Will U.S. Strikes Derail the Iran Ceasefire? - w/ Fmr. US Marine Corps Matthew Hoh

Hinzugefügt: 2026-05-27

[00:00:06]Hi, Matthew. Good to have you back with us.

[00:00:09]>> Hi, Azie. How are you?

[00:00:11]>> Good, good. Uh, good to see you again.

[00:00:13]Uh, when we spoke the other day, it was another round of extremely fluid moment, >> but it just seems like it's more complicated since then. So, let's we have a lot to talk about right now. Um I I wanted to focus right now on the US Iran negotiations of this uh framework.

[00:00:30]Um the confusion around even project freedom that came out uh whether it's restarted, it's not restarted. You know, we we've we've got the limited US strikes also that between Iran and and the US that happened over the last 48 hours or so. Um then we've got Lebanon and Israel, a lot of escalations there.

[00:00:47]In fact, just before we got on, I saw some news that had come out in terms of the expansion of um the operation.

[00:00:55]>> So, you know, getting into this and and really really jumping into that, you know, the reports on the progress of this possible.

[00:01:05]Um it seems to just you we talked about this the other day. It seems like the battleground one of the battlegrounds that seems to um you know permeate across all the other battlegrounds is the narrative battleground.

[00:01:19]>> So you know you have we see the you know Trump saying that it's proceeding nicely and then also warning it's either a great deal or back to the battle battlefield. You've you know bigger and stronger than ever. We've got Ro Rubio saying that their disagreements may come down to a word or a sentence even. Um and then on the other on the Iranian side, you've got the officials are saying, you know, progress has been made on this, but the deal is not uh imminent. Uh we did see yesterday that the the president, the foreign minister, and even um the head of the central bank were all in Qatar. So you seeing all of this and looking at this moment from your standpoint, what are we actually watching happening right now? Is this diplomacy? Is this coercive bargaining or is it just both sides trying to buy some time to figure out, you know, where we're going to go from here?

[00:02:07]>> I think it's more of the latter there, you know, cuz you can add in things. I mean, you addressed the whole host of things there, Azie, right? Like, but they you didn't you didn't include uh that Trump uh last night or two nights ago said uh anyone who signs a deal also has to sign the Abraham Accords, right?

[00:02:24]Which seems like a massive poison pill to throw in to this thing. You know, we could talk about how Democratic Party politicians here in the US are saying that the deal can't happen. You can't have a deal that's going to give things to Iran. You can't have a deal that's going to allow Iran to, you know, I mean, so Democrats attacking Donald Trump from his right on this. Of course, the statements coming out of Israel, uh, essentially amounting to over our dead bodies. I mean, I mean, there's, you know, and I want to say going into the weekend, about half the media and the analysts I follow say, "Hey, we're gonna have a deal this weekend or, you know, shortly after." And about the other half are saying, "No, it's going to go back into full full-blown war." And here we kind of are in this stasis, in this status quo, in this indefinite ceasefire, not so frozen conflict. And I think that's where we're going to remain. Um and I think between the uh uh Americans who don't have coher coherent objectives who uh have uh uh uh been able to accomplish uh anything in terms of position themselves to have leverage over Iran. Uh their military performance was uh lackluster right to to to put it very simply. uh you know and contrast that with the Iranians who have clear principles, clear objectives. Uh they seem to have met many of their short ter short-term uh political and economic uh goals uh and they clearly have the upper hand at the negotiation table. They are in a position of strength. You have the Israelis willing to to be spoilers and then we see here in the United States there's very little political room for Donald Trump on this. uh you I mean the the taking a deal for Donald Trump is running into very severe political opposition in the US. So how do you get a deal? Who's willing to make concessions? You know, and I think that's why you see these mixed messaging coming out. I think there is an attempt to get a deal. I think every all these sides are up against this deadline. you know, Brookings just published uh Brookings Institute out of Washington DC just published a report uh basically giving us a timeline of here's right it's it's very helpful and and nice and short right and easy I could understand the graph so they did a great job with with that you know and but this idea of like okay the Russian oil that's afloat runs out here the Iranian oil that's afloat runs out here the 400 million barrels of strategic petroleum reserve releases across the world run out by early July. And then it's just you have what has been made up through the Saudis pushing oil through their pipeline, the Yamboo and uh the Emirati is the same pushing their pipeline to through the Gulf of Aman. Uh that's making up some of it, but you still have Delta, still have a deficit of about 10 million barrels a day with no cushion, no inventories. And I think everyone's aware of that. And I mean I I certainly I think again the Iranians are now in a stronger position. And I think most of us who are looking at this believe the Iranians have the wherewithal to weather uh the coming uh economic warfare, the the the economic crash, recession potentially leading to a depression if the war resumes and we lose the Gulf's energy infrastructure. Uh but this idea that when we hit this point in July when the inventories when the cushions the buffers are gone uh the pressure that's then going to be on the Americans as well as the Gulf States and the Europeans is going to be immense. So I think there is a desire in Washington DC to get a deal done before then knowing that they have this you know thing hanging over them. Um, and the Iranians of course though have no reason to make concessions and the Americans don't have the political space to make concessions.

[00:06:33]So again, how does that lead to a deal?

[00:06:36]And the Americans know that restarting the war uh might look good, might give them some sound bites. You could get some more videos out of it. It's propaganda, but it's what's changed?

[00:06:48]What forces can the Americans bring to bear that are going to have any different impact on the Iranians than the Americans already unleashed during the five-week campaign in March and April? And the same thing too, why if the munition stocks are where they are now for the Americans, if the resources, if the fleets, the air force squadrons, if none of that has changed, why does anyone think the Americans can have a campaign go longer than five weeks? You know, that's all they could do last time before having to get ceasefire. all these things, you know, I mean, cuz it's very complicated and if you're trying to follow this, uh, it's okay if you don't know what's going on because nobody seems to know what's going on.

[00:07:30]Yeah. You know, in the middle of these reports of, uh, some, you know, I call it, uh, military tango, but, you know, the the strikes against some of those, uh, little the speedboats, I guess, that were allegedly, you know, mining. Um, and then the response from Iran, that that little back and forth. In the middle of all that, Trump, you know, everybody was waiting for Trump to put something out saying, "This is it. You know what? They screwed up." But instead, he he posted about the nuclear material.

