Why America’s CIA coup in Iran haunts both countries - The Global Story podcast, BBC World Service

追加: 2026-05-11

[00:00:00]Where did the obsession of some US presidents with Iranian regime change come from? It may be older than you think. Whether you believe him or not, Donald Trump has said many times he's achieved it or something like it.

[00:00:13]>> Their first level leaders are dead.

[00:00:15]Their second level leaders are dead.

[00:00:17]Some of their third level leaders are dead. I call that regime change.

[00:00:21]>> It wouldn't be the first time that the US has tried. Back in 1953, the CIA led a coup to topple Iran's prime minister.

[00:00:30]A moment in history that definitely hasn't been forgotten in Iran. Why does the 1953 coup have such a long shadow?

[00:00:39]And could it still be shaping US and Iranian policy many decades later? From the BBC, I'm Tristan Redmond and this is the Global Story on YouTube.

[00:00:56]I'm Scott Anderson. I'm a non-fiction book writer and journalist.

[00:01:02]I've written a series of non-fiction books, mostly dealing with war um and mostly in the Middle East. The British had a concession going back to 19 the early 1900s for uh the oil in Persia at the time. And uh ever since they discovered oil in 1907, the British had had a complete monopoly on on Persian then Iranian oil. Um, and this became increasingly a flash point with with Iranian nationalists in the late 1940s, early 1950s that that Iranians were getting a pittance of the money uh that was being uh brought in from from the oil industry.

[00:01:37]>> When you say a pittance, what do you mean?

[00:01:39]>> They were supposed to get 20 20 cents on the dollar of of the of the proceeds of the oil and they were actually getting more like eight eight cents on the dollar. uh the the British were were pretty shameless in in uh in monopolizing and and uh and kind of ripping off the the the Iranian government. Part of the terms of the contract were the Iran the Iranian government was not allowed to look at the ledger books. So this was just a license to steal and by the British uh company that that ran it. British the British company was also tied to the British government quasi private quasi government uh institution. In the early 1950s a kind of a populist nationalist uh politician named Muhammad Mosed became uh prime minister of of Iran.

[00:02:27]>> When you say a populist nationalist, is there anyone in the modernday uh pantheon of politicians that you would compare Moseday to? I'd compare him to uh to say Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. Um a very charismatic uh populist, very popular among the among the people would give firebrand speeches. Um and largely one of the secrets of his powers to have is was to have an external enemy. And that kind of reminds me of of Chavez also that you kind of ride this this whether it's anti-western or in the case of Mosed anti-British uh sentiment this this constant um refrain of how we're being taken advantage of by this imperial power and a huge issue at this time was especially among the nationalists in in Iran was uh to get back the oil to to break this concession that had been given to the British uh back in the early 1900s and Mosed sort of he became the the chief spokesperson for that. So Mosed he was assuring the the Shaw's powers and gradually chipping away at at what had been the Shaw's powers. He nationalized the oil industry. So that put Britain and uh Iran on collision course. Uh Britain imposed a blockade on Iran. uh this continued for about a year and a half and f and meanwhile Mosed was not falling which was of course the British hope. So the British devised a plan to overthrow Mosed and restore the sha who was far more pliant to his kingly powers um figuring that the sha would would cancel the the nationalization give the oil back to the British. So, but the British didn't want to have their hands seen in this operation because they were already reviled by the Iranian people. So, they looked to the Americans to to take to take care of this operation for them.

[00:04:28]They first floated this idea to the Truman administration in 195 in in the summer of 1952. It's like, hey, you know, we we have this all set up to to overthrow Mustade. Um, will you do this for us? and Truman said, "No, why should we overthrow a democratically elected government for you for your oil?" Um, Truman leaves office in January of 1953.

[00:04:52]The Eisenhower administration comes in.

