This video presents a detailed analysis of the complexities involved in classifying genocide and assessing humanitarian situations, particularly in the context of the Gaza conflict. The discussion covers key legal concepts including the interpretation of 'plausibility' under the Genocide Convention, state responsibility for genocide, and the challenges of determining genocidal intent. The analysis examines how the International Court of Justice applies these standards, noting inconsistencies in case law and the difficulty of proving intent in complex military operations. The video also critically examines humanitarian aid statistics, particularly the commonly cited figure of 500 trucks per day, explaining why this number is misleading as it includes commercial goods like concrete and building materials rather than food aid. The discussion highlights the importance of distinguishing between different types of deaths (trauma-related vs. non-trauma) and the challenges of verifying mortality data in conflict zones. The analysis concludes that while the humanitarian situation in Gaza is severe, the specific classification of genocide requires careful consideration of intent, patterns of conduct, and the distinction between individual soldier actions and state-level policy decisions.
Deep Dive
Prerequisite Knowledge
- No data available.
Where to go next
- No data available.
Deep Dive
Caller sparks 2 HOUR STRUGGLE SESSION on my Gaza researchAdded:
The IPC thing seems to just come from the 500 number. But the 500 number again is just referring to total number of trucks per working day in peace time.
Not for like aid as in like aid to survive during a war as in like most of it was concrete and building materials and electrical equipment and things like that. So it's a bit disingenuous to look at a humanitarian situation and to use a number of trucks that's dominated by concrete and to say this is what we need. The press would say they would look at the amount of trucks that were going in, whether some days it was like a few hundred or some days it was uh 80 or some days it was even 30 or like 20.
And they would say, oh yeah, this is uh paling in comparison to the 500 that used to go in before the war. And I'm like, well, you're comparing apples to oranges. No, feel like I'm working pretty hard to get good takes on this thing compared to everyone else, but [ __ ] [ __ ] man.
>> Yeah, that I think you I think you do work hard on this stuff. I think um you do a lot of research for your opinions and I see that. Hi. Um so I had called in I think a few days ago about the the beast process substack.
>> Um but I took a I took a few notes on it. Um I was hoping to get your responses to them. I wanted to say um from the start like I I don't know if I gave the wrong impression or something like I respect you and your coverage. I know that you're a very smart person. I know you've read a lot on uh the topic. I'm not trying to imply that your coverage is bad or anything. I wouldn't have been a viewer of yours for I think years if I if I thought that. Um but I found the some of the criticisms in the article, they seem to be substantive. So I wanted to get your responses.
Um I thought it might be nice to like compile some of them. And um yeah, >> to be clear, um you might not think that. The impression I'm getting from that Queen clip is that he's sounding like my coverage is just trash, just like Noah Samson's. Like it seemed like he's almost implying par there.
>> You get that impression or no?
>> I He was way harsher than I think he >> he was [ __ ] molding over. He was way harsher than I think. Yeah, >> he was way harsher than I think was fair. He He tends to do that a lot.
>> Um, he seems to say things and kind of like the >> the most aggressive, most hostile.
>> Not to everyone though, right?
>> Um, well, I've been in VCs with him where they'll just be like I've called into a stream before and he was doing that to me. I think it's just the way he is.
>> Having gone through that argument about plausibility, uh, what does plausibility mean to you? like what what you've come like you I guess you've read this uh full response to my claims. You've heard my claims. You've heard me looking at the claims today.
>> What does plausibility actually mean?
Um my understanding of plausibility um is that it's referring to my understanding of plausibility from um reading the subsec was referring to like the asserting the rights that the Palestinians have a particular right under the genocide convention to be or that the Palestinians would be a group um that the rights would apply to under the genocide convention. to look like that the Palestinians as a group would have a right to be protected by this convention is my understanding and I saw that there was also there's some other legal stuff that I'm confused about um at the case that uh the article talks about like reasonable prospect of success standard >> that that's a standard that they evaluate and I saw that the substack was talking about how Israel's defense in the ICJ case against South Africa, they were also applying this u reasonable prospect of success standard like they were considering particular merits. Um I saw that you were watching a clip earlier where I think you were um given what I think is the correct interpretation.
Um, and you're right, like it's it seems like a very confusing concept and other people have had it egregiously wrong, including >> U Finkelestein, Noah Samson, >> the entire Western media. Um it does because it seems to me that like even what you said reasonable chance of success >> that doesn't even seem to >> to gel with just previous ICJ uh case law because it seems like there have been at least three cases since 2020 where they've actually uh gone in favor with provisional measures and the rights to be plausible but then uh gone back on it for like just like like a very simple like jurisdiction thing only a little bit later and just um and like basically been the case. So, um if it seems to be if it's happened because there aren't that many ICG cases and if it's happened three times like that um with different cases in just a few years out of not many I think they've only had like eight like maybe a dozen have reached that stage anyway or less. Yeah, it doesn't Yeah, I don't even know what they mean by that. But it seems like what's happening here is that even um and I think Beast Press has told me this as well is he believes that even some of the judges are confused about what plausible means >> because they don't seem to have a very strict definition of it. Yeah, I saw you were talking about um you were talking about the judge >> Noli >> and that you were getting your um interpretation from his writing. I know the article talks >> his writing just suggests to me that like it completely rules out the idea that like to vote for those those provisional measures and to vote for that um finding that you don't need to believe it's even plausible that Israel was currently committing genocide at that time because he didn't believe that. He didn't even believe it was plausible that their campaign was was genocidal. Um, but he still voted for everything. So, it does seem to rule that one out unless he is just wrong about the law. Like, he could be a judge that's like not just wrong about the the case, but just wrong about actually what he's required to do, which would be odd because no one I don't think anyone complained to him about that. Um there's also um Bandari because it his interpretation just seems to be um he basically said that um what was it paragraph 9 he said at this point uh yeah he said again the court is not at this point deciding whether in fact such intent existed or exists. All it is deciding is whether rights under the genocide convention are plausible. Here the widespread nature of the military campaign in Gaza as well as the loss of life, injury, destruction, humanitarian needs following from it, much of which is a matter of public record, are by themselves capable of supporting a plausibility finding. So by his interpretation it seems to be because a war is happening to a particular to a particular of a particular scale is particularly widespread and is a particular level of uh death injury and destruction which I think at that point was about 25,000 killed that alone was enough for him to be which seems to be quite a lot of wars would reach plausibility by that standard.
Um, >> so again, but that's that's very different from N's interpretation of the plausible thing because he didn't even believe that the the campaign itself was plausibly genocidal at that point.
Yeah, I'm I'm looking at the article for where it uh because he has like a section on multi um the article is saying that you in in like an earlier clip which I think you've since corrected um well he he talks about a much bunch, but that wasn't uh what I was looking to get into. I don't think it's a super relevant criticism.
>> Okay.
>> Um so I'm I'm fine with just moving on from that one.
>> Sure.
>> Um and yeah, like like you said, everybody in the Western media was getting that wrong, including people like Finkelstein and Noah Samson who read it egregiously wrong.
There's another thing that beast was writing about where he's talking about state responsibility and he cites a clip where you were talking about state responsibility and you were saying that I think there needs to be a level of command either from a state or military.
>> Mhm. that you said, "I don't think I've ever seen a genocide where it's just troops disobeying orders."
Also said, "There are definitely things related to the convention in terms of incitement and not being enforced."
>> Yeah.
>> The author cites Bosnia v. Serbia from the ICJ and says that the conduct of any state organ is to be considered an act of the state under international law. And an organ would just be any person or entity that exercises state authority and government functions. whatever position it holds in the organization of the state and any of their actions would give rise to the responsibility of the state.
Um so essentially my understanding of that is that about Israel if some organ of the state have committed a wrongful act of genocide it leads to liability on the part of Israel.
Um, >> when you say organ of the state, do you mean like the military or do you mean people in the military like or >> Well, it says like anybody at any level I'll try to find the exact language.
Sorry, just give me a second here.
Uh there we go. One of the cornerstones of the law of state responsibility that the conduct of any state organ is to be considered an act of the state under international law and therefore gives rise to the responsibility of the state if it constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the state.
An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the state. And that status is um any state organ shall be considered an act of that state under international or sorry I'll start over. The conducts of any state organ shall be considered an act of that state under international law whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions. whatever position it holds in the organization of the state and whatever its character as an organ of the central government or of a territorial unit of the states.
>> Okay. So when that says a person the conduct of a person right that was part that was that first part of that sentence. Uh yeah, like any individual >> if one soldier or a sergeant goes nuts and just like massacres a family of 20 people because he wants to he thinks Palestinians should are like a scourge of the earth or whatever. Um that would be sufficient to argue that because that soldier committed that crime that means Israel, the state of Israel is guilty of genocide or is culpable for genocide.
Um, so it would be that Israel would then have a positive responsibility to indict and charge this person under like their law and to hold this person accountable under I think international law standards and if they if they are like if Israel is if the or whatever hypothetical country is aware of that individual's conduct who was acting under their official capac capacity as an organ of the state if they were aware of their contact that they then have a positive responsibility to prosecute that person. Um, this is actually a a criticism that I would have of the article that it doesn't mention um that there is a >> No, no, wait. Sorry, just to clarify.
So, first of all, for the [ __ ] [ __ ] in chat, no, not that commander. I said a person. So to coming to you, the question was if a soldier commits uh like a carries out a massacre of 20 people in Gaza of like a family of 20 that are unarmed and everything else.
Um >> does that mean that the state of Israel has committed genocide?
>> Um it would be an individual act of genocide for which the state of Israel would be liable. So they could so they would then be required under international law to prosecute that person is my understanding.
>> What if they what if they um prosecute the person but they don't prosecute them for genocide?
What if they say this person committed a massacre or this person uh violated IDF conduct?
>> That one I'm not sure about. I don't know.
>> Okay. Um >> um and this is actually a >> that's why I'm curious because like when it comes here like this is there's like the paragraph that I was looking at underneath what you said. It says um so I hope it's clear where Lonox got the issue wrong here and more importantly how this makes his assertion that Israel is not committing genocide much more difficult to sustain. So my that Israel is not committing genocide. Okay. Not only does Lernbox have to rebut arguments that the highest officials of Israel have genocidal intent, but he also has to rebut all cases where someone shows an IDF soldier committed genocide. For Israel to have not committed genocide, literally every single IDF soldier has to have never interalia killed Gazans, seriously harmed them mentally or physically or deliberately, inflicted upon them conditions of life calculated to bring about their distinction.
