Putin Is Losing His Grip on Russia

本站添加: 2026-05-22

[00:00:00]What happens to a dictatorship when the dictator just stops dictating? As strange as it sounds, that's what's happening in Russia, according to a former Moscow insider whose new book chronicles the country's changing power structure. Now, I got curious about the Russia situation a couple months ago when security agencies shut down major parts of the internet, causing mass disruption and outrage. I figured it was one of Vladimir Putin's schemes to tighten his personal rule. But today's guest, Sasha Proenko, says it's actually the opposite. Putin is so consumed with Ukraine, he's largely stopped governing his own country, leaving different factions of the regime to battle each other for control behind the scenes.

[00:00:52]The result is a creeping chaos as oligarchs, technocrats, and even the powerful Siloviks who control security don't know what rules they're supposed to follow. Sasha told me some remarkable stories about the lengths Russian businessmen are going to dodge surveillance, her own crisis of conscience over the Ukraine war, and the changing social contract in a deeply broken country. I'm John Baitman and this is the world unpacked.

[00:01:26]Alexandra Pocapeno, Sasha, welcome to the world unpacked.

[00:01:31]>> Hi, thanks for having me here.

[00:01:33]>> So, we're here today to talk about what's going on inside Russia. The big news event that's driving this conversation, of course, is the so-called internet shutdown that Russians have experienced lately. Can you just bring us up to speed? What is this? Why is it significant? How are people responding?

[00:01:51]>> Internet shutdowns uh becomes some sort of a new reality for uh Russia after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine for Russia after 202022 when drone attacks uh from Ukraine intensified into Russia. In some regions uh regional authorities started to power off mobile internet as a part of um defense uh over uh drones. But uh and it was quite it was uncomfortable but uh explained with security and safety and people get this explanation. In 20126 uh the picture is different. In March uh there was a combination of uh uh uh shutting down very popular messenger Telegram which was used not only by majority of population it was the second uh messenger uh by popularity. First was WhatsApp which was also uh shut down. It was used by authorities for their private uh and sometimes working conversations. It was used at the front line by Russian military and it was used by bloggers and this so-called Z community. So volunteers who are assisting military at the front line. So it was quite essential for a population uh for even patriotic population. So the authorities decided to turn off Telegram and and um and persuade everyone to go to state designed, state created messenger called Max. And then uh the suddenly without no explanation given the internet, the mobile internet was turned off in Moscow city for 19 days.

[00:03:31]Uh and what does it mean for a city which is so digitalized as Moscow? So you cannot use uh navigation. You cannot pay with your card because uh payment because payment terminals are not working. Some ATMs machines are not working. You cannot use public toilet uh because internet of things works this way or your car cannot leave the garage because internet of things requires mobile internet and you cannot call to the door of the garage and and you cannot open this. uh and this was and and and and it's very important that no explanation was given. So business has losses and all types of immediate losses and uh profits which was lost because uh they were forced to uh to accept only cash and Moscow is quite cashless city.

[00:04:24]Why now uh Vladimir Putin has been in power in some form for over 25 years.

[00:04:31]The country has been on a war footing now for over four years. These restrictions are more intense than previous internet restrictions. Why now?

[00:04:42]I think uh because they can because the uh the the the the foundation of relationship between the state uh between civil state bureaucracy and so-called uh celix in Russia so-called enforcement agencies like federal security services and others uh become different after the war and uh Silvix uh gained additional responsibility uh because of uh because they because now they have the monopoly on defining what is state interest and what is a state security.

[00:05:21]So uh the logic uh of FSB is that there is a lot of wrong in internet. There is a lot of uh information uh which is damaging the foundations of the regime.

[00:05:35]Uh there is uh a lot of threats of uh mobile internet uh which allows drones to which allows Ukraine to use drones over Russia. Uh there is a lot of forbidden information spreading via telegram and Russia is at war against the uh against NATO against the western uh western narrative against western allies and uh and and turn off internet.

