TRUMP LIFTS IRAN BLOCKADE! - w/ Major Andrew Fox

Added: 2026-05-30

[00:00:03]Andrew, it's a pleasure to have you on the show for the first time.

[00:00:06]>> Yeah, great to be here. Thanks for having me.

[00:00:08]>> So, um, perfect timing as well. We, um, um, I had a good joke to make, but then we had the technical issue. I was going to say to you, Andrew, tell me we don't live in a simulation because you're so fascinating to watch what's happening.

[00:00:20]We had, um, progress towards a deal.

[00:00:24]Now, I'm in the optimistic camp. I've been saying for a while the war is over.

[00:00:27]Just to let you know where where I'm at.

[00:00:29]A lot of my other guests have been correcting me for the last few weeks that I'm being way too optimistic. Well, then we have an announcement. It came live when I was with Dr. P, Professor Pap earlier. Trump makes an announcement that he's pretty much lifted the blockade. It made it seem like it's a deal. And then when I read through that post, he starts talking about the US will go into Iran, get the enriched uranium, and destroy it. And then he says no money will exchange hands making it seem like there's no unfreezing of assets and that Iran no one would be charging a fee at the straight of hummus which Iran said they want to charge a fee. That's kind of a a condition that's non-negotiable. So it seemed bizarre.

[00:01:03]Why would you be lifting the blockade and mentioning terms that we know Iran said explicitly time and time again they won't agree to then pretty quickly. So I'll give you a quick update because I know you were sorting the technical issue >> Iranian media. So kind of we've gotten in the habit of waiting for the Iranians to respond to understand really what's happening because we got two different rhetorics in that information warfare.

[00:01:23]Iran and sometimes we wait for Israeli media as well to get their perspective.

[00:01:27]IB said a final decision to open the trade homes has not been made but Iran will review it. And then we had reports of a reporter close to the White House said Trump worded his post badly and he didn't actually mean to announce the end of the naval blockade but the naval blockade will end when Iran meets XY Z terms. And then Fox News put out a report saying they dismissed Trump's claims. By the way, in Iran, they didn't even put it in the media. In the daily news, nightly news that happens there.

[00:01:53]They didn't mention Trump's post at all on I think on Fars. And he said the claims about a deal with Iran is a mix of truth and lies in an attempt to stage a fake victory. The sources say the agreement text is still in its final stages of ratification in Iran and no final decision has been made. They said there's two key distortions in the account. First, the first distortion is that Iran is obliged to open the straight of homes without fees.

[00:02:16]Something sources say did not text. It did not it was not in the text and Iran was planning its own arrangement for managing the strait which they've been saying pretty much daily. And second, the other distortion is about the nuclear material. Iran said that these claims are fundamentally baseless and they've said this many times and they've also said he omitted the release of the $12 billion in frozen Iranian assets which we know they've had those discussions in Qatar. Galibbah was there and apparently they went well.

[00:02:44]>> Um and they said Iranian officials said that a deal is has not been reached yet.

[00:02:49]So that's where we're at. The markets initially, you know, responded positively to Trump's post. Not as positively as they would usually.

[00:02:57]Usually it's find oil just kind of collapse. It did drop u but not significantly. It's let me see if we walked. It's kind of climbed back up.

[00:03:05]Yeah, it was at 80 before the announcement was at 87.5 went all the way down to 85 and now it's back up to 86.6. 86.7. So, um we'd love to get your thoughts on obviously these developments that just happened in the last few minutes and also where we're at in general. Where do you think this uh this is heading?

