Understanding Iran | Robert Wright & Hamidreza Azizi

Added: 2026-05-20

[00:00:00]I hope to in particular shed light on a question that Americans may have if they've been following the Iran issue for some time, which is kind of which characterization of the regime to accept. On the one hand, you have people who say still you just treat it basically as a rational actor that's focusing on Iran's national security. At the extreme end, you get people saying, "These people are suicidally apocalyptic. That's why we can't let them at all cost have a nuclear weapon because they'd be happy to die in a holocaust so long as Israel was destroyed and so on.

[00:00:29]>> When there is the capacity and then the willingness to act in an aggressive way and also when the enemy is geographically closed these lead to a rise in the threat perception on the other side. So these three elements led to what Israel considers as an existential threat. So the right question is not whether the ideology of the Islamic Republic is after the destruction of the state of Israel. The right question is what factors contributed to this threat perception on the Israeli side which is now kind of reversed. Iran is feeling the same things and I can explain why.

[00:01:11]>> Hi Hamid.

[00:01:13]>> Hi love.

[00:01:14]>> How you doing?

[00:01:16]>> I'm fine. How are you doing?

[00:01:18]>> You know, I I can't complain. Let me introduce us. I'm Robert Wright, publisher of Non-Zero Newsletter. This is the Nonzero podcast.

[00:01:25]Uh and I encourage everyone to uh listen to it to subscribe to the newsletter. Uh it's free although u if you want to hear uh the second half of this conversation and all my conversations, it helps to become a paid subscriber, which I also encourage. uh and you more importantly are Hammed Raza Azizi. You are now a visiting fellow at the German Institute uh for international and security affairs. Uh but some years ago uh I guess up until around 2020 or so um you were you taught at Shahid Beahesti University which I've just mispronounced I'm sure in Tyrron and you were a guest lecture at the department of regional studies at the University of Tan. Um now the timing for this is good. I'm really looking forward to this. Uh you've got a book just coming out. In fact, it's out in the UK and Europe, uh, and will be out in a few weeks in the US, and it's never too soon to pre-order. And it's called The Axis of Resistance: Iran, Israel, and the struggle for the Middle East. Um, and you know, you've also become a little bit of a star on Twitter. This happens with wars. I've noticed that you know suddenly some regional expert is catapulted to a higher platform in front of a wider audience. In this case this has happened I would say with uh with you and with this is Israeli analyst Satrinowitz. Uh I encourage people to follow both both of you on Twitter.

[00:02:59]So my main goal in this conversation is to get a clearer sense for the character of the Iranian regime as it exists now.

[00:03:09]And that involves two things.

[00:03:10]Understanding the ways it's different from the pre-war Iranian regime whose leader of course was killed by the US and Israel and and other other prominent members of it were killed. Um but also to understand what what continuity there is uh you know o over that period of time and to some extent going back to the revolution what what continuity there is uh going back to the revolution and how how the character evolved since then um in response to events. Uh I I hope to in particular shed light on a question that Americans may have if they've been following the Iran issue for some time which is kind of which characterization of the regime to accept in America you know pretty much everyone agrees that it's a regime and has agreed for some time that that h that has an ideological uh element that is significant but still on the one hand you have people who say still you just treat it basically as a rational actor that's uh focusing on Iran's national security. In other words, basically a realist kind of analysis. Uh other people are put more emphasis on the ideology, including the religious part of the ideology. In fact, I'd say the more hawkish the people, the more inclined they are to emphasize the religious character as a rule, including the kind of religious fervor. At the extreme end, you get people saying um these people are suicidally apocalyptic.

[00:04:39]that's why they can't afford to have we can't let them at any at all cost have a nuclear weapon because they'd be happy to to die in a holocaust along as Israel was destroyed and so on. So there's a whole spectrum of characterizations uh of the regime and and and uh I hope by by the end of this have a much clearer way of thinking about what we can expect from it. Before we get into any of that, I would ask you to say a little more about your background. Uh including uh if if you will, um letting us know why you haven't been back to Iran in what is it now, six or seven years? Um is that right?