Uh I think that means destruction with the intent Oh yeah. uh with the intent to destroy Gazins.
>> Yeah.
>> I would So to say that Israel hasn't committed genocide, I'd say that every single soldier has never done this. You think that's like a is that usually so is that usually how you would understand genocide to be?
>> Um well, no. I this is I was trying to say this is one of the criticisms I have of the substack that it presents that there is this um um like people acting under the authority of the IDF under an official capacity if they are committing acts of genocide that gives rise to a responsibil a positive responsibility of the state to prosecute them >> but that's not what the um that's not what the subsack is saying is it the substack is saying that >> no that's not what that's not the substack doesn't mention that the subsc never mentions that.
>> Okay. So the subst is saying that for Israel to have not committed. So basically for me to say that Israel has not the state of Israel is not guilty of genocide. I have to show that every single IDF soldier has not committed an act of genocide. Even if it's like a if they have with the intent because that's the main thing killed like five people like if they just massacre five people because they hate Palestinians and they want them gone in part. That's what the article seems to be saying. I think it's >> uh that's but the thing is like to me that's just not how that's just not a serious claim, >> is it?
>> Um well, isn't it the case that in Serban um the conviction of genocide was based on the failure of the state to prosecute the people who carried out the massacres. Um, the people who carried out the massacres were the ones who were found guilty of genocide, weren't they?
Madic and Christ.
>> Uh, I think so.
>> So, the failure of the state to prosecute um I mean you've talking about Melvich, but again, he wasn't tried because he died, right?
>> But they they were Yeah, but I think people were being charged in international courts, right?
Um you can show me if you want uh about exactly what the argument was there like the ICJ or the ICC because the ICC was what charged the individuals.
>> Yeah.
>> Um so who was convicted? I I know that Christ and Ladish were convicted um of genocide.
Um were there other ones because I thought those two guys were the ones who were basically like commanding the soldiers that that did the acts. I think that's where these were in this was in the ICC.
>> Uh yeah, so there were the army officers. I think there was also the president of Republic of Serpska. Um but was he >> Yeah, he was jailed for genocide. Yeah.
>> As in not the Serbs, but yeah, Republic of Serbska.
Yeah, that's it.
>> Okay. Um, >> but that's not the claim that's being made in the substack, right?
>> Yeah. So, I the substack doesn't mention like the posit.
>> We're not even talking about commanders or uh general majors or wherever else these people were. Um, yeah, we're talking about individual soldiers.
>> Yeah. like in just an individual doing an individual thing that um so I think it's um it's an inaccurate statement to say that uh you would have to rebut every single case of an IDF's individual or anybody affiliated with the government uh killing gins seriously harming them mentally or physically whatever whatn not Um um okay.
So my Okay, [ __ ] me. My problem with this particular claim is more that like you would struggle to fight any war where someone's not where you have an individual soldier who's done things or behaved in ways that would uh that you could get into a threshold for genocidal intent. Um >> yeah but but but there would be that positive obligation for the state to prosecute the people for those acts.
>> Yeah. So wars where people don't get prosecuted which again as far as I know seems to happen like all the time >> I think even well even America has that problem where soldiers and America tends to actually get fairly long sentences to to soldiers compared to lots of other countries but even in their cases like sometime even sometimes you've had pardons but even some but other times people just aren't nothing happens to them or it's like like again I guess another question would be like okay if the state just like demotes them or like removes them from a post or because that happens as well. I was like, "Okay, well, like how much they have to punish them?" But yeah, like >> Yeah. And I've seen you talk about this um on stream, like failures to failures of certain states to prosecute individuals for acts like this.
>> Yeah. But then there's also maybe a pattern. So what if like uh you get a situation where because I I know that like at least the Israeli government have since the beginning claimed to have arrested people uh and prosecuted people who they believed were uh inciting genocide like members of the public. Uh I know that so soldiers have already been demoted or removed or they get their py they get their pathy albeit still you know military court sentence like they they get something but then I would wonder like what if they prosecute some but then with other ones they uh they don't uh because they they they believe a certain like a different version of the story or something like that like but yeah again like if you if if we're talking about this like I think ever since October 8th or something I think I said in terms of genocide or what I would predict happening I was quite clear at the beginning like I wouldn't be surprised if you know the line of similar war where like a family surrenders but then they walk out the door and then a guy just guns them down anyway and 20 of them die completely innocent and nothing or there's like an air strike where they know that there hasn't been an evacuation but some uh commander who's authorizing the strike just kind of says yes anyway because he's want he wants to take revenge or some [ __ ] like that like I wouldn't be surprised if there were at least like 30 or 40 of those that just came out like at the end of the war. That's that that was my take on October 7th or 8th, 2023.
Um, as far as I know, that's materialized a few times like stories like that. Um, more of them a lot more of them have been the murder of like individuals like one or two people just get shot after surrendering. Um uh but but yeah, like I would never in any world say that like even what if the soldier had a particular intent like that that would mean that Israel committed genocide because then at that point every country that's gone to war has probably um there's the so again like if if so if we have those individuals during the war committing these acts that would the violations of the genocide convention is the individual responsibility to not do that. If that responsibility fails, it would go to next in command and that would continue up until we reach the level of national responsibility where the state would have a responsibility as I understand it to prosecute those individuals. Mhm.
>> Um yeah and the article the subsect doesn't mention that.
>> Okay.
Um is there so coming back to the initial issue? What am I wrong about here?
the initial um actually he posts he gives links to clips and stuff but the initial thing there was a clip that he was citing where you said I think there needs to be a level of command either from a state or military >> I don't think I've ever seen a genocide where it's just troops disobeying orders >> y >> there are definitely things related to the convention in terms of incitement and not being enforced. So I think he's saying that um in this case if you have like it doesn't have to be the genocide doesn't have to be a top down order. It can come from individuals who aren't being prosecuted.
>> Okay. Uh and I'm guessing when I say I don't think there's been a genocide where uh where it's just been individuals committing crimes like is there an exception to that? Because Bosnia was, as far as I remember, that was uh the head of the Republic of Serbs military who was he was in control of the of the of the military in that area >> when he was doing that.
>> Yeah.
>> So that was quite top down, I would say.
Yeah. That was a guy in a position of >> quite a lot of power.
>> But I think um if the state had prosecuted him for those acts, he would have still been guilty of genocide. But I think the state wouldn't be I'm not sure about that.
>> Well, in in the case of the ICC, it would be the individual who was the leader of the Republic of Serco, which was um uh Karich, I think, Ravan Karzich.
>> Yeah, sounds right.
>> Um but I don't actually know what his particular action or like culpability was described as. I don't really know why they convicted him. I whether it was because of like encouragement or because of turning a blind eye or because of rhetoric.
>> I think it is the blind eye thing. I think it is just the positive responsibility.
>> I'm just Yeah, just uh because I'd like to see that >> like something for the positive responsibility >> because he was also convicted of war crimes, crimes against humanity.
Um, something I have a link here because the ICTY should just have their thing up or or maybe something in the Substack has it because that would be an example of like negligence being because again I think even to as far as I know if you're going to convict someone of like the the responsibility or state responsibility would it not would would that mean that you don't have to have the dop specialist. Like if you're just like the head of a say if I'm like the head of a country and the a commander in my military commits genocide but I'm just kind of like well yeah but you know it's going to take I'm a bit too lazy to convict them. Too much resources. Not that I have genocidal intent but just like negligence. Would that still get me a conviction?
>> That I don't know. I've only done a bit of reading on this. Um, I think the answer would be yes, I think. Um, but I have um I'll send it to you >> because I'm looking at the ICTY page here and maybe this is a bad press release, but they're saying for um Karzich, who is actually the uh political leader, he was, wasn't he?
Ratavan, he was he was the president of Republica. Yeah. Um they're saying that he was individually responsible for planning, instigation, ordering, or otherwise aiding in abetting in the planning, preparation, or execution of the crimes.
Um be interested to see what this guy was actually doing because I have a feeling he wasn't just turning a blind eye. Uh but we might be wrong. Let's see.
>> I sent you something from um un.org or office of the on genocide prevention and the responsibility to protect talks about states obligations.
>> Oh yeah, I'm aware of this. Yeah, this is like the obligation to prosecute genocide and all this [ __ ] Prevent punish. Yeah.
>> What did because this guy would probably be the best example of someone who wasn't who was a political leader, not a military guy. But um Oh, is it this? Let me see.
You forget how to spell this guy's [ __ ] name, dude.
I very >> But I mean, I'm pretty sure that like with from my discussions with Beast Bros, it sounds like a lot of his argument is also hinging on stuff like that that on things that are technically possible within the con convention but have not been practiced in case law because there isn't that much genocide case law, right? That's what I would that's why I kind of thought he was going for a lot of it. like yes like these things matter like scale matters or um like I guess with how much zeal you commit it with matters but it's not necessary like you don't have to do it in the most efficient or most zealous or most uh aggressive way but obviously saying that you don't have to do it in the perfect way uh can leave a lot of scope for like well how imperfect or how much does it not have to look like one for it to not be one.
Uh yeah.
Yeah.
So is that one of the points because you me you mentioned when I called in before that you felt like he was um I guess bypassing some of your counterarguments.
>> Um yeah I mean particularly because I said one of my strongest because most of my arguments against this whole like accusation are more to do with like the the allegation of the facts. like I think the merits of the facts presented by people who don't who think it's who call it genocide are just not factually accurate um or just they're ignoring certain facts. So one I think probably the strongest one that I think was ignored by that wasn't mentioned in this article for which I don't think was for a very good reason is that um we still don't know how many what proportion of those 72,000 killed are militants. We still don't know. We only know the number that is basically uh in so far as Hamas is willing to show us, right, to to admit their losses. Um, and I'm just wondering why people are making judgments like in human rights organizations and all that are making judgments like this when they don't even know the proportion of people killed, especially if they're going to judge the overall campaign. Like these are like when people say Israel is committing genocide in Gaza, you'd agree that most of them are saying that like the overall campaign in Gaza is one of genocide, right? like that's that's kind of the vibe you get online or >> or a lot of people.
>> Yeah.