[00:03:25]Well, I think um after this we're going to need a good physiootherapy session to to cure the whiplash that we've all got from trying to follow the the claim and counter claim. Um look, until we see something in paper, it's we're just in this very strange position where you've got two completely conflicting narratives. They're like tankers and straighter formers passing each other in the night. you know this is this is if we look at the uh the zone of um the zone of possible agreement here if if we go back to our our negotiating theory um there's a very very limited overlap between the Iranian position and the American one that there's two red lines and they are completely contradictory one American red line says no control over Hormers no nuclear material the Iranian red line says control over Hormers and nuclear material and unless Washington does something to unlock the Iranian red line. Nothing's going to move here because the Iranians have no incentive to move. And I think we have to go back to the the psychology and and the the philosophy that underpins the Iranian side of things. You know, these are religious hardliners. They have a belief in the Makti in the 12 Shia um religious background where suffering is a religious duty almost. Um if we go back to the battle of Cabala, you know, 684 I think it was AD. um you know this was a complete annihilation of the Shia troops but that the sacrifice on the battlefield has become you know emblematic for them when they're in conflict situations. It's it's a matter of what they see as good standing against evil and righteousness. Um and it's by that example that they will get their religious redemption. And so for them suffering, pain, endurance, the these are religious powerful motivators.

[00:05:11]uh and the more stuff America does to them, be it economically, be it bombing them, the more they feel religiously and philosophically validated in what they're doing, you know, because that this is this is a journey they're on to to paradise effectively. So, you have to completely try and understand that that philosophy on the other side before you then go to the diametric opposite, which is a New York real estate mogul who sees everything as a deal. Everyone has a price. uh you know if you go in hard hard at first and then come back from your initial maximalist aims then then they'll feel that the deal has been made you know that that suits both sides and you still win and these two positions are completely at odds with each other and and I think that's just what we're seeing play out in real time and Trump's announcements his weather vein he's he's he's trying to find a win from this situation you know his psychology is he has to be able to go back to the American people and say yes the 360 odd injured servicemen and however many killed it was. I'm sorry I forget that figure off the top of my head. Um the amount of billions of dollars of of munitions that we've expended, um here is the victory that that has come about from all my actions. And and at the moment he's not finding a position where he can sell something that looks like a win to the American people. And I think that is a really big problem on the American side. And so there's a bunch of stumbling blocks here that are preventing us getting to that possible agreement in future. Um and it may require unilateral action from from the American side. You know, this lifting of the blockade um that was announced, you know, he he sent that message on True Social saying, "Tell the sailors, you know, tell your families hello from your your favorite president." You know, just bizarre stuff. Um you know, this is this is this is I think, you know, Trump trying to find a way to show that he is still in a position of control and power when it's actually very clear that he's not right now. and and yes, the Iranians have had a battering um but they genuinely will feel that they have won this war because they survived. That's the religious motivator here. That survival, that endurance in the face of attack is what they will conceive of as a victory. And I think that's where they are. And that gives them tremendous leverage when it comes to these negotiations. Trump needs a deal. They see not having a deal as as a religious duty to suffer. So that's where we are.

[00:07:31]Yeah.

[00:07:33]So Ali Hashim, before we we start analyzing it further, there's an update here from Ali Hashim who's a regular on the show. He's an Alazer journalist.

[00:07:39]He's been he's kind of been the axious of the Iranians kind of position he's had. He said the following. A well-informed source told me that Trump's truth social post about lifting the blockade was in fact the first condition before moving to the next steps of the understanding. According to your sources, the Iranian side insisted on a formal public announcement first.

[00:07:59]I'm sure that's not how they expected the announcement to go.

[00:08:01]>> Trump appears to have framed it as a secondary issue while tan sees it as a key confidence building measure before entering the most sensitive files. So far, there has been no direct discussions of the nuclear file itself.

[00:08:14]The process is expected to move gradually through anou with every step will be matched by a reciprocal step.

