PUTIN VOWS REVENGE AGAINST UKRAINE STRIKES | w/ Silicon Curtain

Added: 2026-05-24

[00:00:00]20 minutes something like that. What are you what are you planning?

[00:00:02]>> We are going to run for 40 minutes I think Jonathan and that's what everyone watching can feel excited to uh to to to know because we're live. Um hello everyone. Uh I am still in Malawi. Uh I'm in a different place now. Um we left the place we were on Lcomo Island or something. Uh and now we're in uh the capital Leil Longway. Uh and then we go somewhere else tomorrow. But anyway, I'm coming to you from Africa. Jonathan, you are coming to us from Cambridge.

[00:00:26]>> Some somewhere in the UK. No, the other place. the other place, >> Oxford.

[00:00:30]>> Yes, that'll be >> There you go. Well, anyway, there you go everybody. Um, I answered your questions in the comments already. Um, thanks so much for joining us. Uh, we're joined by I think this is the first time we've ever done a live stream with you, Jonathan. Right.

[00:00:42]>> This is the first one. This is absolutely it. Yeah, the first one. And I had the uh pleasure to speak to Jason Smart earlier. So, uh this is my second conversation today. So, hopefully I'm fired up and uh you know, not not the usual weekend kind of slumber and and and dullness. hopefully woken up for this.

[00:01:01]>> Well, I appreciate that. Also, considering it is a Saturday night, so some people watching us might be like, "Do you guys have a do you go out?" But you're you're coming back from a night out last night. By the sounds of it, you're you're nursing a little bit.

[00:01:12]>> Yes. Um and and for some miraculous reason, I have no hangover. Whereas, by all, you know, all rights, I should have an absolutely killer hangover. I'm having mixed beer and wine. But I feel clear as a bell. So, uh I don't know who to thank for that.

[00:01:26]>> Well, I'm glad to know. Uh and to be fair actually people uh who might have never seen us uh collaborating before.

[00:01:32]What I think is cool is that we actually crossed paths about a month ago. Almost a month ago the first time that was ridiculous. Yeah.

[00:01:40]>> Yeah. And that was an interesting I say interesting event. I mean the topic is um uh it maybe not the most sort of vital topic of of our times but it was on Rasputin and uh you know that that's quite a sort of popular theme but it's interesting. I'm not sure.

[00:01:58]>> No, I >> I'm not sure I'm gonna wade through the book that I was persuaded to buy, but >> Oh, you did buy it, didn't you? Yeah, I I I didn't buy it because I, as I think I told you at the time, and I just said to to someone off air now, um it was a very unpleasant experience. The the the author Anthony um Bever was it? I can't remember. Was um he was quite hostile to me. Um even though I wanted >> He was hostile to me as well.

[00:02:24]>> Yeah. I had the same experience. Yeah, I instantly regretted buying the book. So I went up, got the signature and said, um, you know, uh, I've been running, uh, running a running a podcast for for four years. You know, it's had quite an impact, and I've got a background as historian. And he just looked, oh, podcast, podcast? Oh, god, no, no.

[00:02:43]Ghastly. No, I never appear on one of those. I'm like, you've just maligned.

[00:02:47]You know what? I've just told you what I do and you've just basically done a giant [ __ ] on it. So, thank you, Mr. beaver and fu. And then I regretted buying the book. I really want to go and get my money back.

[00:03:00]>> Wow, that's >> What did he say to you? What did he say?

[00:03:04]>> Very well. He didn't he didn't say that much. I I just went over and I went, "Hello, Sir Anthony. I'm I'm quite good at being the, you know, I lived in DC for enough years, so I'm quite good at doing the whole sch smoozing like hello.

[00:03:17]I love the talk. Really interesting book. You know, really appreciated your answer to the questions." you know, brown-nosing as much as possible. And I wanted to ask you, he's like, "Where's the book?" And I was like, >> "Uh, >> I have a slight, you know, I have an edge, which is if someone talks to me this, I'm going to change, right? I'm not going to put up with bullshit."

[00:03:36]>> And he basically just said, "Where's the book?" And and I was like, "Um, well, I actually wanted to invite you on the show, on my podcast to promote your book, but I didn't finish all of the sentences because I didn't have to.

[00:03:47]Where's the next person? Give me the And he almost hit me in the head with sort of his flailing of the arms. Like not deliberately, but he was so candlescent with disinterest and rage. Yes. That anyway I um >> Yeah.

[00:04:02]>> engaged me in conversation. That's not what I'm here for. That's the impression I got there.

[00:04:06]>> It's not like the queue was that big. It was at all. Anyway, um what I wanted to get your uh discussion with you tonight was simply uh things are really looking quite awkward for the Russians right now. Putin's comments in the past >> what 24 hours, I mean we can go back to VD uh parade and everything like that.

[00:04:26]But with the developments in the past few hours, the past day with the Ukrainian striking and and Putin saying he wants to retire, you know, he vows revenge, he's really rattled, isn't he?

[00:04:37]This isn't something that a man in control of his war special operation speaks like, is it? I >> I think not. And uh I haven't seen the full clip, but apparently at this Veterans Day, he was fairly incoherent.

[00:04:48]I mean, as I speaking to Jason Smart, he said he hasn't seen him that kind of incoherent. He almost looks like he was slightly drunk and certainly not in control of even the immediate environment he was with. Normally, those events are packed with what one has to even wonder whether they're real veterans. Usually they're FSB officers dressed as members of the public because he no longer uh has direct contact I think with people generally and people have done offent and they said okay well this person's set up here here and here and in this instance they were playing this character. So but he does seem to not have the sort of coherence around his speech and his movement his act. Um I I think there's some underlying disease there. We we we can't hope that he just pops his clogs. That's not a strategy. Um but it does seem that the the mixture of paranoia, the the not feeling in control. Um I think he was deeply humiliated by um uh victory day.