[00:06:04]That's the way how they think they can um they they can achieve their goals.

[00:06:10]They are not protecting population but as as any kind of bureaucracy and FSB is an enforcement bureaucracy they are achieving their KPI. So no one knows about the threats uh about external threats. So we are doing our um our job well. I can bring you one example. Just recently there was a parade in Moscow uh very sacred event for Putin. Uh it's a Moscow celebrated victory day.

[00:06:34]>> Mhm.

[00:06:34]>> And the way how >> this is to commemorate World War II.

[00:06:38]>> To commemorate World War II. Yes. But the way how Russian authorities prepared to the parade was a real show. So they just um they uh turned off internet um both mobile and um landline internet.

[00:06:57]They issued a statement for foreign diplomats um that Russia is going to attack KEF if Kiev will attack the parade. So remove your stuff uh from Ukrainian capital. Uh they uh shortened the parade, cancelled um military vehicles uh colog uh because of security issues and it was very very well seen from from here from abroad. I mean and uh you can uh see the coverage in western media uh how pathetic uh from from uh our side of the border the parade uh was and and the behavior of of the Kremlin uh was but inside Russia uh Russian media Russian state media which are mostly controlled from the Kremlin they uh they picture they pointed absolutely different picture picture of glorious commemoration that uh there was a parade There was a there was uh different event commemorative events that nation united and not even a word about how ridiculous it was u uh how ridiculous the preparations was seen.

[00:08:06]>> Tell us about the way the populace is reacting to this increased securization of Russian society from the parade to the internet shutdown. On one level, it seems like there's pockets of, if not resistance, frustration, outrage, and popular dissension. Uh, tell us about what you're seeing and hearing on the streets of Russia and if there are signs that the state has gone too far here.

[00:08:37]>> Well, people are annoyed and uh both population and elites. For 26 years, Vladimir Putin constructed the image of a vertically controlled system. Uh I mean decisions were made at the top and handled down for implementation. The system worked uh because uh it has a center and shutdowns destroyed this narrative more effectively than any opposition criticism. So there is no one to blame for the shutdowns. It's some random guys from FSB but no name sure name or the position. So who who who made the final order and there is an ongoing and uh conflict between civil part of bureaucracy of or civil part of presidential staff who are responsible for propaganda which doesn't work well without internet connection by the way I mean or uh domestic politics. This year Russia will have um state duma elections in autumn and the whole infrastructure of mobilizing regions of mobile of corporate of mobilizing corporates how uh people need to vote it's all linked to telegram and all linked to internet.

[00:09:51]So without uh without reliable internet connection it doesn't work well. Uh so uh you can frame this as a conflict between uh two parts of the bureaucracy where one part quite discontent and signaling to Putin please come back and do something with other parts of the bureaucracy who are um worsening our job. also uh an interesting uh what we see in presidential approval ratings uh Putin's ratings are going down and that's a reflection first that's a reflection of how population feels about this uh restrictions because um because absence of internet in 21st century in a very digitalized city it there's a tendency at least in the west to view Putin as a kind of master autocrat someone who is so sophisticated in his use of these authoritarian tools that if he's doing something, it's because that's the smart thing to do for his interests and preservation of the regime. Um, I wonder if you see it that way because it seems like there's signs with this latest internet shutdown where maybe it's unclear who's in charge. uh there's actions being taken that are compromising the regime's popularity in return for this sense of control and security. But uh is it possible that he's making a mistake here?