>> Okay. So if that's the case, >> he mention >> he talked about that point in the article spec.
Um, I didn't find his argumentation against that point >> because because my argument to be clear that that got ignored specifically was that when I look at previous conflicts, there's this trend where Israel bombs a bunch of places in Gaza, bunch of people die, and then the assumption, the immediate assumption from human rights orgs, the media, uh, and even from within Gaza is that these are civilians.
These are mostly civilians. There's not much evidence that there were soldiers here. They bombed a police station, a hospital or a [ __ ] school or something like that, right? And then all this press goes out and you know people like Goldstone will say that they targeted civilians or will very strongly imply it that the strikes couldn't be proportionate because there's these police institutions were all civilian or whatever. But then one or two years later after the dust has settled then Hamas has to do the internal political conflict by proving themselves and telling their citizens that they were the ones fighting for freedom and everything. and then they will admit their losses and they'll publish them.
And it turns out that most times Hamas's numbers that they admit to are about the same as what the IDF says. So if that pattern holds today, that would mean out of those 72,000 that what between 20 and 25,000 who died were militants. That's like the IDF's number right now. But then that would mean like what are we talking there? Like one like just under like one to two and a half or one to three almost. But an overall campaign of genocide, you're not how are you killing one militant for three civilians? That that sounds like you were trying to target the militants and were either faced with the challenge of just militants being too embedded in civilians or my position which is that you could have mitigated civilian harm or you could have raised the standard for collateral damage but you didn't as in like you were willing to accept a higher rate of collateral damage than you usually would or than most NATO militaries usually would to kill the militants. But neither of these allegations are genocide. One of them is a level of criminality, but not.
But I'm I'm just wondering why my research on like cast light and uh those previous conflicts and showing how Hamas obscures their losses was never acknowledged. Um >> yeah. Um >> that annoyed me.
>> He talks about it. There's if you want to respond to the article, he he gives he has a section defenses. He has a quote not enough people have died. And he gives his responses to what you just said. I don't find his um >> not enough people have died. That's not exactly what I was saying, but okay.
Yeah.
>> No, but well, it's it's um I guess it's his general like summation of it. Um >> wait, >> I didn't find this. I think I have read that part actually if it's what you're referring to. Is this the efficiency argument?
>> Um what's the one where it's like there's a big header defenses?
>> Yeah. From here, let's discuss some of the proposed >> not enough people have died. Um, yeah, the bombing thing like with their firepower, the fact that they've dropped more tons of bombs than civilian than the number of people who have died, that whole thing.
>> Um, yeah, I think so.
>> Yeah. So, when I look at the air campaign, you see like however many tons of bombs they've dropped, it's more than 72,000 tons of bombs, isn't like so they've um they've dropped more tons of bombs than the number of people who have died. And also with all the like phone calls and text messages and evacuations that they've done like as in telling people to leave a building before they strike it. To me this all looks like not genocide, right? This looks like you're trying to get civilians out of the way before you strike a target. It sounds like whatever you are targeting, it's not just the general population um for its own sake.
>> And then the response I see is this paragraph as well. The ICT held that although the cardinal question is whether the intent to commit genocide existed, that quote, "The offense of genocide does not require proof that the perpetrator chose the most efficient method to accomplish his objective of destroying that targeted part, even where the method selected will not implement the perpetrator's intent to the fullest, leaving that destruction incomplete. This ineffectiveness alone does not preclude a fighting a finding of genocidal intent. So, could Israel have hypothetically killed more people or more efficiently? Yes, probably. But this isn't a test at all. Um, let me ask you, what do you think I would respond to that paragraph with?
Um, I think it would Well, I I I think it would depend on looking through all of these instances of bombing and looking for instances where they were deliberately targeting civilians.
>> No, it's more simple than that. It's way more simple than that. We're talking about the overall campaign here, right?
>> Um, >> when I talk about you, Israel's firepower 50, this is the overall campaign, not like an individual act or a commander or whatever. This is the overall campaign >> based on the information we have now.
>> Okay. So, my argument being summarized here is me saying that they are dropping more tons of bombs than the number of people who have died. Okay? They are evacuating people and telling people to get out of buildings and get out of areas before they bomb them. Uh this does not seem like something that you would do if your target was the people, the general population overall. Um this seems like you're targeting something either military infrastructure or militant uh individuals. And the response I'm getting to that argument is um while they don't need to do it in the most efficient way, what do you think I would what do you think my counter to that would be? I think it's kind of obvious.
Your counter to that was that you were saying was that you were saying that they are bending over backwards to try to avoid um or to try to limit as much as they can damage to >> Yeah. So I'm not saying that they're not doing it in the most efficient way.
Therefore, I would never make that argument actually because don't I like don't I tend to talk about like the Einstein and how like the the Holocaust was initially not the most efficient way. It literally they changed it because it was not No, what I would say to that is like that's we're skipping a part there like just I'm not saying it's not done in the most efficient way. I'm saying I'm saying that it's being done in such a ridiculously inefficient way if this was their intent. If their intent was to kill the general population of like Palestinians in Gaza, like if that was like their main their special intent was to kill Palestinians and they're literally doing it in the most expensive like or in like the least efficient as in it just it gets to a point where it's so inefficient that it just looks like the goal is something else.
>> But I'm not saying >> just because it's not the most efficient way. And I think writing that off like oh well it's just because this and I don't even know maybe he does say this although I wasn't sure if I got this answer is he suggesting that the air campaign in general was just an inefficient genocide as in like they're doing this stuff but they're bombing and they're evacuating and they're dropping more tons of bombs than the number of people that died that this is all just inefficient targeting of people.
Do you think that would be reasonable?
>> I think he's saying that it doesn't necessarily preclude genocidal intent.
>> Yeah. But I'm not saying the lack of maximum efficiency is what precludes it.
I'm saying that the point of it that I'm saying that the degree to which it is inefficient for the goal of killing is >> is basically putting genocide like out of the realm of reasonable inferences.
>> Yeah, I see what you're saying. And this um this argument that he's making here I don't personally find compelling.
>> Okay.
>> Wait, wasn't this the bit that you brought up defenses?
>> No.
>> Okay.
>> I mentioned I think you had brought something up about this and then I pointed you to this section if you wanted to respond to it.
>> Right. Well, I remember this bit. Yeah.
To me, again, that's just like I don't even know what what is being claimed here because it's like there Yeah, I just I don't know why you would draw that in that that inference from me saying that. Like that's not me saying it's not maximum efficiency. I'm saying that it's like it is so different to what things would look like if this was actually your intent that it it just it it pushes it to me completely out of the realm of reasonable inference.
>> But I I don't know why that's being missed. I think that should be quite obvious.
>> Okay. Well, I I'm glad we have a response to that.
>> Okay.
>> Okay. What was So, what are the ones that you do find convincing then?
Because there's a couple here that you don't.
>> Um >> well, there I have a bunch of notes on it. I can So, I found the the state responsibility one. We talked about that.
Uh, the author talks, the author shows a clip of you saying that we should only or implying a clip of you implying that we should only consider statements by members of the war cabinets or consider official government policies.
I think there's a quote here to prove genocide because you'd still have to show the connection between that and the policy.
Uh where is this?
>> So this is um the war cabinet argument part two.
How old is this clip? Let me see. Har minister Israel must find ways for the gazins that are more painful than death.
They're shaping policy. They need to prove their point. saying those things in their position shouldn't be written off because they're not in the war cabinet because it can communicate understanding down to the soldiers and down to the army. It can communicate understanding of what's acceptable and what's not. That would be enough to prove genocide. It would be enough to maybe prove war crimes happening against humanity, but it would be enough to prove genocide because you have to show the connection between that and the policy. Again, this is like if the claim is that the overall war campaign is the one of genocide, then yes, that I completely stand by that. But I'm guessing this is going to be this isn't an argument against the idea of like no genocide being committed at all by anyone or no genocidal acts being committed. Um yeah, I think I think what he's saying here is that we have to go on uh the author sites ICTR I think is the Rwanda International Criminal Tribunal saying that utterances as well as utterances by other individuals >> Mhm. under direction before, during, and after the massacres also demonstrate the existence of this specific intent.
Um, and the author is >> wait, isn't this sorry, this is later in the this is me talking about the um South Africa submission, isn't it?
>> I don't know the context of this clip.
>> This is appropriate place in the video to discuss the war cabinet argument. Uh, we should not consider. Well, I didn't say we shouldn't consider, but okay. Um, responding to South Africa's submission, let me see. Um, the first submission is it even still?
Yeah, the 84 page thingy aware of their responsibility again. Yeah, because it sounds like from the way that South Africa is uh wording this is like it does seem like they are accusing the state itself of it. um which would imply the war admit's responsibility because they're the ones who are like in charge of the military that's carrying out the acts. Um but again, if you want to say that like I'm pretty again, maybe I'd have to look back at older things that I've said, but I don't think I've ever um I don't think I've ever made the statement that like someone like Ben Gavier shouldn't be considered. Like he is still in the government, he still makes statements. Um >> yeah, >> but if if we get to a stage where the genocide claim is literally like Ben Gavir in made like because this is a scenario that I think is quite reasonable, right? Ben Gavir made incendiary statements because he has a uh special intent to destroy Palestines in Holler in part and he um makes these statements and those statements filter down to the military and the military has had instances where soldiers have acted uh on these statements from Bengavir. They've massacred Palestinians and they've had that intent as well. And uh the government has in the whole time not prosecuted or not reprimanded Bengavir in any way for these statements and that would be that there's like a there's an invocation of the genocide convention there against like Benavir and the soldiers who followed in his words like I could imagine that scenario being like a finding from the ICJ. Two problems. one. I've never seen a genocide that would be to to my knowledge there's no genocide case where it's ever been determined on that kind of connection with Republic of Serka. It was like the president of Republic of Serbska and the generals who were convicted were the people who were actually like in charge of the military. So that would be a war cabinet argument like through and through. Um, so yeah, like if they and if they did that and if that was like their finding and that's how they showed genocide, like I don't even know if I would disagree with like that connection being made. But that's just not anyone's understanding like or like in practice of what genocide actually is or what they're saying. And I think you know full well that's not what people are saying when they say Israel's committing genocide.
