How China Supplies Iran's Military — And What the U.S. Can Do About It | The Trade Off

Added: 2026-05-15

[00:00:00]from CSIS. Welcome to the tradeoff, uh, a conversation show that discusses the geopolitics of economics and how economics and the new developments of the world are shaping our geopolitics.

[00:00:11]Today I'm incredibly fortunate to be joined by deputy director and senior fellow at CSIS Kate Corin as well as uh Kevin Kurland who most recently served as the principal deputy assistant secretary for export enforcement and the acting principal deputy assistant secretary for strategic technology and technology security. Two of the most senior positions uh at the commerce department and department of business and industry and security. Um thank you so much for both being here. Uh we're really looking forward to the conversation. Uh today, you know, right now Trump is in China talking with uh uh she about sort of the US bilateral relationship between China and the United States. Overhanging that whole conversation, of course, is the war in Iran and the closure of the Strait of Harm. So today we want to think about how all three of these actors are playing out in interesting ways and what impacts that has both in the global economy, our economic and our national security. So before we dig into the situation around Iran, Kevin, I'd love for you to sort of dig in a bit about where does do we stand today in this the the sort of dance of export controls between China and the United States and what if anything should we expect out of this summit?

[00:01:25]>> Yeah. Well, thanks Phil for having me.

[00:01:26]It's it's really an honor to be uh part of the today's discussion. Look, I I think coming out of the summit, I would expect uh little change on export controls. I mean certainly uh the topic of of AI chip controls are going to be discussed. Uh you know Jensen Wong is on the ground for sure. Uh there's reporting of course that the commerce department has issued licenses uh to uh certain parties in China. Uh but you know those licenses have not been shipped against because uh actually there's the Chinese government specifically has been holding off uh on the allowing the import of those items.

[00:02:03]So there could be some type of uh allowance there. I wouldn't consider that though a real change in export control policy. I think going forward quite frankly I don't expect any uh significant change in the posture uh for export controls between um you know the United States and China. There's this delicate if you will balance and I think a concern uh that any new controls on either side will create uh escalation.

[00:02:30]Um and so even with uh you know a a pending rule that's been sitting out there or a suspended rule the affiliates rule um I my my assessment is that that rule will continue to be suspended uh you know absent day going in in a in a a downward spiral. Um, a couple areas I do think we could see some action over the the year on. One is, um, I think there's going to be a need for commerce to continue to update its entity list, which could implicate, uh, you know, obviously certain diversionary parties in China. U, but I don't consider that to be a flash point. They won't be uh, you know, major companies that are addressed. It'll mostly be shell companies that are uh, involved in in in violations of controls. I do think that there could be an opportunity to uh re raise uh a a change to how the AI diffusion rule is being implemented. Um when the administration put a pause on it through no enforcement, it did create some loopholes. Um, and so I what I would envision is it's possible to address those loopholes and message that to China that these are just technical corrections to kind of get us back to to where uh we were prior to uh January of 2025. One thing I did want to flag though, I I think there could be uh an opportunity u if the board of trade gets off the ground uh for the Chinese government to raise the issue of including um export control items uh in that board of trade conversation. Um I would expect that that will be treated um or or met with some uh push back from a number of national security agencies.

[00:04:09]Uh but that being said, I think that's one area that that could see um you know, some level of of conversation uh after uh the the talks this week.

[00:04:18]>> That's excellent. So I mean just to maybe paraphrase some of what you said to make sure I understand it. So it sounds like that we're not going to see a whole lot of movement you think in in big picture that sounds like it's more from a place of not we're very comfortable with the current regime, but rather we don't want to get in sort of an escalatory cycle with China. Is that correct?

[00:04:37]>> 100%. I I think anything that could tip uh this delicate trade dton um will be um you know uh uh kept a distance from if you will. And so I think uh any significant export control actions that could explicitly target China will be put on the back burner again absence uh there being you know some some uh other escalation in the relationship uh that that pushes the administration to use more national security levers to kind of bring dant back into effect.