[00:05:43]I think there was no way he could sort of spin that and I think he realized that he was belittled not just externally but internally as well. I think that has rattled him and of course he had this you know demonstrative huge air strike on uh Kiev. Uh, in fact, it was quite dramatic because all through the day um the day the daytime before that huge strike, they were sending decoy drones in to sort of try to figure out where the air defense systems had been shifted to. Five air alarms during the day. I mean, didn't stop anyone going back there shopping. Didn't stop me sitting there with Philip and having a couple of beers over a few hours, but constantly the alarms were going off and on. And then in the evening, of course, this it was the largest strike of the war. But of course, many people who I spoke to who have got used to actually sleeping through the average bombardment, as mad as that sounds, you know, oh, they only sent in, you know, 100 drones last night. I slept through it, etc. Nobody slept. Nobody slept in this. Windows rattling. It was and it was 8 n hours long. Um, so he he wants to lash out whenever he feels that he is is weak, whenever he feels there's any humiliation, which of course is the last thing you need as a strong man. um he feels he lashes out. I suspect that he now feels that he no longer has the tools to lash out and inflict that kind of uh whether you want to call it revenge or whatever or that extreme violence um because 94% of those projectiles were shot down. Yes, I think 24 or or more people were killed, which is absolutely horrific. But I think he would want to inflict far more death and suffering, and he just doesn't have the means to to do it at this point, unless of course he steps up and maybe fires Neshnik into an urban center. But of course, he probably also rationally knows that the stakes of doing that, the optics of doing that, uh, come with potentially other risks that may rebound quite harshly on him. And I I'm not one who thinks he'll go nuclear, even even tactical. I think he knows that that is a line too far for China, and he's absolutely dependent on Chinese support.

[00:07:54]Um it's a line too far for for for Europe. I'm not sure what the response would be, but I think the absolute horror if he went to that level of of nuclear revenge or even nuclear symbolism is is so what has he got? What tools has he got? Uh, and I think he's really feeling that powerlessness.

[00:08:13]>> Yeah. I, you know, look, I I don't even really think about the nuclear element, not because I don't think it's obviously an option, but because the regardless of the detestation we have for Putin, he's still somewhat of a rational actor. I don't think he wants to be the one who subjected Russia to uh complete destruction, right? He's supposed to be the protector and glorif the glory neocar uh of of it. So I I tactical nuclear possibly is a symbolic strike. There was one assessment by I think it was Cas CSIS or Rusei or something and it was like he might strike in the sea of Azov right as a sort of we >> off the coast somewhere exactly in in a deep strike scenario but >> Smanan suggested two years ago why don't we nuke ourselves just to show that we can do it. I mean I think that was going too far even for her fellow propagandists you know. Yeah. No, absolutely. But one of the I did want to come a little bit to your to your um personal experiences given you were visiting just recently, but I just wanted to give a little bit more context for people who were joining and sort of what we're talking about because of the past few hours. So, Putin basically has promised retaliation after he accused Ukraine of of carrying out this deadly attack on a student supposed student dorm in an occupied part of of Ukraine. Uh 18 people have been killed and 42 others were injured. uh in the town of Stereoblinsk in the Huhansk region. Um now Ukraine's military said it hit the headquarters of Russia's elite Rubicon drone military facility.

[00:09:45]Uh and it didn't say whether it was the one that Russia identified. But what's I think most interesting and and sort of goes to what you just said um Jonathan is that often with Putin you can tell a lot by how rattled he is or not by how much he says doesn't say whether he appears. like in times of crisis he often disappears like we don't see him for days like he and all that stuff but in this instance he's pretty pissed because he's very definitive like he says he casorically said no military facilities intelligence services facilities or related services in the facility I'll just read a bit more therefore there is absolutely no basis for claiming that the munition struck the building as a result of our air defense or electronic warfare systems he said at this reception as you said that's pretty detailed for him you quite detailed He never goes into that detail.

[00:10:32]>> He's feeling >> he's feeling rattled because he feels that need to clarify it that much. At least that's how I read that. Yeah.

[00:10:39]>> Um I don't know if you'd agree, but like yeah, he looked pretty unsettled in his delivery. It's also an admission, I mean, if you read between the lines, it's also an admission that many of the other strikes that incidentally hit apartment blocks and so on were not being targeted by Ukraine specifically, but it's Russian air defense electronic warfare has either physically blown them off course or, you know, um, captured them electronically to hit civilian objects. He's basically sort of admitted there that all the other strikes are not Ukrainians hitting civilians. How dare they do this? Now we know that there are huge numbers of students uh being trained to build drones let's say at Alaborga um that there are many foreigners who have been sort of conned into doing that. There are many many students tens of thousands of students actually training for Rubicon um because they have the aim to build a 100,000 120,000 strong elite drone force. So even if this was uh a sort of a hostel, it's entirely possible that it may have contained or entirely been dedicated to training people up to be drone pilots.

[00:11:48]It's not inconceivable. Um despite what he says, you know, and Putin lies. Um but I think being rattled is is is certainly there. Now whether he's rattled because he thought that you know the these drone units were untouchable um or whether this is a genuine accident um you know mis misargeting but then again has Putin ever cared for his own civilians you know if you go back to the sinking of the Korsk and the absolute contempt that he has for his own people I don't think we can interpret this like ah there's been some civilian death toll oh isn't it tragic and he doesn't give a damn and he never has given a damn about people or the lives of soldiers or students or anyone else. That's not who he is. So, we have to say, well, why would he be rattled by such an incident?