[00:08:20]The same sources say a ceasefire announcement between Hisbar and Israel is also expected as part of the broader framework currently taking shape. So what he's saying is that this whole post was part of the the confidence building process that both sides are undertaking. Um that's how he framed it. There also been reports that a deal's been around for 3 days, 4 days. I reported it as well that I I was told three days ago now that we had a deal and I posted about it and then NBC reported yesterday that yes, there was a deal to three three two three days ago but um both sides haven't decided to announce it yet. Um just a lot of bizarre this the reason this is bizarre this all happening in the open instead of happening behind the scenes. Do you think we do have a deal? Do you think we're close to a deal or do you think this is all just time wasting and a deal is close to impossible considering how far both sides seem to be? Cuz difficult to differentiate. Are they really on two different pages or are they just trying to control the rhetoric for their own domestic audience?

[00:09:19]>> Well, I think the answer is both.

[00:09:20]They're definitely trying to control the rhetoric. You know, there is no way Trump can come away from this and be quite as open about how humiliating this is for America as it actually is. I think the American psyche would implode if they realized how badly this war had gone. It's it's the biggest disaster since Vietnam and it's not even close and that's bearing in mind we've got Iraq and Afghanistan to compare it to which were hardly triumphs.

[00:09:41]>> Um you know this is this is a nightmare.

[00:09:43]Um but look messaging aside I think it's entirely plausible that a deal will come because it has to from the American perspective they they have to they haven't have to find an exit strategy from this. They can't just down tools and walk away. Um that that's not going to happen. And so there has to be a deal. and and what we're seeing unfold. I think the way this is being staggered, the way it's being phased makes a lot of sense. Um the Iranians would obviously prefer that the blockade was lit was lifted. They'd prefer that their oil would start flowing again. They would prefer that air strikes on their territory stopped.

[00:10:19]You know, these are all objectively good things. Even if enduring them is a religious duty, they'd still rather they weren't happening. Um so they're incentivized from that perspective, but obviously their trust in Trump is incredibly low. um from their perspective um he will have attacked he's just attacked them uh he broke the uh JCPOA the Obama deal if you will um and so from their perspective they need a kind of uh a proof of good faith before they can progress the talks and then of course moving into this reported 60-day negotiation period over what happens to the nuclear material um is going to be phase two and that that again logically makes sense now that's going to be way harder you know and we've seen also this pattern come out over the Trump presidency. Um these these phased ceasefires. He attempted it in Ukraine. It didn't work at all. They did it in Gaza. It's not going great down there, but you know, phase one did get the hostages home and did stop the most of the war. You know, it stopped ground maneuver. It stopped a number of um >> today said he's going to go to the 70% invade and invading 70% of Gaza. It was meant to be 50% based on the agreement. it went up to 60 and now he said he wants to go up to 70%.

[00:11:31]>> Yeah. And that's an example of how this Trump's phase ceasefire piece doesn't really work. Um >> Yeah.

[00:11:37]>> Because because you lose kind of momentum when you get to the second phase. You lose incentives when you get to the second phase. You know, if if we're looking at Gaza, I mean, let's not get stucked into that rabbit hole, but Hamas have retained full control of their part of Gaza. So, they're happy enough. They've got no incentive to to disarm, and the Israelis have got no incentive to to roll back to the pre-war position because Hamas haven't disarmed.

[00:11:57]So, this is a good kind of model of how it might go wrong in in phase two of the Iran deal. Um, phase one looking like lifting the blockade on Homs, which is the most important thing for the world economy. Let's not forget how terribly badly this is going to hit all of us. If if that Homer's um blockade doesn't get lifted in in due course, the world oil reserves are going to really start running dry. Prices are going to escalate, not only at the gas pump, but also at the supermarket. you know, every everything you have to spend money on will be more expensive if this blockade continues. So, getting rid of that is the biggest thing in phase one. Phase two, the nuclear material. Um, you know, once phase one is achieved, you know, I actually agree with you. I think the war is over. I don't think they're going to go back to bombing. Um, if phase two breaks down, then kind of there's no there's no likelihood of going back to bombing again. And so we'll stumble once again into this weird stalemate that never quite has a resolution then, you know, similar to what we're seeing in Gaza. So that's that's how my instinct would say this is going to go. But getting that uh getting that straight of open is clearly the the global priority right now. It's certainly an American priority. Americans are paying huge amounts at the gas pump than they were before the war. Um opinion polls firmly against the war at all. I think it's into the 60 percentile now about Americans opposing the war even starting, never mind continuing. So all all mood music points towards a deal.

