The New Middle Eastern Balance of Power, with Elliott Abrams

Hinzugefügt: 2026-05-15

[00:00:00]A new Middle East has emerged since the 107 attacks. The balance of power is fundamentally altered. Iran has been weakened. Israel has been empowered. The Gulf countries are competing amongst themselves. Today we have Elliot Abrams back on the show and gives us a real tour to force tour of the region. Who's up? Who's down? What's the future in Gaza? In Lebanon, in Turkey, of course in Iran. It's fascinating. Let's get into it. It is a prescription for war.

[00:00:31]Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

[00:00:33]>> December 7th, 1941.

[00:00:36]A date which will live in infinite.

[00:00:39]>> The bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a state. We continue to face the grave situation in Iran.

[00:00:46]>> The people are not going down.

[00:00:51]>> We shall fight on the beaches. We shall fight on the landing grounds. We shall fight in the fields and in the streets.

[00:00:58]We shall never surrender.

[00:01:02]>> Hi, I'm Aaron Mlan. Thanks for joining School of War. I am delighted to welcome back to the show today Elliot Abrams.

[00:01:08]He's a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He's the chairman of the Vandenberg Coalition. He's also the chairman of the Tikva Fund. Elliot, thank you so much for coming back on the show.

[00:01:17]>> It's my pleasure. Thank you for inviting me.

[00:01:20]>> Uh we're going to talk about the Middle East today. Obviously, Iran is the most pressing question there and the way in which the the tentacles of its various proxies um uh are are are running into opposition across the region. So, we talk about Gaza, we'll talk about Hezbollah and Lebanon. Um but you're you're fresh back from Israel. I believe you you landed back here in the States yesterday. And I'll just say we're recording this morning of Friday, May the 15th. As these events move so quickly, it's always worth pointing that out. um uh what did you see? What did you learn? What did you hear on the ground in Israel that maybe an American audience can't immediately perceive about the wars in that region at a distance?

[00:02:02]>> Whoa, difficult question. Um for one thing, you you walk along the the beachfront in Tel Aviv, um you would never know that there had been two years, two and a half years of war that people were running into shelters just weeks ago. and maybe tomorrow, who knows? Um, so people have in a sense come out for air and there appears to be normal life except for one thing. Uh, the lack of very many foreign tourists.

[00:02:34]Uh, anyone who has visited Israel as a civilian has been through what's often the nightmare of Bengurian airport, long lines for everything. Uh there were no lines uh in the foreign passport uh segment at the or or room in Bengurian airport. I was one of four people online. U so that that um that's really very striking if you've visited the place regularly. U they're also beginning to talk about an election. and they have to have one by October and it could be as soon as uh as September. So politics is very much in the air. Um and I'd say there is one other thing that's quite obvious in talking to people which is um like the Gulf Arabs u they are very largely dependent right now on what Donald Trump does. and what is he going to do for example about the straight of Hormuz uh they can try to influence it just as the Amiradis or the Saudis can um but fundamentally they're watching guessing and planning meanwhile of course uh events continue to transpire in Gaza and Lebanon so uh it's not a relaxing moment even if it is a moment for people to go to the beach >> when you go through Benorian an airport, do you get the third degree like I always do? I just if anyone's listening, I just every single time and I I assume it's cuz I'm a military age male almost always traveling alone. Um, but I I have never received the level of scrutiny. My baggage in person have never received the level of scrutiny as when I fly to and from Israel. I get why. I get why.

[00:04:23]But but Elliot, I do think that one day I'm going to write a memoir called ProI Israel despite it all. Um because it is quite the experience every time.

[00:04:31]>> Yeah.

