البعد الرابع - مفاوضات واشنطن وطهران.. هل تقترب النهاية؟ - مع ميراشا غازي بتاريخ 24/5/2026

Added: 2026-05-27

[00:00:14]Amid American optimism about signing the agreement with Iran within days, Trump tells negotiators in his administration not to rush into concluding the agreement, considering time to be on the side of the United States. He says that the negotiations are proceeding constructively and in an organized manner, and stresses that the naval blockade will remain in effect until an agreement is reached. The Iranian president announces his readiness to reassure the world that Iran is not seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, while Iranian sources deny Tehran's intention to abandon its stockpile of highly enriched uranium. They also say that the Strait of Hormuz will remain in their hands. This is the fourth dimension. I am Mirashghazi, and welcome.

[00:01:20]US President Donald Trump has told his negotiators not to rush into an agreement with Iran, stating that time is on Washington's side. However, he simultaneously describes the talks as constructive and organized, and the relationship with Tehran as heading in a professional and constructive direction. He then sets his clear condition: the naval blockade on Iran will remain in place until an agreement is reached. In other words, Trump is not closing the door to diplomacy, but he wants it to be diplomacy under pressure. Washington, through a senior US official, says that the agreement will not be signed today and will take several days, and that the Iranian regime is slow and confusing, refusing to allow Iran to impose any fees or conditions for crossing the Strait of Hormuz.

[00:02:18]Netanyahu says that he discussed the memorandum of understanding to open the strait and the nuclear negotiations with Trump, and agreed with him that any agreement must eliminate the nuclear threat by dismantling enrichment sites.

[00:02:33]The removal of highly enriched uranium is the crux of the Iranian nuclear issue.

[00:02:41]Iranian President Masoud Pezekchian says Iran is ready to reassure the world that it is not seeking nuclear weapons, while an Iranian source tells Reuters that Tehran has not agreed to hand over its stockpile of highly enriched uranium, despite reports of Iranian officials agreeing to relinquish it. Meanwhile, in Hormuz, the Tasnim news agency reports a memorandum of understanding that would restore shipping traffic to pre-war levels within a month, paving the way for the lifting of sanctions on Iranian oil. However, an advisor to the Supreme Leader confirms that control of the strait will remain in Iranian hands. So, we are facing a potential agreement that doesn't resolve everything but tests three equations: Will Hormuz be reopened without Iran losing its leverage? Will the escalation be frozen without Washington easing its pressure? And will Iran's pledge not to possess nuclear weapons translate into a de facto concession on highly enriched uranium?

[00:03:57]It seems the protracted conflict between Iran and the US is nearing its end after the US president announced that his country and Iran are getting closer. The agreement that the United States and Iran are close to signing includes a 60-day extension of the ceasefire, with the possibility of further extension by mutual consent. The memorandum of understanding includes commitments from Iran never to seek to acquire a nuclear weapon, to enter into negotiations regarding the suspension of its uranium enrichment program and the elimination of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium. Within 60 days, the Strait of Hormuz will be opened without any transit fees. Iran also agrees to remove the mines it has deployed in the strait to allow freedom of navigation. In return, within the same period, the United States agrees to negotiate the lifting of sanctions and the release of frozen Iranian funds within 60 days. These steps will only be implemented within a final agreement that can be verified. The memorandum of understanding also states clearly that the war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon will end. However, the American forces that have been mobilized in recent months will remain in the region for the entire 60-day period and will not withdraw unless a final agreement is reached. Let's go back in time a little. In 1979, Khomeini arrived in Iran on a French plane and declared the overthrow of the Shah's regime, which was loyal to the Americans at the time. Since then, the United States has been strangling Iran with sanctions, sometimes tightening them and sometimes loosening them, all subject to the course and nature of events and clashes. 47 years have passed during which Iran has been subjected to more than 5,000 sanctions, as estimates indicate, and has thus become the second most sanctioned country in the world after Russia.

[00:06:09]Washington was not alone in sanctioning Tehran; the United Nations did so as well, the European Union and major powers, headed by Britain and France. These sanctions have left many repercussions on the Iranian economy, as the figures show.

[00:06:29]Iran's GDP did not exceed $300 billion in 2025, after having surpassed $500 billion in 2017.