>> Yeah. I think for a lot of people when they're saying Israel is committing genocide, they're saying that or they're believing or they're implying that it's like a top- down ordered thing by Netanyahu himself that he's imparting into the minds of all the IDF, all the individuals in the IDF, I think is how people conceptualize it.
Um, but I think the article was arguing that we could find like that because the state because the these individuals within the government are all organs of the state and that they are expressing um what the author considers to be genocidal intent that we can then assign responsibility to Israel to prosecute these individuals.
Um but are you saying then >> but then what I'm saying is that if you apply this logic then you're broadening the genocide convention to involve so many things that we have never considered genocide in the past. Like you know that when America went to Iraq, right, we had generals who were like, "Yeah, these like these sandward words that are going to they're about to face the wrath of God and that all they understand is force." And we're going to show them exactly what like we've had this kind of rhetoric. And not to mention every other Arab leader in a war against Israel will talk like this, right? Um throughout ever since the 48 war, and these are just the ones that I know about off the top of my head, or let alone even some of the rhetoric with Trump, right? some of the stuff Trump said with with regards to Iran, but like when we say a state has committed genocide, like a country is guilty of genocide in this particular or this was a genocidal war, this is usually not what we're referring to when because >> yeah, >> that's just breaking a lot of uh like common practice even if it is theoretically possible uh by the wording of the law.
>> Yeah. Um so I guess colloquially colloquially that wouldn't um fit a lot of people's conception.
>> Well, apparently by the courts as well, right? Because the ICC and they like it seems that or even in previous cases with the ICJ, it's like they haven't prosecuted cases yet in this way, have they?
>> Yeah, I think I saw I read something that was talking about how the South Africa case was an interesting precedent because it kind of added another layer of potential responsibility to the genocide convention that there is um an international responsibility for other countries to um to charge that country if they are failing to uphold their responsibilities.
>> Yeah. And then we get into a situation so like what like other countries are stepping in to charge like a country like Israel because uh cabinet members or even if they are war cabinet members like said because some of the war cabinet members said some crazy [ __ ] uh gallant was in the war cabinet when he spoke about human animals and no electricity, food or water. Um but then like so that means like other countries would be obligated to step in because he said that and didn't get like prosecuted. Like to me, you're you're broadening the the practice of the genocide convention in a way that would just implicate like it would it would implicate so many different countries and so many different conflicts and it would also implicate uh so many different countries like getting involved with others in the in uh and moving against them in a way that they normally wouldn't. Um not to mention however many politicians said no food, no water, they did they didn't they didn't do this though, right? There was food and water and fuel throughout the war, but and the one time where they stopped it for 3 months was after um a several month period of stockpiling it in large numbers.
So >> yeah, but there was also um I forget the the name of the organization, but they declared like stage five famine at one point.
>> Yeah, they did. But they were wrong. We can go into that as well if you want. Um >> they were wrong by their own standards, by the way. I'm just saying by their own standards they were wrong.
Okay. I hadn't uh I hadn't seen that.
>> Okay. So, it's August 2025, right? Okay.
>> So, um >> first of all, by their So, I'm guessing you accept by the I by the IPC standards when they apply these phases. There's like three things that uh necessarily have to be there. There's one which is like a it's like the arm circumference and then there's like a malnutrition level that they calculate and then there's also the number of deaths per 10,000. So, it's like two to four deaths per 10,000 for famine, right?
>> Yeah.
>> Any issue with that? Okay. Okay. Um and if I can find the um there's two there's the 59 page report, but there's also the shorter one that has the infographic on it. Um IPC famine August 2025 snapshot.
Was that the one?
Was this from August? Yes, I think it was because published in August, but it's referring to July, June.
Okay. And here. Okay.
So, this is the report where they uh broke a bit of ground because they hadn't been using the famine designation until this point, right? I don't know if you can see my screen or you want me to share it.
>> Um, well, I'm watching your stream. No, >> it's behind. It's [ __ ] useless. I'll share it here. Okay. Okay.
So, who's this?
Someone with no mic. Okay. Um, this is from 22nd of August.
You go down here. This is where they're saying the famine is a stage five, right? They're saying uh Gaza total population 937,000 phase 5 281,281.
These are the ones who are in phase five famine, right?
>> Mhm.
>> Okay. This is a um current period. This is not a projection. This is them saying this is currently happening, right?
>> Yeah.
>> And the stage five phase is classified when an area has the following. 20% of households facing an extreme lack of food, 30% of children suffering from acute and malnutrition, and two to four deaths from non-trauma every 10,000 each day. Okay.
Y so for this to be true between the 1st of July and 15th of August 45day period there would need to have been two between minimum two deaths per 10,000 from non-trauma every day right?
>> Um yes >> okay it's about 45 days right?
Yeah, I think so.
>> Okay. So, I'm guessing if my math isn't totally [ __ ] then 210,000 for 281,281 is about 28, right? Be 28 per day.
>> I I guess so. Yeah.
>> Times 45 um 1260.
So, for this designation to have been correct in this period, you'd have seen,60 non-trauma deaths.
in 45 days, right?
Um 1,260 is higher than the number of people who the health ministry have claimed died of malnutrition, famine, whatever, uh in the entire war. I don't even think they're at 500 yet for the entire conflict. And that's the health ministry.
Mhm.
>> So, so no, it wasn't easily hit unless you believe some, unless someone other than the health ministry is given that number.
>> Um, well, this is the first I'm seeing that. So, >> yeah. Um, I mean, this happened with because the ICJ made projections where they were predicting stage five all the way throughout 2024 as well, but these numbers just never materialized.
They never materialized.
>> So are they um >> I think I know way >> they were wrong to issue these.
>> Yeah. Yeah. I mean which is also it's it's wrong by their own standards because normally well what they said was and they have justified this in other uh situations where they get because they don't have data. They said they they said that they didn't have data on the non-trauma deaths but they went ahead anyway because the first two numbers here were high enough that it was sufficient to this is like a scientific process like if these two numbers exist these two will be there we'll just find we'll just get confirmation later is basically what they're saying or um like by the time we got these numbers it's already going up and it's indicative that this is threshold has already been crossed like they've done that in the past um but it seems like in the past they are quite stringent with that two to four that two per 10,000 minimum because in Zam Zam in Sudan they um issued a famine declaration when it was uh at 1.9 deaths per 10,000 each day but because the two other numbers were had drastically increased and because of reports they had about the worsening humanitarian situation they were quite confident that it had already gone over two and that's why they're going to issue it as if to suggest that they were um as if to suggest that they were going to be saying less than that before like to to be uh to be not designated because 1.9 was too low or 1.7 or something like that. So they seem to apply a pretty strict standard before but I don't think the IPC since then have actually ever shown this these two deaths per 10,000 in the per day even in this area of Gaza.
>> Those tables on the right there do they show they don't show number of deaths?
No, because they haven't added that.
Normally they would. Normally when they designate uh famine uh or or when they don't, they have numbers of deaths per 10,000. I can find you some examples if you want. Um where's claims here? If there's any claim I'm making that you're skeptical of, by the way, you can just let me know because I should be able to find something.
Uh oh, yeah, this was Yemen.
Remember how many people died of starvation in Yemen? There was like I think 85,000 children under five were estimated to be dying in Yemen.
>> Um >> I remember hearing it was a lot, but the exact numbers.
>> Um they never issued a they never called it famine, the IPC in Yemen >> really.
>> Yep. and they explained why.
Uh, page 11.
Nevertheless, the crude and under five mortality was very low at 0.28 and 1.3 per 10,000 per day, respectively, which is below. So they've got one per 10,000 per day.
>> Mhm.
>> But that's not enough as far as they're concerned.
Um >> have any of their classifications um like their standards for classification changed in this time?
>> No.
>> Or no? No, >> not that I'm aware of. Uh because this is from 2023 2024, isn't it?
Yeah.
Yeah. This is until the end October 2024. It's over a year between the end of 23 and 24.
>> Um I think this was them in Zamzam where they actually found 1.9.
This is from this this is from 2075 I think. Yeah.
Oh, >> was that just 1.9 is the midpoint between 1.9 deaths per 10,000 as in like per day as in this was like just below the threshold. So they say here similarly for non-trauma mortality the CDR the crude death rate was already very close to the famine threshold in January 1.9 deaths per 10,000 per day. Since that time, there has been an increase in the risk factors for non-trauma mortality.
With all these factors contributing to worse situations since January and especially since April May when violence escalated and access routes were largely blocked leading to near collapse of the death of the healthare system, the FRC concludes that mortality has crossed the famine thresholds. So this is them using an older crude death rate of just under the classification, but because they've got new data fulfilling the other two requirements, then they're saying that like it's pretty good reason to believe that the um it's pretty undisputable that the uh mortality will have followed.
>> Yeah, that makes sense. Mhm.
Um if you wanted to look at this the if you went for Gaza like the um a mortality rate of uh like what one per 10,000 even if you just applied that to like under fives five. I think that would that would get you like that would probably uh equal one per 10,000 that would mean like 30 something famine deaths a day just for the under fives in Gaza. she'd be even if it was the just the under in Gaza because usually they're the first ones to they're the most severely hit by famine.
Um if it were half of the the two per 10,000 like if it was just one per 10,000 you'd you'd have seen 12,000 deaths a year across all of Gaza.
>> I see that that makes sense.
>> And the numbers actually where's the um where's the health ministry reports? Um, so is this 1.5 to 2.4 95%. Is that a confidence interval?
>> Oh, what?
>> So I'm reading >> Yes, this should Yeah, that would mean confidence. Yeah. Yeah.
>> Okay. Yeah. See? Yeah. Cuz once Yeah.
>> Um Oh, here. Wait, is it here?
Uh, [ __ ] Where did I put that number? I just had it. Oh, here. This was from September 2025.
Yeah, from September 2025, they said uh 440 were dead from starvation. And I think this is applied to the entire conflict, right? As of September, according to the Ministry of Health in Gaza. So, this is after the report from the Yeah. As of September. Yeah. Yeah. So, this is after the designation from the IPC because the IP wasn't the IPC's claim applying to July to August.
So, even they're not giving numbers that are showing and this is over this is over the entire war from the Ministry of Health, the government office.
>> They were designating that specific window, right? They were designating the window from just July to August, but this is the health ministry saying the entire war.
>> Do we know does the report give numbers for how many people died during that specific period?
>> No, not that I've seen. Oh, maybe they updated it, but not when they wrote the actual report. No, they said that that was missing.