[00:05:13]>> Gotcha. That's excellent. So uh Kate now to the discussion of Iran. So, of course, China and the United States as the two largest economies in the world have a lot uh to to to play for as the straight of Hormuse uh controls 20% of the global oil exports uh that goes by uh by sea. Um you've been recently been doing some research on sort of how significant uh China's role is in sort of supporting Iran both through the direct trade of oil of course, but more specifically through their trade of of dual use goods. Can you tell us a little bit more about that?

[00:05:45]>> Yes, I'd be happy to. So, China is a longtime and really important trading partner for Iran. Uh we have a slide if you can uh put up here for our viewers.

[00:05:54]Uh so you can see here how you know just how significant you know China's role is in terms of you know Iran's imports.

[00:06:01]What we're seeing here is based on Iran's uh self-reported uh you know trade data imports and you and we can see that you know China is you know for several years now you know the number two supplier uh really only after UAE.

[00:06:14]Uh so in the last couple years he's actually accounted for really a third of you know all of Iran's imports. So that's for everything.

[00:06:22]>> Um and that relationship is likely to take on even more importance. UAE being the number one current uh supplier of Iranian imports. Uh and as we've all you know seen in the news uh you know Iran has been you firing drones and missiles on UAE. uh in this in this recent conflict they fired uh I think at last count uh almost 3,000 uh drones and missiles at UAE uh killed you know multiple civilians caused a lot of economic damage they've actually fired more uh on UAE than they have even on Israel so there hasn't been you know any announcement from UAE about a change in trading posture but it seems unlikely that it will continue you know at at a previous pace uh and the obvious sort of place for that to reroute uh and go is from China to take on even more significance. Uh the other thing to keep in mind uh is how much uh you know Iran relies on China for uh its you know really its budget. Um about 90% of all of Iran's oil uh sales are to China. Uh and those sales account for uh almost half I think 45% is the most recent statistic of uh the Iranian government budget. So extremely important uh to Iran. uh also you know not uh insignificantly important to China. It's about 10 to 15% of you know its uh domestic uh crude consumption comes from Iran.

[00:07:42]>> So uh if we can go to the next slide uh where we just break this down a little further. So this is the same data on Iranian imports just uh visualized a different way where we can see uh some additional suppliers. Um what's uh you know kind of varied in here is that uh you know in terms of the areas where China is really dominant uh for Iran's you know dual use supply chains uh it's its largest uh exporter uh for iron and steel um and also for a lot of the items that Iran uses uh for its drone program.

[00:08:13]So all of the printed circuits, diodes and electronics.

[00:08:17]>> So that's fascinating. So I want to dig into the UAE real little bit just just to to touch on this more. I mean to your point I mean I think we when we were all in government uh me a little bit uh less recently than the two of you. I mean you know the UAE it's always been a bit of a delicate dance where you know we have been trying to get them to control certain goods um you know more than they would otherwise want to. And I think you know please correct me if I'm wrong but I always sort of interpret this at least in part as they were trying to keep the peace with Iran and supplying certain goods. To your point that peace uh has uh been disrupted. Um, and the other point there is, you know, so much of what obviously they were getting through the UAE was essential trans shship shipment. I mean, they were not an enormous producer of these goods. So even if they wanted to, that that there's a disruption there through the straight. Um, so to your point, I mean, that, you know, do we should we think about China basically filling the hole of of that trans shshipment or that sales?

[00:09:09]>> Yeah. No, that's a great point. Uh, so you know, UAE does not release its trade statistics unfortunately, which makes uh >> interesting. Yes, it makes uh tracking those trans shipments and things a little little more challenging. They do release uh some annual reporting though uh and their most recent annual reporting shows in 2024 of that you know almost 20 billion uh you know in exports to China uh 95% of it was reexports. So you're exactly right. it's not coming from UAE. Uh you know, so yes, uh in the terms of that trans shipment where that's going to come through and we're going to speak to that a little later in the program as well, uh and some other places that could go, but certainly China and Hong Kong uh as you trans shipment points uh rerouting for that to get to Iran.