[00:06:43]Successive rounds of sanctions targeted several sectors, most notably the oil sector, as well as liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipping networks. They also affected government and private institutions and entities accused of facilitating and financing oil and petrochemical trade.

[00:07:02]The sanctions also extended to Iran's assets abroad, which became frozen or held in a complex global network. These funds are estimated at around $100 billion. China holds the largest share of frozen Iranian assets, amounting to $20 billion, followed by India with approximately $7 billion. $6 billion is held in Iraq, the United States holds $2 billion, and Japan and Luxembourg each hold $1.5 billion. Some might ask why these countries do not release these funds to Iran. The answer lies in the fear of US sanctions and isolation from the global financial system.

[00:07:51]In any case, it is important to note that the 2015 nuclear agreement allowed for Tehran has recovered some of its frozen funds abroad, but Trump's withdrawal from the agreement in 2018 meant that the freeze restrictions were reinstated on Iran's foreign assets.

[00:08:48]Now, let's discuss these developments with my guests. I welcome my guest from Washington, Dr. Aqeel Abbas, Professor of Political Science. Welcome, and from Tehran, Dr. Hossein Ravan, Professor of International Relations at the University of Tehran. Welcome to the fourth dimension. Dr. Aqeel, let's begin. Before we discuss the prospects of this memorandum of understanding, how do you view it, given that the United States seems close to approving it? Is it an understanding of necessity after failing to achieve a military victory?

[00:09:32]Thank you for this opportunity. First, greetings to you and your esteemed guest in Tehran. Does this mean a framework agreement? It seems that if President Trump proceeds, there are doubts that he will, especially after what was reported about him today. It seems the whole matter is threatened, but if it does proceed, it will be due to the pressure President Trump is under: the inability to open the Strait of Hormuz, the impact of energy prices in America, the internal American political equation, and the upcoming midterm elections.

[00:10:08]President Trump fears losing both houses of Congress to Republicans. This could paralyze his presidency for the next two years, perhaps even leading to impeachment. While impeachment wouldn't succeed, it would politically [ __ ] him. Will this agreement go through? In my view, there was a deliberate attempt to create ambiguity. Some aspects of the agreement emerged in the public sphere as a trial balloon, and this trial balloon has sparked considerable anger among Republicans, including allies of President Trump like Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the former Secretary of State and current chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. They argue that this agreement is unacceptable and worse than the 2015 agreement. They claim that Iran is being given funds, its frozen assets are being unfrozen, and it is being allowed to export oil, which they interpret as a return to its nuclear program without any solid Iranian guarantees of dismantling it.

[00:11:12]Therefore, President Trump said something today that I believe he is trying to use to undermine the agreement if he senses strong opposition. He stated in his conversation with Netanyahu that he will not lift the naval blockade unless the agreement is finalized, meaning a 60-day period for Iranian-American dialogue following a ceasefire. This means that to end the war, this contradicts what has been leaked. What has been leaked is that the agreement involves lifting the sanctions, lifting the American naval blockade, and lifting the Iranian blockade on the Strait of Hormuz. I imagine that President Trump is holding something back. If he feels that this agreement will harm him politically, he can overturn it by stipulating the continuation of the naval blockade, and this is something that Iran will certainly reject. I mean, without a doubt, yes, in any case, as I mentioned, this agreement, or memorandum of understanding as it is referred to, seems to be, as close as it is to a consensus, also close to collapse.

[00:12:29]Tasnim News Agency just spoke about the possibility of the draft agreement with America collapsing, and specifically said that the issue of frozen Iranian funds is still unresolved. The Iranian Tasnim News Agency also says that America is obstructing some parts of the draft agreement. With that, my question to you, Dr. Hussein, welcome back with us, how does Iran view this memorandum of understanding? Is it also an understanding of necessity for Iran, or is it an understanding that is profitable for Iran?

[00:13:04]In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. Greetings to you, Dr. Aqeel, and to the esteemed viewers. I mean, firstly, America wanted to overthrow the regime. In Iran now, they agree with this regime, and this is clearly a major setback for the American objectives, which sought to establish a regime loyal to them in Iran, namely, controlling Iranian oil, etc. This, firstly, reflects the firmness of the Iranian position. Secondly, more than three weeks ago, Iran proposed that the war must end first, then discussions on the nuclear issue could begin.