[00:12:40]And I think it's because it shows him to be weak. It shows him to be powerless.

[00:12:43]Um, and whether it was an elite drone force being trained or not, it essentially shows that he's no longer in control, no longer in control of Russian airspace, strategic objectives, civilian objectives. uh and we're seeing choruses of criticism uh especially amongst the Z patriot community. Not saying like the war was wrong and you know we shouldn't be killing Ukrainians.

[00:13:05]They're mostly upset that they're not killing enough. Um but they're upset that they realize now that their strategic objectives won't be met and there's a chorus of objections to actually continuation of the war. people are in the elite sort of I'd say somewhat fearful of where this will lead because the further fur the further it goes the greater the economic calamity at the end of it and the less control potentially uh either Putin's regime or the region that follows it will be able to sort of you know glue things back together. So I think I think he's entering quite a a fevered and paranoid state. That kind of means that whenever Ukraine strikes uh strategically and hard or creates the optics of Russia being undefended, um everything is now going to be impacting on his uh uh on his psyche.

[00:13:57]>> I want to dissect that a little bit further, but I did see something from I think he works supports you Jonathan BME.

[00:14:03]>> BME he does. He's one of our expert moderators. He's a Vatnik Vatnik Basher extraordinaire.

[00:14:10]>> Well, he just came over from your channel to smash the like button on mine. So, I'm just going to say for both of us, if you don't support Jonathan and you on Jonathan, so you don't support me, supporters, like each video or I don't know, do something like that. I'm not great. I'm too British. I'm I'm very uncomfortable in asking uh you know to like and subscribe and all that, but you know, I >> Me too. But um sometimes you have to sometimes you have to to build things up. Yeah.

[00:14:35]>> But just on that point then so I think what's really interesting about this Jonathan is that what does this do? This doesn't only demonstrate that Putin is losing the capacity to uh illustrate himself as protector and um you know uh the sort of re to reestablish the great Russian Empire or whatever neo-Russian sort of resurgence of of of Russia as a great power. But also it's it's undermining the very thing that he he based a lot of his entire SMO over of this invasion, wasn't it? The protection oration of the Russian oppressed people in eastern Ukraine and now they're being targeted or whatever they're being the Russians are not even able to defend them.

[00:15:18]>> He has no capacity to explain this, right?

[00:15:20]>> No. And again, we have to put in context in that uh did he ever care about the people of Daetsk and Lhansk? Uh no. Um essentially he has turned Dombas into a gulag, an open air gouag. I mean the people of Donbass, especially in the villages, especially those who um let's say have at this point actually doesn't matter if they have sympathy for Russia or not. Uh or I mean Ukraine or not rather um you know they're all targeted uh similarly. They're all prone to um the total lack of lack of law, lack of infrastructure, total impunity of the sort of criminal forces that have been put in charge of those territories. If you're in villages, you can be looted, beaten, killed, raped at will. There's no rule of law there whatsoever. So, we got to dispense with this idea that somehow he cares about the people in these areas, but he absolutely doesn't.

[00:16:15]you know, for months now they've had brown sludge coming out of their taps with with no water and very little sort of supply. So, he's reduced these territories to essentially um an area of absolute horror. And I think the horror is something we we'll only find out about later. So, again, he does not care. What he cares about is the implication that he is weak, the implication that he has lost control, the implication that he can no longer, you know, command authority within the vertical of power. That is what exercises him.

[00:16:49]>> No, absolutely. And and and I think just I wanted to also unpack, sorry, my phone is uh saying I've got low battery, so I'm just going to fiddle with my wires here. But yeah, Zinski said, I think was it on Thursday that the Ukrainians hit an FSB headquarters? They killed about 100 Russian >> a claim. Yes.

[00:17:07]>> Yeah. And and what I find interesting is that it's such a obviously bad situation that even Russian uh military had to uh comment on the issue or one pro sorry excuse me one pro Kremlin Telegram I'm just reading this from an article here reported casualties after what quote massive drone strike. So clearly the as you say the telegram channels the the Russian bloggers who want to be pro Putin pro the war etc etc are having to admit that we are facing serious issues here and and they can't even get away issue you know >> and and it's also an intelligent strategy because if you can hit uh the infrastructure of the Sylvia key um that is going to have far more impact on Putin because if he cannot protect his protectors you know the the the core that is there to prop up his regime if they are no longer protected and if they are no longer necessarily getting the resources they need. I don't think we've reached that point where he can no longer supply the uh you know FSB with the resources they require. But if he can not provide protection to them um then that that's a serious I think threat to him. And there are some of these uh Zed patriots who are starting to ask the question why do we need Putin if Putin cannot uh you know arbitrate between different factions which is very much his role within the system you know preventing open warfare between uh uh you know mafia and sylvviki factions. If he can no longer, you know, keep them down and stop the squabbbling and the theft amongst themselves. If he can no longer protect uh physically, you know, our illotten gains and wealth and status, what is Putin for? Um, and isn't it time we got a strong man who uh uh actually protects our interests?

[00:18:53]>> No, for sure. I think it's pretty clear that the elites, what a month ago, Putin was basically saying, "Hey, can you give me some money, please?" um which I never thought I would ever see reported. Um I've got an interesting question here from one of your uh subscribers, Andreas, which I thought Rich, so he said he's I'm guessing and you're based in Germany, Andreas, but he says they there's a massive problem with the Russian disinformation, which I do find Germany is particularly targeted in a way that Britain is sort of targeted in a kinetic war sense, whilst the Germans seem to be a recipient of more uh cyber war. Um but he's how is it in the UK?

[00:19:27]like how how is Russian disinformation in the UK?