[00:13:24]Phase one will probably see Hummer's opening. Phase two will probably drag out.

[00:13:30]>> Yeah. The So Professor Paper said something interesting. He said there's kind of three reasons why we could see an escalation back to kinetic action eventually. Um because I'm optimistic about reaching an MOU and the full-blown war ending, but long-term I'm not as optimistic because there is number one, we've just crossed so many red lines.

[00:13:47]Striking the Gulf, closing the Shadow Ho, US bombing Iran, all these even Israel bombing Iran, all these things were considered red lines. I remember back years ago, no one would would even, you know, it was considered unfathomable for Israel to attack Iran. That's like a red line that will never happen, never be crossed, are always going to be through proxies. We've crossed this red line and all the ones above it. Um and then PPE talks about how now Iran has more incentive than ever to build a nuclear weapon. So my question is okay and then what? And then you've got the um so that's one is the the red lines have been crossed. He talks about an escalation trap. One thing leads to another horizontal escalation. So Iran using their proxies more that's been happening for a while. And one thing that treat Parcy said to me yesterday which I found fascinating. He said you know what could happen that's a big risk is Israel has a habit of not abiding by the ceasefires because they have significant incentives to continue the war whether politically for Netanyahu but also to get rid of Hzbalah which is seen as a threat and will always be a threat. Um so if Israel continues the war despite there being a ceasefire then how will Iran retaliate? They might retaliate whether through their proxies but if they want to support them further they might. That was wild to me. is like and that was according to sources he spoke to in Iran. He said they might strike the UAE as a way to deter pressure the world to pressure Israel and also deter Israel because one of their allies is getting hit and also deter other Gulf countries from getting close to Israel. And lastly, something that worries me a lot and something that um Brandon you know Brendan Wer um said to me a couple of days ago which is interesting.

[00:15:22]He said um that it'll be the Middle East will be a tripolar world. There'll be three big powers. The Sunni axis, Saudi, Turkey, Egypt, Qatar, Pakistan, the Israel access, US support and it's maybe Israel and the UAE and then Iran and any allies of theirs. So it's going to be those three powers trying to get more influence in the region and that is going to lead to more instability. He says how tripolarity leads to more instability. Multipolarity when it's more than three is what leads to stability if you look at it historically. So, if you put all these things together, it's just really hard to be optimistic about if a deal happens, we're talking that even if a deal happens beyond the MOU, the MOU is a temporary band-aid. Um, that the region may never see the the kind of stability it's seen over the last few decades, and the last few decades have have not been stable. So, in other words, it could only get worse from here in Syria and Lebanon and in other countries.

[00:16:13]>> I think that's a very pessimistic reading. I mean, look, I think certainly from an Israeli perspective, I suspect if they could get a ceasefire tomorrow, they'd be delighted. But both sides would of course have to stick to it. And you know, Hamas haven't stuck to their side of the bargain and disarmed in Gaza. Hisbala and Lebanon have continued to fire rockets into northern Israel.