[00:05:15]>> Yeah, sure. Uh first of all, thank you so much for having me on this podcast and I look forward to discussing with you all these issues as much as we can because it's a kind of a long story. uh we have to try and do our best to uh keep it as as concise as possible. Um so yes you mentioned clearly you mentioned correctly that um I was a lecturer at the Shahit PhD University which is uh formerly um called uh National University of Iran. So before the revolution, I mean speaking of the revolution, that was one of the uh changes, right? Versus continuity.

[00:05:56]University of Tehran, the other affiliation that I had remained the same in terms of the name, but the national university change. Um so u I did my education there. I uh received my PhD in the field of regional studies, international relations from the University of Tehran. Then for a few years um I was a lecturer uh there and um I left Iran in 2019 uh to start a posttock here working on Iranian foreign policy in the Middle East with a focus on Syria and Iraq back then. My work was mostly focused on Iranian strategy in Syria. It was at the somehow peak of the Syrian war still and u so since I left there have been quite a few developments as you know. Um so we had the um election of uh Ibrahim Rei as the president in 2021 and uh I was effectively fired from the university you know uh shortly after uh leaving the country because uh you know uh for them for whatever reason it wasn't quite acceptable uh for someone like me a young professional to leave the country for a longer time. So they would be okay with a few months but I had the opportunity of being here for two years. So that was one of the reasons. Then uh the political atmosphere changed. I started to be uh vocal here and there in the media about especially the protest movements. First the woman life freedom movement and then um you know the um other rounds that that followed. Um so this uh automatically you know puts you under the spotlight and uh makes it difficult to uh think of uh returning to the country given all the complications.

[00:07:55]So yeah um now uh here I am now after seven years in in Germany still working with the same institute uh but my focus has broadened a little bit to also concentrate on Iranian elite dynamics as you know also a little with more background on the Iranian regional policy the access of resistance and so on >> okay so I gather you don't expect to be going back to Iran unless there's a dramatic change in the character of the government.

[00:08:26]>> Yes, we can uh we can put it like that which uh unfortunately I don't expect to be the case anytime soon. I mean speaking of a change in the system and I know that President Trump likes to uh speak of what has happened in Iran since the war as a regime change which is not the uh you know quite correct way of characterization. There has been a transformation in the type of the regime but it has actually hardened not softened especially its security stance you know that's uh that's the current situation actually in a way.

[00:09:03]>> Okay. So why don't uh we start kind of early uh in the in the relatively speaking in in the history of Iran. Uh what I'd like to do there there are two things about Iran. Uh one is hostility toward the US, one is hostility toward the toward Israel. I I understand or as they would put it toward the the Zionist regime uh in Israel. Um I I understand I think the the American part of the hostility better possibly because I'm an American and I focused on that. Let me give you very quickly my understanding of some important ingredients in that and then maybe you can comment on what I've gotten wrong or right and and then talk more about that and especially about the source of antagonism toward Israel. Okay. So America, of course, you know, pretty famously now, I think, we we we helped uh we supported a coup in 1953 that deposed a democratically elected leader, and stalled the sha of Iran, who was, you know, a somewhat authoritarian dictator, and the Iranian revolution of 1979 was focused on deposing him. So naturally there was you know tension between America and the the emerging regime in Iran on those grounds alone.

[00:10:27]Uh I mean I think number of people would call him a brutal dictator. Uh he uh then as soon as he was deposed the US gave him sanctuary against Jimmy Carter's better judgment actually he was he came here to be treated for cancer or something and this was one of the grievances of the I don't know they called him students at the time but whoever was holding uh hostages at the US embassy uh they wanted him him released so so that was an issue. Now uh after uh then there was the Iraq war uh Iraq attacked Iran. It was very traumatic long war.

[00:11:03]The US supported Iraq. They gave it intelligence including I think targeting information. I gathered they provided some of the precursors or some kind of uh something that helped uh Iraq develop uh chemical weapons uh that were used.