[00:11:24]>> Um I don't think that it's done deliberately by Putin. And I think that illusion that he's still the only person in charge and he has everything under his control could be uh misinterp it's it's now a misinterpretation. It was valid. It was so at his first, second, and maybe third presidential term. Uh then there were some turbulence. Uh and after the war, it to me it seems like Putin loses his grip on the country because he's preoccupied with other um uh with other stuff like military or geopolitics and any kind of you know analysis of Moscow's um campaign against the internet uh has often fallen back uh on narratives about the arbiterness of the security services and this is also an uh misinterpretation. Uh there we're not talking about the security services uh having arbitrarily deviated from any normal Kremlin. It is a normal Kremlin now but the head of the Kremlin is preoccupied with other stuff. So uh this uh allows the situation to develop um this way. So what I'm trying to say the security forces are not incrementally taking over the system. They are the system in its current configuration. So it was changed um before and and and now it's become visible. So if Putin is no longer exerting topdown control over every facet of the domestic machinery, what are the constituencies within the regime that are vying for power and what are the major major fault lines between them or the the kind of internal debate or struggle below the level of Putin about how to run Russian society.

[00:13:28]>> Uh well, what we see now it's calls for Putin to come back from uh his cloud where he is uh and and and and do his job.

[00:13:39]>> And who's calling for that?

[00:13:40]>> Everyone. So we see this unhappiness uh publicly uh which is not very usual for um for for Russian situ for Russian type of the regime in different Moscow on on Moscow streets will let's say this if before people were avoiding to express their unhappiness on the current events so there were you know like a legal way how to complain on prices on economic situation It was something you know that this this talks were okayish but now people and also members of Russian elites are expressing um their negative attitude towards what's going on and not only on internet but also on the but also that there is no clear image of future and there is no clear image of victory. No one expects that the war will drag four years in a row and start go to and and and and go beyond. Uh no one knows when it ends. It consume resources and people are unhappy with that. Same from a patriotic part of the elites and patriotic part of the society. uh that uh they want Putin come back and to and to have the vong guard against uh all those who are discontent with the current state of affairs who uh they required Putin to double down against enemies of the country. They want Putin to uh be more maybe bloodthirsty in terms of the war. So just finish the war. But everyone wants his want him to finish the war, come back to the country and preoccupied with the uh with domestic state of affairs. So and and and this all could be framed as you know as a demand for any kind of rules-based order since previously the person who issued the rules who issued the order was Putin himself and now he's absent and so there is no rules uh anymore. There is a lot of there's a huge path dependence and we are at the stage where all kind of forces trying to bring Putin back and restore the center of this hypercentric system. This is a fully authoritarian maybe even closer to a totalitarian regime now does it matter that this dissension is bubbling up from the streets and even inside of the system itself? Are these forces capable of pushing Putin to uh bring the war to a close, restore internet connectivity, become more involved in the governance of the country, or is he fully insulated from these political forces and capable of just continuing on as he wishes?

[00:16:34]I think first and foremost it shows that markers that once implied stability like lack of protests uh functional economy or loyal elite are no longer reliable in terms of Russia. The system could look uh stable on the surface while simultaneously crumbling from within and that's what happening right now. It doesn't mean that Russia Russian political regime is on the brink of collapse. No, but we see that it's not a monolith. It's not a homoganic system that there are a lot of different controversial uh inside processes which are now conflicting with each other.

[00:17:17]>> Yeah. So if the system is crumbling but not in a way that threatens the integrity of the regime itself, what does that mean? Does that just mean the country is just not going to be functioning as well going forward? That there's going to be more business disruptions, more um uh sort of counterproductive activity within the state and the security forces? Are we just entering a period of greater chaos and confusion? I cannot give you any time frame um until to to see uh to what extent this regime is resilient and when it break down or do we see just cracks or its fatal distortions. It's not clear where we are at the very beginning of the process.

[00:18:08]But what do we know now? Uh that the internet uh shutdowns is just uh it's it's it's it's just one of many examples. There are other examples of crumbling state capacity when state become less and less functional. For example, protection against external violence. It's the foundation uh which the social contract between the ruler and the people has historically have built. uh people and companies pay taxes so the state can ensure their safety uh um um the state can ensure their lives and property. But in today's Russia, the situation is different. For example, the uh Ninth May parade which was sacred by Putin. We uh discussed that um wasn't protected 100% and that was the reason why uh >> and you're talking about the threat of Ukrainian drone attacks and also Ukrainian ground incursions into Russian territory.