[00:19:30]>> Um it's far more subtle. You know, I think um and I've got some friends who are working on this. Um they uh interview people who voted for No, we we now have an outbreak of of um the center is fragmenting as is the Conservative Party. The Labor Party's traditional support. So we have you know a growth obviously in reform and there's another one I don't what's it called revival or whatever the hell it is and then we have the Greens. Yeah, we so we have these sort of uh movements. It's the horseshoe theory and of course if you go far enough left or far enough right uh you will find people who are apparently sympathetic to Russian narratives. So in the extreme left and extreme right we sort of hear quite a lot of this French stuff especially like well of course Russia's war is wrong but actually NATO is equally culpable blah blah blah.

[00:20:19]Someone in the comments just now repeated one of those sort of classic lines which I actually heard from someone yesterday which is why are you caring about Ukraine when Boris Johnson and Britain uh you know torpedoed the Istanbul deal. Um and I I actually argue this with Ukraine say you know she was saying oh well you know there was a deal on the table. There was a deal to destroy Ukraine. There was a deal to hollow out its military. There was a deal to take vast chunks of its territory have a pause and then start again. that that's not a deal in my book whatsoever. And they were absolutely right to fight on. And Johnson was absolutely right to say, "No, we're going to commit to support you." So, don't sign a deal that will hollow out your state and and lead to its eventual destruction. Um, but it it is, you know, a classic Kremlin line. We don't hear too much of that in Britain, and I say it's only from fairly extreme quarters.

[00:21:10]The rest is just things you hear out of out of ignorance. There'll be a lot of pro- Ukraine people who will who will sort of say things that maybe just aren't quite correct, but that's just about, you know, getting good information and and having a good debate about things. We're far less susceptible to it than other countries. Whereas, however, what I fear is that we have a lot of internal problems which of course populist politicians are leveraging. Um, so Farage wouldn't pop up and say, "Well, we're going to desupport Ukraine." What he will say is, "Well, we should deal with our own problems first." So they the real danger is finding ways to de defund and desort Ukraine without explicitly saying so.

[00:21:49]And there are narratives I think which unfortunately will will work in our current uh sort of fevered politics and uh the state of sort of e economic duress that we're we're under.

[00:22:01]>> Yeah. Yeah, I just add to that simply that to me the um uh Germany is obviously central Europe and it's gotten its divided political uh climate at the moment. The AFD are very popular in certain areas i.e. Eastern Germany, right? And and the split there.

[00:22:18]If you look at any political map or or demographic breakdown of of Germany along voting lines or social and economic patterns, you can clearly see that the divide >> west is it? Yeah.

[00:22:30]very strong.

[00:22:31]>> Their narratives are so much more clearly pro-Russian. I mean, their narratives are, you know, myth, myth, myth, propaganda line after propaganda line. I It's absolutely overt. The uh the the sort of lines they're delivering. I would say they even go further than some of the stuff Trump said, although he said some pretty horrible things over the last year or two that have certainly been fed by his inner circle, some in his inner circle, and and and even, you know, conversations had with Putin. often after these conversations he'll he'll repeat these narratives but the AFD are absolutely consistent and they take the most extreme um I would say sort of fatnick point of view I find it extremely dangerous the question in my mind is is what will Putin do if he is under this psychological pressure and I think you're absolutely right and pointed out it's coming across in his manner his tone he's saying and doing things that he that he previously is not he would have let minions handle these statements he would have let Ditra Piskovv or propagandists say the things that he's been saying in the last couple of days. Now he's saying them directly.

[00:23:31]It smacks of a certain desperation. But what does Putin do when he's desperate?

[00:23:36]Does he lie down and stick his legs in the air? That's not who he is. He's like a cornered rat. He'll come out scratching and biting. So it is a question of what he does, what he can do, what he will find to do. because if he says he wants revenge and let's face it, you know, him threatening to strike Kiev, well, he struck Kiev almost every night of this war anyway. Um, he had concessions on victory day, he then launched a mass attack on Ukraine anyway. It it's using the word revenge somehow implies that this is a sort of reciprocal thing. And it it it it almost covers up the fact that Putin will lash out and strike anyway. whether Ukraine fights back or whether they don't, they're going to be subject to the same violence. So I I think it works in that mechanic.

[00:24:26]>> No, I just want to show this image here because I think that this right here, I mean, I know it's midsp speech, but when he was giving the delivery of this VD speech, his mannerisms, his facial expressions, his gestures reminded me very much of the day that the full-scale invasion happened. There was a certain level of him portraying he was he was incensed with a sense of frustration, rage, um dissatisfaction or the reality of the war being what it is, which is not going well. I haven't seen that sort of he looks genuinely angry in this screenshot. I know it's mid wording, but like he still looks like when you if you watch that, you know, when he sits at his desk and he he goes on and on about why this war is justified and the relationship of Russia to the West and Ukraine and etc. Um he is really animated, really agitated and and and I just normally when he gives these kinds of public exper appearances he's quite measured like you know when you see him >> he's usually quite cold. Yes, there's a sort of calculation isn't there to him.

[00:25:28]Um >> so I know it's a small case but I think it's important. I think it demonstrates him losing himself in public which he doesn't normally do.

[00:25:36]>> No, normally he's completely in control of that and and in fact historically because I spoke to someone who actually was part of his speech writing team.

[00:25:43]This was an interesting night in the pub a couple of years back where uh and this is a very intelligent you know researcher with a PhD or whatever in in history and she described to me the architecture of his speech writing. This isn't the classic no pre pre fullscale invasion where everything is architected where every one of his public appearances is engineered to make him look good. Um you you'd have a team of of dozens of people and they'd write you know they'd write a pure script without any propaganda using absolute experts, historians and so on and then it goes through layer after layer as they gradually tweak it and refine it and you know twist it into something that's sort of more propagandistic. Um it's just it's just the mechanics of that strike me as extraordinary. So that's the background of orchestrating his image and his words very very carefully. What you say here is interesting because he seems to be speaking more off the cuff here and this is more directly him. It's unpolished. It's slightly demented. It's impassioned.