[00:09:52]>> Yeah. So, uh Kevin, as people might have noticed up here on the slide, we've also got Germany, uh the Netherlands, Switzerland, and a few other countries that people might be surprised to see on this graph. Um can you tell us a little bit about sort of uh you know how the European Union its member states have restricted trade to Iran uh both historically and now today?

[00:10:14]>> Sure. I mean historically I think there there has been a divide between how you know the United States views Iran and how the European Union um you know views Iran. Um you know we have seen though particularly since uh the Russian invasion of Ukraine um and the relationship between Iran and Russia um really come to the forefront of of enabling uh the Russian war machine in in many ways uh that the Europeans uh have become much more aligned uh with where we are now. Of course we have virtually a total embargo uh on Iran. Um but you know the the Europeans have you know been continuously evaluating their systems um and uh ratcheting up controls um many many ways uh that are equivalent to ours particularly in items that are like dual use items. So items that you know could be used for both uh military and uh civilian end uses. Um and so they have a range of tools. you know, obviously they're following UN Security Council resolutions for sure. Um they're they're they're key members of the multilateral export control regimes that we also um adhere to. Um so we have alignment there. There's also alignment in other uh areas of uh lower level dual use controls for example on items related to their drones program. And so um I think you know we have we have seen the effectiveness collectively of that alignment um with regard to uh preventing Iran to get access to um you know certain key technologies. Now of course there are still differences particularly on you know commercial items. So these are items that historically haven't been used for military end uses. Okay.

[00:11:57]>> As the war uh in both locations uh plays out, we are continuing to see uh items that that normally wouldn't be thought of as as a dual use item being used for those activities. And so there's always going to be room, I think, for uh amendments and updates uh to to address kind of those situations. You know, the Europeans also have been doing a lot of work, particularly as a result of the Russia conflict, um, in enhancing their enforcement posture. Um, and that of course could also relate to the Iran situation. They've also, uh, instituted some, um, more, um, expansive or extr territorial due diligence practices uh, on their companies related to say the reexport of items from UAE or through China. um that I could see being uh re-evaluated, relooked at in the in the Iran context to make sure uh that there's some comprehensiveness uh between those actions. And of course, I think lastly, uh always re-evaluating kind of their policies for approving any license to begin with. um and clamping down on uh you know uh or or making more aggressive the use of denials um when items are being shown to be uh you know contributing to Iran's military capabilities.

[00:13:19]>> Okay, that's great. So yeah, one thing I want to follow up on there is so you mentioned you know there's this whole area of dual use and we're and we're creeping more and more into things that used to be thought of as commercial and now are being worn. Can you give us some examples? What are we talking about when we talk about that? Yeah, I mean a lot of it is and we found this out in the Russia context is, you know, just very pedestrian commercial electronics um that uh the Russians and the Iranians have been leveraging because they couldn't get access to higherend components um to put into their their drones or or their missiles which were just good enough. Um and so you know this is an area where we have done over the last three to four years really under uh under Kate's leadership at at commerce um you know really working to you know address those areas of of commonality um so that there is consistency and then at the same time and really a key component in all of this has been working with industry um there's been red flag guidance that's been issued not only by the US government we also issued it with five eyes we issued it for the first time with the G7. Um but you know those things need to be updated as well. Uh diversion tactics are changing every day as our enforcement gets better. Um obviously uh elicit procurement schemes are are are amending um and we need to make sure that we're keeping up with those changes and tactics and and a key way of doing that um is working with industry. They're the ones that are actually receiving right these requests.

[00:14:48]um how can we kind of uh get access to that information and then um particularly when one company is denying because they see a red flag. We don't want them to be undercut by another company filling that order. How do we get that information out to everyone? Um and a key aspect of this is really getting the governments involved um to publicize those activities and then hopefully to do more sanctions or blacklisting if you will um of those parties that are involved in the diversion. Yeah, couldn't agree more.