[00:19:08]>> And who pays for that? And who pays for that? And that's business large businesses expenses with no compensation from the state. So the the situation is that Kremlin started wars and business pay for air defense out of their own pockets and having received the signal from the government that your security your problem. It's also a part that state becoming less functional.

[00:19:30]>> Sasha are you saying that Russian businesses actually pay for their own air defenses or just through tax?

[00:19:36]>> Yes.

[00:19:37]>> What is this?

[00:19:38]>> They are paying anti- drone defenses for like oil companies. They need to pay their own money for this uh metal nets uh they using to cover the facilities uh from the drones.

[00:19:50]>> Wow. A very tangible manifestation of what you're describing, the state no longer being able to offer the security portion of the social contract. Are people feeling as though the state is losing its legitimacy on a basic level?

[00:20:05]And when I say people, maybe we could break that down into the different groups that have some sort of power. Um, I know you've written a lot about the kind of technocrat class, the what we might formerly have called an elite within Russian society, the civil servants, uh, you know, people who manage the central bank, other parts of the apparatus.

[00:20:34]What are those people thinking and feeling right now?

[00:20:38]They are confused because uh even previously they uh showed that they were forced to exist in a very unpredictable environment and now this environment became even less predictable and there is no center uh where they can complain or even not complaining but explain the situation and uh and and fix the problems. Previously there were some mechanisms how they can settle uh their existence. Uh now it seems that this mechanism are broken or functioning differently. Uh that's on the that's in terms of internet. We are now uh Russia now entering the budgeting process. So Russia's economy is in a quite a bad equilibrium. It even it's coming after and and it's looking for a new one but it's probably would be worse. Just recently there was an an interview of Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak who called the new budget structure as a problem for the government. I mean by saying new budget structure he means elevated expenditures on everything including the war. Uh that's very Russian euphemistic way to say that uh yeah that that you know your war is our problem because Putin has started the war but finance the war is the problem of the government and it's and and this and this problem is getting more and more intense since the resource since the reserves are exhausted and um >> so I know that um energy prices are very important for the Russian economy and the Russian state budget. Um, energy prices are very elevated right now due to the war in Iran. Which of these factors matters more? The elevation of energy prices and the increasing uh, you know, revenue that Russia gets from that or the tremendous expenditures of a wartime economy. How are those two things balancing?

[00:22:40]It was and a very interesting uh thing happened with this uh additional um revenues for the budget. Uh first and further they're less than expected. Uh second for Russian economy they they are provided only you know like an additional oxygen for a mountaineer.

[00:23:00]It's nothing uh it's it's it's not a g a a game changer. And third, uh I think it was I think it was the it it was backed by the Kremlin, but the decision was to double down the expenditures and we see uh the the state budget on a record high, which means that state continue um doubling down expenditures regardless of uh the factor that uh additional revenues from uh conflict uh in Persian Gulf are temporary. So it's all like mortgaging the future. Uh some someone need to pay for this bills.

[00:23:39]Someone need to cover this deficit and this def deficit would be covered by domestic borrowings uh by may maybe some uh budget uh expenditures recalibration but it's all unhealthy situation. That's what we see now. You're listening to the World Unpacked with John Baitman, where we dive deep into pressing global issues and make sense of the big forces shaping our world. Now, have you learned anything so far that intrigued or surprised you? Let me know in the comments or just give us a like. And if you want to hear more of my conversations with the world's most informed and interesting people, you can subscribe right here. Now, back to the show.

[00:24:21]And then I guess when all is said and done in the war, there will have to be a major effort to take care of wounded veterans, widows, orphans. The latest estimates coming out of US think tanks and independent Russian media in exile is that uh Russian kill count uh the Russian soldiers who have died during the war are above 350,000.