[00:08:01]>> Yeah, >> that was his focus, right? And and we talked about this the last time. Um, you know, when Trump came back from China for about 3 4 days, his media rounds was, you know, whether it was Hannity or or whomever else, he kept saying that, you know, uh, the nuclear the nuclear dust, the nuclear material is important, but it's more psychological and for public relations. He he said that, I think, in two different interviews, public relations. Um, given all of that, you know, do you think a case can be made that both sides are just flatout exhausted enough to accept even the most imperfect deal um to an extent? you know, given given some of the other uh narrative that is coming out, you know, especially Trump Trump yesterday giving that option of I'm sure you saw that he gave the option of two or three different ways that um Iran could get rid of the nuclear material, send it to Iran for I send it to America for America to dispose of or you know in conjunction on the ground there with evidence and proof and and people overseeing it to make sure that it gets removed.

[00:09:09]>> I think that Yeah. Go ahead. Does that look like does that indicate maybe they just want to get something done to move past this?

[00:09:18]>> That looks like the way forward, right?

[00:09:21]That looks like a pathway to get out of this where both sides can turn to their constituencies and say we won. Now, of course, uh the thing that that the Iranians are sitting on top of with this is that they don't have a nuclear weapons program. and they have a nuclear program, but since 2003 they have not had a nuclear weapons program and they don't want a nuclear weapons program. As far as we can understand, there's not been a change in, you know, even though their their senior leaders were killed.

[00:09:49]You have uh essentially a new generation uh in charge now in many ways. Uh but also too, you have uh leadership that is heavily influenced or dominated by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Uh but you've still not seen that indication that they're going to go for a nuclear weapon now. So the Iranians what they're what they've been fighting for here is principle. They've been fighting for sovereignty. They don't want nuclear weapons, but they're not going to give up their right to have a nuclear program. And before the United States launched this war on Iran at the end of February, we have to remember what the Omani foreign minister reported that was confirmed by the British national security adviser who was also in attendance of the talks that the Iranians had offered uh to down blend uh right so they they've got uranium at 60% enriched right now. that needs to go to 90% in order to be no weapons grade, which in going from 60 to 90% is not a big deal. It's it's not I'm sure it's complicated, but it's it's not an issue.

[00:10:55]It doesn't take very long. They can do it. Um, but the Iranians offered at the end of February to down blend the uranium uh to 3.67% which is the level of enrichment that's used uh for civilian nuclear uses. So the Iranians had already offered that.

[00:11:14]So the idea that the Iranians could then say, "Okay, we will we will keep this nuclear dust as Donald Trump likes to call it and we will down blend it to 3.67." Now Donald Trump can then take what he said about destroying Iran's uh nuclear dust uh as being it's been downblended. It's no longer nuclear weapons dust. Now it's just regular. I mean there's all types of semantics and he can put something in the truth social that would explain this all way okay and then you have a deal right and would be able to walk out of this except you can't because the Americans themselves whether it's Republicans or Democrats are dominated by leadership that wants this war in Iran just as much as the Israelis want this war in Iran. You have of course the Israelis who are going to sabotage this who have for for many reasons don't want to give up this war but especially don't want to give up the war in Lebanon. So now you hit this impass then right where the American president though he can make the argument that he got what he wanted you know which they could have gotten before uh this war but you know so so on but uh you know and and so now here you're stuck and I think that's where we're at and that's why I continue to see this continuing to go forward in the way that we've seen it where the straits of Hermoose starts to open up uh the Gulf States acquies to the the uh Iranian control. Uh the American blockade is there, but it's very porous. The Iranians can still get some ships through, but they're getting their tolls now from the other Gulf traffic, so makes up for a lot. The Iranians find other ways to move their product overland or what have you. And so the Iranians are able to survive uh and start to rebuild. And they've got revenue coming in. Um, and the Americans are essentially launching strikes every now and again. We have what we had a couple days ago where some Iranian boats are sunk, an American drone is shot down, missiles are fired back and forth, and so you're in this uh, again, it's not a frozen conflict. It's it's not a real ceasefire, but it's certainly not war. And that's the essentially motus for vende, right? That is that is what has been uh uh uh you know this this we can get by like this and Donald Trump can then say to his political opposition which is both Democrats and Republicans in many ways at this point that you know hey we're still we're still containing them. We're still fighting them. We're not letting them get away with this but the economy is not bottoming them out as bad as it could. you know, but the whole economy thing, you know, Azie is just uh we'll see what it's like in August. Uh when, as we were talking before, those in inventories stop providing a cushion.

[00:14:07]Oil potentially going up to 150 as well.

[00:14:09]At that point, the downstream or byproducts of uh of Persian Gulf oil and gas uh that starts affecting the markets, right? You're get less helium, less aluminum, less copper, less fertilizer. we start seeing that, you know, so August then it may be a question for the Americans of okay, the Republicans are going into uh the midterms and what are they going to do about this?

[00:14:37]>> Yeah, I I definitely see some of what you're you're saying here. I I want to move a little bit to this I you know the the chatter around Project Freedom um in the strait. We've seen reports, as I said in the beginning, we've seen reports suggesting that it may be restarted and then Sentcom walked it back and said, "No, that's not true."

[00:14:56]You know, we've see there's this language there. You know, it is the confusion around Project Freedom a signal of this operational ambiguity or do you see it as deliberate messaging? That's I think that's in everybody's mind. Really mine actually from a comm's perspective. But how do you see that Matthew? I think your use of the word ambiguity is a very kind way of putting it. Um I think uh >> yeah I think that's a very kind and generous uh but but certainly uh yeah I I I think it's it's well I for for me I really do believe that what the issue with project freedom has been it's been the Saudi and the Kuwaiti saying no and essentially when project freedom was announced it was the last month ago already or whenever it was that the United States was going to uh escort ships essentially through straits or haramuz and then that got walked back to no the United States actually won't you know put ships there and convoy them but we'll provide protection in other ways as well as providing insurance and um the Kuwaitis and the Saudis uh recognized that this is just going to restart the conflict. Iran's not going to allow this. Iran's going to sink uh these ships or attack these ships and the Americans will respond and we'll be right back into the war. the escalation ladder will just zoom right up it and they'll be hitting our oil and gas fields and this time we'll lose a lot more than we lost in the first 5 weeks which already was very costly. So I think the Kuwaitis and the Saudis said no you can't use our bases you can't have our you can't fly through our airspace for this project freedom which we believe is going to restart the war.