[00:16:31]Those northern Israeli towns aren't safe. Um, and Israel is certainly in, you know, a strategic trap in Lebanon where they're setting out the war aim of trying to secure their northern border, but that's going to stuck them into a very long-term occupation if there isn't some sort of movement on the Hzbala side and and the Iranian side. Of course, Hisbala being a direct Iranian proxy. I mean, look, in in military terms, that proxy network is badly damaged. They they've been heavily battered from um Israeli and other action um since 7th of October. I mean, Hamas aren't anything like they were. Hisbala aren't anything like they were. They're still a threat, but they're not sitting on those enormous rocket reserves that they had prior to 7th of October. Um the Houthies, I think it's very noticeable that they've been incredibly quiet during this war. Um you know, if they if if they if they could have done, I suspect shutting the Bab alandev as well as the straight offood would have been a great move by Iran. that would have really choked off the world economy and layered that pressure on and they didn't do it. And I think that's telling and it shows how American and allied action against the Houthis is we condemn significantly. Uh the Iraqi militias um Katy Hzbalah in in Iraq and their allies again they've been pretty pretty quiet because you know they're deeply embedded in the Iraqi state. They've got no incentive to escalate too much and lose the power and status that they have through the the Iraqi side of things. So Iran is vastly weaker on a military level than it has been in decades. And I think we need to acknowledge that fact, you know, that the war strategically has not gone well in Iran. But that is one achievement. Um they do, however, as you correctly identify, have the capacity to keep striking the Gulf States to keep using their rockets and drones against the UAE and uh and others. But really, this all fundamentally goes back to the fact that Iran is the single greatest sponsor of terrorism in the world. This is a deeply malign and evil regime that slaughters their own people, that is responsible for huge amounts of terrorism, drug running, narcotics, people smuggling, weapon smuggling globally.

[00:18:34]Um, and they do that for religious reasons. Again, look at their esquetology, the the end states, you know, what they think the end of days are going to look like. It it starts with the destruction of Israel, the destruction of America, and the return of the Makti, you know, the hidden the hidden Imm Islam and and and you know, usher in a new a new age. Um, you know, this is what they believe and and they they're not going to stop being malign um and they're not going to stop trying to start wars and and and cause trouble around the world because this is their religious mission. And it all goes back again to that psychology and that religious philosophy they hold. Um in terms of alliances, I think you're absolutely right. You know, the Sunni alliance is very very clear. Um the Israeli and UAE alliance, again, I think that is more convenience than anything else. The UAE are very keen to position themselves away from Saudi Arabia.

[00:19:27]They've had a very public and clear falling out. And that's why you're seeing the UAE funding things like the RSF in Sudan. Um why they are very much playing both sides. I think, you know, they're suit it suits them to line up with Israel right now because it opposes them to Saudi Arabia, but how enduring that is, I'm not sure. Um, and then yes, of course, you've got the Axis um that focuses on Iran and and their allies in China and Pakistan. Um, so I think the mission really is to try and build some kind of coalition of people who we can do business with there and and try and use that as a a leverage for stability. You know, it comes down to economics. I think if you can find a way to draw in countries like India into this sphere, if you can find a way to to kind of get the global south engaged in the Middle East, um if there's some sort of economic driver that binds people together, that is far more powerful. Um and then you can present a united front against this incredibly malign um uh vicious regime in in Iran, which is the single point of instability in the region.

[00:20:31]>> All right. So there's a lot of points here. So that's I think where we cuz we agree on the first part it's been a strategic disaster for the US on the Iranian front and their access and and the instability in the region. So I'm not a fan of the regime. I was one of the most vocal people against it in January in the crackdown on the protesters and also I'm not a fan of their foreign policy. They could have pursued something. I understand powers expand their influence through proxies.

[00:20:53]It's always been the way of warfare especially since uh since World War II and after the Cold War. Um, but I think Iran has kind of done the same on steroids and and we've seen that across across the region. Um, but I think let's stick to to Israel and Lebanon. Um, I think is Hezbollah is very clear. If if Iran Israel stops bombing Hezbollah, they'll stop attacking. Now, they want the SAM. I think it's very clear I don't want Hezbollah to exist. I was again very vocal about it before the ceasefire, but I think now that ship has sailed, there's no way Iran is going to give up on Hezbollah. And I was talking about the possibility of a deal between the US and Iran when I expected Iran to be a lot weaker than it turned out to be. I expected that deal to include their proxy network as well. So a concession from the US for Iran to give up their proxy network. That ship is sailed. So Hzbollah is going to be there to stay.