[00:15:18]And I I should have noted at the top, I mean, one thing that we all worked really closely on uh a few years back was essentially this diversion to Russia, right? And and Kate is the, you know, architect of the common high priority list which was done under under your leadership and really just a fantastic effort uh to to identify those things that are more commercial in nature, but we need coordination and so hopefully we can get some lessons learned from that good work and and apply it to this context. Uh Kate, sort of on that a bit. I mean, so you know, as we see here, 20 billion dollars in 2025 from the UAE. Um, we have China 18.

[00:15:51]Can you break down this trade a bit more? Uh, what types of goods are these and and what should we be worried about versus, you know, what are tube socks?

[00:16:00]>> Sure. So, by actual, you know, dollar value, kind of the highest amount of things coming from UAE and China are things we're largely not concerned about. Uh there's a lot of agricultural products, soybeans, uh there's uh actually gold, which is interesting, and I'd like to dig into that more and find out exactly what's going on there. Uh but if you go to the next slide, >> uh when we think about really, you know, what matters most in there, >> uh I think the best way for us to contextualize this is to look at, you know, what has been destroyed, uh you know, in Iran in terms of their military capacity, uh and what they're going to need to rebuild. Uh so what you see here is uh some uh satellite imagery um you know following recent strikes. So we've got uh yeah thank you. So that is uh a uh drone production facility and storage facility uh that you just circled there.

[00:16:50]Uh and if you go to the right uh that is a uh cruise missile production facility.

[00:16:55]>> Uh and below is a uh yet another uh missile production facility. Uh and to the left is uh a port of Andrabas and you see actually the ship on uh on fire there capsized uh and the port itself you know heavily damaged on all that infrastructure. Um you know this is just a small sampling. Obviously there's been really heavy uh you know heavy strikes uh there's a lot uh in particularly in terms of Iran's navy uh that's been taken out. Um, so I think uh you're probably familiar with uh recent reporting that's come out about uh some of the maybe uh limitations uh of the strikes particularly in terms of you know Iran's missiles and those are because those missile sites bunkers are deeply underground. Uh the uh tunnel access you know to those uh was damaged but uh intelligence seems to suggest uh that Iran's been able to you know dig those out and retain that missile capability. Um but what is you know more clear uh and more clearly observed are these you know above ground facilities.

[00:17:56]So that's where actually they're you know making uh you know these these items uh making the weapons and munitions uh and the actual you the naval fleets uh and that port infrastructure as well as in line shipyard and ship production facilities.

[00:18:09]So given that and all that context uh and given uh what seems to be a generally accepted uh you know situation just in terms of drone expenditures uh that Iran's used that they've uh used about 60% of their existing drone fleet.

[00:18:23]Um so from that you know we kind of dig down to what are they going to need to procure. If we go to the next slide.

[00:18:29]>> Yeah.

[00:18:30]>> Uh and one of those items in particular uh is uh CNC uh computer uh numerically controlled uh machine tools. Uh so these are you know the most advanced type of machine tools uh that are used uh really for producing everything. They are very dual use. Uh a tool is a tool. Uh but they are also used uh to make you know to make weapons. Um and those production facilities uh that you know have been you know decimated uh you know many of them uh are full of them. They use those to do that. Uh so when we look at you know where Iran has gotten these in the past um you can see uh you know the shift over time here uh you know from Germany uh towards China. Uh so that tracks uh actually with global trends but certainly accelerated by you know the changing posture on Iran. Uh Germany is uh really one of the world's you know leading uh you know machine tool uh CNC machine tool uh producers. they make still the most you really high-end along with Japan um they really are you know dominant in terms of really the best of the best uh but China makes uh the most uh they are the leading global producer of machine tools uh and largely even though they are not as good as the German and Japanese versions they are good enough for most use uh so we can see that that shift going uh it's interesting to see Russia here uh as well Russia really does not make these >> um but uh So that is likely, you know, trans shipment reexports that, you know, of tools that Russia acquired uh through illicit means.