[00:16:42]Now that was explained away by everyone in the region as essentially being because uh the Iranians had attacked the UAE. The Americans didn't respond to that and so that the this was the Kuwaitian Saudi response to the American N response. You know, they felt disrespected. The Americans didn't take the Arabs concerns seriously, etc., etc., etc. I don't believe that excuse for an instant. I think this really was the Saudis and the Kuwaiti saying, "No, you're not going to escalate this." So I think that you you have that as well is you have Saudi, Kuwaiti, Qatari uh uh uh uh certainly Omani uh leadership that is dead set against this war, right? I mean even too you see what they're talking about in terms of what it's going to look like afterwards. You know, this idea of a non-aggression pact, some type of Helsinki agreement for uh the Middle East or for the Gulf States, right? I mean so already positioning um that the day after this war uh that there is a day tant uh that there is uh uh relations between these countries in a way that you wouldn't expect from uh countries that are uh bent upon uh victory. Uh even the Amiradis I I I wasn't able to see the the I saw I just saw a headline today or a suggestion today that the Amiradis were looking to deescalate and the Amiradis of course over the last few weeks have been understood to be in the Israeli camp of you we got to restart this thing and let's win it. There's no other responsible way to to see the end of this conflict other than a change in leadership in Toronto. So I mean I I think the the recognition of that there is no victory here that this game of chicken of whose economy is going to crash is one that the west and the Americans and Europeans but also too the Gulf Arab states can't win. Um and that there is no military solution. uh that the Americans tried. The Americans and Israelis tried for 5 weeks and you know what the Iranians gave it back as good as they got and from everything we can gather the Iranians are in a better position now in terms of particularly say miss missile stockpiles uh as well as all their drones. Um that would make another campaign ruinous uh particularly if again the critical energy infrastructure was really targeted. So, I think with Project Freedom, I think it gets brought up because there's so much pressure on the Americans to do something about Iran's control of the streets of Hamuz. Uh, one because it is fundamental. Uh, but also two because it's humiliating. It's embarrassing. And as people love to bring up, this wasn't the case on February 27th, right? That is only because of this war that the Iranians have this control of stra. So, I think that's why we keep hearing about it. But I I mean my estimation is that it's not going to happen uh because uh the those states don't want to see an escalation. I also don't think the Americans want to see an escalation at this point. If they had if we if they did, we would have seen it already. Now, Donald Trump is incredibly fickle. We got to caveat everything we say here that Donald Trump can change his mind.

[00:20:02]You know, uh you know, right now he could be typing out that on true social that he's launching the war again. But, you know, I mean, from what we can kind of estimate here, uh, it just seems the politicians in DC, uh, as well as, you know, out, you know, as well as the Israelis are the ones that want to see this war started.

[00:20:25]>> So, speaking of Trump, I want to read one of his truth social posts from just a, I don't know, two hours ago, three hours ago. But before that, I you know, there are some that make the argument that the US would say this is more defensive. We've got the commercial shipping has to move. The energy markets can't be held hostage anymore. Iran can't be allowed to regulate one of the world's most like important waterways. Of course, you know, it contributes 20 at least 20% of the world um is it 20%? Yeah, 20% of the world's um oil comes from there. Japan about 20% of the oil and refined product about 20 million >> Japan he heavily Japan I mean early on in the war I remember the prime minister of Japan went to meet with Trump but then after as soon as she left that meeting she called Iran and said hey what kind of deal can we make so that my chips can go through but >> but don't you think that it's also a fair argument to say that to an extent you know it is one of Iran's non-kinetic ways of responding to this war and I guess all is fair and love and war but at the same time you you know you have a lot of countries that are dependent on this waterway and so um from that perspective I guess some some do make the argument that the US's position and posturing on this is defensive but in defense of all these other countries too that are being um impacted by this yeah >> outside of American Israeli and some European leadership no one buys that right I mean so and outside of corporate media media that is loyal to or part of uh the establishment, part of you know part of the American empire and its structures. No one buys that. I mean, everyone understands the reality of why this is the way it is. Uh and this was uh understood to be part of Iran's strategy. First of all, Iran has exercised enormous patience that this is the first time they've ever done this with everything that has occurred uh over the last 47 years. the Iran Iraq war, uh the the the uh sanctions that begin in the '9s, the cyber attacks, the sabotage, the assassinations, the bombings, you know, on and on and on.

[00:22:38]The Iranians have not done this. Um and so their patience and waiting until now, I think, is is quite remarkable from an American perspective, like a Western perspective. I can't see the United States doing something like that, having that degree of patience. But the other side of the is that this is well thought out. This is part of their strategy.

[00:22:58]They understood that in order to defeat the United States, yes, they could fight the United States both symmetrically and asymmetrically. Uh and you know, they certainly showed that they could uh and they, you know, forced the Americans to retreat from 13 or 14 of their bases.

[00:23:15]They kept the American aircraft carriers a thousand kilometers away. You know, essentially the United States can restart the war. But again, to what point? Um, I mean, so they were able to fight the Americans in that way. But more important, but that's not going to win, right? That's not going to give get the Americans to leave the region fully, certainly hell, but more importantly, it's not going to get the Americans to give up their uh Iranian frozen assets.

[00:23:39]It's not going to get the Americans to end uh the sanctions. It's not going to restore uh Iranian sovereignty in the way the Iranians are looking for. So, the idea was twofold. both political and economic. Uh the first economic uh was to by closing the straits of Hammuz putting that economic pressure on America's Gulf allies because their their revenue is gone, right? I mean, and Saudis Amiradis are able to produce get some out, not as much as they could, but for the Kuwaitis, the Qataris, the Bahrainis, uh the Iraqis, pretty much their product is shut in now. It's it's done, you I mean so the pressure there on those American allies but then it that expands even further by having those economic consequences felt throughout the world. So essentially Iran has waged economic warfare against the entire world and that's why Iran is should now be considered a world power.