[00:13:56]America said the nuclear issue first, ending the war second.

[00:14:02]Now, the memorandum of understanding states ending the war first.

[00:14:08]This is also true; it came within the framework of the sequence demanded by Iran. This reflects that the issue of the Strait of Hormuz was putting immense pressure not only on the United States domestically, in terms of fuel prices, inflation, and stock market crashes, etc., but also globally. Ultimately, this strait was open, and America, through its alliance with the Zionist entity, accused Iran of causing its closure. Therefore, America's priority now is opening this strait.

[00:14:46]Opening this strait is in Iran's hands; America cannot manipulate it. They can't say the embargo will remain.

[00:14:54]How can the embargo remain when there is a fundamental clause in the agreement to end the embargo?

[00:15:03]The possibility of selling Iranian oil to other countries. I imagine that the primary issue in this understanding is ending the aggression, in addition to lifting the freeze on some Iranian funds.

[00:15:26]This is also on the table and within the framework of the negotiations. It is true that America said that it could lift the freeze on a quarter of the frozen Iranian savings, while Iran is demanding half. This disagreement is part of the process and must be agreed upon. In any case, I imagine that this understanding is in Iran's favor, whether in terms of its convening or in the sequence of all the issues and the resolution of the disputes within it. Okay. Yes. Okay, Dr. Aqeel, if Trump proceeds with this memorandum of understanding or agreement— meaning memoranda that freeze escalation and effectively abandon the strategy of negotiating under fire, meaning ending the war and then negotiating, as Dr. Hussein said—can Washington ultimately guarantee concessions from Iran, especially on the most important issue for Trump, the nuclear program? Of course not. If this framework agreement or memorandum of understanding is finalized, we don't yet know exactly what concessions Iran has made.

[00:16:50]There's talk about removing enriched uranium, but that alone isn't enough. I believe it will be a political defeat for President Trump because the war started for reasons unrelated to its beginning. Secondly, if the war ends with a swap—lifting the naval blockade in exchange for lifting the blockade on the Strait of Hormuz—and then negotiations begin, there are no guarantees that the negotiations will resolve the problem, meaning a mutually agreeable agreement.

[00:17:24]What if the two main parties don't agree? And what about the missile issue, the issue of proxies? There are many complaints from Iran; they have heavily targeted the Gulf states with Iranian shelling. The issue of ballistic missiles has become fundamental for them. The UAE has been struck three times more times than Israel by Iran using ballistic missiles and drones. These countries also want their position to be clear and focused on negotiation, not on the idea of ​​an Islamic NATO that Iran speaks of. It's not like we'll strike you today, and after the war, we'll make a mutual defense agreement. Things don't work like that. There's suspicion and doubt. I think even President Trump can push through this. He's dreaming about the problem of war, but the tension in the region will remain high because the fundamental issues haven't been resolved. Even assuming it's the nuclear issue—and this is difficult because Iran and the United States have been negotiating for 15 years without a solution—there are significant differences. But let's suppose it's resolved in 60 days. This is an exaggeration, excessive optimism, and the facts don't support it. The ballistic missile issue will remain, the issue of proxies will remain, the tension will remain, the tension in the region will remain, and perhaps this will pave the way for a third war.

[00:18:56]Ah, ah, okay. Dr. Hussein, I'll ask you specifically about the nuclear issue. Will Iran give up uranium, Your Excellency? Enrichment in exchange for lifting the blockade on its ports and lifting any partial or complete sanctions later, and ending the war—that is, implementing the equation that Iran has been demanding, which is the sequential equation for reaching an agreement.

[00:19:24]In the nuclear field, the agreed-upon solution is as follows: First, America recognizes Iran's right to enrichment.