[00:11:20]Uh so obviously at the end of that around 1988 or whatever uh the Iranian regime was not all that favorably disposed uh to the US. Um and I think all that helps explain I'm I'm skipping a lot but I think all this helps explain why uh when the US invaded uh Iraq in 2003 that was profoundly threatening to Iran. Now, and of course, Iran famously uh mobilized helped cultivate these uh sympathetic Shia militias who attacked some Americans. But even separate from that, uh they had a remember Iran still at this point considered Iraq a big enemy. In fact, I gather that that's when they when they first uh started the nuclear weapons program that so far as I know was abandoned in 2003. They were thinking about deterring Iraq. that that was not about Israel and that was also some of the reason for cultivating the Shia uh militias in in Iraq. But but in any event uh you know when we invaded uh Iraq having just declared Iran a member of the axis of evil uh this didn't didn't do anything uh to help relations with us. Uh and of course since then we have given given America's close relationship to Israel, we've done a number of things uh that that Iran didn't like. Most notably recently attacking them twice in in June of last year now. So anyway, I kind of get uh I kind of get a certain amount of American hostility. I mean, uh, and I gather that by the time the revolution even happened, this was a big, uh, talking point for the regime, uh, hostility toward America. Now, the Israeli side of it, I know less about. So, uh, I I guess I'd at this point stop talking finally and let you comment on anything I've said, add to it, and then get into the question of how Israel has joined. Well, I don't even know which came first, but but how how how how it came to be that both Israel and America are kind of the great Satans.

[00:13:31]>> Yeah, sure. Um there's a lot to unpack here, of course. Uh just let me u say something about what you mentioned about about Iraq. actually um after the first Gulf War in uh 1991, uh the significance of Iraq and the Saddam regime as uh kind of the uh arc enemy of uh of the Islamic Republic uh somehow reduced and u that was actually the time. So in terms of you know kind of u where our starting point should be um so in a way and this is something that few people know or or talk about in a way the u first call for the US invasion of Iraq in 1991 helped Iran helped Iran in the sense that um after the ceasefire between Iran and Iraq in 1998 uh 1988 uh some of the Iranian territory toward the uh you know uh west border areas were still under control of Iraq.

[00:14:38]Uh so it was a ceasefire that uh Iran was forced to accept because the United States had intervened directly and so on. Uh it was only um after the and during the US invasion that Iraq in order to concentrate on the center uh they pulled u their forces back and handed over the territory back to Iran.

[00:15:00]And not only that uh but they also brought some of their uh fighter jets to Iran in order to keep them immune uh from the US attacks. Some of which uh you know there are rumors that Iran never gave them back. Uh so this is also a kind of a how to say less uh discussed context that is uh that is needed. And then of course in 2003 what uh the US did with this invasion and uh when when when looking at it in a longer term perspective it was uh just uh uh intensifying and deepening uh the Islamic Republic's uh influence in the >> Could I could I inject just one thing that's related to the point you just added? There was a period of seeming raproma ma that that went up to 2003 because Iran actually helped us prepare the ground for the invasion of Afghanistan, right? They were helping us out. I've even heard that Sulammani, whom we later killed, >> went to Afghanistan and helped prepare the ground and then like almost immediately we declared Iran a member of the Axis of evil like right like like not long after they did this. But anyway, so there was this moment where there was seemingly the possibility for other things as maybe there was after the the uh uh Obama's nuclear deal. But anyway, I'll stop there. Uh go ahead.