[00:24:35]It was able to do that. It's done it successfully. You brought up Japan. You can bring up South Korea where the South right mean same thing. I mean the issues there are dramatic. I mean across Asia it's been uh you know Philippines, Vietnam uh this is having enormous consequences and as we were saying before the consequences to the rest of the world are coming right there's a latency here and so it's coming it's like you could see that wave way out and it's it's coming so the the Iranians were able to do that quite well and then the other aspect of the strategy was a political was to call you know utilizing this economic warfare but also by expanding the war throughout the region. Um this put enormous pressure on America's Gulf Arab Arab Arab allies or you know I will call vassels and you know and that's causing a fracturing within that order right you know and and again we're just talking about the Kuwaitis and the Saudis telling the Americans no you can't use our airspace for your project freedom but even further than that you have political pressure being applied throughout the American empire uh you have the pressure that we've seen come between the United States and NATO already tenuous, already uh a lot of bad blood there between the Americans and the Europeans. This just even opening it up more, right? I mean, and then we could talk about the Pacific uh nations.

[00:26:03]Uh the Japanese are now all upset because the Tomahawk missiles they paid for two years ago. Uh there's another two-year delay on them, right? I mean like so even something like that you know you see where this pressure is being put on America's upon these nations that are a part of the American empire and you add that on top of the reality of the decline of the empire the reality of the multipolar world and these states are now saying is this deal that we're with with the Americans is this alliance is this relationship worth it you know I mean so I mean you saw the Iranian strategy there uh meant to achieve those political and economic objectives. And you know the the political is what wins wars. Regardless of whether how good your missiles are, your tanks are, the quality of your fighting forces, it is the political level of warfare that determines the outcome of war. It's the way it is. And the Iranians understand that. The Americans don't. The Americans thought they can bomb Iran, kill uh certain people, and that in three days time the war would be over. And you know how now here we are. uh getting close to what 90 days.

[00:27:13]>> Yeah. I want to read something from Trump today real quick. Get your thoughts on it and then I want to sort of move to a statement you made recently. Um I I have a quote from what you said. Okay. So ton Donald Trump said roughly I think it's 3 hours ago. He said, 'If Iran surrenders, admits their navy is gone and resting at the bottom of the sea, and their air force is no longer with us, and if their entirely entire military walks out of Thrron, weapons dropped and hands held high, each shouting, "I surrender. I surrender while wildly waving the representative white flag. And if their entire remaining leadership signs all necessary documents of surrender and all quotes documents of surrender and admit their defeat to the great power and force of the magnificent USA, the failing New York Times, the Chinese street, the China Street Journal, Washington, WSG, corrupt and now irrelevant CNN, and all other members of the fake news media will headline that Iran had a masterful and brilliant victory over the United States of America. It wasn't even close.

[00:28:21]The Democrats and media have totally lost their way. They have gone absolutely crazy. President DJT.

[00:28:30]Okay. So, it's it's interesting when I read Trump's statements like this, especially because it starts out and you assume that it's going to a policy position of the United States to kind of indicate and signal where we're at with this negotiation. All eyes. And then you get to the part where it's really about the failing New York Times, the China Street Journal, etc. But but on a serious note though, you know, do you see because certainly on the Iran side, I can see it just understanding the dynamics and the DNA of how even the political infighting and the structure works inside of Iran and and understanding how we are in the United States as well. um Ted Cruz, Lindsey Graham, and so many others came out over the last two, three days very upset about this deal, >> right?

[00:29:16]>> Do you think Trump is doing a good job though navigating and and I and I would ask you maybe even the same um about the Iran side? Do you think all the parties involved in this are doing a good job of keeping everyone in suspense and maybe that protecting the process to an extent also because they also have their own political their domestic political infighting and um factions not necessarily wanting to see this go through. Well, I I think yeah, I mean with Donald Trump, God, if he was a a Netflix show, you know, I'd never miss an episode, right?

[00:29:57]You know, I mean, in the sense that the absurdity, the entertainment, just the creativity uh that comes out of him uh is remarkable. Uh but he's the president of the United States. And so now you worry about is this man, you know, his his his mental capacities. Uh, and I think that's a very serious thing.

[00:30:17]That's a real thing. I mean, he can't divorce anything from the personal, right? And so, as you pointed out, this always go back goes back to his vendetta against the New York newspapers that wrote bad things about him in the 1980s, right? I mean, so we're dealing with somebody here who uh the the the the personal is everything. Um, and he would be a character that would fit into uh Edward Gibbons the history of the cl the client of the Roman Empire quite well. I mean, he's a mad emperor. Uh, you and what he's dealing with then.

[00:30:53]Sorry, but but real quick on that though, but you don't see maybe some of this is just, you know, posturing or just, you know, social media kind of I dare I I I say trolling that the United States president is trolling, but to an extent though, I mean, using, you know, the younger generations lingo here, >> do do you think maybe that's just on the surface there to throw everyone off and distract them >> to kind of keep everyone away from some of these negotiations going on to get to a No, I mean it could be. I mean, there is that possibility that yeah, this is a smoke screen to, you know, uh uh because because Donald Trump does, you know, you've got to point Azie because he does at times do things and then surprise us with something else. Certainly the Iranians will tell you that they were negotiating with him twice and they got bombed twice. So certainly that that is something that he likes to do. um you know the focus on the domestic again the going back to this vendetta against I mean that is I think what you have to take away from this is this understanding that for him the uh the message that is his own message right that that that that the idea of of um centering us back to his self-interest um and here he is I think if we looking at what you read this idea that uh no matter what happens, like you said, if all the soldiers of Iran march out of Tran with throw their weapons down and you know say I surrender and giant uh you know giant uh banners of of of surrender or you know all these things uh the you know the dumb the Democrats and the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal would all say anyway that one right I mean so you see there is that type of victimiz ation that he's been famous for. But, you know, I mean, it's really difficult to see how he gets himself out of this. It's a war that he can't win and it's also a war that he doesn't seem like he can leave. I mean, I think he's focused on the the nuclear program because maybe that is something attainable. Um I mean he he's reading you know with what you just said there about if the Iranians admit that their fleets at the bottom of the ocean and their air force is all destroyed you know that implies that that is what happens and the Iranians just won't admit reality right so he's going to say what he wants to say never mind the fact that who cares about their old aircraft who cares about those old ships that's not what they use to fight you know it's their missile and drone fleets it's it's you know but uh so I don't know I mean Donald Trump this is Uh, I think I've been doing this for a long time and this is the hardest I've ever worked at trying to figure out something. I never thought I would say that I understand uh a nation other than the United States uh better than I understand the United States. And you know, I I try and people ask me what I do is I analyze American foreign policy. I analyze America's military. I'm not an Iran expert. I'm not a Middle East expert. I'm not an expert about right, you I'm an expert about the United States and I have an easier time understanding the Iranians, the Saudis, the Israelis, the Egyptians, the Russians, the Ukrainians, whoever, more than I can understand the Americans with this administration, you know, and this is why, you know, this is why in 2024, Vladimir Putin said he wanted to see Joe Biden re-elected. Even though he knew Joe Biden would be much more hostile to Russia, would be much will continue support to Ukraine, he rather deal with a Joe Biden who is predictable than a Donald Trump who was not predictable. You know, so this idea of certainty, this danger of uh you know, Trump's uh ability to change his mind, uh this is a this is a real problem for all of us. For all of us. It's a problem for everyone. Um, even the Israelis don't like it and they love Donald Trump. Uh, and but the Israelis, this scares the Israelis. Uh, and it scares everybody else.