[00:19:33]In return, Iran voluntarily freezes enrichment for several years, to be agreed upon. This is the first part, the issue of enrichment. The second issue is the uranium enriched to 60%. Its disposal can be within the framework of facilitating it into uranium enriched to 20% for medical use under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency, or it can be transferred to Russia or China within the framework of an agreement between Iran and these countries. For America to demand that it be sent to America is not going to happen, and Iran has stated that the issue of its disposal is on the table and possible. However, for it to be handed over to America to create a spectacle for Trump to claim he went to Iran and seized this uranium to create an electoral controversy—this is something Iran will not do and completely rejects. Therefore, the nuclear issue is resolvable. So, before time runs out, and before... Returning to the question, Dr. Aqeel, I also ask you, Dr. Hussein, about the Strait of Hormuz. The advisor to the Iranian Supreme Leader says that the administration of the Strait of Hormuz will remain in Iran's hands to guarantee its security, according to the memorandum of understanding. Dr. Hussein, Iran will open the strait, and it will open it without fees, as Trump says. Will Iran give up the Hormuz card? I mean, firstly, will Iran open the Strait of Hormuz? Yes. Will Iran impose fees? No. Iran says that, firstly, the passage, going and returning, has been through Iran since the 1950s, and Iran has not received any fees from any party in return for doing this.

[00:21:44]Now, Iran says that instead of fees, there could be some kind of environmental insurance for ships. This is being discussed now internally. The Iranian Supreme Leader said that the strait will remain in Iran's hands.

[00:22:05]Yes, meaning that the administration of the strait was and still is in Iran's hands. The issue is not new. No, it was also in the past. Iran was the one that had joint administration with Oman.

[00:22:22]Oman did not fulfill this duty. It should be like this, right? But since the deep side is towards Iran, Iran was handling this matter. But regarding the issue of fees or anything else, the leader said... Arqashi clearly stated that the Strait of Hormuz will remain under Iranian control, but this will not be in violation of international law. This is the framework within which the Strait's revenues will be managed.

[00:22:54]Okay, Dr. Aqeel, also, according to what we know about the Memorandum of Understanding so far, if Trump proceeds with this Memorandum of Understanding, will the Strait of Hormuz be Trump's gift to Iran in exchange for a nuclear agreement he deems acceptable?

[00:23:16]Trump cannot do this. The Strait of Hormuz is bigger than Trump, bigger than the United States.

[00:23:21]There is international consensus. Iran is alone in what it says.

[00:23:24]China said it wants an open strait according to international law. The Europeans want an open strait. The Asians and even the Americans want it.

[00:23:34]This is being used as a pressure tactic. There is no such thing as joint management of the strait in international law.

[00:23:41]This is an international strait. There is no management between Oman and Iran. International law has settled the matter.

[00:23:49]Iran has the right to plan, and Oman has the right to plan. Rescuing ships is subject to fees if ships sink or experience a water leak. If a ship is disabled, it can be towed. In emergency situations, it receives fees for specific services provided to ships. These ships are exposed to damage, malfunction, or environmental problems, etc. This is how international law applies. Of course, regarding the planning of routes, Iran has limited sovereignty in this area, but no sovereignty over passage. It cannot charge fees, nor can it prevent ships, warships, or aircraft from passing.

[00:24:37]International law is clear on this point. There is limited sovereignty, with the exception of the right of free passage, also known as transit. Therefore, there is an international agreement that international law applies to the Strait of Hormuz just as it applies to other straits. Iran may have been forced, under pressure, to use the issue of the Strait of Hormuz, as it lacks military options to confront America and Israel. Perhaps it wants to reach an agreement regarding the Strait of Hormuz, but this agreement will not include permanent arrangements concerning the Strait of Hormuz that differ from the existing arrangements for straits in other countries. There is international rejection, global rejection, and regional rejection. The Gulf states will reject any agreement based on Iran's commitments, whether within this memorandum of understanding or any potential agreement concerning the Strait of Hormuz, without any on-the- ground military arrangements, meaning without a US military presence for a specific period in the Strait. Control without clear mechanisms—do you think Trump intends to deal with the Strait of Hormuz as a complex issue, with all its details? I mean, in my view, he's not aiming for that. He wants to use it as leverage in a naval blockade. But the problem Iran will face isn't the United States. The United States doesn't receive much oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz. We must remember what NATO and the European countries have said, and the draft resolution at the UN Security Council. If the war ends, if America lifts its naval blockade, Iran won't be able to control the strait. An international resolution will pass stating that this constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The Europeans have told the Americans explicitly that once the war ends, it ends. If the strait remains closed, we will open it by military force. Iran will then be facing Europe and many other parties. I believe all the talk about the Strait of Hormuz is for political purposes and to exert pressure to end this war. Ultimately, the strait will return to its pre-war status, otherwise Iran will face the entire world, and it will be difficult for them to continue this confrontation. They will lose allies, and the strait will be secured by military force, against the will of the international community. Her will, and I believe the leadership in Iran understands this well, and she will not try to challenge the world. She is only using it now to respond to the United States.