>> Okay, that uh I see what you're saying then.
to clarify as well non-trauma death non-trauma death doesn't you're about to say non-trauma death doesn't just have to be malnutrition starvation it can also be disease from uh from like famine related conditions right >> yeah it's the net difference between expected and so yeah you just cited the malnutrition deaths which are notably low in this case but that's not enough to make the determination >> what do you mean that's not enough to make the determination >> well if if it's supposed to be two per 10,000 per day non-trauma and I believe that you just cited deaths by malnutrition in the numbers in that period as your like evidence against the two per 10,000.
>> Oh, so you're saying that the health ministry might have somewhere a much higher number of people who died of disease and sickness related to the >> Yes. related to nutrition exacerbated in a famine.
>> It would be related to but the cause of death would still be sickness rather than just discreet malnutrition.
>> Has the health ministry said that?
Because if they if they know if the health ministry knows that like famine is a big claim, would it not be in their interest to show that?
>> It would be. I remember seeing some articles where I couldn't track down like particularly good evidence where they said that there was a massive spike in um obviously deaths via this type of sickness and due to increased transmission. Nothing that would be able to get it over the threshold, but some things that were implying it. Not enough that I was able to really pin it down.
But yeah, the claim that people were going around who were a bit more familiar with this idea that we're still arguing for famine in this period was that the sickness deaths were able to get it over that threshold even though the malnutrition deaths weren't. But to be clear, but when they so sorry when the when the health ministry attributes deaths to when they say um >> maybe they don't do it in this one, but I when they say um uh this is they're saying here's numbers that starve to death, but in other reports would they not maybe they changed the language or use it loosely, but when they used to say um deaths from malnutrition or famine, when you say deaths from famine, would that not include diseases? that are related to famine or malnutrition >> is the 2 per 10,000 deaths per famine or non-trauma or like the net increase of non-trauma deaths. Uh what's the language that they use? I thought it was >> No, that's the the IPC is non trauma.
Yeah. But when the health ministry says famine like this many people died from famine, would they not be including? I presumed that they were I presume that they were discussing malnutrition rather than like increased transmission of sickness >> because if you just get like increased transmission of sickness across the board as a result of famine-like conditions and more conditions that are caused by like prolonged acute malnutrition. I presume those would not be attributed as famine deaths but or starvation deaths but still caused by the famine-like conditions.
>> Let me find this particular one.
I don't know how the health ministry does things though.
Can >> I ask a a question? The threshold is two two four deaths, right?
>> Between two and four. Yeah.
>> So the lowest is two.
>> Isn't this their highest classification?
Like why is there an upper limit? Like why is it up to four?
>> Um you know what? I have no idea. Do you know? Maybe it's because of margin of errors and why why would they have an upper limit? should be >> I I have no idea. I'm just I was just asking >> gets past four, then you get uh mega famine.
>> Super.
>> But you can also do this, too.
>> No, that's just regular famine. If you get >> mega Oh, I thought they said you get to make a famine. Oh, okay. I thought you But no mega famine. Okay. [ __ ] >> Yeah, I don't know the answers to that.
>> Are these like strict um strict requirements or are they more like general guidelines?
I can find their guidelines. Hang on.
Given that they were quite hesitant when it came to Yemen, it seems like they're fairly strict. But um you were saying >> No, I was just going to say like it's implied from MUAC to the 2 to 10,000. So like strict is not the sense, but like they have enough reason to believe that one implies the other.
>> That's like where you got the um where the [ __ ] was that sentence?
Um, is that I can't remember what this meant. I'd have to look at this again.
When they talk about like R2 direct evidence or four like three outcomes with R2 direct evidence or four other pieces with R1 plus or minus evidence, at least two of them from the season analysis. Uh, where was that bit? Um, >> also I'm pretty sure the IPC phase 5 wasn't declared across the entire >> No, it wasn't across the entire part of Gaza city. uh governor it right that's why we that's why >> how many people should have been >> it was 281,000 who were in that so 28 per day to get to two and 10 No wait it wouldn't even be 20 that's one in 1000 thousands Jesus it should have been higher would have been so whatever [ __ ] it would have been like 50 no maths why can't I figure out 28* 2 it's just 50 plus 6 56 All right.
It would have been 56 per day for 45 days.
Are are we still here?
>> I'm still here.
>> Okay. Um I just had a thing open >> 500 give or take.
>> Yeah, it would be about that. Yeah.
Do we have any numbers on just general death via sickness in the strip?
>> Um, it depends because >> or just general non-trauma deaths.
>> Um, see, do they call them nonra because I thought the health ministry when they put those 72,000 they're generally saying it's all trauma deaths, aren't they?
72,000 is trauma related deaths. Yeah, I'm pretty sure.
>> Do we have information on the non-trauma deaths?
>> Uh yeah, one second.
I almost uh cited one that was just a prediction from some person. So, okay, that's not right. There's like some projection from like 202 [ __ ] 4 or whatever saying 8,000, but I don't know where they're getting that from. I don't think that, as far as I know, the health ministry only commented the only nonviolent thing they've commented on was this um the only non-trauma thing they've commented on was that um thing we just looked at, which was this one. But the the language changes sometimes. Where was I looking at that?
The language changes because on Another occasion here they were saying where did I put it?
They were saying they were attributing it to malnutrition, starvation and famine or star yeah starvation, malnutrition or famine as in like they separated those three things that here is in the UN.
Yeah, this was on August 15th. This was a year earlier I think.
No. 2025. Okay.
>> Just real quick, >> just so you know why people can join randomly. You're in the waiting room now.
>> I know. That's fine.
>> I'm not worried about it. I forgot about >> Enjoy. Also, this was my talking point, but it made he made it dumb. Anyway, see.
>> Wow. Um, >> he did make it dumb. Okay.
So you by 15th of August 240,000 deaths were reported attributed to starvation, malnutrition or famine. But apparently that's them quoting the health ministry.
But I I I don't know what they mean by starvation, malnutrition, or famine.
Don't know. What's that report link to?
>> IPC 240.
>> Can you drop that?
>> One second. Uh this they're saying it again. Uh where are they linking to? The MO had reports reported 240 deaths that they officially attributed to starvation matters or famine. These deaths had been reported periodically since early 2024, but the reported death rate rapidly accelerated in July 2025, which is consistent with the exponential increase in acute malnutrition that was measured in MUAC screenings, as well as the persistent extreme level of food insecurity and the deteriorated public health situation. As of 15th of August, the 5-day moving average death rate was six deaths a day.
However, the for a number of reasons, these reports are likely to only capture a fraction of the true toll of malnutrition related mortality.
It seems to be that they're taking the other deaths will be cont occurring where malnutrition is a contributing factor but is not reported as the primary cause of death and does not appear in the mah report. This will include deaths where the failure to recover from injury is due to malnutrition but the recorded cause of death is an injury. Anecdotal reports from medical practitioners suggest that this is a common and increasing phenomenon. deaths are occurring at home and may not be captured in official counts that are derived.
>> They're saying that the injury deaths would be considered to be um trauma related.
>> Well, they're saying what they're saying here uh deaths where the failure to recover from injury. Oh, as in like they're injured but they die. Oh, they're injured but they fail to recover because of Okay.
>> Yeah. Would that be classed as a traumat traumatic death and that's the reason why it's not >> that that doesn't go into the IPC's thing? Oh, that doesn't go into the comment thing. That's what the IPC is suggesting, but not the health ministry.
>> Yeah, they're suggesting that might be why it's lower. Um, >> but again, like they're also giving this explanation here, like deaths occurring at home that not be captured in official counts derived from facility records.
But we know that's not true because the health ministry uh family reports are sub like a really large number of their deaths, right? It's not just hospital records or like official facilities.
It's family reports are really common in the health ministry's numbers.
>> Does it take some time for these um like family deaths like deaths in the home to reach >> Yeah. reported >> that's why there's been steady increases since the ceasefire but very small and the same with the last ceasefire as well. It's like the whole thing about them finding supposedly 10,000 people under the rubble. I mean that was the media office that said that not the health ministry. uh the health ministry in 2025 in the January ceasefire pulled out I think about 800 I think um >> what's the implication here that the MUAC is just a bad metric or that the MUAC was just badly sampled in this case >> there's a suggestion that it's badly sampled I haven't looked too far into that although um appar so one of the accusations I'm not too sure about this one is that they over represent presented uh clinic data, which is where you would expect everything to be worse, but they applied it to the general population. That's one accusation. They >> sent out probes into the general public for MUAC, I'm pretty sure. Right.
>> Um you can I can go and look back on it at some point, but um apparently some of what they used as well was um was clinic data, but again that >> it was mostly data, I'm pretty sure. But like they also did like outside clinics like outside um like setting up stations into the more general populace to like avoid that.
>> Yeah. And again like that's so that's so the accusation I heard and didn't look into fully myself was that they said that they had um they basically used clinics in a way that was not like um that contradicted something in their in their manual. But again, I'm not sure if that's the case. My maybe other theory would be that I would not be surprised and again this is like a big claim so I don't know if uh like how strongly I would stick by it but like it could be another um Iraq in the '90s situation with Saddam Hussein.
I don't know if you know about that situation.
>> I've heard you talk about it. Uh who's fudging what where.
>> Um in the case of Iraq, it was like it was just anyone.
>> No, no, no. Here in Gaza.
>> So here that would be the same thing, right? Like because you have to if you're the IPC, part of your methodology involves consulting clinics and also uh consulting uh households. It wouldn't be too surprising if um given that most of these organizations will say that they have to kind of go through the government in some way or the like the government in Gaza has some influence over what's being said. Um it wouldn't be surprising if um there was a like an effort by Hamas to just uh to amplify information in the same way that Saddam's government did >> in terms of like deaths or the house like what's it called the food securities. So I'll give you the example that um when it came to the situation with Saddam, what they did was uh some households had reported uh like they'd reported things as like infant mortality or like like under five mortality which just like wouldn't qualify like so they included like miscarriages and things like that. Um or just people gave numbers that uh couldn't be verified. So when it when the same workers went back to the same households a few years later, the answers were getting they were different or there was clarifications that weren't given the first time. Um and also >> talking about these types of you can't have someone lying about MUIC and so what they would be lying about like the food security like household food security.