[00:21:43]>> And um so I think Israel's strategy of disarming by pressuring the government to disarm them, keep weakening Hezbollah and cutting off Iran's ability to arm them. I think that that possibility is no longer there and Hezbollah will stop striking Israel. Amal said it on their behalf a few days ago. The spokesperson Nabi spokesperson for Hisbala. My concern is on the Israeli front because Netanyahu lost the war in Hamas. You know, Hamas is still there. Very weakened, but the war hasn't ended yet.

[00:22:13]There's been significant casualties. Um so it hasn't achieved a victory he can claim to be a victory in Gaza. in Iran, he can't claim it to be a victory because the war started about regime change, getting rid of their ballistic missile program, getting rid of the proxy network. All these things are still on the table and now we're talking about Iran getting assets and Iran maybe controlling the trade of Homo's possibilities. So, the objectives has gone from completely defanging Iran to hey, let's just not get them get rid of the enriched uranium if we can. Um, the Houthis are still there. They didn't close the Babel Mend straight. Was it because of Saudi pressure, US pressure, or is it more of a card that Iran wanted to leave as part of the escalation ladder? If the US does this, we'll close the Babel Mendip straight and they haven't played that card yet. Impossible to know for sure. Could be both. Ian Bremer says it's a bit of both. Um, but I think the incentive for Israel to keep attacking Lebanon is there for Natanya to be able to achieve some sort of victory and to be able to weaken and to go back to the status quo. not a full-blown war, but the status quo before the Iran war where Israel was striking Hisbala and Hzbala was not responding. Rearming in the south, but not responding. I think Israel wanting that status quo, and there's been multiple reports in Israel, they've said it very openly. Benvier, Mr. Katz, um Netanyahu himself, they all said Lebanon is not part of the ceasefire. It's not because if they wanted the ceasefire in Lebanon, they'd say Hezbollah needs to abide by the ceasefire. Hzbalah saying Israel needs to be to abide by the ceasefire but Israel saying no we don't want the ceasefire to apply for Lebanon.

[00:23:45]So I think in this case it's Israel that would like to the war with Lebanon to continue. Now you can say whether they have whether it's justified or not is a different discussion but my worry is that Israel wanting that war and thinking it should be decoupled from the Iran war could then drag us back into a conflict because Iran is more emboldened after this war and could then retaliate more aggressively towards Israel.

[00:24:09]Yeah, that's an interesting one. I mean, remember that there was a ceasefire in Lebanon on 6th of October um 2023, and it was Hezbollah who opened fire first.

[00:24:18]I think that's an important point to to keep in keep in context.

[00:24:21]>> Yeah.

[00:24:22]>> Um you know, and and Hezbollah has been rebuilding down in the south. I've been there on the ground and I've seen it firsthand. So you can, you know, you can certainly say that Hezbala has shown no no concrete or or or genuine move to to have a ceasefire and they exist to fight Israel. That's why they're there. You know, that's where they come from 1982 onwards. You know, that's their entire rais on detra and then they've since been developed into this Iranian proxy that that's like a sword hanging over the Israelis that the Israelis have been trying to just degrade and degrade. Now, I don't think it's going to work on the Israeli side. I don't think there is that they're trying to find a military solution to a political problem and that is that's just a recipe for a quagmire uh that that drags on indefinitely. But I think you do hit on a good point in terms of um how Iran responds now. It's going to be really interesting. I think how on what on what metric is the Iranian regime going to feel emboldened after this war? I think they'll feel very emboldened on an economic metric.