[00:27:16]But after things are over and the war is over, it will be difficult for her to continue with such a policy. Ah yes, well Dr. Hussein, many believe that this 60-day truce is sufficient time for Iran to reposition itself, rearrange its affairs, and also prove the strength of its regime. That is, it will exploit this time or try to gain this time, not for the purpose of reaching an agreement, but for the purpose of repositioning itself.

[00:27:51]What is your opinion?

[00:27:55]No, in my view, firstly, America was negotiating while saying for over a decade that the military option was on the table. Obama said it, Biden said it, and Trump said it. Now, the military option has been exhausted.

[00:28:17]America fought Iran for 40 days, and Iran withstood the pressure. Therefore, the military option and the military threat are no longer as influential in the equation as they once were.

[00:28:36]We are now facing a different situation. Iran has withstood the pressure, and this has strategic value.

[00:28:45]Negotiations with the Americans are taking place in a different context than before when America was threatening and acting aggressively, etc. Another point: let me remind Dr. Aqeel about the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits.

[00:29:05]These are natural straits, but Turkey charges fees. The issue isn't as he described. Is the Strait of Hormuz an international strait? Yes, it is. But can Iran, which regulates traffic, collect fees? Yes, it can.

[00:29:31]If the Law of the Sea, international law, is the way it is, then this isn't possible. Dr. Hussein, thank you for your time.

[00:29:38]Let me say that Iran signed the 1958 Law of the Sea Convention but not the 1982 Convention.

[00:29:48]Thank you very much. Dr. Ali, thank you for your time and for being with us on Al-Sharq TV's "The Fourth Dimension."

[00:29:54]Dr. Hussein Rawan, Professor of International Relations at Tehran University. Special thanks to Dr. Aqeel Abbas, Professor of Political Science, my guest from Washington. Thank you both very much, our viewers. A short break, and then we'll discuss the Republicans' reactions to the potential agreement with Iran.

[00:30:31]Welcome back to "The Fourth Dimension."

[00:30:34]Reports and statements by US President Donald Trump regarding the imminent agreement with Iran have angered some of the most important members of the Republican Party, while others have praised the move, which could end the war permanently. We'll monitor the most prominent reactions to the agreement with Iran.

[00:31:55]Joining me from Washington is Mr. Adolfo Franco, a strategist in the US Republican Party.

[00:32:01]Welcome, Mr. Adolfo.

[00:32:05]Mr. Adolfo, to begin, what is the true extent of the opposition within the Republican Party regarding Trump's approach to the agreement with Iran? And when we mention names like Lindsey Graham and Katz, what do these names signify? How might their opinions or objections be reflected in Trump's decision, a decision of this magnitude?

[00:32:32]Thank you, Mirasha, for hosting me. First of all, it's true there are divisions within the party, and there are always differences of opinion. This is normal in a democracy like the United States, not only between the two parties but also within the same party.

[00:32:50]But let me talk about these two people I know well. They are leaders in the Republican Party, and don't forget that both of them ran for the presidency of the United States. They are also heads of some committees and are well-known Republican conservatives. There's also Senator Wicker and other senators who carry weight, of course, in the American political world.

[00:33:20]Israel, for example, is also disappointed that any agreement won't permanently change the situation with Iran, from regime change to complete surrender.

[00:33:38]All of these issues are a disappointment to conservatives in the Republican Party. But you have others who will celebrate such a step, especially independents and those with more moderate views.

[00:33:54]Today's polls in the United States indicate that the majority supports ending the conflict because people are concerned about high gasoline prices and have daily concerns. But there is indeed a segment of the population... He believes the operation should have been ended, and they support Netanyahu's viewpoint. They are present, but they don't constitute the majority. The majority is with the president.