[00:26:44]>> I wonder two things. One whether he has really, you know, started to to believe his own mythology, believe his own lies and propaganda. I rather suspect since co he has, you know, not been as detached as he used to be. He's developed a passion for this pseudo history and he probably believes part of it. He may also be fed completely false information that actually the war's going okay, he's going to win and eventually they're going to get the whole of Dombas or Ukraine's going to fold, etc. So I wonder whether there isn't also some anger here that he's being fed one picture and yet the information he's also getting from other quarters doesn't really match and he's he's maybe feeling this sort of dissonance between you know or detecting maybe that somehow uh his view of reality isn't sort of matching matching up um maybe an anger and and you know with his own inner circle but not sure how to direct it. We don't know that. I mean, this is just pure speculation, but certainly that frustration is is is apparent.

[00:27:44]>> Yeah. I mean, I I think it's pretty clear that he he's he's lost the capacity to portray things in a way he wanted. Uh and he's he's having to react more instead of dictate the terms. Um I mean, just look at the way that he's increasingly attacked Europe. I just want to bring back to answer the question that was put before, right? In the case of Britain, whilst in Germany, perhaps it's more about the political uh influence uh and psychological warfare.

[00:28:11]In in England, it's much more of provocations through kinetic means. What I mean by that is that we've seen with the Yantar, I think it is, that ship that has been um bobbing around Brit parts of the North Sea, the British Isles, the Russians see the Brits as enemy number one now because of Trump's sort of apparent uh love for Putin. So the way that the the Russians engage the British is very different to the Germans. There's a lot more military activity. There's a lot more physical means. And I think that has partially to do with Britain as an intelligence hub, but also because of its just geographical location. Right? When we think of Britain, we we should think of its relationship to Greenland and Iceland, the GIUK gap. Uh because that is a central strategic access point for the Russians from the Arctic into the Atlantic. Um and therefore if the Russians can underme the UK um and NATO with one of the most important means that's a huge win for them. Um and and given the whole political drama in the UK right now and Scottish independence and this whole idea of Trident being affected that's a huge therefore um escalation for NATO's one of its cornerstone deterrence means right. So I think for the Russians they're, you know, like it or not, they're quite good at identifying the comparative disadvantages of each or like the Achilles heel. And I think in the UK it's it's that element versus the Germans which are, you know, it's different. So I don't know if you would agree with that, but I I see that quite distinctively for me. and and and to your point about Putin just actually made me think of like we've both I think hosted Mark Galotti in the past great expert on >> and he's um you know he's talked about different phases of Putin which I think is very true right Putin went through different psychological changes you know his early 2000s and then after the Munich security conference that was the next phase and then after the snow revolution of 2012 and then after sort of covid right he's he's increasingly become more paranoid more uh more autocratic. He's done these mini purges to centralize control more to to to to reduce his inner circle and more and more and more he's isolated himself and and and as you say like I never really used to think of him as an ideologue but goodness me when he wrote that article in 21 about >> Ukraine and relationship to Russia I I it became very clear just how ideologically he is driven especially or specifically about Ukraine right it's crazy >> that's the point where I thought okay this is happening because it's it's it is quite literally the Bond villain telling you what they're going to do, monologuing. And you think, you know, no matter how mad it sounds, this is what he's going to do. This is Blofelt. This is Goldfinger. You know, they're absolutely barking mad. But here they go. They've told you the whole plot, the whole script. It's also the mine moment.

[00:30:55]And again, I think we think back to the 1930s. British diplomats and and analysts and others had access to that and they read it and they thought, "Well, this guy's a bit of a clown and this stuff he's written is barking mad."

[00:31:07]So, we can't take this at all seriously because it's not going to happen. Well, hello. When the bad guy tells you what they're going to do, just I [ __ ] believe them because this is what he's done. You know, as unhinged as it seems, um I it's interesting certain historians uh and and many many Russian oppositionists who previously I thought were were quite accurate in their descriptions all said he's not going to invade. So I I wouldn't point the finger at, you know, some some some British historians who, for instance, advised the British government and said, "No, no, no. I mean, despite your intelligence data, it doesn't make any sense. He's not going to invade." I think we have to park rationality. And this is very important when we're dealing with Putin, we have to park what we think is rationality. We have to park what we think is reasonable and achievable because he's working from a very different framework. He's working towards very different ends. He's he's not uh really has to be accountable to his people in any way whatsoever. And he is also working with different information. He's working with a vertical hierarchy that is entirely built to tell him what he wants to hear.

[00:32:13]I mean, this is a system that didn't start out this way, but he's architected so that only people who are sickants and loyalists make it in that system. So it's completely deformed by his own uh you know his own dictatorial ego I would say.

[00:32:31]>> Yeah. I just actually um you made me think of something about uh when this was happening. There was a great article in the um am I lagging? Um uh there was a great article in Alazer about two weeks before the invasion. It was an opinion piece, but needless to say, I didn't decide to reach out to the author because he didn't do a great job of predicting the conflict. I just remember reading this and I was like, >> all the signs are pointing to the complete opposite.