[00:04:32]Uh, not on this trip, I've got to say. I mean, it was I I don't usually get the third degree. I get the usual questions, takes a few minutes, but there was actually a lot less on this trip than I've ever seen. People were just walking through the lines. It's uh, you know, one would like to believe that they've turned over a new leaf with respect to uh, handling visitors with charm. That's almost completely unbelievable. So >> my my favorite anecdote on this front is um I was leaving Israel. Um and again I mean I'm I'm half joking here. I mean I I I of course understand the reason for the tights but leaving Israel. I had been uh there I was I embedded with the IDF uh in Gaza and up north. I had attended a conference essentially hosted by the IDF and I'd been given a bunch of books um some of which were in Hebrew actually. Um momentos for me. I don't actually read Hebrew, but some Hebrew, some English books uh produced by the IDF about Gaza and about the war and the the police officers or who whatever organization the security and Bengorian come from are pulling the books which you know have cover shots of like you know devastation in Gaza out and sort of staring at them and staring at me and asking me what's the meaning of these books. I'm like they're literally from the IDF. I was given them by the IDF yesterday. Anyway, >> a likely story. Yeah. Anyway, anyway, anyway, um politics, Israeli politics, um how do Netanyahu's political fortunes in the broader question of the constitution of the Knesset, um which we really haven't talked about on on School of War, um and probably should talk about how these domestic political issues connect to strategy more. How do they intersect with the strategic picture? Um uh and uh you know, whether it's Israel's approach to Iran, Gaza, what have you? To be very brief, I'd say they don't connect as much as many people would like to believe. Um that is if you look at the positions of those on let's call it the center left, the main opposition now to Netanyahu, the the coalition of former prime ministers Bennett and Laid. How will their policy toward Iran and Iranian potential nuclear weapon differ? It won't. um their policy in Gaza, their policy toward Lebanon. I think that that there is a wide consensus on uh national security issues in Israel. The IDF itself of course has an influence over this. So um a lot of this is very personal with respect to Prime Minister Netanyahu. Um it it isn't it isn't going to there isn't going to be a revolution in Israeli foreign policy and national security policy. They will lose the personal relationships that Netanyahu has with President Trump, with Muhammad bin Zed, let's say. Um, but presumably, you know, a new prime minister can create uh new relationships. Um where where they're um is they hope um those who are challenging Netanyahu hope where there will be change is perhaps um in reducing the amount of anti-Israel hostility that they see and that it tends to uh show itself in attacks on Netanyahu. there. Again, I think they're going to find um less than they hope for because I think the fundamental hostility uh is to Israel. Um and maybe even more broadly, the fundamental hostility is to Jews. Uh and it's personified in Netanyahu because he's been there for a long time. Um but you do hear in the average, you know, breakfast or lunch conversation much more politics being discussed now. which coalition will last. Uh, and you know the fundamental question, can BB pull another rabbit out of a hat? Uh, he is the dominant figure in Israeli politics for decades now, the longest serving prime minister ever. And usually when I discuss this with say an Israeli journalist or old friend, um, they'll begin by saying never count BB out. And I think that is the beginning of of wisdom. I think while you were on the ground there um if not then just before you you left for Israel it was reported speaking of Netanyahu's personal relationships in the region that while the fighting was ongoing the highintensity fighting was ongoing with Iran Netanyahu made a a secret visit uh to the UAE which you know I I think I'm I like to tell myself that it's hard to shock me but like even I even I raised my eyebrows at that was a really striking report. Um what can you tell us about that and and what was the reception to that uh uh news in Israel?

[00:09:36]>> Uh of course it was immediately denied by the Amiradis which led everyone in Israel to say oh then it must be true.

[00:09:42]Um and uh there's new news that the um chief of staff of the IDF also u visited the Emirates u during the war. um everyone believes it and it is emblematic of the uh level of relationship that Israel has achieved with the Emirates. We know also that there they sent not only Iron Dome um facilities but uh Iron Dome staff, IDF staff to the Emirates to help protect them. I should add, Aaron, on on landing in in Bengurian airport in Tel Aviv, I saw something I've never seen before.

[00:10:24]Um you land and there are banks of gates that normally would be filled with planes from Delta and United and Lufansa and um British Airway etc. Um and those companies are not flying to Israel right now. And all those gates have American military aircraft.

