therefore began to be lowered gradually during the negotiations, don't you agree with me that the truth is that the high ceilings were set by the Americans, and they are the ones now lowering them to that level?

[00:13:17]Because when this war began, the Iranians were saying, "We are where we are," meaning they didn't set any ceilings other than some things they knew, even they, would n't achieve—the American withdrawal from the region, and so on. It was perhaps more media propaganda than real demands. It's true that the retreat is an American retreat, and the high ceilings were actually set by President Trump.

[00:13:49]In this context, his open-ended speeches, which are always changing, talk about unconditional surrender and that he changed the leadership, brought about regime change from within. Ultimately, it is the facts that decide, not the speeches, and the facts are that he wants to end with a partial nuclear deal, hoping to develop it into a full nuclear deal in the two months of negotiations. Even during this war, he was clearly saying that he wanted to resolve the nuclear issue, he wanted to resolve the ballistic missile issue, and he wanted to resolve Iran's regional behavior. The shaky logic, referring to the proxies or arms, that these must be dismantled—he said this explicitly in the early weeks of the war and his support for the boycott until he stopped mentioning it. It's true that weeks have passed since the ceasefire on April 7th, and the focus has shifted to the nuclear issue. I believe the problem he faces in this regard is that he will return to this topic, even if it ends with a nuclear deal only with Iran. Of course, we must consider the pressure from the allies, the Arab allies, especially the Gulf states, who are angry and want their voice to be represented in the negotiations. This isn't necessarily about ceasefire negotiations; that would be a waste of time. Trump wants to stop the war and get concessions in the nuclear field, but in the 60-day negotiations, I think things might change. The Arab position, and even the Israeli position, are being taken into account, including ballistic missiles and the proxies' shelling of Gulf countries, for example, by Iraqi factions. For instance, Saudi Arabia was shelled around 600 times— shells originating from Iraq. The UAE shelled some Iraqi ambassadors. In those countries, they received protest messages. They summoned representatives from these countries. What was previously a local issue has become a regional and global one, and it will be difficult for President Trump to ignore it in the two-month negotiations. If it is n't resolved, and Trump only obtains this concession—freezing nuclear enrichment and removing enriched uranium—it will be difficult for him to present this as a lasting achievement. Even the public and Iranians will find it difficult because when they objected to the 2015 agreement, a key part of their objection was that it didn't address the ballistic missile issue or Iran's destabilizing behavior. So, I think it will be difficult for President Trump to close this entire file with what he can obtain regarding limited nuclear concessions. His political legacy and his political movement will be greatly harmed by such an end, which seems modest compared to the rhetoric and high demands he promoted so much.

[00:17:16]Yes, and now he is trying to promote it as a victory. One of the points of victory is the issue of the Strait of Hormuz because, as is well known, it wasn't originally the cause of this war. The war and its resolution became imperative for the American president because this war, which he waged, led to the current situation regarding the Strait of Hormuz. Now, Iran is essentially selling what it doesn't own; it wants its frozen assets in exchange for the Strait of Hormuz, which does n't even belong to it. On this point, I'd like to ask Dr. Muhammad his opinion. Welcome back, Doctor. You wanted to add something before the connection was cut off. Of course, I thank you for this question. The most important point for me in resolving this entire dilemma is that any potential American-Iranian agreement will be marketed in both capitals as a political economy deal. Each side will prepare its own narrative, and Iran will claim victory despite any potential agreement. However, what's more important to me is the issue of releasing the frozen assets. We were talking about six billion dollars, then twelve billion, and now General Mohsen Rezaei spoke of twenty-four billion dollars in an interview with CNN the day before yesterday. So, this is the crux of the problem: Iran wants money, and it's possible that it will stimulate the economy.

[00:18:56]The economy is in a very difficult situation, everyone knows that.

[00:18:58]Every dollar has reached nearly 2 million rials or 200,000 tomans. This is enormous for Iran.

[00:19:06]Therefore, Iran wants to obtain dollars to use for two things. First, to some extent, meaning to liberalize the economy, even partially, or to revive the economy, even partially. Second, to use these funds for political marketing domestically and with proxies and allies in the region. Based on this, the perception is that the host, Guantanamo, which was already open before this war, has become the focal point for ending this conflict.

[00:19:30]Yes, well, in light of this situation, we saw Steve Wittkopf and Jared Kushner go to Tennessee to meet with nuclear scientists. I mean, there is no accurate information on whether they will study with them or seek their opinions on how to eliminate enriched uranium, Dr. Aqeel, because the American president hinted a few hours ago that this uranium will be removed with or without an agreement. Is there any information on this subject?

[00:20:14]Firstly, their visit and meeting with American nuclear scientists, and the announcement of this news, I believe, is intended to strengthen the American negotiating position domestically, not vis-à- vis the Iranians. This is because there were accusations in previous rounds of negotiations before the war that President Trump's team didn't understand or know anything about specialized nuclear issues, and therefore couldn't negotiate effectively, and that they missed an opportunity. This was widely promoted in America, by the way, that he might have contributed to missing the opportunity to reach a sound nuclear agreement before the war. Of course, we don't know; there might be some exaggeration in this.