[00:16:20]No, that's a very good point actually because uh that also has to do with these um long-standing grievances and mistrust between Iran and the United States because you know people especially under the influence of social media I guess you know people uh tend to read less uh history books than they ever did maybe in the past. uh they tend to focus maybe on the only on the past one or two years and then they don't see these kind of efforts mutual efforts at some points you know we had also you know eras periods where uh the United States wanted to initiate Raf and those mistrusts I mean it's been a kind of a vicious circle in a way but you're you're you're absolutely right uh in Afghanistan uh Iran uh actually helped uh the United States because they saw at the time Taliban as their own enemy as well. There was a time uh around 1997 if I'm not mistaken or 96 uh around that time when uh the Iranian uh diplomats uh and uh consulate staff were uh killed by the Taliban and uh Iran almost entered into a war against against the group. uh it was only the intervention of uh Hassan Roani and then Kame himself who basically you know decided last minute not to do that anyway so this is also an important context but speaking of uh the US versus Israel how they are framed in the context of the Islamic Republic I think here another context is needed and that's about the Islamic revolution itself so the 1979 revolution which we know as the Islamic revolution which it wasn't uh only Islamic, right? There was a coalition of actors that contributed to the revolution. And uh some argue that uh the role that u uh some leftist groups at the time uh played in in the revolution especially those with the uh background in you know guerrilla oper operations uh you know uh sort of um urban warfare and so on which contributed a lot to the victory of the revolution especially in the later stages. Those groups also played an important role. Then we had also uh the nationalist front uh which was kind of the remnants and sort of a reconfigured uh setting uh of the nationalist front that Muhammad Msad the prime minister who was ousted by uh the uh US uh initiated coup he had established. So these groups also had a role in a way uh immediately after the revolution the Islamists and because of course the um leader of the revolution was a cleric who around whom you know all these groups had somehow gathered uh it became somehow Islamic and there was a purge of the leftists and and liberals and and all those other groups. So uh why I'm mentioning this background because uh there that's exactly where the issue of Israel and also the support for Palestine come to uh the forefront. So it wasn't only a matter of for example Islamic unity um as um you know explained by Humeni Rahmeni the first supreme leader of the Islamic Republic for example. It also had to do with this uh very strong uh leftist uh support for for Palestine at the moment uh which also impacted uh quite clearly and deeply uh some uh revolutionary Iranian groups as well. For example, uh the some of the uh Iranian revolutionaries uh especially those u affiliated with uh this organization called Mojahedal MK which then became an opposition group and started arm activities against the Islamic Republic itself. Those were actually trained by the uh PLO uh by the Palestinian militias in U southern Lebanon. And uh that was how uh basically at the time uh the kind of uh how to say this exchange of um military uh expertise and and knowledge and so on. It was the other way around. So the Palestinians were helping that. So it's a it was a mixture of anti-colonialism uh seeing Israel as they describe it both the leftist and then increasingly the Islamist as a colonial project. So it was partly anti-colonialism partly about Islamic unity and partly about this kind of pragmatic relationship somehow or better to say operational relationship that had been uh forged and formed over decades between the Iranian revolutionaries and and these groups. So this is the way that uh we should understand this whole phenomenon when it comes to Israel actually >> right because you know as things develop and and Iran builds this so-called axis of resistance um you know it includes some kind of disperate elements. You've got the Shia Hezbollah but you've also got the Sunni Hamas and like what do they have in common? They don't like Israel. And so uh it's natural for Iran to you know certainly sustain if not amplify that theme and also to broadly uh gather sympathy within the Middle East because so many Arab leaders are thought of by some Arabs as not really caring much about the Palestinians and not really being uh having sufficient enmity uh toward Israel. And I want to um I want to like distinguish that from uh any any uh extent to which the hostility toward Israel may have to do with Islam per se. I mean, you started out talking about the Islamic character, the revolution. I'd like to drill down on that a little more. Uh because again, in the in the modern history of Middle East antagonism, it's like Arabs, not Persians, who had the original grievance with Israel. I think a lot of especially younger people don't understand the extent to which it used to be thought of as an Israeli Arab conflict or maybe an Arab versus Jew conflict but not a religious conflict and it wasn't really very religious in character. It has become more that way.

[00:23:08]But anyway, the point is originally Iran per se had no big issue in that sense along that dimension with Israel and you know nobody took land from Iran to to start Israel. And as for the Islamic character of the regime, you know, I'd like you to talk about that a little more because, you know, if you look at the Quran, you can certainly find anti-Jewish passages. On the other hand, you you can find these, you know, tributes to Moses. And you know, my sense from just looking at the Quran is that Muhammad was actually trying to build a coalition of of of Jews and Christians and others. And when that was working out, he was saying very nice things. And when it wasn't working out, he wasn't. And all of that was kind of captured in the Quran. But in any event, my point is that it's not like you would you would read the Quran and come away with this unambiguous hostility toward Jews or or Israel, right? a as being built into the religion. Now there is this whole thing about jihad and infidels but they are you know Jews like Christians are people of the book they get a certain kind of special dispensation in Islamic law you know uh so um talk a little I I I took you to be saying that the Islamic character of the regime of the revolution had a certain amount to do with the hostility to Israel and I guess I'd like you to just elaborate on that.