[00:10:45]It is extraordinary. It is really like an American military base. I've just never seen anything like that um in Israel or at any other commercial airport anywhere in the world. It's a reminder of the degree of um cooperation and indeed integration. And I think the the the trip which I assume did take place to the Emirates uh by the prime minister and separately by the um the chief of staff of the IDF uh is um a reminder of the choice the Emirates have made to a much greater degree than any of their Gulf u neighbors u for an alliance with Israel, a military and security alliance with Israel. Of course, with us as well, but the others have it with us. They just don't have it much with Israel.

[00:11:42]>> Well, so I want to pull on this thread and I I wasn't really planning to go in this direction, but this is so interesting. So Elliot, let's let's try to talk about the structure of the new Middle East that is coming into focus now uh what are we two and a half years on from 107. So, but let's start by by just just unwrapping the UAE Israel dimension a bit more. Why why is it the UAE as opposed to Saudi as opposed the Qatar question kind of answers itself, but maybe you'll you'll explain it for the for the the audience. Um why is it the UAE specifically that this particularly close relationship develops even within a broader con I would assert I'm curious if you agree within a broader context of of warmer Israeli Gulf relations in general that this is the particularly close one.

[00:12:26]>> I think the UAE is is unique in a couple of ways. they made a decision years ago uh to modernize uh the economy and society. If you go to Dubai or Abu Dhabi, you see it physically. That is you see the the skyscrapers, you see the uh international community that's there.

[00:12:47]You see the prosperity, you see the economic modernization, you see the um decreasing dependence on oil.

[00:12:55]They make more money now from their immense sovereign wealth funds than they do from uh if you will merely um the sale of oil. Um and they differ from the Saudis who are also trying to modernize in that they don't really have much of a domestic population. That is there are you know roughly a million Amiradis but there are 30 million Saudis. And although Saudi Arabia is not a democracy, public opinion counts and it circumscribes what Muhammad bin Salman can do. For example, in um joining the Abraham Accords and normalizing with Israel, that is not a popular uh goal in Saudi Arabia today and he's got to be aware of that. Whereas the rulers of the Emirates don't have to worry about public opinion in the same way. of course is a lot easier to modernize when you have a very small population and much greater per capita wealth. The Amiratis have also I guess I'd say followed the logic of the conclusions they are drawing. Um the logic would suggest Iran is a perpetual enemy under the current Islamic regime. Uh who is a reliable ally against the Islamic Republic? Who is reliable and capable and courageous? And the answer is Israel. Uh a more reliable ally in the sense than the United States because they can't be sure what policies we're going to to follow. Maybe we'll do another JCPOA someday. U not so with the Israelis. And the Israelis have proved uh certainly in uh Midnight Hammer, what they called Rising Lion last year, uh that they're willing to attack Iran directly and they're willing to help the Emirates defend itself directly. Uh we know now about the Iron Dome battery. uh we don't know what else has been done uh between the two governments in terms of military and intelligence cooperation.

[00:15:05]Uh so the Emirates are are are fully in it. They obviously joined they were the centerpiece of the Abraham Accords in the Trump first term. Um and they haven't pulled back from it. Nothing, not even the Gaza war has led them to pull back. They're fully in it. This is the kind of Middle East they want to see with an integration of modernizing Arab countries with Israel against the threat to all of them which they view as Iran.

[00:15:35]>> Well, let's let's move around some of the the the heavyweights in the region um and how how they fit into the new balance of power. uh Saudi um I I I took I don't think this particularly um groundbreaking idea sitting here in the spring of 2026 but uh I took uh 107 itself to be uh an effort um to disrupt Israeli Saudi normalization which which at the time was a hot topic um not the only strategic rationale for what the mos did but certainly uh high up there on the list. uh where does that process stand? What is the Saudi attitude towards Israel, towards Iran? Obviously, not a great deal of love lost between Saudi and UAE. How do they fit into the new balance of power?