[00:33:02]>> They're pointing to the complete opposite. And one can see why they don't, you know, they'll look at it and say, well, that that doesn't make any sense because one, you're, you know, military people say, well, you're going to have enough force to take a country that large uh against an army. Uh, you know, you need five to eight times uh the number of troops. Um and uh you know rather than the 200,000 that were gathered north of Kiev uh in hindsight you know one maybe should shouldn't have invaded across multiple fronts in that fashion but theoretically he should have had an army that was several times larger than the one that he actually put in the field. So in hindsight that's all that all kind of makes sense. But at the time uh I think a lot of people were like this is just this is the 21st century. People don't do that. My question is well what else are we presuming? What else are we assuming that can't happen in the 21st century?

[00:33:55]And unfortunately, I think there's a lot of things we're assuming can't happen, but a desperate Putin would not have those same uh barriers. uh for instance a full-scale hybrid attack on Europe, a kinetic attack using drones on Europe, let's say to shut down European airspace to uh damage our economies combined with a full-scale um psychologicalformational campaign to try to destabilize our governments. You can see how this might work um in in parts of Germany. Like if if the economy is going down, airspace is shut, Russia is attacking, there will be politicians that say, "Oh, hang on a second. I can save you from this. All we have to do is come to some accommodation with Russia. Start buying their oil again. I can make this all go away. I can lower your bills. Why Why are we starting World War II with Russia?" You know, and and they they'll actually frame it as if it was their fault. As if, let's say, we the Germans provoked this, you know, like poking the bear and stuff. And you can see maybe how this strategy might actually play to Putin's advantage, which is terrifying.

[00:35:01]>> Yeah. I know you you echo a lot of what um Wesley Clark uh I had him on the show about two weeks ago um the former NATO commander during the Kosovo war and it was really interesting to hear someone who's been in the room with the Russians in such a pivotal time of history um and in you know for a good few years at the highest level of NATO Russian relations but someone I think it's um cat has just put one word nukes which I think is um indicative, but also I want to it's a good point because I wanted to get your thoughts on the recent Russian nuclear is it um they've put a bunch of them in Barus uh or whatever this was yesterday.

[00:35:44]So what's what's your take on that uh considering everything else that's going on?

[00:35:49]>> I mean they also wheeled out Karaganov yet again to to do his rapid bond villain baldheaded you know madness. Um, and that tells me that is highly performative. Uh, I think again Putin might have bad information. He might think that an invasion on uh Kiev from the bill Russian side backed up with the idea of nukes like don't fight back or we'll nuke you that that will somehow be a deterrent. again I don't think he would actually use them because that would really be a rupture with China which he's entirely dependent on entirely dependent on you know if China literally severed the link and I think China would because that's a huge systemic shock to China uh if the the world you know went into some kind of uh recession as a result of of of Russia really stepping over that line which I think it would I think it would trigger extraordinary turbulence in the markets potentially leading to to global economic crash Um so behind the scenes I think it's like no way India also would probably bulk at that even though they're quite happy to gobble up Russian oil like there's no tomorrow. Um not that it's helping their economy much. Uh no gloating there but you know um so again I think it's part of the theater the psychology of threat. Now I suspect that the Bellarussian army um would not really make much of a dent. Um it was said that if he'd sent them across in 2022, they'd have been made minceme of then. Now, of course, Ukraine is far far more geared up uh and has the skill, munition, troop numbers and actually has many many units, one presumes, along that sort of border area between Belerus and and Kiev. I they would they would be Yeah, it would not go well for them, put it that way. um it would be an irritant to Ukraine, but it would certainly not go well with Belleris to the point where it may even destabilize the Lucashanka regime to the point of revolution and collapse. So, is Putin prepared to take risks like that? Is he prepared to take risks like that because he doesn't realize the risk he's taking?

[00:37:56]This is this is a house of cards. He may bring the whole thing down in his desperation. Um we just don't know. I mean this we're at an extraordinary pivot point here where Putin has made all sorts of decisions and he almost lost Iran as an ally. He lost Syria as an ally. His actions may well bring about the demise of one of his core allies uh Lucenko. Um Orurban of course wasn't saved by Russian intervention.

[00:38:22]Quite the reverse. Vance and Russian propagandist to try to prop up that regime accelerated the vote towards uh towards his opponents. So Putin um in his desperation may well make some really disastrous decisions that that make his position far far worse. There is also a threat back to you. There's one of the discussion points because one of one of the correspondents I listen to every day is is Michael Naki >> along with a few others in Russian language. But Michael Naki has a great team of researchers and he goes through and he he lists all the different theories and why certain things might be happening. Well, Putin's made a whole bunch of really quite terrible decisions with knock- on effects on the Russian economy. There is one school of thought that says actually there are people within the regime who are feeding him advice to make terrible decisions in order to accelerate the decline of his uh of his power and and try to provoke some kind of opposition to it. They would frame the culling of of cattle in uh in Siberia as one of those. you know, the regime's done something very handed, heavy-handed, which it turns out every Russian was talking about that. Every distant Russian or diaspora Russian was talking about that and and and you know, how awful it is that the regime are culling these cattle and ruining people's livelihoods. Um it it seems very despotic and and and sort of vicious. It also seems odd when Ukrainians like frankly that Russians should be really so exercised by cattle.

[00:39:44]Um but that's that that is what it is.

[00:39:47]Um so that that's one school of thought that actually you know they don't have necessarily the political organization to lead a coup but they may be sort of just sort of you know bringing Putin along down a certain path which they think will lead to his demise and doom.

[00:40:02]Um but again it's it's not a it's not a transparent system. So we just don't know.