[00:24:32]Yeah, of course. Uh I mean uh I'm not a I'm not an expert on religion. Uh I must say that I have read the Quran uh of course and you're right about I mean um passages being there about uh the hostility with the Jews but it's also about I mean uh because these are kind of context oriented right uh they have to be understood in the context of the time that uh they were um sort of a explained by Muhammad uh in some instances you see for example hostility towards Christian as well or you see hostility towards some uh some words about you know those people who pretend to be Muslims but are acting otherwise something that they call monafodin. So uh what I want to say is that the text itself that the religion itself is very much like you know any other religion is very much open to interpretation. Uh so when I said that it has to do with the Islamic nature or the Islamist nature of the of the uh government um I have a distinction in mind between Islam and Islamism you know because Islam is a religion but Islamism is an ideology and it has actually a lot of shapes and forms like the the form that uh you know eventually prevailed in Iran was a very much Shia based u you know um sort of a version of Islamism which u in so many respects uh is at odds with uh the Sunni version of Islamism. You know that kind of Salafi jihadi uh uh explanation of that. Um so that was actually why I mentioned that kind of mixed nature of the of the revolution because this is actually a criticism you know um looking back uh some people who uh explore the roots uh and also the implications of the revolution. uh they uh speak for example of certain intellectual like Alisharati uh how uh those people uh basically uh instrumentalized religion mixed it with the uh leftist and especially Marxist narrative which was quite you know popular at the time in order to uh get as many people as possible on board in in the fight against the United States like the way that uh he describes the the character of the Shia imams, you know, like Ali, like Hussein. Uh the way that he tried to connect, for example, uh someone like Abu Zar uh who was um you know, very uh someone very close to Prophet Muhammad uh to the idea of uh opposing tyranny, for example, you know, these these these sorts of things. So it's all about the the interpretation and within that interpretation uh we can u speak about the role of the United States and the role of the Israel. So uh when it comes to the United States as you also uh you know clearly mentioned uh it has to do with the history but then uh they see themselves you know this is very important. It has to do actually with the perception of a perception which is the result of all these ideologies and historical experiences and traumas and everything. Uh so the perception is that uh this country has been ruled by a tyrant uh which was backed by the United States. So that was the uh uh US uh project right and now that we have managed to get rid of this now that we have managed to get rid of the US dominance it is our duty it is our task to help other nations who are uh suffering more or less in a similar way around the region and not only that around the world also to liberate themselves from the United States and to them the clearest manifestation of this is uh uh Israel uh which again as I said they they they see this as a as an entity which was based uh which was founded uh by Britain and then supported by the United States in order to uh facilitate the dominance of uh the uh hegeimmons of the time the western hegeimmons of the time uh on the region.

[00:29:08]So in that sense uh they don't see they didn't better to say because it evolved over time they didn't see Israel as an actor um you know having uh sufficient agency in itself that would uh you know result this sort of hostility. they saw it as the expansion of the US role and uh the kind of colonial role in the region and that uh you know resulted in the sort of a uh kind of support for for Palestine that we saw. But here what what's important also to emphasize is that it it wasn't confined uh to the issue of Israel. Uh there was this concept called uh exporting the revolution which was uh clearly mentioned and also uh supported in different ways by himself especially the kind of hardline revolutionaries of the uh early of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Those who ironically later become became reformists in the country and became liberal. uh they also fervently supported this um idea of also you know helping those other Muslim nations in the region like in the uh countries of the Persian Gulf in Iraq itself you know to liberate themselves from uh their own tyrants and that was one of the reasons not the only reason one of the reasons that uh provoked the Iran Iraq war Iraq Saddam himself had long-standing plans for that invasion but that was maybe one of the last triggers that uh caused the war to happen eventually. So let's this is just a footnote but to some extent Sodom's attack on Iran was itself in his mind to some extent defensively motivated because I mean this is such a big theme in history and I want to in current affairs it just seems to almost always be the case that uh people nations perceived as aggressors and even that commit aggression in their own minds are often committing more of a defensive act than they are perceived as committing. And I think this is we'll get back to the extent to which this is true of Iran itself. I think it's underappreciated by many in America. The extent to which Iran sees a lot of what is taken as offensive and in terms of its use of these so-called proxies. I know that's a term you have some issues with, but uh they see that as kind of pure offense and and I think you'll agree that to some extent that's actually not the way Iran is thinking about it. Anyway, we'll get back to that. But but uh honestly, I hadn't really thought much about Sodom Hussein's motivation in in uh invading Iran. But you're saying that in his mind that was a national security measure to some extent.