[00:04:54]He has a kind of a rabid anti-communist secretary of state named John Foster Doulles. Uh, the British come back to the Americans right after the inauguration of of Eisenhower and repitch the story. And and this time the the the idea of overthrowing Mosed has taken on a new shade which is that waiting in the wings and uh standing behind Mosed are the communists are the reds and >> this becomes a classic cold war dynamic almost.

[00:05:22]>> That's right. That's right. And the reds of course will take Iran into the Soviet sphere. Um Iran having a a very large border with the Soviet Union. So this this sufficiently spooks John Foster Doulles and Eisenhower. So they sign on to the say they sign on to the idea of of carrying out the coup in for the behest of the British and that operation is becomes known as operation Ajax.

[00:05:50]>> Mhm. And what is operation Ajax? What's the plan?

[00:05:53]>> So the plan is to the initial the there's they have a few uh operatives in inside thrron in the city. The the plan is to basically the Shaw has the power to revoke Mosed's prime ministership and he had tried to do this once before and it led to massive riots in Thran. So basically what the plan is is that they are going to have the military on alert uh and people loyal to the Shaw on standby. They're going to inform us today that he's been he's been dismissed from the prime ministership and if there's any problems uh the the people loyal to the shaw will take control of the streets. Um so that's the that's the basic plan. So the man in charge of the of the of operation Ajax is Kermit Roosevelt who is a CIA officer cousin of Theodore Roosevelt president. So Kermit Roosevelt goes to the Sha and tells him of this plan uh that that that they're going to to uh unseat Mosed. The Sha is famously passive figure. He's he's a man who has always wanted other people to do his dirty work for him. Um and he vacasillates for for months actually. He goes back and forth of whether he's going to approve or or cancel the operation Ajax. Uh he finally says yes, we're we're going forward. And then on the very eve and in and about August 12th, 1953, he tries to back out again.

[00:07:28]The shot says, "No, let's we're not going to do it." Kermit Roosevelt sneaks into the royal palace. He he hides in the footwell of a car and with a blanket over him, he he gets into the palace. He confronts the Shaw and says, "Look, it's too late. This coup is going forward either with you or without you. So, but it's too late to cancel it now. So, the Shaw kind of agrees, but then the the Shaw takes his his own action. The Shaw was a pilot. He loved to he loved to fly planes. So, that night he and his second wife uh get on a a small plane that the that Shaw is piloting and they fly up to a um a royal palace, a small royal palace on the Caspian Sea. They get out of Tan. There's likely to be some unpleasantness. Um so, he wanted to be kind of in a in a safe spot. What happens is the next day the the coup starts. Mosedig has been tipped off its coming. He has his own loyalists uh respond to the the Sha's loyalist troops and there's pitch battles in the streets of Tehran. And this goes on for two days. And during those two days, the Shaw first flies his plane to Iraq >> and then flies on to Rome in in Italy.

[00:08:37]So on day three, what happens is it looks like the coup has failed. Most of the CIA's operatives have fled Tehran and Kermit Roosevelt locks himself in a CIA safe house uh and uh drinking gin and listening to Broadway show tunes and at uh what's going on there. Tell us more about that.

[00:08:57]>> I I apparently he had a passion for Broadway show tunes, but I guess it inspires him because as a kind of a lastditch uh effort, he decides he's going to rent a mob. And this is a this is actually something of a tradition in Iran that you can rent street toughs to you know to attack your your your rival company or or a rival politician. So Mo uh Kermit Roosevelt hires a group of thugs to masquerade as Mozedig loyalists and to go through downtown Tyrron smashing windows, roughing people up and and kind of yeah just being hooligans, but hooligans uh supposedly in support of Mosed. To clarify, the role the role of the Brenna mob is to essentially paint Moaday's um supporters in a negative light and hoping that that will turn the tide of support against >> Moses. That's right. That's right. And uh you know, they're they're chanting pro-communist slogans. They're smashing windows. They're roughing up passers by tearing >> flag operation basically.