[00:35:04]>> Yeah. I I want to go to a statement you made. You wrote, "Between the domestic political constraints on Donald Trump and US false articles of faith regarding American military and moral dominance, Iran's clear upper hand, why would they make concessions and their wellestablished principles and objectives and Israel's role as spoiler?

[00:35:25]I don't see how a deal is reached between the US and Iran." Now, >> that's a strong claim. you know um what do you mean by you know Iran having the clear upper hand and you don't see how a deal would be reached between the US Iran right now? Well, I I think in terms of Iran having the upper hand, they have control of the straits of Hammuz. That's not going to change. They're going to have control of the states of Hamuz for as long as they want to have control of the states of Hammuz, you know, unless the United States put a puts a 2 million man army into Iran. And even then, right, there's no more than likely you'd be engaged in another Iraq, Vietnam, Afghanistan type of war. So even that wouldn't bring about success. But the idea that uh uh you know Iran has fought the United States in Israel uh toe-to-toe again symmetrically and asymmetrically uh using missiles and drones in a fight that was a conventional modern war fight but then also then using uh six or 7,000 drones to destroy 1 billion dollar radars. Right? I mean, so you saw the Iranians here come out of this fiveweek long war in a position where they have uh from what we understand through CIA and Pentagon leaks as well as almost what most independent observers and analysts are saying with a missile and drone dominance that they have more missiles and drones and can continue to produce them particularly drones in a manner that uh dominates the Israelis and the Americans. uh the the fact that uh I would say one of the things you want to evidence that the United States uh this war failed uh look at where American defense stocks are you know I mean the big five defense stocks uh all have had terrible 90 days uh you know usually during a war like this where uh American defense companies would would see a a restocking benefit as they call it right the okay we're going to fire off all these weapons and fire off all these munitions and we've got to build more. Oh man, we're just going to be rolling in it. No, what's occurred is that you've seen American defense stocks perform poorly. And a lot of that has to do with the fact that the world is looking at this and seeing this is 20th century warfare. And it is at best uh a stalemate against this 21st century war against Iran, a nation that's been blockaded for how many decades now? A nation that was supposed to have not been able to last longer than a week.

[00:38:03]uh and here they are. I mean, so uh you know, you put all that together, we go back to the economic warfare that they su so successfully waged. We go back to the reality that the Iranians have been living under siege uh for almost five decades now. And their economy, their culture, their society, their leadership all understand that. Uh they have a wherewithal to make it through whatever is coming. It'll be difficult. It'll be hard, but they'll have an ability to make it through in a way that the Gulf States aren't prepared for. And I can tell you the United States is not prepared economically, socially, or politically for a global recession brought about uh by, you know, and then again, if it gets worse and you lose uh critical energy infrastructure in the Gulf uh for the next four or five years, you're in a global depression. Iran is not cannot be blockaded. They have uh land routes into friendly nations. They have the Caspian Sea connecting them to Russia. Uh you've seen the Chinese not come out with a position paper saying we are on Iran's side, but I think anyone reading this is is understanding that the Chinese are happy to see this continue where the Americans are being humiliated. Uh right. I mean, I don't think the Chinese want to see this prolonged, but they enjoy, I think, the Americans uh s uh uh losing uh this war.

[00:39:33]Uh I mean, so you put all that together and I think the Iranians have the upper hand. And I think maybe the most important aspect is their popular will is the fact that their people have turned out in the streets. This is a people that, you know, divided whether they support the government or not. uh a country that is not ethnically homogeneous but right very very desperate. Uh the Americans and Israelis thought they could incite uh ethnicbased uprisings create a civil war there. That didn't happen. Uh, I mean, and so you have an, you know, an a rally around the flag effect here that chosen Iranian people that, yeah, many of them may not want to see uh, the government they have, but they'll be damned if they're going to see the Americans and the Israelis of foreign powers uh, overthrow their government, right? Or defeat them in war or force them to bend a knee. I mean, so this idea of the will of the people, then you compare that to say the Americans where less than a third of Americans support this as three months old and it started off with barely a third of the people supporting it. I mean, so you have you put all these together and yes, Iran has the upper hand here. They don't have to make concessions. Uh it's the Americans that will be forced to make concessions at some point. And the problem is though is that Donald Trump is up against this bull work of both Republicans. You talked be you know Ted Cruz, Lindsey Graham, but I think you also mentioned Richard Blumenthal who's a Democrat and he saw >> I didn't but he's of course another one too. Yeah.

[00:41:10]>> Right. But you also saw >> Cy Booker who you know the senator from New Jersey Democrat Debbie Wasman Schultz uh who former chair of the Democratic National Committee from Florida uh as well as too we just know the sympathies uh of uh the Democratic Party leadership, Chuck Schumer, Keem Jeff. These are people that want this war. And so on the Sunday morning talk shows here in the United States, the news talk shows, you had people like Booker and Wman Wasman Schultz saying, you know, this Donald Trump, you know, we will not let Donald Trump give concessions to Iran. The Iranians cannot get billions of dollars from the Americans to buy more ballistic missiles. They cannot control the streets of Hammuz. They cannot be allowed to continue to threaten Israel.

[00:41:56]yada yada yada yada. Right? And so Donald Trump has very little political space. Not that he would turn to Democrats for support on this, but it shows that he is really hedged in here.