[00:20:03]>> Yeah. So I mean to your point, I mean on the common high priority list, machine tools are certainly there, right? So this is something we've been focused on for a long time in the Russia context to your point because how important they are for for uh missile production and other things. And to your point, I mean, obviously there's the Chinese good enough stock, but if you're trying to get the absolute best, it's still from Western producers, right? And I think that's something where in the common high priority list which you put together, we were trying to focus on things that were both really important and we had some ability to sort of control through that product. Um so I mean how you know if these Chinese products are good enough I mean how should we think about what are we trying to do here? How can we work with our European partners to to sort of limit this or um you know what how should we take this information and move forward?

[00:20:50]>> Sure. Uh so there's you know there's certainly uh limitations right uh to what we can do in terms of you know the machines coming from China. Um an interesting aspect of this though is even though uh you know China is the leading global producer and they are making these machines uh most of the actual controllers the really kind of the brain of those CNC machines is still coming from Germany and Japan okay really a handful of companies uh you trade you know market estimates are that you know about 85% of all CNC machine tools made everywhere uh are using uh controllers uh from Germany and Japan including many Chinese models. Uh and I think we have some fun graphics later of uh from some Iranian uh you know imported uh and domestic made machines.

[00:21:38]Uh but we see when we you know we look you know at those uh you know advertised uh you know uh machine tool companies uh within Iran uh and what they're importing from China that they are using uh those western controllers. Yeah. Now, that is an extremely difficult uh thing to counteract uh because you know they're on 85% of machines globally and most of those are not going to be reexported to Iran. Um but it does give uh some potential angles uh for allies to have an influence over over this part of the trade.

[00:22:10]>> Okay, that's fantastic. Um and so if we're trying to control the trade, uh we have to somehow control where these things come from. to your point, if 85% come from our uh from you know the US and its allies and that that block um how do we sort of think about trying to stop it from getting into Iran? I mean obviously the the probably not as much coming from the OE. So so where do we how do we think about these trade flows?

[00:22:33]>> Yeah, go to the next slide.

[00:22:34]>> Sure.

[00:22:37]>> So just looking at geography uh we see on the left here uh showing you know you know Pakistan uh next to Iran. Uh so uh right uh I think just a few weeks ago uh late April uh Pakistan uh you made a a quiet but formal announcement you know authorizing reexports uh to Iran through its ports and overland.

[00:22:58]>> Uh so that is uh a presumably uh one uh obvious sort of new pathway for things to go in uh that you know we can be looking at and looking for options to disrupt. Yeah. Uh the other uh potential option uh which is you know not based on the formal announcement but just likelihood uh is when we look at the Caspian Sea and the countries that border it. Uh so you can see there Turk menistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan. Uh you know these countries are all you know have that geographical location uh putting them on the Caspian which would uh make them really ripe for Iran to target for a new place uh to set up its kind of elicit procurement networks.

[00:23:41]>> Yeah. So that's not uh you know saying that these governments would you know authorize this or allow this. Uh but it is uh it is difficult to stop uh you know uh these you know determined adversaries from setting up shell companies that look legitimate. Uh and these these countries uh do uh have somewhat weaker export control regimes.

[00:24:04]We've all worked a lot with them uh to help shore those up uh you know in terms of the Russia context. But uh it's difficult uh it's difficult for any country uh and especially uh you know ones uh in this region in particular. So if those uh procurement companies are able to you know get those items there then they can route them um either by land or across the Caspian uh which is very challenging uh for us to disrupt you know access to the Caspian uh is limited to the countries that border it.

[00:24:31]>> Yeah. So that's a great point. So I mean you know just as we see here of course Iran down here at the bottom you have bordering here we have Russia which obviously is going to be difficult for us to get cooperation from uh you've got you know Turk menistan we've got Kag Kazakhstan at the top I mean many of these are the same countries that you know that we visited uh in the last administration trying to get more uh uh progress um on their help with the trans shipment to Russia and to their credit you know you know given the small amount of resources they they are putting work towards that but this is just another challenge And I think a lot given to the point about Russia, anything that gets into Russia, we should think about as potentially going straight to Iran as well.

[00:25:09]>> Absolutely.

[00:25:10]>> Um, excellent. Okay. Well, that's a challenge.