[00:24:47]um which is almost like approaching like maybe 1% of the military age males in the country. It's an astonishing figure and what kind of burdens does that create going forward?

[00:25:01]>> Well, officially Russia never recognized uh the losses and that's a part of state uh run policy. I also think that uh one of the reason why FSB now is closing internet so heavily is that um probably they feel the anxiety of the population and uh they do they want to prevent any you know uh any horizontal conflict um contacts between uh different uh groups of population especially patriotic groups who are more uh tightened to the war who are more involved into um discussion on losses, on benefits and on how to live uh of um how to continue living after the war uh than um people of big cities um and so on and so forth.

[00:25:50]But but but mostly so war uh war is not an elephant in the room anymore. Uh and different groups of population discussing different outcomes. There is no problem with veterans yet. And I think that uh experts in uh in the United States or here in the west talking about veterans much more uh than uh Russian authorities. But this problem is not existing because the war continues and these people are still at the front line. I think Russian authorities are well aware that the problem appears uh after the ceasefire but there is no any kind of systemic uh solutions preparing for to to to to to facing this problem first and second they all required money which are not uh there so there is no financing for this kind of program >> we've been talking at a pretty high level about the strategic challenges facing the Russian state and how different groups within the state and power structure are contesting for solutions or authority within that system. Um, could we make this a bit more personal and kind of talk about the type of people that fill these roles and what their psychology is at a moment like this? You have an insider perspective. You formerly were an adviser at the Russian central bank. You also were a journalist in Russia and cultivated high level sources throughout the Russian power structure.

[00:27:26]Who are these people today? The the people running the machinery? Uh what is their personality, their mood? Uh what does it look and feel like to be inside this world right now? I never considered myself as a part of Russian elite. But to me uh the war was was a transformative uh event which made my personal life inside country um in country aggressor as impossible and which brought me to a huge identity crisis since on my birth certificate uh states that I'm Ukrainian. I come from um I come from a Soviet family and when I was born Ukraine was part of Soviet Union but still they recognize nationalities and back then in 2022 to me was quite you know uh hard to figure out who am I Russian Ukrainian does it matters why it matters what it is for me so it was quite a complicated dialogue uh uh Yeah. Uh speaking on my former colleagues who are um who are still there, uh some of them were not um I think looking at this technocratic system, it's it's an assemblage of personal decisions. So no, it was a privilege to step down and uh go um and and leave. Uh immigration is not an easy way but it's uh more safer than stay in Russia. People are terrified. Fear is one of the biggest drivers of why they are in places and it's sometimes it's fear is overstated fear over um fear against FSB that you can be imprisoned that you can get killed. People are afraid of their physical security and they know that this regime could kill their opponents or not even an open opponent but those people which the regime doesn't like and no one wants to be at um and no one wants to be there and there are different uh stories like you know I I traveled to Russia in back in 2022 and for example I met with um one deputy minister in the cafe and he literally sit uh on his phone on his iPhone because that was the recommendation uh from their security uh officer that that's the way how they can prevent uh overhearding uh or recording uh the the conversations via his um uh via his phone. And he was like, you know, he was very embarrassed when uh there were when someone ringed him and he need to put his uh put his phone out of his ass aspect basically and answering that I'm on the meeting. Sorry. And put it back.

[00:30:23]Uh and there is a lot of other anecdotal evidence of this tremendous fear uh which these people uh have >> just on this fear factor. Um, obviously for someone like that, he is trying to avoid running a foul of the being on the wrong side of the rules, the explicit rules, the implicit rules. How clear is it to someone like that what the rules are and if they're changing? uh you hear stories from time to time about maybe um higher levels of Russian officials and oligarchs that are falling a foul of the rules or maybe a broadening of what the implicit rules are. Do people have a sense of what it is that they need to do and say and not say or is that shifting?