[00:40:09]>> Well it's an interesting theory. I think that may well have been something that we've both heard from another guest we we host um which is Constantine Somalio right of Inside Russia. He often um appears on on our shows and he uh I think this was about a month ago. He first notified to me this idea that cattle were being called in the tens of thousands. Yes. um in Siberia and other parts of of the far east because of the the sheer conditions and just sit economic >> foot and mouth is the is the undisclosed reason for it but they they don't want to say foot and mouth because they've only just gained you know they gained valuable export dollars which they're using on the SO uh and if they declared a foot and mouth crisis that would shut off export markets so there's a logical reason why they might do that and and deploy all this subtifuge but just the optics of them turning up at farms destroying people's livelihoods with no compensation and no reason given it it's it's it just made quite an impression on people. I mean I do find it horrific that that makes an impression on people but apartment buildings full of children and families being slaughtered doesn't.

[00:41:21]But that's again we don't know what necessarily what people think in a dictatorship. But um I I suspect that that there's not that many Russians giving too much thought to to the Ukrainian suffering whereas uh their own loss of sort of let's say privilege, internet access, convenient lifestyles that does seem to get people quite angry but that's >> yeah I mean look as soon as it starts happening in the urban centers as as we see internet outages as we see deliberate uh clamping down of certain information as we've seen happening in the biggest of hubs Moscow St. Petersburg and Ketronburg and obviously Misk and everywhere else. It's uh it's not something that you can pull the ball over people's eyes. Um and and people are aware of that. The biggest obviously question all the time and we've seen it in a couple of comments in the stream so far is what does it take for the Russian people to to stand up and and that's unfortunately a uh the critical question but also a very unlikely one to to see happen still. It's a very unlikely one to see happen because conditions in the villages are probably not great but then they've always been not great and it's it's not since the you know the revolutionary period that that anything like uh the discontent was there and to an extent Russia was far more politicized uh ironically you know in the early 20th century that it is now it's been sort of it's been beaten out of them you know and and and educated out this what's called learned helplessness um there's far less les I would say politics uh active you know organic politics in Russia now than there would have been in the in the period following the 1905 revolutions and that's so there's not much to work on I don't expect any uprising what what may be more realistic is a is um let's say some kind of elite elite coup um and and there's a long history in Russia of course of uh um >> there's never been a transition to power has there >> no it's never there's never been a democrat transition of power. No, not once. Um, and people say, "What about Yeltson?" Well, I'm afraid I have certain views on that. I mean, >> opportunity of which didn't go anywhere.

[00:43:26]It lasted about two years. And even that >> and his route into power was very much managed and orchestrated to an extent by certain factions within the the Sylvia key. So there's never been a you know there's never again no >> but um I just wanted to add a quick comment on Barus and then I want to get the last thing I wanted to ask you a bit was about China Russia and the visit but from my perspective you know to what people's asked and said about Barus I mean Belarus has been floated in and out of the war several times but I don't think we've really heard anything about Barus joining the war since 2024 and even then it was never really likely the Bellarusian army is non-existent um and there's a lot of resistance as Well, apparently there's a lot of of antipathy there amongst the military hierarchy.

[00:44:09]They would not look kindly on on on being sent into the mid [ __ ] show that's gone down for the supposedly second largest powerful army in the world. Um or fourth large most powerful in in in Ukraine after the tractors and the the legions and everything else.

[00:44:26]>> So housewives, you know, as the CFO said, Ukrainian housewives, the the third most powerful army in Europe.

[00:44:33]>> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Absolutely. So um no I Bellarus is nothing and to be honest with you you know I look at Lucenko like I look on certain countries that want to remain like VHIC comes to mind and there know I know the circumstances are different but in the principle of um hedging right they're trying to hedge their bets by sort of staying on good reasonable terms with Moscow but also keeping the door a jar with Europe right Lucenko did I think was what was it a few months ago he he he loosened or he released a bunch political prisoners I think uh and that was sort of meant to be seen as in good favor and trying to get sanctions relief and maybe this was with the US administration but I think he's been trying to keep you know some assurances if you know day zero occurs with Putin in Moscow that he doesn't lose power as well you know he's he's he's still trying to keep his own interests ahead of Putin regardless of their unique relationship I think that's great >> I think so I don't think China wants to see um Putin fall um but also I don't think they're prepared to sign a blank check for that. Um, yeah, there are limits to what they're preparing to do.

[00:45:41]>> Well, the key thing with that is, of course, I mean, if we just bring in China bluntly, then it's the power of Siberia 2 pipeline. Putin went there with the desire to get that deal or sign and this has been going on for what the best part of a decade. I think he's been trying to get China to agree. The Chinese will not accept certain price points because they think, well, they have the leverage. the Russians don't want to accept reduced prices because they can't afford it. So Putin comes back from Beijing empty-handed despite talking about the limited friendship and all that. So >> yes, there's no Nord's dream three.

[00:46:13]That's that's that's the long-held dream. It's not been agreed and it's likely not going to happen. Um and even if they were to agree, I mean, how how long would it take to build that infrastructure? Not not within the time frame of of this war anyway. Uh that would really benefit him in any case. So he's I think he's kind of struggling here and obviously they've been trying to get the Americans to help as much as possible and there's been certain people within the Trump administration who've been quite happy to lend that assistance. Um whether it be Eldidge Colby sort of sucking troops out of Europe or trying to get sort of patriot interceptors sent other to other places, kicking wars off all over the place to try and distract. um you know it's not worked and and um Ukraine has find found ways to hit Russian oil infrastructure.

[00:47:01]So what we have to ask and this is the scary one for me is what else could China do if it's not going to go allin with Russia which I don't think it will economically if it's not going to go in militarily. I don't think China will send troops in like North Korea did.

[00:47:14]North Korea is sort of proxy for China in that sense but um they're not going to send you know their own Red Army in.

[00:47:20]What could China do to prevent a Russian collapse and uh you know still come away with a sense that uh you know they they they've actually got I don't think they actually care if if Russia sort of normally loses the war as long as China feels it's come out on top but it may feel that Putin needs a bit of assistance to sort of keep going. Well the obvious one of course is to kick off the blockade of um Taiwan.