[00:31:58]>> Yeah, it was. I mean because uh look uh there were instances uh in the first months and uh basically the first year after the revolution where uh some clerics also some officials uh you know spoke openly about the um you know need for uh the Iraqi people to rise up against Saddam for example. And look at the end of the day even in the absence of any initial any uh deliberate project on the Iranian side because of the organic ties between uh the Iraqi and Iranian Shia and uh the very fact that Humeni uh before uh going to France and then you know returning back to to Thran spend uh many years uh in exile in Najaf in in Iraq and had a lot of contacts also followers uh among the Iraqi Shia also political factions.

[00:33:05]Uh so that was that was an alarm bell you know for for Saddam. uh the hostility between Iran and Iraq was there of course for uh for for many years and just a few days before uh the start of the war we had uh there was this agreement uh between u the sha and and Saddam over uh delination of Arvand river uh which was uh perceived by Saddam as very much one-sided and that was another issue he wanted to basically fix that so Yeah, as you rightly said, you know, there's a lot of uh motivations that um you know, leaders and countries have in mind when um think of offense or defense and the same is the case uh you know regarding the uh current conflict what is uh perceived by the Iranian side as um kind of you know uh as as a a full scale aggression uh is seen differently by many people in Israel. Uh so it really depends on uh the uh kind of a lens that that you uh apply in um studying or or thinking about these uh different developments actually.

[00:34:22]>> Right. And and it absolutely is the case that Israelis more than a lot of Americans realize consider what looks to be pretty aggressive behavior especially since October 7th to be defensively motivated. I mean that that's actually the governing conviction. And uh the idea I I think broadly the idea is look everyone hates us. They're always going to hate us. Uh we just have to incapacitate the neighboring states uh so that they don't have the capacity to act on the hatred. Now with Iran specifically, Israel has a, you know, a kind of a narrower rationale, which is to say, as we said, you know, the Iranian regime has since the the re the revolution kind of singled out uh Israel. I mean, it's very interesting what you say that that's been to some considerable extent because Israel is seen as an American tool since lately in America, the perception has been the opposite. But in any event, I mean, among some people uh since this war especially. Um but th this is you know a big concern in Israel and and they'll say look they keep saying they want to wipe us off the map. You know the reply to that from I think traditionally even from the regime is first of all the you know to wipe them off the map quote strictly speaking the translation was more like uh the Zionist regime or the regime that occupies Jerusalem must pass from the pages of time or something. So in other words it's about the regime not the people of Israel. We don't plan to kill all the people in Israel. And I think that's what leaders in Iran when pressed have actually said, right? We want regime change. And of course, that's what Israel says about Iran. Now, in that sense, I guess there's u kind of symmetry, but at the same time, first of all, is the Israeli regime, like most regimes, is not enthusiastic about regime change. And the Israeli people might well imagine that look, once Iran changes the regime, they're obviously want to gratify all of the Arabs on whose behalf they have spoken, right?

[00:36:22]So, they're going to be in favor of right of return, letting the Palestinians come back. How much room does that leave for us? And so on.

[00:36:29]Anyway, the the the big question I'm getting at is um to what extent is I mean I mean to what extent Israel considers Iran an inherently existential threat? My my own view is that to to the extent that it is that it's gotten closer and closer to that as a result of some things that both Israel and America have done.