>> Um maybe like I >> but like food security like clearly crossed a threshold in the case of a famine, right? like and it was likely under reportported >> food security.
>> I don't think that there's any world >> cross the threshold in the case of a famine where what >> like the three standards there's like HHS whatever it was called that one like I didn't even realize the idea that that was that threshold was not was even in contention >> uh which one for the for the first one for the 20%.
Yeah, the one that's like necessity like um 20% of households facing extreme lack of food is like the big part of it. And I didn't even realize that that was in contention here.
>> Um I I don't know like how do we how do we know it's in contention?
>> This was primarily done by like phone reporting. I I guess if the idea that you could say that maybe HHS wasn't like met in this case, but like uh I guess there's no reason to assume not to. Iraq could be the case for misreporting. Well, if it's from phone reporting again, but that's the it's a similar situation because we know that in other for other situations where um families are asked about people who died and like we know that they kind of have no choice but to say they were an innocent, they were a civilian because Hamas will like [ __ ] them up if they don't.
So, we know that if like again these are but I I can't prove any of this. This is just like what I do know though is that the evidence for this two or four deaths per 10,000 non-trauma has not been demonstrated even though the health ministry would easily have like have very good incentive to it sounds like you're suggesting it's because the health ministry have got like because there are the these missing deaths might be there in the name in the in the way of uh in the way of sickness but for some reason the health ministry just hasn't put that in their numbers when they say these people have died of famine or hunger or malnutrition.
>> Well, yeah, because any non-traumatic death circumstances, attributing it directly to famine might not be like clear or cut. It's not like they starve to death, but like transmission rates goes up in the event of acute malnutrition. So, if this person just has acute malnutrition, but it's not like they're starving to death, but as a result, they contracted something that kills them. They got an infection that they previously would not have. The idea that this wouldn't be like I I I can't say for certain whether or not that was counted. I just heard you say malnutrition deaths and I came in like it's non-trauma.
>> Okay.
>> I honestly have no say whether it's one way or the other. Just that's a necessary correction.
>> Yeah. Okay. So, it could be it could be higher, right? Um I don't really dispute that part. Um that would also mean though that for these IPC reports to all be true for these um because they've done loads of these right where they assess the food insecurity of the population this wasn't the only one um then you would have to then somewhere in Gaza that means that there are like tens of thousands if not over a hundred thousand people have died from uh like non-trauma excess like famine related deaths, but it just hasn't been reported by the health ministry yet.
>> It's just non-trauma. It's like excess non-trauma >> which would be which would according to the IPC's uh assessments if you add them all up would be over 100,000 by now.
>> Yeah, that's a good point. So probably >> so I'm just thinking like yeah how is that even Yeah, >> I guess like >> sorry I just want to uh just something anecdotally with regards to the infection rates and stuff like that like acute malnutrition, you know, take this with a grain of salt because obviously like I live in a first world country. Um, I recently got like blood tests done for my like vitamin levels and my vitamin D and folate levels were quite low, like really quite low. And I have a child, so she goes to a germ factory, which others may call a kindergarten. And I was sick pretty much every second week, if not every week.
Well, I live in a first world country. I can, you know, beat these infections pretty easily. But, uh, yeah, it's like just having like some, uh, vitamin deficiency like already [ __ ] with your immune system pretty [ __ ] hard. So, it wouldn't surprise me that every single [ __ ] person that has acute malnutrition is like actually sick in Gaza. That's just, you know.
Anyways, >> do you think that explains the um the sheer scale of what the IPCU were suggesting has happened?
>> Potentially.
>> Okay.
>> I mean, we won't know until like, you know, after the fact, but uh yeah, >> like we won't know until >> Yeah. Okay. you know, right when everything's counted.
>> Um, are these like Yeah.
>> Yeah. Cuz I took a here I took a >> sense of just general death numbers in terms of like non-trauma.
>> Um, >> is there like a that I know that they use the language of like famine attributable, but like is there just a list of non-traumatic deaths that occurred throughout the course of the war?
>> I haven't seen them. The only thing I've seen from the health ministry is either the the big the 70,000 number and this 500 or 450 number for the for what they claim are the famine deaths. That that's what I've seen.
>> Um I actually added up the IPC assessments here.
>> Um >> crazy low non-trauma number if that was the case.
>> It would be such a like the excess would be like so here in their assessment you're you're looking at um >> I remember someone actually did this, wasn't it? It was those doctors, the um the PALMA doctors, they added it up in the end of 2024 and they're they were already at um like 60,000 just non-trauma like excess deaths. Um so from 2025, which is actually where the the famine declaration came, the that designation arrived, yeah, you would be you'd be looking at like give or take like 100,000 like from November to December 2023, you were suggesting something. They were saying something like what 75 deaths per day or Yeah.
>> Yep. So, I guess you would have to see them if you wanted to.
>> Yeah. I just I just don't know where these where these where they are. And that's a lot of people that go missing >> from a health ministry.
>> Yeah.
>> But you have a fair amount of faith in IPC standards. I understand that they might have like sherked their responsibilities a bit when it comes to the MUAC data, but like what is the discrepancy just due to bias in the MUAC data due to the fact that it was mainly like clinical sampling?
>> I'm not sure about that part. Like the only thing I'm I've I've heard suggestions for that which I've I've already mentioned. Um, but the thing I just can't seem to get my head around is like how their current assessments, not the pro, even if you ignore the projections. Um, their current assessments alone have the would imply that there are just like tens of thousands of deaths that have just kind of gone missing that have not been reported on this whole time.
>> And I just don't know how you explain that.
>> What's implied?
>> Yeah. Yeah. Are they using Are they using confidence intervals in like are they are they >> basing these off >> miscarriages count as like miscarriages still births stuff like that count as deaths >> apparently for a miscarriage? I don't think so. No, because that was the problem with the Saddam claim was that they were reporting under fives. One of them, one of the issues was that they were reporting the deaths of under fives um as because of like the sanctions and malnutrition and famine. Then when they found out that they were actually miscarriages, they were like, "Oh, it's actually not the case." I can find that as well cuz that was actually the same researcher who went back. Um, interestingly, the guy Michael Spagot, I think it's Michael, isn't it? He was one of the people who wrote about this quite extensively, but he was also one of the people who said that the death was one of the ones who pushed the theory that the death toll is much higher in Gaza than we think it is. So even though he was aware of the issue with Saddam's Iraq, he's he's also the one who says that I think his estimates were that um 8,000 non-trauma deaths have happened in Gaza since October 7th. That's his theory. But um that still puts you way below the IPC's project uh their assessments >> unless like 2,500 of those deaths happened like during the GHF period.
>> Um it's not just well it's not just that period though, right? because they were making assessment cuz they weren't making stage five assessments before that or the famine ones but they were making um assessments that would have applied one death per 10,000 per day. So when you add all those up >> I'm just saying though if you have concentrate all of those 8,000 into one little block then maybe you get the famine death maybe if everything else was completely wrong.
>> Yeah. It would mean that their yeah their assessments were wrong about everything apart from the the one where they said famine. Yeah. That would that would >> that that would that happened. Yeah.
which is odd. I don't know.
>> That's my spiel. Nonsense is clearly a foot here. I agree.
>> Okay.
>> What's your story, Tony? Oh, yeah. You too, buddy.
>> I forget how we forget exactly how we got on.
Uh, I don't know >> because I know the article talked a bunch about um inferring genocidal intent from using starvation as a weapon of war.
>> Yeah.
>> But couldn't you also could wouldn't it be possible that they could be using starvation as a weapon of war even if this organization is overestimating the extent of the famine?
Um, it could be, but then again, you get to the situation of like how many other things would have to be kind of like ignored or like it's it's a question of like, okay, it's not maximum efficiency starvation because there were trucks going in almost all the time. Uh, but then it's like how inefficient does it have to be to be a genocide to to not be a genocide anymore? Um, if you're trying to starve a population to death and the best you get in three years or two and a half years is 400 dead and out of two million.
Um I I've always said the best argument would be whatever was going through people's heads at the beginning of the renewal in 2025 when they blocked aid for 3 months. That's probably the best argument where there should be a pretty strong explanation there for why they did that. Um, I think there are other reasonable inferences besides genocide. Um, but still a pretty [ __ ] insane thing to do.
Uh, especially given that their rationals were contradictory, right?
Because they said, "Oh, yeah, well, they've stockpiled six months worth of food because of the c like in the ceasefire in January, there were loads of drugs going in like way above the wartime average." So, they said that they stockpiled six months worth of food, which was probably about true. But then they're also saying, well, Hamas steals all the aid. So it's like, well, if you're stockpiling, then you're also saying it's not getting distributed properly and you're not letting more aid in, then are you not kind of like, yeah, so there should be some there's probably some need for explanation there. There definitely is. Um, I would call it criminal regardless because the people needed food and it could have gone in and they weren't letting it go in. Um but yeah to again like a genocide conviction that looks like that I I that would be a bit that would be diluting to me. That's diluting the term.
>> The article had um some contentions with >> just 3.5% 400 is not 3.5% of seven of 2 million. You [ __ ] [ __ ] Sorry.
Okay. What?
Sorry.
Uh, the article had some contentions with the way you were estimating the amount of required trucks per day.
>> Required trucks per day.
>> Um, is that what you said?
>> Yeah. Like for well for food aid for Israel's responsibility to provide a I'm trying to find the specific thing in the article.
How much do you believe it's specifically not genocide versus just trying to like skirt around the edges of like it being a genocide like intentionally?
Do you think I'm trying to skirt around the edge? Is that what you're saying?
>> No, no, no. I mean, like >> I think at this point it's really far away from >> what? Yeah. Okay. Yeah.
>> This the Israeli government is like >> basically just skirting around the edges.
>> No, I don't think it's going around the edges. No, >> the more I look into it, just like the less I see that to be plausible. Um the more like >> even with the blockades.
>> Yeah. Yeah. Um like again I just don't know like what your like blocking >> I haven't been like I haven't been like uh I've actively avoided anything IP related like in the past I don't know year or so. So I haven't been like keeping that much up to date with it.
So, >> um, >> cuz I still have like a lot of friends that pretty much are entirely convinced like it's genocidal regardless of, you know, what anybody says.