[00:16:23]>> Well, I think you have to go back as as you suggested to 107. Um 107 was the product uh or a manifestation of a really smart Iranian foreign policy, which was we're going to surround Israel. We're going to surround it with proxies. Um, we're going to build our Iranian influence in Iraq and Yemen and Syria and Lebanon and Gaza. Uh, and uh, so it's good for us in Iran as a regional power, but we'll also surround Israel ultimately strangle it. Um, and that policy seemed to be working. If you look at the level of Iranian um influence, uh it looked as if Israel did not really have an answer to that Iranian policy. U but they went too far. They presumed too much. Um and on 107 they attack in a way that um severely damaged Israel. And by the way, if his had gone into it would have damaged them even more. But it was a bad move. It turned out to be the beginning of the end for that Iranian policy because the Israelis have so greatly set back Hezbollah and Hamas.

[00:17:46]Uh and this train of events helped lead to the overthrow of Assad. So now you know you and I are sitting here talking in a week in which Israel and Lebanon are talking in Washington. Obviously, Shara and Syria has a very different policy uh toward the United States, toward his neighbors, toward Iran. Um and the proxy war in a sense ended in 2025 when Iran attacked Israel directly.

[00:18:17]Another mistake I think on the part of Iran and then came Rising Lion and and Midnight Hammer and this year's war where enormous damage has been done to Iran. I think for the Gulf Arabs, u there is a there is a huge question here as there is for Israel, which is what is American policy going to be under President Trump and with two and a half years to go under potential successors. But we we can start with Trump. Um is he a nightmare for the Gulf Arabs? Is the president actually going to let Iran take over the straight of Hormuz such that every Gulf oil producer is in their thr? Is he going to lift sanctions and unfreeze assets so that Iran can rebuild its economy? Or is the United States going to maintain a really tough line uh and and keep Iran down uh at the levels that that they are now? The Saudis, I think one could say, are hedging. Um, they talk to the Israelis, but obviously it's not um it's not at the level that Israeli Amirati relations are. Um, their rhetoric in the last two and a half years since October 7, uh, the rhetoric about Gaza and about Israel has been extremely tough. Um, their relationship with the Emirates has declined. And I don't think it's just that well Muhammad bin Salman and Muhammad bin Sad are rivals. They don't like each other anymore. It's a psycho drama. That may well be true. Probably is true. But um the Saudis are um not joining up for this Israeli Emirati maybe Israeli Emirati American um new Middle East. they are looking at a region in which the key power is really um Saudi Arabia.

[00:20:24]Uh and uh it's very striking to me because if I go back to uh the George W.

[00:20:32]Bush administration and previous administrations, the most powerful country in the Arab world was Egypt, >> right?

[00:20:41]If you wanted to get something done, let's say in the Arab League, you wanted Arab votes in the UN, talk to Hosni Mubarak.

[00:20:49]Um, and Egypt is truly peripheral now.

[00:20:52]It's partly the product of um, poverty of the general population. Um, it's partly the question of how stable uh, their own politics are. Um they did finally uh it seems send a squadron of aircraft to uh the UAE in the last uh few weeks um aircraft which I think it's fair to say are useless um but are you know a gesture of Arab solidarity but um today the question of who leads the Arab world is a Gulf question. uh the balance is completely shifted uh to the Gulf and it's Qatar uh the Saudis, the Amiradis and the Saudis of course look at these two tiny countries the Emirates and Qatar uh Qatar with about 600,000 actual cuttery citizens um they and they've got as I said 30 35 million people and uh they they think they are uh clearly the country that should be the the dominant um leader uh in the Arab world and they are also in a way that the Emirates um is not now doing. Um they are now um trying to build a relationship with Turkey um and they would like to exercise influence in Syria and in Lebanon in a way that the Emirates is much less interested in doing. So it's it's a real scramble. Uh, so let's let's another question for you about um a major regional power and then I want to bring it back into the immediate neighborhood of Israel and go deeper on Lebanon and Gaza. Um, but Turkey, so if if the elements of the new Middle East and the the shifted balance of power since 107 are obviously an empowered Israel, obviously a weakened Iran, we'll see how weakened. We don't we don't know what's going to happen in the weeks to come, but objectively there's there's no way back anytime soon to where they were on 106. An empowered Gulf with competition between the Saudis, the Qataris, and the Amiradis.