[00:31:13]>> It's shifting. In normal conditions, they thought that they know the rules, explicit and implicit. And their superpower is to recognize changes in implicit rules. Um, and now it's changing. And now I think it wouldn't be an overstatement to picture all these people standing at the red square and shouting, "Bring us rules. What are rules?" and something like that because we we discussed the economy, we discussed internet shutdowns. There is a very interesting process of redistribution of assets from one owner to another in Russia which I think very important uh for uh the future of Russia and people are terrified to lose their assets because of whatever like >> and and are you talking about oligarchs, ordinary people who whose assets are being redistributed?

[00:32:11]oligarchs and businessmen. For ordinary people, uh situation is different for oligarchs uh for medium-siz businesses uh former um western uh owners of different companies. So you can lose your assets in Russia because you are you have a western passport uh which wasn't uh I mean which wasn't forbidden or not western but like this story was doeda airport where one of the reasons why state nationalized the airport was that they uh that its beneficiaries has a temporary uh residency permit in Israel and in United Arab Emirates which are not even considered as non-friendly countries in by Russian legislation or uh like just a very recent uh case uh when nationalized um when the state nationalized Rousagra holding one of the largest agricultural holdings um um um so just um and and it was uh and it belonged to Vadim Mashkovich who was on top Forbes who was former senator and they said okay he was corrupt corrupted.

[00:33:25]It was corruption and this corruption took place 15 years ago or more and now we're taking his assets uh for a billion dollar worth billion dollars. So there is no rules at all. No, no, no.

[00:33:38]>> Yeah. So even for the the top the the wealthiest and most politically connected elite, there is a growing instability around how you stay on the good side of the regime.

[00:33:52]>> Absolutely. Absolutely. That's and and and here we're talking about uh business assets. There were terms of you know people's behavior. I'm writing about this in my book in 20120 in winter 2023 just a few days before the New Year's Eve which is quite important um holiday for Russian population much more important than Christmas. There was a party called the almost naked party where was a dress code coming almost naked and then participants of uh this uh party was cancelled uh and not only cancelled by I mean random users of social network not by society society was wasn't actually ever I mean involved or aware of this uh party but uh for example um episodes uh with some partic participants of uh this um of this party were cut off new already filmed new year movies. So, you know, it's three days to the new year and you need to refilm part of the movie because you cut uh some major heroes.

[00:35:03]Their contracts on New Year parties was canled. They were forced to go to the front line to sing uh soldiers songs and to be forgiven for this. And there was also as an indication that they broke some rules but they ne but they explicitly said that we don't know that these rules are existing. And it's also a very interesting definition that the state wanted people to act like this is a holy war never admitting that this is a war. It's a special military operation. So it's something which conducted by professionals somewhere. It's not it's not involved the whole nation. It's not uh bring another types of atas and other types of behavior. It not makes uh the whole population, the whole society to dress to wear hockey and you know to share this war um uh war attitude. But the the level how the the extent how people how this uh people were cancelled was tremendous and and that was the first sign of this you know show us the rule book. We will obedient but but please tell us the rules. And the so the unique feature of this situation now that on every level cultural, business, uh technological uh there is a huge demand on rules and we see that Kremlin just gave up its role on producing these rules.

[00:36:34]>> Where is all of this headed? Because I think an overall theme from this conversation is a political and cultural system, a regime facing growing internal pressures, contradictions, confusion, chaos, with the overarching trend being toward more securitization and control, but sometimes in a confusing fashion.

[00:36:59]There's a couple big events that are coming up that we know are coming that could force some kind of reckoning. One is some resolution of the Ukraine war where maybe the immediate security threats that are used to justify many of these moves are taken off the table and two is the departure of Vladimir Putin from the scene. He's in his early 70s so he could continue ruling for some time but on some level there is a reckoning coming. Something will have to uh change perhaps or or or do you agree with that?

[00:37:35]what what will happen um in the future where where is all of this headed?