[00:36:51]To what extent is that u is that a wellfounded concern and in what senses of existential you know existential to the regime you know existential to the people or or what?

[00:37:05]Well, now we are uh at a situation that both sides see uh you know the other as an existential threat and uh this cycle of violence and escalation and especially this latest war has brought us to the point that I think uh you know both can verifiably claim that the other side is um sort of after the uh destruction of uh of the other and not just the regime but uh maybe also the people. I mean this is the case about uh what Israelis have not just said but also done in targeting the Iran infrastructure and also more or less the same about uh you know uh Iranian attacks on uh civilian areas in Israel.

[00:37:53]So but uh you know actually the way that uh we can maybe a little bit better analyze this is again to uh go a little bit bit back uh in the history and and look uh how it evolves and how it develops. Um, one thing that again is uh usually uh ignored or u maybe probably uh not understood at all uh is that uh even after the Islamic revolution and uh during the 8 years of Iran Iraq war uh Israel still didn't see Iran as u as as an existential threat or maybe as a even a among the top uh pre uh threats to uh its security. Uh there are historical accounts and this is something I have also mentioned in my book briefly that uh at some point during the war the Israelis uh through intermediaries actually sold arms to uh to the uh Islamic Republic and uh this was something that um is quite uh you know interesting right when when they look at this. Why?

[00:39:06]Because at the time Saddam uh and and his regime was uh the main threat to Israel, you know, the way that he claimed to be the um sort of a leader of the of the Arab world before him was Jamal Naser, right? Um so it's about uh in in one way we can see it as uh inherently a battle over uh regional hegemony in the first place and then uh which is of course also motivated to some extent or mixed with um ideological or nationalist or I don't know religious um sort of elements as well. So in the case of Abdul Naser, in the case of Saddam, it was mostly about Arab nationalism and in the case of Iran, it's mostly about the Shia Islamist ideology, right? But in the end, uh what all these actors did when uh they uh saw the situation as uh kind of uh how to say uh favorable and ripe uh was to uh try to use that ideology again. uh whether nationalism or Islamism or whatever in order to uh project their influence in the region, right? So as long as Saddam was there and uh as long as this um uh hot or cold war between the Islamic Republic and and and Iraq was ongoing somehow uh there was a sort of a balance. none of them could um sort of you know uh really uh claim uh to to to to have uh the upper hand. But what happened actually after 2003 after the fall of Saddam um and and then uh with the developments of the Arab Spring Iranian intervention in Syria uh you know all the way uh up to uh October 23 was that Iran managed to step by step uh expand its influence in the region.

[00:41:15]There was a point actually not long ago uh it was in early 2024 that Yahim Safavi who's a a senior adviser to the Iranian supreme leader I don't know if still he still is or not but he was an adviser to Ali Khal he said something very interesting he said that for the third time in history we the Iranians have reached the shores of the Mediterranean the first time uh it was um Cyrus the great the second time it was Xerxes and now we are once again with the help of Hezbollah on the shores of the Mediterranean. So when you uh you know delve deep into uh the um strategic narrative which is of course uh the the main focus of my work uh you see that uh throughout all these years and especially we can say that gradually after the Islamic revolution uh ideology and probably after the death of Rahui ideology itself became a tool for uh regional expansionism and also So um this kind of an idea of of a forward defense as it is uh presented and uh and perceived by the Iranians. in the sense that to put it in a nutshell uh the forward defense which was very much motivated by the experience of the war with Iraq uh says that in order to preserve uh the mainland we have to uh essentially create buffer zones you know in in neighboring uh uh countries uh to increase our strategic depth and uh the support for Iraqi militias, the support for Hezbollah all that uh basically served uh this main purpose. So Iran became a power that was uh in a position that it could uh challenge Israel and that combined with uh the uh rhetoric from the more uh uh hardline ideological elements within the system. At some point we had Mahmud Ahmed for example.