[00:22:59]The Amiradis, as we've just discussed, throwing their hat in with the Israelis.

[00:23:03]Uh Syria gone. Um in its former Iranian um satrappy form, reemerged as a Turkish satrappy. Um Turkey. That's my next question. Where where does Turkey fit into all of this as a threat on the horizon to Israel?

[00:23:24]Also as a NATO ally of the United States, a power uh like others in the Middle East that likes to play both sides of a lot of questions. What's your what's your take there?

[00:23:34]>> Well, um I'm not a Turkey expert. Uh but it seems to me that Turkish foreign policy has not been very successful over these years. They had a very friendly relationship with Israel and it's gone.

[00:23:49]Erdogan destroyed it. Um he has not been able to exercise any great um influence in what let's call the Turic world, the countries with Turic languages in the uh in the Caucasus for example um and the Balkans. He has not been able to exercise any significant influence in the Arab world either. uh the the great you know um fear on the part of the the Turks um is that there should grow up to be a Kurdish state. But what have we seen in the last year or so? Discussions about arming uh the Kurds to help bring down uh the Islamic Republic of Iran. So um what has what has Turkey gained? uh a difficult relationship with Syria, which is also worried about uh the Kurds, difficult relationship, hostile relationship with Israel, no great influence in the Arab world. Uh they seem to me to be because of, if I can put it this way, their aggressive posture to be in a fairly defensive situation. no close allies in the Arab world, hostility to Israel, uh considered to be an unreliable friend, u obviously in a in a in an anomalous position in NATO. So I I see the I see the Turks as sort of hanging there um and maybe waiting for the poster period to see what kind of policy they want to pursue. Do they, for example, want to go back to being a reliable NATO ally of the United States? Do they want to join the United States and Israel and some of the Gulf Arabs um in a closer relationship with us and uh against Iran? Uh I I don't I mean right now I see Erdogan as having achieved essentially nothing but a kind of isolation of Turkey with his foreign policy.

[00:26:06]>> You know there's there's two polls to this debate amongst I would say amongst pro-Israel people in in Washington DC.

[00:26:16]Um I've heard the argument made you you I won't name names. You might associate it with some names of mutual uh friends of ours. um uh that actually Turkey is increasingly central whether it's through its um uh its new role in Syria but also because of its role in the Ukraine conflict um where it plays a you know a kind of clever game of balance but but certainly sees it seems to me the survival of Ukraine as as in its broader interest u obviously you disagree on some level but what's your response to those particular points >> um the Turkey's, you know, yeah, it's playing a role and and has formed a relationship with Ukraine. But I I guess, you know, one answer is big deal.

[00:27:02]Everybody in NATO has or should have a supportive relationship with Ukraine.

[00:27:08]Everybody in NATO should. Everybody uh in Europe should. Um so what would be more remarkable would be a Turkish position of hostility. Yeah, they're balancing, right? Erdogan wants a constructive relationship um with Putin and with the Russians. So he's got to be careful how he plays Ukraine. He wants a constructive relationship with the Gulf Arabs who've got among other things lots of capital. Um he's worried about um always worried about the Kurds in Iraq, in Syria. Um so yeah, he's balancing all these off. But tell me tell me which government in the world considers Turkey today to be a reliable friend. I don't think there is one and I don't see why that is an achievement for everyone.

[00:28:04]>> Um so let's move south. You uh you mentioned that the uh Lebanese government and the Israeli government are going to be in talks here in Washington DC. Um maybe explain a bit for the audience. I mean it's it's a it's an odd structure, right? um uh because uh Israel um uh to my mind and I think to their mind is not at war with the state of Lebanon. Uh Israel is at war with Hezbollah. So what what is to be achieved at these talks? The Lebanese government has a pretty weak track record. I mean in general, but specifically when it comes to taking a tough line on Hezbollah, where does all that stand and where do you think it might go?