[00:37:41]So for the neartime future I think we need to be clear that regime has a lot of uh different kind of repressive tools at their disposal to to preserve and to maintain uh status quo and Putin he's in a quite good house and he has access to uh very good health care so he can stays with us for next five 10 years it's I I I don't like this scenario but um but it's it's but but but it's likely so he's not going anywhere but what we see and it's uh it's not because of Putin uh it's it's it's also visible with with the current state of Putin which I don't think that will improve somehow it's the request on an image of future there so Putin monopolized uh the ability to produce image of future to define to on which direction state goes and where and how the future for elites population syllovics how the future for the whole country will look like and now it is a vacuum and I don't think that this vacuum is longer existing and this is a chance which probably wouldn't be immediately picked up by some political powers since there is no visible political powers in Russia but there should be a a competition of other future projects And since Putin is losing grip on domestic stuff because he's preoccupied with the war, with geopolitics, with the revisionists role of Russia in the globe, some alternative um future visions of future would appear and it it appeared previously like the uh um yini prior and Putin's march on Moscow could be considered and could be framed as this kind of alternative vision of uh the future.

[00:39:40]Yeah. So this was the event where one of the most powerful figures in Russia, the head of the Vagner private military corporation staged a mutiny and you know took over a major military base, marched on Moscow. Eventually this was put down.

[00:39:54]He surrendered and he died in a plane crash. And this was the moment a couple two three years ago where it seemed like the Russian regime was was at maybe at its most fragile. But but you you took you to you take that moment as some kind of signal for an alternative future. Is that is that the the notion that the the patriotic front within um within Russia the kind of pro-war dissenters the the could somehow take over and create an even more jingoistic militarized society?

[00:40:30]>> Not necessarily pro-war. I mean you know what struck me uh the most uh uh during PGO's mutiny was the reaction of uh some my interlocutors on this that uh so they were all terrified and scared because something like this never seen before in Russian modern history but they were also very enthusiastic like something changed something happens and um it seems that so uh I can frame it the way that rational elites has no you know agency for changes. So that's why they have a great hope on something external that someone from some someone outside of their bubble which prejudge was perfectly are come and change the situation somehow. So uh and then they will they will step in they will act and so on and so forth.

[00:41:28]But the first changes need to be brought from um uh from the outside and I think with the s with such heavy demand on uh on image of future if this images of future will appears we could see a very interesting configurations and very interesting uh return of pol of of politics into Russia because one of the biggest Putin's project was how to depoliticize Russia to keep himself self as the only center of politics.

[00:42:00]>> That's a fascinating portrait of a Russian elite that has given up on influencing the course of the nation and is simply waiting for someone else to present them an opportunity to do so. When that finally happens, do you have a sense of the two or three potential visions that someone might offer? Or even what would what would Putin say the day the war in Ukraine ends and he then has to give a speech to the nation describing the nation's purpose and where everything is headed outside or separate from this war. What will he say? What might he say?

[00:42:43]Oh, of course, for sure he will say that uh Russia won the war and everyone was war heroes and so on and so forth because he's not in the position to lose this war uh at least in eyes of Russian propaganda. So it's not so that's that's obviously what he says what he will say.

[00:43:02]The problem here is that uh Russian society doesn't feel uh participants of this war as war heroes. They do not treat them. They're mercenaries who went to the front line for money. Not and um and people and and and then Russian society absolutely lost the sense of uh why the war started, who started this, and they just want it to be over.

[00:43:30]So I think uh so Putin will will Russian society buy this for by this Putin speech, Putin's explanation. I'm not sure. Uh but then we're coming back to my uh words about um state has a lot of uh repression tools. So for some time it would the situation would be manageable.