Uh well, yeah, because there's like every uh every authority that you would expect to have authority on these issues is kind of saying that, but um and most people aren't going to actually look into the details of what they're saying and assess and look at footnotes and look at where they got this information from or what is this actually saying and does this add up or or looking at how it compares to past conflicts. Yeah, no one's doing that.
Why would you? Waste of time.
Anyway, Tony, what are you saying? Have you found your thing?
>> Um, yeah, the article has a big section talks about Israel's use of starvation as a weapon of war.
>> Mhm.
>> And it takes contention. This is it's kind of a longer section.
Um, and it goes through a few of your statements.
Uh, sorry, I'm just um reading something right now.
He does not believe that the limitations on trucks entering Gaza is proof of genocidal when you're so and then there's a quote when you're giving sorry when you're claiming that the Israeli government is satisfied or that they want to starve the population.
I feel that needs a bit of substantiation.
So far the number of trucks going in doesn't provide evidence for that at all. I think he takes issue with the way that you were um estimating the amount of trucks going in that would be >> required.
>> Yeah.
>> Um I remember having that conversation with him.
Uh >> yeah. And I I see he um he says he he like in the article he talks about um yeah look here here. Lonabox contrasts this with the number of 500 to 600 trucks entering daily recommended by the WHO and the UN.
I I think his issue was that you said you were comparing pre-war numbers with current numbers and that that wouldn't account for like people being moved around or stores of stuff being destroyed.
>> Absolutely not. There's no [ __ ] way he said that. I don't believe you. I I mean I do. It's just it's just if that's what Let me see. Can Can I see that?
>> If that's what was said, that's just very upsetting to me. Uh because that's just not what I said. That's not what I did. I spent [ __ ] ages trying to find out why.
Whatever. Let me just see what you said before I let me um I'm trying to find that specific part of the As far as I remember, I was inconclusive on how many was needed daily. I had a rough idea but it was about 72 71 72 trucks uh daily for food before the war but domestic production I think according to depending on how you judge it based on value or caloric or whatever uh I think it was like a third was domestic produced which meant that it would probably but then domestic production was largely like things like fruits and things like that that were less calorie calorie efficient so to and then there was all kinds of like people who had done research into what would be needed to fully replace the domestic product, but I don't know the numbers I got were like some were saying uh they needed 80 or 90 trucks a day to replace the domestic product and others were saying 100 110 or I I I thought like a 100 was roughly what I came to but um yeah I don't think I ever gave like a >> and he >> I didn't I heated it.
>> Okay, I did but I didn't give a conclusive calculation in it. I never did that.
I just said, "Here are some ways you could do it. I don't know." And you would probably rather go to the I'm I'm guessing one of those clips is me saying uh you'd rather go above. You'd rather overestimate than underestimate, right?
Is that not what I was always saying about it?
>> Uh I believe so.
>> Yeah.
So I Okay.
Can't believe we're right back to the food trucks discourse.
>> I'm sorry, but if if people still want to defend the [ __ ] 500 truck [ __ ] then you know we will be here forever as long as that still exists.
>> Yeah, this there still the mainstream media still says it. They still say 500 sometimes.
>> He talks about it around there's a thing. Lonerbox contrasts this with the number of 500 to 600 trucks entering daily.
>> That's the start of a par there's a few big paragraphs.
Later on he talks about how you were calculating >> these numbers are not completely fabricated. Okay. Um, in September, uh, Lonerbox looked at the number of tons of food an organization like the World Food Pro program can place on a truck, which he concluded was 18.7 tons.
So, he's looking at your calculations and taking >> Wait. So, wait. 500 versus 150 to 180 fabricate. What? Um, so first of all, they're not fabricate.
They they do come from somewhere like they're just they're just useless.
They're just not accurate to what's needed. Um so the fi if the 180 to 1501 if that's the true one then what's the 500 one?
But um the 150 to 180 one from the IPC we can go into that one as well. And I did I did as much. Let me find it. 151.
>> I'm trying to find where he says that they were um being moved around during the war. So people they would >> Yeah, I know where they got this number from. Um this seems to have come from here if I remember correctly. This was when they were saying um >> this was where the they said the truckloads were 500 and they said around 30% were food per working day. Um so that would be if you calculated that 30% of 500 is 150.
That seems to be where they got 150 from.
The problem is is that the daily trucks first of all was a bit less than 30% and it is just counting working days. Um given during the war they're getting trucks they they weren't just using working days, they were using every day.
>> You would look at their daily requirements.
>> Saturdays.
>> Yeah, even Saturdays, eh? Would you believe it?
So the the part where he mentions people being forced to move um there's a paragraph the paragraph starts with regarding the number of trucks entering Gaza the issue here is the comparison of pre-war aid entering Gaza to the amount of aid entering Gaza after >> I'm sorry this is so [ __ ] >> Is this like something you've done to death?
>> No. No. I'm looking at this quote right now. Um, sorry, I don't have >> this is me talking about the prewar average. This is not me saying how many are required a day during the war for one. Um, yeah, that's just never the pre-war average was 70 food trucks a day. That's just true. Um, that's from the UN's own data. We can even find it if you want.
Um, I really hope that's not what he's saying. Yeah, this is before the war.
Okay. Yeah, before the war, the pre-war average, uh, where are we here? Several hundred a trucks a day is completely fair. That that is just that's true, though. It's just it's that's true. Um, if you read this in the mainstream media, you would think that they needed 500 drugs a day of food.
There's no way people are still defending this, are there? Is there?
What do you think?
Um, I assume I know you've talked about 500 like a lot of these would be a lot of these trucks wouldn't be transporting food. They'd be transporting like other >> like building materials, concrete material larely. Yeah. Yeah.
>> Yeah.
>> Um, >> I can find Oka's um, yeah, the pre-war >> thing. Um, >> you mentioned being frustrated that he mentioned people being like moved around in war.
He said he talks about that.
>> Wait, wait, wait, wait. Just a anchor.
Where are we?
Okay.
When someone when Oka in December 17th says the number of A trucks is well below the daily average of 500 truckloads, including fuel and private sector goods that entered every working day prior to October 7th. or when uh the general secretary says about 500 trucks per day were crossing Gaza before the hostilities began or when the when Reuters said the United Nations has long said that at least 500 trucks a day of aid and commercial goods need to enter Gaza. Uh when who says the target is to get between 5 to 600 trucks in per day over the coming weeks. Uh when CNN says before October 7th, 2033, the daily average was around 500 trucks or 15,000 trucks per month. Um is this useful? Is this useful data or is this accurate data or no? You don't know. What are you stuck? Are you stuck between like are you something pulling you towards yes or towards no?
>> Well, I I I just don't really have a frame of reference to know which number is Okay.
>> The number they need.
>> Should we use UN data?
>> Um from pre-war compared to >> present day the OKA site's not working.
What if I use this uh here? Pre-war according to the UN. So this is from the UN. Overall 106, this is in 2022ish. Uh 106,449 truckloads of imported goods were allowed to enter Gaza through any of the borders. This is about 12% above the 95,335 truckloads that end in 2021.
Slightly higher than the annual average of 106,000 between 2015 and 2021. So between 2015 2021, there's about 106,000 truckloads going in uh over the over the year. Uh and then they say about 25% contained food. So 106,000 >> uh in 2022, 25% contained food. Um, so that would be an average of 292 per day if you discount working days, right?
>> I can bring up the calculator if you want. 106,4.
>> We don't need the >> 291. I round it up to 292.
Okay.
>> Okay.
>> 25% contain food.
Yeah, >> it's about 73 72.9 73.
>> Okay, let me that makes sense.
>> And that's this is un uh there was a data sheet that had this as well, like a like a database that does have all the um that has all the the breakdown of what's in every truck and everything like that and it it'll give you the same number.
Um where the [ __ ] is 500 coming from and why is that a reasonable Um, well, he's saying the author claims that this is the number recommended by the WHO and the UN.
>> Yeah. But even if you look at what they said, they actually didn't >> and 150 to 180 of food trucks per day reported by the IPC.
>> Yeah. Uh and the IPC thing seems to just come from the 500 number. But the 500 number again is just referring to total number of trucks per working day in peace time. Not for like aid as in like aid to survive during a war as in like most of it was concrete and building materials and electrical equipment and things like that. So, um, it's a bit disingenuous to look at a humanitarian situation and to say and to use the and to use a number of trucks that's dominated by concrete and to say this is what we need because that's this is what went into the press. The press would say they would look at the amount of trucks that were going in whether some days it was like a few hundred or some days it was uh 80 or some days it was even 30 or like 20. Uh, and they would say, "Oh, yeah, this is uh paling in comparison to the 500 that used to go in uh before the war." And I'm like, "Well, you're comparing apples to oranges." No.
>> Yeah. Yeah. I see what you're saying.
Um, you said that there was no way that he had said um >> I was maybe misunderstanding because it sounded like he was saying you it sounded like you were saying that um I was arguing that they only needed um like they needed uh only 70 trucks to replace domestic production. But that's not true. Like I've never said that. 70 trucks is the same as the amount of food trucks that were going in on average per if you average it per day pre-war.
>> Yeah. Well, that that's how the um the substract seem to represent.
Um but I if you didn't make a definitive statement on that then um yeah, I guess it's not um as big of a concern. It's not really tall, is it?
Because it's like like and I am 100% right for and this is why people think that they're using hunger as a weapon of war and starving the population on purpose because if you thought that uh they're only importing 30 or 40 or 50 trucks a day, but actually it used to be 500. Well, then you're thinking, okay, well that wow, so in some days people are literally getting 10% of the food that they need to survive, but that's just not what the that that 500 comparison was just never appropriate.
>> Yeah, I see what you're saying. Um, >> and the 150 just seems to come from >> it's just it's exactly 30% of 500 per working day. Um, >> yeah, I get that. Um, you seemed frustrated that he um said you were comparing the uh the number of trucks going in pre-war and postwar and that people would be moving around during the war. if he wants um the part where he says that um the point is to examine whether food aid had been reduced following October 7th.
This analysis is of course flawed because it assumes that Gazin's need for food aid during a war can be calculated by comparing the difference between pre-war and war number of food trucks entering Gaza. The amount of food aid needed to prevent starvation might of course be higher than both of these numbers. Remember Gazins are being are constantly being forced to move.
So, >> but because they're forced to move, then just calculating the pre-war domestic production and making up for that still isn't enough because people are moving.
>> Is that it?