[00:10:04]>> Absolutely. Yeah. Yeah. And it was 11th hour. Yeah. um you know lastditch idea to try to turn the tide and against all odds it was >> fueled by jin possibly >> fueled by jin and Broadway shows. Yeah.

[00:10:20]>> What did the CIA make of this operation?

[00:10:23]Was this according to the CIA handbook?

[00:10:27]>> They had the CIA had never really uh done something quite like this before.

[00:10:31]Um you know it was almost just pure adventurism. It was you know it wasn't going to cost much money. uh it didn't require you know the risk level was low.

[00:10:41]It was kind of see you know let's just see what happens that you know the the the backside to this of prior to the Iranian coup for the previous six seven years the Americans had been trying to fment anti-communist uh revolts behind the iron curtain in the in the in the in the Warsaw packed countries and they had they had air dropped anti-communist partisans behind enemy lines every every one of these operations it was Ukraine, Albania, Romania, Poland they were all disasters. So, so by 1953 you'd had you now had a very static uh battle line in in in Europe, the Iron Curtain. Um, and so now I think Eisenhower and John Foster Doulles were thinking, well, okay, this idea comes to us from the British. Let's try it out. Let's see what happens. I don't think it was, you know, very much more complicated than that. when it succeeded and the the royalists took over, the Sha was having lunch at the Excelsier Hotel in Rome and he learns that the coup has succeeded.

[00:11:44]So he kind of comes back two days later kind of a little bit shamefaced. Um that you know I mean who runs away from their own coup.

[00:11:55]Um and then and reinstate and takes over and uh sentences uh finds Mosed guilty of treason. Uh sentences him to internal exile. Mosed goes back to his home village and is quarantined there for the next seven or eight years until he dies. And now the Shaw has absolute powers and now he's on his way.

[00:12:15]>> What happens to the oil at this point?

[00:12:18]>> I think the Americans kind of pulled a fast one on the on the Brits a bit. So what happens is because the the the the AngloIranian oil company is so hated that uh the Americans with the with the Shaw's collaboration obviously they create this consortium where most of the oil now goes under the control of American oil companies and a very small part goes stays with the British but essentially the Americans take control of of the Iranian oil and this in on this level on the economic level This is really the beginning of the American alliance in Iran, but not politically. This and this is the thing that's quite fascinating about the 53 coup is that because of the Shaw's behavior during the during Operation Ajax, the Americans are actually quite a scance of him. They I mean again, who runs away from their own coup? So the American government continues to keep the shaw if anything at even more of an arms length for the next 10 12 years. um they they they think he's a coward. Obviously, he's very passive. So, they they they there's not this huge political investment in the Shaw right after Operation Ajax.

[00:13:30]Yes, you you're starting to see the beginning of the economic alliance, but not so much of the political and that really comes about 10 years later.

[00:13:37]>> Nevertheless, the sha and the United States are yolked together at this point, right?

[00:13:44]>> Very much so in the eyes of the Iranian people and in the sha's eyes. So he was seen as a creation now of the Americans even though the Americans didn't didn't want to assume that role and and did not assume that role for a long time to come. But of course this would come back to haunt the Shaw during the revolution because anything he did even when he instituted reforms or promised change uh he was still seen as the American Shaw.

[00:14:09]>> Is any part of this story contested?

[00:14:13]>> I'll say in two ways it's quite contested. I mean Mosed has been you know kind of kned as this the martyr to democracy and he he really wasn't that he was constantly assurping not only the shaw's authority but also parliaments um if if things had gone on there's a very good chance he would have been a dictator uh so I think there's been this kind of whitewashing of moedade in in history the second aspect to this is ironically enough really the American role in the coup was quite exaggerated and it was exaggerated created by Kermit Roosevelt. Kermit Roosevelt after the coup.