[00:21:03]President Trump wants to give the impression, the message domestically, that we are facing a deal that nuclear experts believe is good, and so on. But there is also another issue that President Trump raised, and this is possible: if this peaceful deal collapses, the first thing Trump will do in the event of renewed war is to forcibly extract enriched uranium, occupy the prepared area in Isfahan for a period of time, and then deploy American forces and nuclear scientists. These are the specialists in these matters. He extracts [iron/oil], and through this, Trump can present this as a victory. He says, " I wanted it from you peacefully, you refused, so I took it from you by force." But this also has its price because he will also have to destroy [iron/oil] centrifuges, and America knows their locations buried underground because centrifuges are what handle enrichment. Through this, he can declare the end of the war, that he has won. He says, "I tried to resolve it through negotiation, they refused, so I resorted to war." But this leaves the fundamental problem: resolving the Strait of Hormuz. The high energy prices are putting painful pressure on Iran through the naval blockade. However, the Iranian public's patience is much higher than the American public's patience regarding high fuel prices. This public will most likely punish President Trump if there is no solution to the issue of high fuel prices.

[00:22:52]This is the main challenge for President Trump. The urgent challenge before the elections is to reduce fuel prices, and this is difficult to achieve without an agreement with the Iranians. If they don't agree with him, he will have to find a military way to open the strait. This involves uncertain profit and loss possibilities, which he wants to avoid.

[00:23:20]Okay, quickly, because I want to return to Dr. Mohammed in the remaining minutes. But Dr. Aqeel, do you think that the American president—let's say after the World Cup, the one that will captivate the world—might give the American president a chance, or perhaps he wants to give this global sporting event a chance to succeed?

[00:23:44]Do you think that before the midterm elections, he might undertake this military action to increase his electoral chances, or that he can only use this card after the midterm elections? Quickly, if you please.

[00:24:04]No, if he needs to do it, he needs to do it quickly because he needs time for prices to drop if the operation goes well. As for the World Cup, it has no general importance in America, not even in the political debates in the Middle East. In the world, there is a lot of interest in the World Cup, but not in the United States, even though football is followed by 5% of the public, the fourth most-watched sport. The purpose of this, of course, is economic. And the purpose of all this is that President Trump will not consider the World Cup an obstacle or a barrier preventing him from doing By military action? No, on the contrary, I think he might use it, especially in America. The World Cup is n't a major issue for the public; only a small minority follows football, even though its popularity is gradually increasing. So, I don't think that if he carries out this strike during the World Cup, there will be a popular American reaction like, " You've ruined a great pleasure for us." I don't think that will happen in the Middle East, perhaps, but not in America.

[00:25:13]Yes, in the Middle East and Europe, they are also very interested in this issue. Okay, Dr. Muhammad, if we want to talk about this scenario that Dr. Aqeel mentioned, the issue of the US wanting this uranium through peaceful means, but you refused, and taking it through war, this scenario is certainly possible, especially since the American president is saying it. He's telling them what to prepare themselves for the Iranians, what he's going to do. The Iranians are certainly preparing for such a step. So, to what extent do you think this operation might succeed, given the Iranian readiness to prevent this American move, which will make the situation even more dire and difficult for the American president if he tries and fails?

[00:26:03]Consequently, the Iranians will have the upper hand in the negotiations. The Iranians say Trump did indeed try, and he tried to launch an airborne operation.

[00:26:18]He stated in the media that this operation was intended to rescue one of the two factions that were lost during the Iranian military operations. The Iranians say that Trump is not being truthful, and that this operation was aimed at an airborne commando force going to the Natanz and Fordow sites and extracting the designated uranium from one of these sites or the Asfar site. Therefore, it failed.

[00:26:42]The winds came and Iranian soldiers came and thwarted this operation. But they followed it up a week later with a ground maneuver operation conducted by the Revolutionary Guard.

[00:26:54]These maneuvers were very strange to me. I mean, I have been following all Iranian military maneuvers for almost 20 years, and I follow them because they have certain implications and symbolism. Now, these maneuvers were ground maneuvers for the handover of the capital, Tehran, and targeted urban warfare and asymmetric warfare. Because the Iranians say, or rather, because the Iranians say simply, that Trump might try to do this operation. This operation is impossible because if you want to go to one of the sites and obtain the refinery located on the ground, And on top of that, tons of rubble, cement, clay, and all that stuff, and the American commandos pull it out without any resistance. This means there's a complete American ground occupation of Iran and a complete ground defeat for all Iranian armies and forces. This is unlikely.

[00:27:51]Nevertheless, Iran is considering this scenario and has conducted maneuvers—I mean, the Revolutionary Guard held them for this purpose. But overall, any American military operation on this kind of land, which is unimaginable in the eyes of the individual, is doomed to failure.

[00:28:06]Yes, anyway, the first narrative I mentioned might be relevant, and you can confirm it for me because the time for yes or no internal Iranian propaganda has passed. They want to portray victories for the Iranian people, that the state or the regime has triumphed over the Americans, even though the rescue operation for the American pilots was clear and went smoothly, and no American soldiers were killed. Perhaps it's a fabrication by the Iranians so that this regime can tell its people, "Did you see? They tried to land, and we repelled them."

[00:28:49]What do you think?

[00:28:51]Twenty years in 20 seconds? The regime doesn't say that. I'll tell you what it does say. The regime says that heaven will triumph over Trump, that there is a divine will to defeat Trump, and they called it the Second Battle of Tabas. The first Tabas was during the failed attempt to free the American hostage, and this second Tabas is during the failed attempt to extract the Iranian.

[00:29:14]Thank you both very much for this information and participation. My guest from Washington is Dr. Aqel Abbas, an expert on American affairs, and from Cairo, Dr. Mohamed Mohsen Abu El-Nour, head of the Arab Forum for the Analysis of Iranian Policies.