>> Um, >> wait, I'll just read this. Regarding the number of trucks in Gaza, the issue here is the comparison of pre-war aid entering Gaza to the amount of aid entering Gaza after October 7th, uh, and before the January 2025 ceasefire. The point is to examine whether food aid had been reduced following October 7th. This analysis is of course flawed because it assumes first. So maybe something's going to change, but so far this was not my argument. I was never saying that they only need 70 trucks a day during the war. Okay, this analysis of course is flawed because it assumes that Gazan's need for food aid during a war can be calculated by comparing the difference between pre-war and war number of food trucks entering Gaza. The amount of food aid needed to prevent starvation might of course be much higher than both of these numbers.
Remember Gazans are constantly being forced to move. they can no longer make a living. Food production has uh internally declined among a host of other pressures presented by Israel.
Moreover, the culpable conduct is found not only in the potential discrepancies between these numbers. Okay. Food production has internally declined. Uh okay, let me find you.
>> So, you're saying this is a misrepresentation of your position?
>> We'll see. We'll see. We'll see. I wonder if there's a clip of me saying it. Yeah.
Is my Is my screen share giving you the audio here?
Or maybe you wouldn't have heard it.
I'll just tell you >> your screen share is your screen share is just like a YouTube >> [ __ ] All right, let's go here.
Applications.
This is me working on it. Uh, still not satisfied.
But yeah, I'm still not satisfied with a good number of what was actually needed, drugs per day.
Um, even when I look at this in terms of tonnage, if Ok is saying that they need 60,000 tons and being conservative because you'd rather obviously you don't want to you'd rather over import than under um 60,000 needed monthly for two million people. So that means if each truck is 18.7 tons, this is just for food, you need 3,28 per month. And a month is on average 30 days.
So per them, they're saying you need 107 drugs per day.
And if you look at UNRA or even even Koga, there are one two three months where they were way below that. Way way below. So, I guess maybe the first assumption we can find where I was looking at domestic production as well.
Um, it's curious that I would say 106 when the pre-war was 70, right?
>> Mhm.
>> Okay.
Um yeah, definitely seems like um your calculations were a lot more complicated than just looking at pre-war and postwar >> and or pre-war and during the war.
>> Let's look here. Yeah, the pre-war production is just not complete. There's not a good answer for for how much caloric intake was domestically produced. I don't know if World Bank data, they don't say whether they're using like financial amounts or just like like weights, but obviously caloric because if it's fruit and vegetables, then you can spend a lot of money on fruit and vegetables that don't give you nearly enough calories compared to the same amount spent on wheat products or other [ __ ] And here they say working day now at least.
Do we calculate what was the level of domestic food production pre-war? Well, one guy citing Oxfam said that about 12% of food in uh consumed in Gaza was locally produced. They say 12% quoting Oxfam from 2013, but I can't find the Oxam report he's citing, so hard to say.
The United Nations has long said at least 500 trucks a day of aid and commercial goods need to enter Gaza. I guess it's maybe it's interesting because that's the link that I sent him when he was asking me about the my takes on the trucks. So, no. Yeah. And obviously my I think I I think I was digging for [ __ ] ages trying to get stuff about domestic production here.
Where is it? Domestic. Yeah, look at this. [ __ ] me, man. Annual uh local production. I went through like Palestinian reports uh from the Middle East monitor and like this is like a lot of government statements about how many tons of fruits, vegetables, fish, poultry, red meat, uh eggs, milk, how much of all that they were uh producing and how much that would go into trucks to replicate. I think one of the estimates here was um 133 trucks per day to make up for all of it. Uh another estimate was like 97. Yeah, I was trying quite hard to find an answer for this.
And then I also said, "Yeah, you need to be high. You should probably be higher than lower." Uh it seemed like with most the average was somewhere around like a bit under 100, but I would I tend to lean over 100, but yeah, bro. I was >> Yeah. But yeah, [ __ ] me. like you were you were um doing a lot of work on this and factoring in a bunch of things and that he wasn't representing that accurately.
>> She that's why it's nice to have the response.
>> Yeah. And I hope Queman's watching all of this by the way, this entire [ __ ] hours long struggle session because otherwise he's dodging. Okay, I'm not going to ask him to watch. I'm just going to assume he's dodging.
Get the community to spread that I'm joking. Don't do that.
Don't get me involved in this. Not again.
>> It's okay. You know, everyone's everyone's on their own journey. All right. What else? I don't mind.
>> There's one last thing that I had taken notes on. Um I think you might have already talked about it on stream as well. Uh but the author claims that you failed to consider the pattern of conduct for the genocide is the only reasonable inference.
That's the only reasonable inference standard from Croatia v Serbia.
>> The author claims that you focus too much on individual military aes patterns.
>> I focus too much on individual actions as opposed to patterns. You're saying >> um >> is that what it says?
>> That's what the that's what the author was cla >> Let me try to find a quote >> cuz I can't see patterns here. as well.
>> I swear to God if they start saying that like the IDF is >> they a clip of you >> in terms of like how they conduct their military in Gaza, then I'm going to lose my shirt.
>> They site a clip of you saying >> yes. They're saying the current ICJ case law on genocide would basically mean that any genocide that happens during a war would not be genocide because war would be the other reasonable interpretation.
>> Oh no, this is >> so I think >> yeah this is this wait this is when I was react was this a reaction to the to the lady speaking? No, I' I've since gone back on this one. That's not what that's not what reason means. You can have you can have a war and you can have like a [ __ ] genite happening within a war.
>> Um, no, I'm completely on more with that. Yeah, >> but that's been that's been credited way before though. What the [ __ ] When I spoke about is the bit where I speak about side quests or whatever the [ __ ] Um, >> yeah, I thought you had talked about this on >> the law they site is Bosnia, which was a Oh, wait, wait, wait, wait. They're saying the current ICJ case law would mean that any other genocide happening during a war would not be genocide. No, wait. I'm criticizing.
way because war could be the other reasonable interpretation. Whereas if they say like if an act has to be seen as genocide, gentile intent has to be the only reasonable interpretation. But then it's funny they make that criticism because the case law they site is Bosnia which was a genocide that took place in a war, right? Because it was like the specific act of Sheranita that was it couldn't have any other reasonable rotation. Okay.
Wait, so what's the issue here? Seems like I'm aware of that though. No, I'm not I'm not saying >> so I'm not saying that like uh the case law precludes any genocide from happening within a war.
>> Yeah, because that's the whole thing that he talks about here is about um the only reasonable >> what's the standard only reasonable inference standard. But but if you've already addressed that then uh we don't need to go into that.
And um yeah, that's the last of my notes from reading over the substack.
But there's a bunch of other stuff like he talks about.
>> This is why you talk >> a lot of instances of like bombing and contentions over aid trucks.
>> Yeah. Apparently this uh the substack was supposed to be a video.
>> Yeah.
>> But for I guess his laptop wasn't working or something. He says at the top.
>> That is quite a shame. Yeah.
But yeah, I guess thank you for letting me uh bring these to you and for giving your responses.
>> Um that's all good. If you have any more, I'll be happy to address them.
>> Yeah. Okay. Well, I'll I'll uh try to make sure Queenman sees that you've responded.
>> I'll do that.
>> I I don't give a [ __ ] man. He can whatever whatever he wants to do this time. If I'm his special interest for a while makes him happy, whatever.
>> I think he was I think he I guess for me personally, like I um I wasn't sure why he didn't want to just like go through the substack and respond to it. Well, this is why because I've had this argument already with him in DMs the whole time and gotten frustrated and felt like I was maybe like or just like I I just I don't even think he's a dumb person. I think he's actually like a very clever person and I and I like him as a person to this day.
>> Yeah, I saw you I saw >> I saw that you recommended him.
>> I do recommend it. Yeah, I still will to Yeah, because if people want to see the cont but but like the fact that I have to go through this argument again like also none of these are arguments I've not already addressed. I've gone through all of these arguments already multiple times on stream uh throughout. Um he's not satisfied with some of the arguments and that's that's fine. Like but to me I just I just feel like there's um there's maybe some points where I'm just maybe not like being kind of ignored or like or just there's disagreement. That's it.
But yeah, I don't know. This um I don't think it's an indicator that I have no [ __ ] idea what I'm talking about or out of my depth or trash coverage or whatever. I feel like I'm working pretty hard to get good takes on this thing compared to everyone else. But [ __ ] [ __ ] me.
I think you I think you do work hard on this stuff. I think um you do a lot of research for your opinions and I see that. So >> who's this FO guy? Who the [ __ ] are these people?
>> You're in the room.
>> Yeah, I know I am. Tony Tony Tony, when's the Hutch hit piece coming out?
>> You're doing a Hutch hit piece?
>> Oh, yeah. I've been doing a video about Hutch. I don't think you'd like drama stuff.
Um, it'll be I want to finish it.
I don't know if your audience would be that interested in. So, >> I'm still working on it.
>> No, like 80% of his audience is just people that enjoy slop. So, don't worry about that.
>> Yeah. And I want to know why Hutch is so dumb. I don't know. I keep hearing this about him, but I >> Well, we we'll probably check it out.
Like Kilo released his video finally, so the pressure is on, Tony.
>> It is on.
Subscribe, you [ __ ] [ __ ] I mean, sorry.
Related Videos
VALORANT's Latest 'Exclusive' Tier Bundle is Rough...
KangaValorant
17K views•2026-05-28
Flight Attendant Mocks Poor Looking Black Woman — Mid Air Announcement Exposes Her Real Power
SkyboundStories-b4r
184 views•2026-05-28
I FIXED My Friend’s Blown Turbo RX-8… Then Sold It
Cameron-RX8
134 views•2026-05-28
NewsWatch 12 at 5: Top Stories
NewsWatch12
1K views•2026-05-28
Simon Jordan & Danny Murphy deliver PREDICTIONS for Arsenal's Champions League FINAL with PSG
talkSPORTArsenal
6K views•2026-05-28
Botting is OUT OF CONTROL in Classic WoW (Again)...
SolheimGaming
108 views•2026-05-28
The "AI Job Apocalypse" is CANCELLED!
WesRoth
9K views•2026-05-28
STREET FIGHTER 6 - INGRID Story Walkthrough @ 4K 60ᶠᵖˢ ✔
RajmanGamingHD
12K views•2026-05-28