[00:25:13]>> Well, but it's a challenge. But all of that work we did, you know, in the last uh, you know, few years uh, to, you know, build those partnerships and relationships and build capacity in those countries in the Russia context.

[00:25:23]We can build off of all that now to, you know, double down on the Iran context.

[00:25:29]>> Yes, exactly. And I think you're you're heading off to Turk Manistan in a bit.

[00:25:32]So >> uh Tajikistan, apologies. That's a that's a that's a giant popa. Apologies.

[00:25:39]Uh Kevin, uh I want to try to bring this full circle. So bring coming back to sort of the the China of it all. Not specific not just for the the trans shipment. So um you know, how do we think about the situation in the strait um and the broader dynamics of the China Iran relationship playing into the Trumpi negotiations? Right. So um how do we want to think about um you know what what China can and might want be willing to do what we can ask of them just just broadly speaking how does this sort of triangle you know uh work out. Yeah, I I mean I I think uh at its core, you know, the the discussions uh are going to continue to be, you know, in the US interests, trade in the in the Chinese interest, the the focus is going to be on Taiwan. Uh but certainly, you know, uh underlying all of all of that is uh cooperation with China on uh ending the war in Iran. Um and you know this is a a very delicate det right that that we have um and any friction um that potentially results from the end of a ceasefire particularly if you know US interests in the region um or US assets are hit um you know potentially could undermine I think that delicate relationship building that's happening uh currently in in Beijing um because of you know I think what is expected by the administration is significant influence ultimately by by Beijing over uh uh Thrron. Um I I think there's been some real positives that have come out already. Um you know there's been agreement on that there shouldn't be any uh you know tolls on the straight of her moves. There should be no militarization um uh on the straight of her moves. And you know, I think again there's a a continued I think expectation that President Xi is going to be back channeling ways um to uh you know, bring Iran um and its position on a ceasefire to a point where it can be uh agreed with with the United States. The flip side of that is if hostilities were uh to you know reignite you know you know China has a a role to play here. You know there has been already significant concern about the provision of material support. Um and you know the president has already been public about his his concerns that he's raised in a letter to President Xi about uh for example Chinese man pads um you know that have shoulder fired missiles that have uh you know ended up in in Iran. uh obviously and and and as Kate has has really well documented, you know, the volume of dual use components um that continue to find their way um into Iran from China and that are enabling uh you know, the the the uh Iranian military uh and and potentially its rebuild. So, you know, my my expectation is there probably will be explicit front channel um conversations about uh milit direct military supports um and hopefully there's some back channeling that's going on at a minimum with regard to the dual use support um you know currently and and potentially foreshadowing you know after the war ends about what that support would look like and what would be acceptable from the United States perspective.

[00:29:00]>> Great. Excellent. Um all right. Well, thank you so much both of you. Uh we'll wrap this up by just asking you both sort of what what should we be looking at for this in this broader context whether that's sort of the US China um export controls day tant or or dance or the Iran situation. What are you looking for uh in terms of what policy makers do or don't do? Kate, let's start with you.

[00:29:21]>> So if I could ask you to go back last slide. So I know we we've moved on from CNC machines, but I this is too too much fun not to share.

[00:29:29]>> Yes. Exactly. Uh so but this is sort of an illustration too of you know the problem we're really facing and how difficult this is to stop even with something as large as machine tools. Um so what we're seeing here on the left is uh from the Instagram account of an Iranian uh CNC machine tool company. U this is a this is a legitimate company.

[00:29:48]This has been around since the 80s. They are a real company um that were actually for a long time you know fully uh legitimately working um you know under uh the advisement of German engineers had they were a authorized distributor of you know German and Japanese equipment um but they are no longer able to do that uh legally uh and so now they uh openly uh advertise that they are able to import these sanctioned goods uh and get them in there. Uh we don't know exactly how they're doing that. Uh but uh from the geotagging of some of their uh their posts, it does appear that they are actively making use of what we're talking about in terms of setting up proxies, setting up shells in other countries, getting things onto ships, uh you know, in those other countries and rerouting.