[00:47:46]um that may be seen as as as the most effective strategy to move forward their plans for global domination um but also to aid their uh ailing ally Putin which would really take the Americans attention away uh from from Europe when it's already taken away to an extent. Um but that would put the nail in the coffin of that. The other attack of course would be for Russia to u really step up attacks on Europe so that we start stockpiling weapons interceptors and uh possibly our economies come under extreme duress um from uh hybrid attacks and sabotage which would then allow them to you know step up their um political psychological campaign. I think there's evidence of that happening. There's evidence of them trying to already launder their reputation through the Venice bianali through the uh trying to get you know various disciplines like gymnastics uh readmitted into world sport. These things don't happen accidentally. We have to imagine that huge huge funding has gone into uh these uh things, you know, massive bribes, massive networks of of supporters, probably massive compromat behind the scenes to try to rehabilitate Russia.

[00:49:01]So, I think they're they're starting to hedge, they're starting to say, okay, we need a we need a post-war strategy either to integrate ourel in Europe and to to whitewash our crimes. and that that's kind of playing out. But they say also maybe maybe that's not the way to go. We'll invest in it, but that may maybe actually attacking Europe and trying to break it up into a mosaic of states, some pro-Russian, some anti-Russian, but essentially not being a coherent force to fight back. That could be the other way it goes. At the moment, I suspect they're building both of those strategies and and may not have decided exactly which way to go, but how China reacts to Taiwan may decide it. If Putin sees that going on, he may say, "Okay, well, this is this is the chance, right? Let's let's let's hit Europe when it's uh largely undefended."

[00:49:52]>> Yeah, I you know, I think that's a good um a good uh point to to sort of wrap um I think soon. But I I would just add, you know, look, I for the years I've spent studying China, um it's it's very much an undeided um it's very undecided what China wants.

[00:50:12]Um do they want to be a global hegeimon?

[00:50:15]Do they want to just be the regional leader or do they just want to be a status quo power? This concept, you know, they benefit from the status quo, the system as it is. um you know they don't really care where they get their energy, where they get their whatever, you know, where they can prosper from as long as they can. So they don't care who runs Russia as long as Russia is inherently useful to them. Their relationship is a strategic convenience.

[00:50:39]It's a utility for the Chinese. Um I I think they've got they want Russia is essentially a vassel of China now.

[00:50:47]That's they achieved their strategic objective. Yeah.

[00:50:51]No, largely speaking, I I I I wonder I mean there was one comment I read in the news, I think it was Reuters yesterday, and she had apparently told Trump that he thought Putin would come to regret the war. Now, that's about as sort of animated a comment you get from President Xiinping something, isn't it? I mean, that's unexpected.

[00:51:11]But I think the last point I'll just end and I hate to end it on this tang.

[00:51:15]>> He is unfortunately the deciding factor which is I think a large proportion of whether China is willing to support Russia depends on Trump's actions over Taiwan. I made a video a couple of days ago about Trump's comments because he's basically putting Taiwan under the crossfire. Now, if Trump is to support Taiwan with military aid and and and and change the recognition of Taiwan as a as a you know, this strategic ambiguity, the Taiwan relations act, then the the that's going to incentivize Xi Jinping and the CCP to really, I think, up the pressure on Taiwan, which will obviously then that will need that that will trickle down to their relationship with Moscow and how that impacts Russia visa v Ukraine. it all quickly becomes intertwined even more than it already is because of Trump's uh decision-m. Um so I >> I think it's as good as abandoned Taiwan. I mean it reminds me of the Forklands which I do remember which is when we withdrew our destroyers and our nominal protection of the islands that gave a huge green signal uh to Argentina to invade. uh we essentially uh removed the deterrence and and created the the idea that we were no longer interested in in in that territory. Well, Trump has just signaled exactly the same around Taiwan that we're not going to defend it. We don't care. It's not that important. It it's a massive green signal. In the same way, I'm afraid to say that Biden gave a green signal to Putin uh prior to the invasion of Ukraine, which was to say, "Well, we don't agree with this. We know what you're up to, but we're not going to prevent you from doing it." that unfortunately in politics that removal of ambiguity and power of deterrence is is a is is a green light to invasion and I think Trump's done that.

[00:53:00]>> No, very very astute point. But Jonathan, it's been an absolute pleasure talking to you for uh best part of an hour and um uh we'll definitely have to do this again. Maybe we can grab, you know, another uh Russia Ukraine orientated uh creator colleague to to join us.

[00:53:15]>> Yes, that'll be great. Let's do that.

[00:53:17]And um yeah, I I have to actually bounce now because I have another stream that I've scheduled in 10 minutes. So on Iran, we're returning to Iran.

[00:53:27]>> Hope you have time to relax as well based on where you are. You know, you need some time, some down time as well.

[00:53:31]Yeah, >> I do. But um lots happening and the world waits for no man. So we've got to um keep going. But uh yeah, do be sure everyone >> Yeah, this opportunity. It's great to to be here.

[00:53:43]>> No, absolutely. We'll uh we'll do it again. And um as I say, everyone do check out the Silicon Curtain. Jonathan, I mean, you tell me to to to take a moment to reprieve, but you're hosting guest after guest and all these podcasts which I I don't even know how you manage to put out like three or four a day sometimes or two a day.

[00:53:59]>> I've got I've got a twin, you know. I've got a twin. It's that I don't tell anyone about.

[00:54:03]>> Oh, nice.

[00:54:04]>> No, I don't really behind the scenes. Um but yeah, thanks a lot, Jonathan.

[00:54:08]Everyone for watching. Cheers.

[00:54:10]>> Take care everyone. Bye bye.