[00:34:21]Ah, okay, but you say the majority is with the president, Mr. Adolfo. But we know the importance of Lindsey Graham specifically. So, let's talk about Lindsey Graham and his influence on Trump's policies in general, and especially foreign policy. To what extent do you think this wave of objection, represented by Lindsey Graham specifically, can actually influence the course of the American decision regarding Iran? And do you think that Trump's statement a little while ago, instructing his team not to rush and that time is on the side of the United States, is perhaps a result of the pressure he is facing among the Republicans? I do n't think this matter is related to any pressure from the Republicans. I know Lindsey Graham, and just so you know, I share his opinion. In fact, I agree with him, and with Senator Cruz.

[00:35:33]I am closer to them, but I am objective, and I know that the majority of Republicans care about the midterm elections. They care about winning a majority of seats.

[00:35:44]But again, I support Senator Graham's views. But I would welcome this agreement for other reasons. I also know that in every administration, you have different opinions. For example, Secretary of State Rubio is more in agreement with Ted Cruz and Lindsey Graham.

[00:36:04]Within this administration, you have Stephen Miller, for instance, the White House Deputy Chief of Staff, who also shares their view. But you also have Vice President Vance and others with different perspectives. So there are differences of opinion. Therefore, I think the American president is trying to have it both ways, meaning he's trying to find a middle ground. We must understand that President Trump is a businessman. When he talks about negotiations, he talks about reaching a deal. He's a dealmaker, so he's always in favor of reaching an agreement, not military force, even though he used military force this time. But the goal, from Trump's perspective, was to get to the negotiating table. We must remember that Mr. Trump's approach is different from that of Ted Cruz or Senator Graham, and therefore he has a different agenda. As a strategist, I know there are different voices, and it's important for President Trump to listen to these different concerns and fears, even from Prime Minister Netanyahu, who is not an American citizen. But ultimately, he will balance domestic political considerations with his own opinion. The special one who is actually against the war, ah, thank you very much, Mr. Adolfo, for your time and for being with us, Mr. Adolfo Franco, the strategist in the American Republican Party, thank you very much. A short break, viewers, and then we will discuss the Strait of Hormuz issue in the negotiations between Iran and America and the role of the Gulf states.

[00:38:14]Welcome back to the Fourth Dimension. So, the Strait of Hormuz card may be the most important one in Iran's hands, and if an agreement is reached, it will open the strait, which represents the most prominent economic artery for the Gulf states. Let me consult here with the advisor, the artificial intelligence advisor in the Fourth Dimension, to understand the importance of this step.

[00:38:36]Welcome, advisor. In your opinion, what is the importance of reopening the Strait of Hormuz for the Gulf? Welcome, Mirasha, and to the viewers of the Fourth Dimension.

[00:38:46]Certainly, it is a gain, but it is not enough from the Gulf's perspective. Opening Hormuz temporarily does not mean solving the crisis. What is required is for the strait to become a neutral passage, not a bargaining chip that is closed and opened with every crisis. The Gulf wants stable freedom of navigation, not a 60-day maritime truce. Ah, so what is the greatest danger perceived on The Gulf states, in the current proposed format, are at risk of dealing with the Strait of Hormuz as part of an American-Iranian deal only, while the first to be harmed by any disruption is the Gulf. Therefore, the Gulf states must have a direct voice in any arrangements concerning the strait, rather than being merely a party waiting for the results of the negotiations.

[00:39:29]Iran says that the management of Hermes will remain in its hands to ensure its security. Can this be reconciled with the interests of the Gulf today?

[00:39:39]Yes, if we separate security from control, every country has the right to speak about its security, but no party has the right to turn its security into a threat to the security of others. The formula acceptable to the Gulf states is not to hand over the Strait to Iran, but rather to establish a monitoring mechanism and guarantees in which the bordering and affected countries participate, and to prevent the passage of the Strait.

[00:39:59]Ah, thank you, Advisor. I will, of course, discuss all these ideas, as usual, with my guest, and I welcome my guest from Riyadh, Dr. Mutlaq Al-Mutairi, Professor of Political Media at King Saud University.

[00:40:11]Welcome to our program, Doctor, in the fourth dimension.

[00:40:14]Doctor, according to the Memorandum of Understanding, as far as we know about it so far, does it seem that the situation in the Strait of Hormuz will return to what it was before the war and will be in the interest of the countries and the Gulf? Good evening, Professor.