[00:30:32]>> Uh and what's on the right here uh you know is showing again that these are uh actually domestic uhly produced uh Iranian uh CNC machine tools. There are a handful of uh companies in Iran that do make them.

[00:30:45]>> Oh, really?

[00:30:45]>> Uh but what you can see on there uh those are uh German controllers.

[00:30:49]>> Ah seams.

[00:30:50]>> Um yeah. Yeah. And yeah, they offer it with the uh phonic which is the Japanese version. That's an option. But uh if you know what you're looking at there, you can see those are the those are the seammens controllers right there.

[00:31:00]Interesting. Uh so just a good illustration of both the the challenge but also the opportunity. Um so in term >> just digging into that. So I mean kind of adding this to the question I was asked before is like so so this is a huge problem obviously and it's amazing and thank thank you to them for continuing to post on Instagram. That's helpful to us. Um but how do we like what policy would we want to see to try to get at this admittedly incredibly difficult problem?

[00:31:25]>> Yes.

[00:31:26]>> Yeah. Uh no it's a good question. Uh you know the this is already against right uh it is not allowed. So that's step one right making this not allowable. Um and so I think you know closing those remaining gaps in other areas where there are you know across our control systems you know globally with our partners in Asia uh the more we can do that the better um but it's really it's continued diligence um you know there it is a game of whack-a-ole uh in terms of taking out proxies I think we need to be realistic that you know they're not going to give up uh you know it's not you know okay like so they if they lose you know the trade route you know through UAE it's you know pack up and go home. Um so it's it's continued sort of effort to you know fight against and you push on the challenge. Um I think there's uh you know options for creativity in terms of you know if sometimes if you know uh something is going into a country that gives another opportunity uh to to take advantage of that in in other ways. Um but uh keeping the policy pressure uh up but really working multilaterally because it's a global problem.

[00:32:34]>> Yeah. Excellent. I couldn't agree more.

[00:32:36]Kevin to you. What are what are you looking for? How should we be thinking about the the progress we're seeing and and what what are you thinking about?

[00:32:43]Yeah, I I think what's most going to be interesting for me to see is, you know, how the administration continues to use the tools in its in its um in its kit to address some of these issues where, you know, China is enabling um Iran both in terms of economically and and materiality uh in terms of um um its its military. And you know to date interestingly uh you know the administration has been willing to use very targeted sanctions >> um you know both against uh you know oil refining uh against uh Chinese parties that are involved in satellite imagery >> um and uh you know the Chinese of course have responded um just like in the export control uh uh scene last year um with regard to you know new controls that that that commerce proposed uh say on the on affiliates and and they responded with critical mineral controls, you know, China actually for the first time um actually responded with uh executing its blocking order statutes. So it was actually put in uh it was uh put in effect in 2021. It's taken 5 years for them to implement, but but it's interesting that they they've done that and chosen to do that. Um and so I think should the conflict uh you know uh intensify again you know I think the US will be forced to respond um and take actions uh and I think you could see even say uh my my former colleagues at the commerce department get involved uh with with for example putting parties uh on the entity list for the first time since the war uh began. Um but then it will be interesting to me then how the Chinese respond >> um and what additional measures that they have in their back pockets um to um really retaliate if you will against US unilateral and extr territorial uh you know sanctions. So that's what I'm I'm interested in seeing. Hopefully we don't get there. Hopefully the the war is resolved. Um but you know I I do think going forward um you know history has a way of repeating itself. uh of course uh and so in the export control world, in the sanctions world, I think we're going to continue to see China building up these capabilities and executing them in a way that tries to impede uh the US's uh uh uh actions with regard to sanctions and export controls.

[00:35:08]>> Yeah, that's a really excellent point and and sort of tying that to what Kate mentioned beyond just for efficacy, that's another reason why multilateralism is super important here, right? We need a larger sort of coalition to be able to do this. Yes. Um excellent. Well, thank you so much both for your excellent research and your joining us on the first episode of of The Tradeoff. Really appreciate your insights and uh thank you all so much for joining us. Have a great day.