[00:43:28]this whole uh crisis somehow intensified after ahmed reiterated Rahui's words about you know Israel being wiped off the map or whatever it was u so uh and we have it in the uh in the um this uh neo realalist uh school of thought in the literature right when uh there is the u uh capacity like uh the kind of material capabilities and then uh there's also the willingness uh to act in an aggressive way and also uh when the enemy is geographically close these uh kind of lead to a rise in the threat perception on on the other side. So these three elements uh basically uh led to what Israel considers as an existential threat. So the right question I think that's what I want to say uh is not whether uh the ideology of the Islamic Republic is after the uh destruction of the state of Israel. It the right question is what factors um work together and contributed to this uh threat perception on the Israeli side which is now kind of reversed and in a sense Iran is feeling the same things and I can explain why if you want.

[00:44:51]Yeah. Um, so I mean it sounds like to some extent it is a classic story of what's called the well the security dilemma is in a way a more complicated concept than this but but it is a it is to some extent a classic case of uh both sides doing things for largely defensive purposes so far as they're thinking of it that are perceived as offensive and then you get this positive feedback cycle where you get more and more seemingly offensive stuff kind of and here we are. That that's the broad pattern, right? I mean, it's fascinating the way to some extent this starts with Israel being seen as a tool of the US which had occupied such a central narrative in the in the in the re in the revolution itself. In other words, the US is a Satan. Um, but then once you get this positive feedback cycle going, uh, you know, same with World War I, right? That that's the broad story.

[00:45:49]>> Yeah. I mean in a way we can frame it like this but then again we are we have elements like uh Hamas like like before that it was PLO um so these um um armed groups slash political factions uh Palestinian uh who had their own objectives had their own uh history of uh you know uh fighting against Israel uh their own idea of resistance uh But then they also saw a patron right in the Islamic Republic. So as I said the whole relationship again started as organic and it had to do more with the uh leftist groups and also with uh groups like Mujah and it had to do with Kmeni and uh the current you know kind of leadership structure. uh but then uh that support also uh contributed to uh uh to this sense. Um so this is yeah this is the way that uh it all uh uh evolved and and developed into uh what we are seeing at the moment. But there is another element to this as well.

[00:47:00]Look, um it also has to do with um the uh view among the uh u Iranian leaders that um you know supporting the Palestinian cause and opposing Israel uh gives them uh credibility in the Muslim world gives them uh you know more influence among the Arab and Muslim communities and uh in line with this idea of Iran being the central of the Islamic world as the Iranian leader perceived this uh so it cannot be you know uh the center of the Islamic world without dealing effectively with the uh issue of Palestine because it had already become you know a core issue here that's the same reason more or less that uh despite the pragmatic contact between Saudi Arabia and Israel for example Saudi Arabia has not yet normalized with Israel uh the way that some other countries countries like the UAE or Bahrain have because the Saudis do have this claim of uh you know uh the leadership of the of the Muslim world.

[00:48:09]Uh so these are all the complexities that we have to have in mind when uh you know thinking about and analyzing this whole uh Iranian Israeli issue.

[00:48:20]>> Okay. So I want to explore those complexities now and and get into the actual construction of the axis of resistance which is a lot of what your book is about and the um and and the term proxy that that uh I know you think is in some ways an oversimplification and that's very relevant to the current moment because like when people say well at some moment Iran may activate uh the Houthis well I I don't know whether they can just push a button and do that. I don't know. I'm I'm going to ask you about that kind of thing. But uh first let me say that you know as I as I said earlier you know uh we uh the structure of these podcasts is we do have a long discussion in public then we go into what's called overtime which is available to paid subscribers to the non-zero newsletter. There's a link in the show notes. You can go to nonzero.org or uh you know click on this post and become a paid subscriber or if you don't want to do that at least become an unpaid uh subscriber. But but before we go into overtime I just want to say to people again uh your book the access of resistance Iran, Israel and the struggle for the Middle East available for pre-order now. Uh it'll be out in a few weeks in the US. It's available already in the UK and Europe. And uh also people should definitely follow you on Twitter uh if they're if they're interested in how this war uh is unfolding and may unfold. Your Twitter handle is Hamid Raza Az. So that's h a mi dre e za az.

[00:49:53]Uh and uh I really appreciate you agreeing to stick around talk some more in overtime. Uh, so that's what we're going to we're going to do