[00:42:07]And the issue then becomes, and I think this is why the Democrats have leaned so heavily into opposing an end to this war, opposing any type of deal, uh, is this idea that maybe they can get some political gain from it. that if Donald Trump does secure a deal with Iran and Iranians get some type of sanctions relief, they maintain control of Jaser Hamuz, they don't have to force their missile and drone fleet and those type of things, the uh you know, Apac in the Israel lobby may decide to punish Donald Trump by removing support from some of his uh uh candidates in the November midterm elections and maybe providing support to pro-Israel Democrats in those elections, right, to punish the president for this deal. And I think the Democrats see that as an opportunity or a possibility. Um, and I mean, but also too, I don't want to take away from the fact that people like Booker, uh, Blumenthal, Wasman Schultz, etc., uh, they are all Israeli firsters. Uh, they they're they're true believers in Israel.

[00:43:12]>> Yeah.

[00:43:14]Speaking of Israel right now, I want to move a little bit over to what's going on um in South Lebanon.

[00:43:21]with Israel.

[00:43:24]Some are of the position that Israel launched this or escalated what was going on. Of course, Hezbollah, even during the ceasefire, you know, Hezbollah was still um launching uh towards Israel and of course, Israel are responding. But over the last few days since this UOU was announced, it seems like is Israel has really ramped up its efforts. In fact, I was just, you know, just a couple of hours ago, I saw that uh Netanyahu was in the middle of a meeting and I think um he left that immediately and spoke directly with President Trump. You know, we're seeing reports that Israeli forces have begun advancing north of Israel's self-declared yellow line, that yellow line that they had, you know, talked about in the beginning, into southern Lebanon. Netanyahu said today, "We're deepening the operation in Lebanon and capturing controlling territories. We're fortifying the security uh strip." So, um when we see this alongside the reports of uh approved plans for expanding the ground operations and aerial campaigns in Lebanon, I think it was yesterday there were also, you know, fighter jets reported over Beirut. But then you also see Trump coming out and saying very explicitly, stay out of Beirut. You know, don't go too far.

[00:44:39]you're, you know, essentially you could see some of the signals there that Trump was a little bit do not violate this aspect of the ceasefire because there were some specific terms of that ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon um that it just you know is getting close to that line of violation um to many.

[00:45:00]There are some that are of the position that this is happening right now because Israel wants to get in as much as it can because thisou looks like it's about to be signed. There are some that are saying that Israel is doing it to sabotage it uh to try to get in the way to trigger Iran into a response um you know because they have this this sensitive spot towards his bullah and it's always the the idea of Lebanon has always been in fact I think it's one of the from the leaked versions or one of the leaked versions it's one of the elements of what Iran is asking for in this framework >> in your in your um understanding of this and even your experience even with the state department before how do Do you see this? What how do you see the strategy behind this? How should we think about Lebanon and the relation of this Iran talk, the US Iran talks and and um how Israel is engaging and behaving and how Lebanon and Hezbollah are engaging and behaving. Well, the Iranians has have, as you said, Azie, the the Iranians believe that this war in Lebanon is a part of the larger war, that they're not separate, that it's the same war, and that they won't accept any deal that does not include uh Lebanon as well. And it's going to be a question of what do the Iranians mean by that? Does that just mean a cessation of fighting, right? I want to say, you know, or does it mean the Israelis have to end their occupation? The Israelis have to go back to uh northern Israel, you know. So, it's a question, I think, of what the Iranians are looking for in us. But for the Israelis, uh you know, this idea of the conquest of southern Lebanon is something that uh this goes back to the early earliest Zionists. I mean, this goes back to Hersel and Japinsky and you know, others. idea of greater Israel and that encompasses Lebanon in some accounts all the way up through Beirut.

[00:46:57]You know, you've seen whether it was the occupation of Lebanon uh from 1982 to 2000 or the 2006 uh war on Lebanon by Israel. You know, this desire to conquer, this desire to occupy. Uh certainly I follow on October 7th, you had many Israelis who were saying October 7th gives us the best chance we have had in decades to do what we need to do. And part of that, you know, one of those things is to occupy Lebanon.

[00:47:28]Now Lebanon is a goal in of itself, but I as I understand for the Israelis, Lebanon is secondary to the West Bank.

[00:47:36]And so the idea of that if you ever want to enex the West Bank, you have to have fully isolated the Palestinians from any support, whether that be political, moral, diplomatic, economic, uh, military, etc. In order to do that, you need to do things like remove Hzbala from interfering so that when the Israelis go to annex the West Bank, of which they're they're doing, you know, in slow motion right now, although if you're Palestinian, you wouldn't say it was slow motion. um you know, Hezbollah can't interfere. They need to have that northern flank of Israel secure as well.

[00:48:11]Then of course the idea of the occupation of Lebanon for its own purposes and whether you are part of the settler side of things in Israel and you see this as part of greater Israel or you come from a more secularist uh uh national security state side that believes in a buffer zone. Uh you see the importance then of uh you know taking uh Lebanon uh at least to the Yellow Line or at least up to the Latani River. Uh I mean now you're seeing uh the same type of commentary coming out of Israel that we saw uh with regards to Gaza calls essentially for genocide. Uh you had I think it was Bezel Smootri the finance minister who said the other day that for every drone uh the uh that Hezbala launches 10 apartment buildings should be destroyed. Uh you had uh I believe it was uh uh Israel Katz the defense minister who said we will do to uh you know Lebanon the same that we did to Gaza. uh you know I mean so you have that same desire there uh to finish Lebanon to make Lebanon no longer a problem for the Israelis. So you know you have that uh reality too that this is where Benjamin Netanyahu has received his fiercest political opposition since October 7th. uh you know certainly he has his criminal charges as corruption charges you know uh but in regards to the ferocity a um uh cohesion in his political opposition and now they have elections coming I don't think the elections will be any earlier than uh late August so most likely September they have to have them by October in Israel so you see now of course maybe some more uh urgency to the opposition But you saw Bennett and Laid join forces, create a new party essentially dedicated around this idea of opposing a ceasefire in Lebanon, a ceasefire in which the Israelis have killed a thousand people.

[00:50:15]By the way, I mean, but even too, you saw saw a comment from Benny Gance, another opposition leader in Israel.