[00:14:49]>> Yeah, I know. Kermit Roosevelt after the coup comes back to Washington. He's he's led into the Oval Office and he's there with Eisenhower and John Foster Doulles and it's like this group of boys sitting around and in a clubhouse and they say, "Tell us what happened." And Kermit spins this tale that has him, you know, in this heroic role and his people like uh you know being absolutely instrumental in in the coup. And they really weren't. But Eisenhower eats this up. He says this is this is this reads like a dime novel. This is you know this is fantastic. And famously, Kermit Roosevelt remembers looking at um John Foster Doulles while he's telling the story of Operation Ajax. And John Foster Doulles has a cheshure cat smile on his face. And already Kermit Roosevelt can tell his, you know, his brain is is whirling with other possibilities. If we did this in Iran, where can we go next?

[00:15:51]>> Well, I have to say I I find this so fascinating, partly because it's so of its time. The story you're telling is of uh the world emerging from World War II, Britain um essentially still believing itself to be a player, very very quickly finding out that the United States is the um is the the big player in town. Um entering the operation, stealing all the glory and the oil, returning back to Washington and and backslaps all around.

[00:16:21]What has the United Yeah. What's the United States learned from this experience?

[00:16:27]>> Well, it it becomes kind of the CIA's new playbook. They've learned, well, let's, you know, it works so well in Iran. Let's do it again. So, a year later, they decide they're going to overthrow the the democratically elected government of of Jacob Guzman in Guatemala, who um wants to give do agrarian reform. Most of the land of in Guatemala is in the hands of of a handful of oligarchic families and the Standard Fruit Company. Uh so he's >> similar profile to Mosad in Iran.

[00:16:58]>> That's right. Very similar um a very similar profile. So they the CIA um finds this disgruntled ex Guatemalan colonel to get together a ragtag army of about 40, 50, maybe 60 mercenary uh soldiers. The idea is they were going to march on Guatemala City. they all bogged down um within miles of the border that this this assault doesn't go anywhere. But meanwhile, the CIA has a radio transmitter set up and there's they're casting these broadcasts into Guatemala saying, you know, the liberation army is on the march and just as what happens in what happened in Iran, the the the loyalist army around Arbins folds. They collapse. It's it's another massive bluff and it works again. uh Arbenz is overthrown. Uh Guatemala becomes a right-wing dictatorship, very pro-American, very anti-communist, and it stays that way for, you know, for the next 40 40 years. Um so now now two CIA has achieved two bizarre successes backto back >> at very little expenditure.

[00:18:09]>> Um you know, nothing compared to what had been spent in terms of blood and treasure uh in Eastern Europe. Now this really becomes the playbook. And so over the next six years of the Eisenhower administration, the CIA tries to replicate this all throughout the world >> like where >> uh Congo um they they're uh in in Southeast Asia. They try to step in when the French are flailing in in Indochina.

[00:18:36]um they they're in the in the Middle East, in Yemen, and and so and none of those work, but they have the effect of of you know, essentially alienating people in every region or sub region of of the world. Um and the most then the final kind kind of carry on from this era of CIA adventurism is the Bay of Picss and that's all planned uh under Eisenhower and John Foster Doulles. As Fidel Castro, who's overthrown the dictatorship in in Cuba, he becomes more and more of a leftist, there's a CIA plot to overthrow Castro. That becomes the Bay of Pigs under Kennedy. And that's of course a fiasco.

[00:19:17]>> 1961, right?

[00:19:18]>> 1961. And if you look at what h look at that, it was an exact replica of what say what happened in Guatemala. you know, you throw 1,200 anti-conomist Cubans on a shore with, you know, on the shore on the beach of Cuba, tell them to march on Havana, and that's supposed to overthrow Fidel. And instead, of course, it was a total fiasco.

[00:19:39]>> Okay. So, I mean, I have to say, we do have a soft spot for the Bay of Pigs uh story on the global story. It's it's one that crops up an unexpected number of times. So, I feel like you could play a game of global story bingo where every time um every time the Bay of Pigs comes up, you get a prize. Uh so, thanks for raising it again today for those playing global story bingo.