[00:28:40]>> Well, step back for a minute and and um we should state that Hezbollah dragged Lebanon into a war with Israel. There was no reason for it and it wasn't a decision of the Lebanese government or army. Hisbah did it and as attacked Israel and as a result the Israelis are now attacking Hezbollah mostly in southern Lebanon but not entirely in southern Lebanon. Also in the Beirut area, also in Baka Valley. Um and the Lebanese government says stop. You're right in saying that that two of the three relevant parties are in Washington, the government of Lebanon and and the government of Israel talking to each other. And I think what'll happen is they'll agree, they've already agreed that that, as I'll say in a minute, I'm not an optimist about this.

[00:29:35]They've agreed a hundred times. The formula is that the government of Lebanon and the Lebanese army will take over full sovereignty of Lebanon, including right down to the Israeli border. And as they do that, Israeli forces pull back. Israel stops acting in Lebanon. It stops hitting Hezbollah targets and allows the Lebanese government uh to take those targets whe a base, an armory, a village from Hezbollah and pulls back the forces that are now in Lebanon back into Israel. That's the right formula. And what will come out of the talks in Washington is a restatement uh of that formula. And in my opinion, it will go nowhere. Uh I'm really quite pessimistic about this in the sense that I think this is the best opportunity because of the weakening of Hezbollah by Israeli attacks.

[00:30:34]This is the best opportunity the Lebanese have had um maybe in 20 years uh to take back their country and they're not going to do it. They're not going to do it because it would mean taking on Hezbollah. It would actually mean fighting. There will there will be moments where um Hezbollah agrees to pull back from this location or that but ultimately there will come a moment and ultimately meaning in a matter of weeks or months where his will say no and it would be incumbent on the Lebanese army Lebanese armed forces LAF to fight and they're not going to do it.

[00:31:12]Now the excuse is we don't want a civil war. Uh I understand that but the question is who rules the country? Is it Iran or is it the government and people of Lebanon? Uh and they're they are in my opinion not willing to stand up to that. So to take back their country, to take back their sovereignty from Iran because Hezbollah much more than say Hamas, much more than the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah is an arm of the revolutionary guards in Lebanon which created it, which built it. Are they going to be able are they going to be willing to fight to take back their sovereignty? And I think every indication is that the answer is no, they are not. So the current situation I think is likely to obtain for really the foreseeable future. The only answer to it is the end of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

[00:32:10]>> Yeah. Yeah. And we'll we'll finish with Iran because I I do want to get your thoughts on um on what the road ahead there is. But but the situation you just outlined with Hezbollah in Lebanon has a real parallel of course with the remnants uh uh the well-armed at least with small arms remnants of Hamas in Gaza. And there's a common theme here to Trump administration foreign policy in the region and hopes for peace which is in both cases you have an armed group Hezbollah and Hamas on the ground. Uh and peace is going to require someone to disarm them. The Israelis are willing to fight in both cases. is America actually restrains the Israelis in both cases. Uh the Lebanese, as you just I I think persuasively outlined the case, the LAF is not going to disarm Hezbollah. There are no obvious parties available other than the Israelis to quote unquote disarm Hamas, which you and I both know means going back to war with Hamas. So I I I guess uh to to land this in the form of a question, uh what are we doing here? We're we're trying to we the administration is pursuing with all kinds of structures and uh you know there's there's obvious border of peace with with Gaza and these plans for future development, but but there's an armed group of of milinarian thugs on the ground who um they're not going anywhere. Um uh what are we doing here, Elliot? Well, uh, I'm not critical of the administration, uh, but very critical in either the the case of Lebanon or Gaza, um, for trying. And I think the idea of getting, um, Lebanese and Israeli officials to meet in Washington, talk to each other face to face about, for example, the border. Um, that's fine. uh as long as the position of the United States government is, we understand that Hezbollah is a terrorist group and that Israel um is right to be striking it uh and preventing it from attacking Israel again. Um same thing in that is our position right now. Same thing in Gaza. I think the idea of uh you know put aside that the President Trump is supposed to be head of the board of peace for the whole rest of his life and um the idea of trying to put something together I think is fine as long as we acknowledge that the Israelis have the right to continue to try to erode Hezbollah and prevent its recomposition.