[00:50:23]Benny Gance, if you go back a few years, uh, go back, uh, about two years now, when the Joe Biden administration talked about what they wanted to see in Israel, they would put forth these ideas of of a moderate like Benny Gance coming into power. It's complete nonsense. And Gance showed Gance shows again why, you know, his opposition to anything other than victory essentially in Lebanon. So you have this very real political pressure they are being exerting on Netanyahu that even if he wanted to end the occupation of Lebanon even if Netanyahu said you know what I've thought about it this is just not a good idea you know history tells me this isn't going to work out and I'm going to you even that was the case he had would have tremendous difficulty in doing so very similar again to this idea of Donald Trump facing his political opposition in the US to end the war in Iran now further further aggravate things. You've got Trump, I think maybe he might be annoyed with Netanyahu. It's so it's hard to to understand this. A lot of the nonsense in the American press about these splits between uh Trump and Netanyahu were just uh utilized for narrative purposes, propaganda purposes to create drama that isn't there. You know, I think somebody did looked back and looked at Barik Ravid's uh the journalist at Axios's uh stories over the last two and a half years and something like uh three or four dozen times he's described how Joe Biden is angry at Netanyahu or Donald Trump is really upset. This is the last straw and it's it's the same straw over and over again. Uh, but you know, you did have Trump last week saying that he's more popular in Israel than Netanyahu was, and if he ran, he would be prime minister. You know, >> I think he said 99%, right, Denise?

[00:52:10]>> 90% 99%.

[00:52:12]>> I was there in November of 24, so right after he won an election. And there was a lot of support for Donald Trump in Israel. We would go through a checkpoint. you be in Palestine and we go through an Israeli army checkpoint and the Israeli soldiers would say stuff to us like make America great again, you know. So, um >> I mean for what it's worth the Iranian diaspora I've seen, you know, pictures from Austria to Sweden to Canada. I mean, Canada is our neighbor, too. We, you know, apparently they want to be part of our country as well. I don't know. That was a joke to all the Canadians there. Hi. But uh you know you see a lot of Iranians in the diaspora from all corners of the world carrying the you know the Trump flag not just the US flag. It's the Trump flag. So I I see that.

[00:53:00]But Matthew many Israelis and I mean even some Iranians to an extent as well uh because the amount of energy and focus and investment that the Iranian government has provided to Hezbollah all these years. From even the Israeli perspective, they would say the Hezbollah remains still a an active threat. And so these northern communities have been displaced. You know, Israel cannot just simply stop the military operations of course because you know, Washington and Tehran are negotiating. H how do you respond to this security argument without dismissing some of the fears too um that may have some historical validation to them as well?

[00:53:42]Um, I mean, I I think the way I I look at the security arguments and all this is that this is a reality of, you know, the US and Israel's making. And so whether that security argument is uh centered around Iran or Lebanon or or you know, the the larger axis of resistance, that's a reality of the US and Israel's making. Hisbala doesn't come into existence until Israel invades and occupies Lebanon. It's a reaction to it.

[00:54:14]You can we can have our conversations about Hisbala, you know, and and certainly I know there are variety of different views on Hisbala from the Lebanese. Uh but you know, there is this reality that they were an occupation force against sorry, they were a resistance force against occupation. I mean, and so many other things. uh you know the the the one of the lines you hear a lot in the US uh from both Democratic and Republican politicians is this idea that well how can we allow the Iranians to to carry on shouting death to America and it's like you know what if a foreign state overthrew my government and then put a murderous uh uh dictator and a police state in charge for 25 years and then when we overthrew him they launched a proxy war by having our neighbor invade us and kill us for eight years. I'd probably be walking around saying death to that country as well too. I mean, so I think so much for me always comes back to the context of it, the history of it. Uh trying to practice some degree of strategic empathy, put myself in their shoes, uh you know, strategic political uh cultural empathy, I guess, you know, and understanding it that way. Um but yeah, I mean this idea that you can't let them uh if you subscribe to um and this is the way most of Washington DC operates uh this view of the world as taught by Henry Kissinger or more more accurately more by Ziggnu Brazinski Jimmy Carter's national security adviser uh this idea that the world's a chessboard and that's Bzinsk's book the grand chessboard which is >> a good book >> yeah I mean in that book is when I referenced my uh uh ex post there or Substack post or whatever it was this idea that of articles of faith uh in in Washington DC that's one of them you know this idea the world is a chessboard uh and I think that's very uh normal for imperial mindsets and world views to see it that way but the idea that essentially you're playing a game of risk here you know and how could you allow ow uh a adversary uh to control a strategic waterway like the straits or Hammuz that just is anma that just you know that is is fundamental you have to oppose that so there's a lot of reflexivity here that is just uh exists because of the uh again the the the conceits right the the concepts uh the the worldviews that exist that are completely devoid or removed from the context, the history or actually what your adversary is actually like. Uh, you know, I've long said that, you know, it wouldn't surprise me that if we woke up someday, not now, but someday two, three years from now, and Iran and Saudi Arabia have flipped places in the American order, uh, that wouldn't surprise me, right? I mean, why not? Why couldn't they? What's the difference?

[00:57:25]You know, I mean, so and you know, maybe we'd see that maybe and maybe we could see that come out of this war. Maybe you could see some impression moment between the Americans and the Iranians. Trump does strike a deal with uh Meshitoba and uh you know, >> you're about to give a lot of people a lot of heart attacks at that point, >> right? you know, and at the same time the Saudis MB N MBS is saying, you know what, I'm going in with the Russians and the Chinese, you know, I mean, so, you know, I mean, that's I'm, you know, a lot of speculation there, but uh less odd and less weird things have happened in human history. So, >> yeah, that's true. That's true. Um, I I want to spend just a little bit more. I know we we're we're coming up on time, but I want to kind of zoom out from all of this. You know, this whole structure feels very different from traditional war and peace. When we're looking at this, we have a ceasefire but not peace.

[00:58:20]We have strikes but not war. You know, >> yeah, >> escorts that may or may not be restarted, negotiations but not settlements, markets reacting to rumors, >> social media circulating, uh, leadership health. I mean, look, the the landscape of all of this is just a very very I said this earlier, we're just in a very interesting time when we're looking at this. And I wonder sometimes, is this the new normal of multipolar conflict?

[00:58:46]Is is this is that where we are now in this in this new world?