[00:20:03]>> Okay, >> so Scott, you've told us about how the 1953 coup in Iran shaped things from the US perspective. Now, last week on the Global Story, uh we spoke with a woman called Ambassador Wendy Sherman. uh she was appointed by President Barack Obama to be the US lead negotiator uh for the Iran nuclear deal. And when we were talking to her, she told us that in her direct negotiations with Iranians, she was aware that the shadow of 1953 was still present for those Iranian negotiators she was talking to.

[00:20:44]How does anti-American sentiment uh begin to ferment and ferment inside Iran after 1953?

[00:20:53]>> M. Truman's exa absolutely right. So in a in a way what happened in 1953 is the Americans took took away the role of the British as as kind of the great Satan. And it had been the British prior to that. Um and now it was now it was the Americans. And I, you know, I I think that when you go to say the Iranian revolution of 79, it was 53 that really gave it this this sort of this the catalyst because along with it being this religious counterrevolution was a very strong element of kind of anti-colonial rebellion. The sha was the American shaw. So uh he was a tool I mean again this is in the eyes of the opposition.

[00:21:37]He was seen as a tool of the Americans and of the continued domination uh of of Iran by the West and that was something he could not not get out from under uh with his own people.

[00:21:51]>> What are the practical lessons that Iran learned uh through that experience in 1953 about how to conduct themselves particularly in their dealings with the United States? What I think the certainly the Islamic regime was been very adept at was playing that anti-American card to rally to rally the people >> in June 2025 >> 2025 right um so I was talking to people in the Iranian opposition um and there had been a growing ground swell of of dissent against the regime and what they were saying to me is you know if we come out and support if we come out and protest now against the regime we're we're tred as um American lackeyis and and Israeli lackeyis. So turns out that in general uh people don't like being bombed by foreign countries and and so there is this rallying around the flag effect and you know I think that the regime has been very adept at at constantly going back to the the beginning of American meddling in internal Iranian affairs going back to 1953. Interestingly, the the Iranian the the current regime has never known quite what to do with Muhammad Mosedc because he was not he was he was liberal. He was quas socialist. He was not he was not you know Ayatollah in Humeni's camp. But so they've kind of presented him as this martyr but not too much of a martyr. you know, he he's he's kind of this he was kind of the first victim of of, you know, of the the the American, you know, collusion in in with the Shaw.

[00:23:34]>> Scott, I have to ask you, and I didn't realize I was going to be so uh taken with a character called Kermit Roosevelt. Um there's a there's a lot of conversation uh in the in the modern age about whether the world is shaped by inexraable global forces or by um individuals.

[00:23:54]Is it possible to say that without a jin uh swilling um show tunes listening um intelligence operative called Kermit Roosevelt. Um we may not see we may not be seeing um US and Iranian relations uh such as that they are today and that he changed the course of history. I think ab absolutely I'm I'm very much I ascribe very much to the to the latter notion the the kind of the so-called great man theory of history you know that this idea that that just flukish events uh you know the right people are the wrong people at at the wrong place at the wrong time can affect history. I I I think you saw it with Kermit Roosevelt in 53. I I I sort of think you're seen with Donald Trump today >> and and in the case of Kermit um throwing the dice uh on a wing in a prayer with one last chance to try and make the coup work, right?

[00:24:52]>> Yeah. Yeah. No, and and all of history changes on that that last roll of the dice.

[00:24:57]>> Amazing stuff. Thank you so much, Scott.

[00:24:59]It's been wonderful to talk this through with you. Thank you for taking the time.

[00:25:03]>> Well, thank you. No, my my pleasure.

[00:25:05]Anytime. Thank you, Tristan. That was Scott Anderson, author of King of Kings: The Iranian Revolution, a story of hubris, delusion, and catastrophic miscalculation.

[00:25:17]That's the end of this episode. Thanks for tuning in. The Global Story is also an audio podcast. We're available every weekday. You can find us on BBC.com or wherever you listen. Thanks for tuning in. We'll see you next time. Cheerio.