[00:43:54]But then I mean uh there is no um there there is no road without bumps for Russia in the future. If uh the war is over then uh the economy will stay heavily militarized for a while because uh because of its structure the economy will remain under sanctions which is quite an effective cab on Russian technological development. So countries like United States, Russian uh biggest partner, China, uh Europe uh moving towards AI, quantum computing and other technologies and Russia would lagging behind because its inability to produce hardware and inability to produce software because of internet restrictions because of security. So uh Russia will be a yesterday's economy uh with quite uh grim uh perspective and population know this and the population know that there would be less security because it's unclear uh what kind of ceasefire we will see and uh will drones attacks continues after this ceasefire to what extent to what objects and so on and so forth and we see how state is not responsible for security anymore or trying to be less responsible for security. So um I don't see um I I I I cannot um I don't know what kind of uh alternative future projects we will see but we can uh figure out what kind of tradeoffs any Putin successor will need to um we'll need to figure out we'll need to we need to deal with like uh uh keeping the keeping country as an arty or uh having some deals with the west some somehow opening uh country's economy to have access to technology to additional market and culturally I mean Russia never was a part of Russia never was an Asian country never was a part of um like Asian cultural space it was like European western cultural space then of course all these uh imbalances inside economy how to deal with this extended military expendit military sector and the civil economy which is uh lagging behind. Uh then uh what how to deal with the workforce crisis which is quite acute for uh Russia. All this stuff uh I think all all these issues will require different political uh decisions which the current Russian elite are not able to take.

[00:46:41]those who who who will take this responsibility he can win additional I don't know not not votes but he can gain additional political capital but uh of course we need to be prepared that it's not um that that the Russian path wouldn't be democratic it could go to more far right um leadership or something like this so I I I don't I I don't know will it be right left centric or democratic or not but uh I think we and we need to be prepared that there would be some future scenarios we won't like.

[00:47:20]>> Yeah. Yeah. To westerners the assumption is if there are cracks emerging or a weakening of Putin's regime that's good uh because that creates alternatives alternative possibilities.

[00:47:36]Um and there's I think an assumption in the west that those alternative possibilities are more democratic, more liberal, more friendly to the United States. Um but my sense from you Sasha is that's not an assumption that anyone could make and prog illustrates that.

[00:47:51]>> I think cracks are good because cracks definitely leads to changes but we need to be prepared that we don't like the changes. Um the picture that I'm getting from our conversation is one of contradictory instability and at the same time still some stasis. Um on the one hand Russia is changing. Uh there's an intensification of the security culture.

[00:48:19]There's a sense that the rules are becoming more ambiguous. There's a sense of chaos and conflict. So maybe the contradictions of the Russian ruling system are growing. that on the other hand I also hear you saying that big changes in the way Russia is governed in its economic prospects in hope for the future we're not seeing a strong prospect for that anytime soon. Um what do you see? Are we in a moment of change? Are we in a moment of stasis? Is it both? I'll give you the final word here.

[00:48:52]>> I think we're definitely living in a very interesting moment. Uh is it a moment of stasis or changes?

[00:49:04]Hard to say. We're at the very beginning of the new stage of uh how this wild Putinism will develop. It's on its late stages. Uh for this type of regimes could be different um scenario, different future scenarios. We definitely can uh we definitely see that Putin loses his grip inside country and outside he's not very successful frankly speaking. I mean his bets on um Donald Trump or on friendship with Xiinping are beneficial but uh not beneficial 100% for Putin. It's not a very comfortable space uh for Putin now. So we're we are at the very beginning. I need we need I think that we need to um be openminded and cleareyed on what we see believe to our eyes uh and let's gather in a while and discuss uh changes >> love to do that let's see where all this is headed I would love to have you back on Sasha thanks for joining us today >> thank you it was very interesting conversation >> you've been listening to the world unpacked, a production of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. To get episodes delivered directly to your inbox, use the link in the description or subscribe on YouTube or popular podcast platforms like Spotify or iTunes. Views expressed are those of the host and guests and not necessarily those of Carnegie. Learn more at carnegendowment.org.