[00:58:51]>> I I think so. I I think you know you go back to uh certainly uh Orwell didn't describe a multipolar world but he did describe what you were you were just alluding to here that there is no reality that there is no truth that there is no foundation upon uh you know which we can have some type of objective understanding of what's occurring and that everything is subjective right and that uh you know wars peace piece and you know you just I think you just said it very well. Uh I mean so I think certainly um having that ability then to understand what the other side is trying to accomplish, right? What the other side is actually saying, what their intentions are is going to be incredibly incredibly important. Uh you know for mo for the cold war uh so United States only had to try and understand the Soviet Union and they got that incredibly wrong. They saw everything through uh essentially uh their own imagination of what the Soviets believed. You know, there's this United States sets up this thing called RIA station which is supposed to be all these experts who uh analyze intelligence and you know the historians go back and they look at it and these guys are wrong like 90% of the time, right? Because they had this conception, they had this bias, right? they had this this belief and then everything conformed to that. Now, so maybe in a multi-olar world because that's not possible to have just one single bias, you know, maybe you get things more correct then because you do have to do the work, you do have to understand better. But whether or not the Americans can do that where you know one of the things that you know again what you just read off that that I said uh about these articles of faith uh it's just not articles of faith about how the world works or about America's adversaries but most importantly it's articles of faith about what the United States is who the United States is you know the the mythology uh of the United States the narrative particularly the postworld war II narrative that we are the good in a man struggle of good versus evil. Uh you know I mean that yeah that how how does that have to change in order for the United States to function in the multipolar world? And of course the concern for the United States is not just functioning in a multipolar world but dominating in the multipolar world.

[01:01:21]And that's why I think the Trump administration did get it right with their national security strategy that they put out the end of of 2024 which I don't agree with it but I I understood their logic. I understood what they were trying to get to that the United States, the 20th century American uh uh uh imperial order cannot stand, cannot survive uh in the 21st century multipolar world. And so we go back and look at that document, what the Trump administration is saying is that we have to reshape the American empire. We have to reconfigure it. We need to, you know, uh uh anchor it or re reshore it, etc. in order not just to compete in the multi-polar world but to dominate it >> and so again I don't agree with what they were saying but I understand what they are trying to accomplish I understand their logic behind it but then you look at their actions right you look at the American actions in the sense of whether it's you know uh the you know Nigeria you know throughout the Middle East uh etc this commitment to uh uh you know m this commitment in in in eastern in Europe with regards to Ukraine, which you know, something we're not talking about at all, but certainly the Ukraine and Russia war is getting to a point that many of us have been very concerned about for years. Certainly anchored my arguments for negotiations to end that war. Uh, you know, before it started was that you don't want >> Definitely something to talk about the next time we connect.

[01:02:51]>> Yeah. Because it's it's it really is where it's going where we're going to there. Uh I think we may now be getting to that point where we have this is what we want to avoid. This is what we've been arguing for for years to avoid.

[01:03:02]Yeah. But yeah, I mean so I think in this multipolar world I think what you just said Azie about uh uh you know this subjective understanding of everything is going to be really important to to for everyone to understand right otherwise uh there'll be no meaning in anything. there'll be no uh uh nothing will have any veracity. Uh yeah, and um you know, I don't know, but we're certainly dealing with right now where we can't I'm sure just like you, you'll get off and you'll go on X, we'll get off of this, we'll go on X and half the stuff that we read just right, you know.

[01:03:43]>> Yeah. Every every five seconds it changes. I don't know. Just >> Right. Right. Um, last question and I I appreciate you um, staying as long as you have with us. I I think we went a little bit uh, over, but um, great conversation.

[01:03:58]this idea of whether or not this deal is in danger given what we've talked about you know that the strikes project freedom I mean operation pre project freedom um the little skirmish between the US and Iran the last few days the war with Israel and Lebanon this conflict over the strait all these things happening I guess in a in a yes or no I guess do you see this deal do you see this framework work at risk and at a danger or do you see us eventually signing it at some point soon?

[01:04:32]>> No, I don't see us signing anything. I mean, maybe some smaller deals, maybe some type of again use, right? So, not deals in themselves, but >> Well, theou that we're sitt sitting on right now. Do do you see that signed?

[01:04:45]>> No. No. Uh it's hard to understand what we're actually sitting on right now. But I anything that uh I I don't see the United States being able politically I don't see Donald Trump being able one to provide any type of sanctions rel relief whatever that looks like. I don't see uh the ability to allow the Iranians to give blessing to the Iranians to control the streets of Hermuz. Um, and I I don't see the United States able to walk away from this without some uh some solution, if you will, to the nuclear issue. Now, we talked about that it probably would end up looking just like the Iranians offered back in February. Um, and that certainly is something that should be achieved, but I don't even know if that is politically possible for the Americans. And of course, you got the Israelis just hanging over here ready to sabotage uh whatever uh you know, whatever whatever does get accomplished.

[01:05:41]So, no, I don't I don't see a deal happening.

[01:05:44]>> Okay.

[01:05:44]>> And I hope I'm wrong. I hope I'm no one will be happy or I'm wrong. I'm happy be I if I'm wrong, have me right back on and I'll be glad to say I was absolutely wrong. You play this clip over and over again. I'll be like spot on. I was wrong, you know. Yeah.

[01:06:01]Matthew, I mean, depending on who's listening, you're you know, they're either clapping for you and saying, "Thank you for saying that," or saying, "No, no, no." So, you know what? Uh, it's a 50/50 right there, I think.

[01:06:12]Right.

[01:06:12]>> Right. Right. I always I always like when I read the comments and people call me a shill for you. I get this with Russia Ukraine a lot. I'll get one comment that says, you know, "Hey, when is your check when when is your check how often do you get paid by the Kremlin?" you know, and the next comment will be how I'm a NATO stoogge, you know, like stop kissing uh you know, uh Mark Ruda's ass kind of thing. Yeah. I mean, I love when they're they're right next to each other. Yeah. So, >> yeah.

[01:06:39]>> Well, um well, I guess we'll see what what what you you are today, I guess, Matthew.

[01:06:46]But, uh thank you for coming and and spending your time here with me uh discussing some of this stuff. Very important news coming out that impacts so much across the world. Um, and I I wish you a well evening and uh hopefully the next time we talk we have some updates on this process or maybe just the same PR >> battleground. Uh, >> who who struck which words which way that that the new the new drones are words, right? But uh, thank you again.

[01:07:14]Yeah, thank you. Thank you. Okay. Thank you. All right. Bye.