[00:40:30]Good evening to your esteemed audience. There is no doubt that the current situation in the Strait of Hormuz means the consolidation of a certain reality, and this reality is that the Strait is controlled by Iran, and Iran also uses the Strait as a bargaining chip, meaning it is a pressure tactic and a negotiating tool that it cannot relinquish without any compensation. The compensation is negotiation. Regarding the nuclear program, there is no doubt that the Strait of Hormuz now means, or rather, discussing the Strait of Hormuz means discussing it in a way that carries many threats, especially to the security of the Gulf, particularly to the strategic interests of the Gulf states. These states are the most harmed by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz because the strategic commodity upon which the Gulf economy depends is energy, which passes through this waterway.

[00:41:20]Herein also lies the danger, and the danger also lies in the nature of the negotiations between the United States and Tehran.

[00:41:27]We know that the Gulf Cooperation Council states are pushing for a resumption of negotiations and a diplomatic solution, meaning that they are against the military option and in favor of a settlement that comes through negotiation and dialogue. But ultimately, what will be the formula of this settlement? Will the settlement guarantee Tehran's presence or control over this strait? We know that Tehran's control over the strait is also a threat to Gulf interests. Gulf development depends on attracting investors, on tourism, on all of this, and it cannot be achieved without it. This is being realized, in terms of a developmental concept, and Tehran possesses control and dominance over this strait.

[00:42:13]So, what are the options for the Gulf states, Dr. Mutlaq? Can it be said initially that the Gulf states, despite their role in pushing for a peaceful and diplomatic solution and the weight of this role, are, in terms of interests, outside this memorandum of understanding? Is this possible to say? And consequently, what are these states' options for dealing specifically with their rights in the strait, especially freedom of navigation?

[00:42:45]And of course, now, like your program, there must also be a fourth dimension for the Gulf Cooperation Council states, so that it is far removed from Israel, far removed from the United States of America, and far removed from Tehran.

[00:42:55]But do they also possess these options, meaning are they compatible with the conditions and with the American objectives for a ceasefire and reaching a comprehensive truce? Are they also aligned with the American objectives?

[00:43:05]And are they also aligned with the Israeli objectives? There is no doubt that the Gulf Cooperation Council states are in favor of, in terms of the dimension, a ceasefire and reaching a truce.

[00:43:13]This is required and maintains the security of the region. But what are the details now? Do the details also represent a threat, a strategic threat, to the Gulf Cooperation Council states?

[00:43:24]I think the answer is yes, especially Any settlement will not include the factions supported by Tehran, which are currently present and powerful, and they also possess the means to use weapons. This poses a danger to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries as well. We know that the problem is a problem in the Arab world.

[00:43:47]We, as a problem, are dealing with the Iranian project, which has created this great chaos in our region. There is no doubt that the current negotiations do not address this issue. For the negotiations to succeed, this matter must not be addressed. This is the dilemma for the GCC. What dimension will the GCC countries add to ensure their future security? Just a while ago, artificial intelligence consultant Dr. Mutlaq, whom you must have heard, said that there is a formula that could be acceptable to the Gulf states, which is, of course, not handing over the Strait to Iran, but rather a monitoring mechanism and guarantees. Do you believe that the Gulf states can participate in a monitoring mechanism and obtain guarantees from whom?

[00:44:38]First, you must pay attention to the fact that control of the Strait must also be based on geography, and there must be political considerations. This refers to the security arrangements within the Strait, including the Gulf region, and also involves international cooperation, whether with the European Union or China. This is considered a waterway, not an international one, not just a regional one. It's a special regional passage within the region, but it's also an international passage requiring international protection and security.

[00:45:15]If Iran were to gain sole control over this strait, I believe it would threaten the stability and interests of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. This would also contradict the GCC's development strategy, which, as we mentioned, is based on tourism, attracting foreign investors, and internal investments. If this strait falls into Tehran's hands, that's the real threat. Ah, I understand the point, Doctor. Thank you for your time, and please excuse my interruption. The episode is over. Dr. Mutlaq Al-Mutairi, Professor of Political Media at King Saud University. Thank you very much for your time. Thank you, Professor.

[00:45:56]We have reached the end of tonight's episode of "The Fourth Dimension." Thank you for watching, and I'll see you in "The Eastern Circle."