[00:34:38]And that is the that is the American position. I think what we're seeing now is Israel has half of Gaza and Hamas has half more or less it may be 55 45 under the control of Israel. I think the next step frankly is going to be to try to do some rebuilding in the Israeli governed half of it. Hamas is very much against this and is trying to prevent it. trying to prevent gazins for example who may wish to move at some point to uh the Israeli part or prevent now workers uh who would be involved in construction projects in the Israeli half which is largely depopulated. Uh Hamas is Hamas is blocking that. Um but I think we're I think um we have the right policy for right now. It's tragic because in both cases you've got the government of Lebanon unable to control its own country because of an armed group that takes orders from Thran. In in the case of Gaza, you have no um self-government by Gazins. You have an armed terrorist group which is running the half of Gaza where most Gazins live. Um, but uh, as long as these groups exist, as long as they're willing to kill to promote their ideological agenda, then the United States should be doing essentially what we are doing, which is saying to the Israelis, we get what you need to do militarily. Meanwhile, we're going to experiment with uh, ways of getting people talking to each other about a potential better day. So, as promised, let's finish with the great unresolved issue of what the heck we're going to do about Iran. Um, we've talked here on School of War Adnauseium. I I worry about uh the audience getting bored with the Straight of Hormuz with which I I've be I've developed an obsession. But I I I think it's a justified obsession because to me the whole question revolves around the future of the strait. Kind of like the analogy I keep trying Elliot is it reminds me of of those final months with the hostages in Gaza. how the presence of those hostages just completely scrambled and disadvant aside from extremely important humanitarian uh human considerations that strategically the presence of those hostages in Gaza just scrambled the whole calculus frankly inflated the importance of Gaza in Israeli strategy um disadvantage Israel and the moment and to me one of the great diplomatic achievements of the 21st century so far those last hostages were freed everything was just better strategically um for Israel um and and the enemies of Hamas, including the United States.

[00:37:28]Similarly with the Straight of Hormuz, if if traffic could just be restored, everything would be easier when it came to dealing with Iran. There'd be more freedom. There'd be more time. I don't know if you assess the the issue of the straight as as centrally as I or or being as central as I do. There's obviously other important issues when it comes to thinking about Iran, but what what are we going to do here? What would you advise be the the road ahead? I see um the the best realistic outcome now um as an agreement essentially only on the straight of Hormuz and the American uh blockade of Iranian ports. Those are a match. Um I don't think we're going to get a peace deal with Iran. I hope we do not seek to get, you know, another JCPOA because I do not want to see American sanctions on Iran lifted, which would only enrich the regime, uh, and abandon the Iranian people. I'd like to see is what I'd call a vermuse deal. Iran agrees the straight is open. It's an international waterway. There will be no tolls. We agree to lift that blockade.

[00:38:38]So all shipping, Iranian, American, international shipping can go through the straight of Hormuz as it was, let's say, a year ago. No deal on anything else, including the Iranian nuclear program. And I think the president should say, um, I think I've proved that. I mean it when I say they cannot have a nuclear weapons program.

[00:39:01]And if I see them trying to get the highlyenriched uranium out of Isvahan and other places it may be buried, if I see them trying to reconstitute the problem, u I'll hit him again. Uh and obviously there would be discussions between the US and Israel and at certain points the president might prefer that the Israelis do it alone rather than it being a joint military operation. But I think the best realistic outcome is just open the straight and as to the rest the president uh reiterates what American policy is and reiterates his willingness to do it. The the alternatives I think are much worse because they involve an end first of all endless negotiation um with the Islamic Republic which will as always cheat with respect to the U nuclear weapons program and its missile program. Anyway, I would do a barebones hormuz deal.

[00:39:59]>> Elliot Abrams, that was a real tour to force and tour of uh a Middle East uh that has changed so dramatically in the last two and a half years. Grateful for you as always coming on the show and I hope you'll come back soon.

[00:40:11]>> I'd be delighted. Thanks for inviting me.