[00:25:22]they they've now um unlocked Straighter Formulas as a as a key to um you know as a doorway to to to exerting real genuine influence in the region that actually in the past was only ever a threat. You know, it was something that we always worried about. Um, we always knew about and it's criminal that the Americans didn't consider this when when launching this this operation. Like it is a mistake that will be studied in war colleges around the world for a generation that they attacked Iran without putting something in place to keep open. Genuinely mind-b blown, >> you know, but that is now something the Iranian regime will see as a doorway that, you know, gateway that's been opened and something they can use at any point in the future. Um, so that's that's really interesting. They'll feel economically emboldened. Militarily, I don't think they'll feel emboldened particularly. Um, I think the Gulf States will certainly invest heavily. I think they're going to be on speed dial to K about drone defenses, missile defenses. They'll be buying every Patriot they can get their hand on. Um, so we can expect this this kind of quiet period to be used by by everyone around the Gulf to make sure they've got defenses in place against the Iranians.

[00:26:32]um which will make chances of success lower for any any repeat attacks that the Iranian regime decides to launch. So that's that's a really um a metric I don't think they're going to be be feeling quite as strong about. Um on a political metric, I think they'll be delighted they've survived. Um the IRGC still appear to be in full control. Um they've managed to keep their population under control uh you know through through brutal and vicious methods. Um, but they'll see that as a win as well.

[00:27:02]So, there's a bunch of metrics here. So, if you're sat in Thran, uh, and you're looking now at this ceasefire deal, I think everything's going to hinge on the nuclear material they've got. What happens to that? I think it will be they will do that what the Iranian regime always do, and that is drag these negotiations out for as long as possible. If if it's if it's done in 60 days, I'll be incredibly amazed.

[00:27:23]>> No, I won't be.

[00:27:23]>> And I just Yeah. You think you know, you think it'll be done in 60 days?

[00:27:29]>> No. Oh, no way. No way.

[00:27:30]>> Oh, no. Yeah, you're with me. Okay, cool.

[00:27:32]>> Yeah, it won't be. It won't be like JCPOA took what, 18 months, I think.

[00:27:35]Year and a half.

[00:27:36]>> Yeah. If not longer back room stuff that was going on. Yeah.

[00:27:40]>> Um, but you know, where does Iran escalate in future now? Going on going forward. I think the proxies obviously make sense.

[00:27:48]You know, that is something they will try and um rearm. Um, that's going to be harder to do with Syria where it is at the moment. that corridor, that hinge through to Lebanon is is is far more restricted than it's ever been in the past. Um I suspect Israel will will continue to take aggressive action if um if they see signs of proxy rearming. Um again, that's that's a potential for escalation as well. Um and so yeah, I think these these levers are going to be are going to be um slightly differently graded than they were before the war. Um I think >> you know but I think that the Iranians have now worked out which ones they can pull and get away with and which ones they can't.

[00:28:31]>> Um and they will lean lean heavily. And if we look just break it down. Think military, economic, diplomatic. You know let's look at the three levers of statecraftraft. These are well known.

[00:28:40]You know diplomatic they're going to try and drag out the negotiations as long as possible. Economic they know they have the lever to pull in Hummers. Military they know that's the bit they need to start working on and rebuilding. And so you can see those lines of operation and how it's going to go forward from this point.

[00:29:00]>> Yeah. Look, I um I think Iran is obviously weaker on a military level, but I think the strategic wins they had controlling the straight of Homo, striking the Gulf and also proving I think the biggest win is proving they could sustain the bombardment from the US and Israel and be able to maintain 50 70 80 90% depending who you want to believe of their missile capabilities intact or operable. I think that's their biggest win because what that will do is that would that would um um incentivize China to rearm them further to make them into not a proxy but just a bigger ally um instead of standing back like what happened with Venezuela similar to Ukraine and the West. The West saw Ukraine do such a good job against Russia that in fall within six days and now they've rearmed the hell out of them. Now I think that I think and worry this is the same thing that will happen in Iran. Um that's what I think will embolden Iran is like it could rebuild those missile and drone capabilities relatively quickly. They've already had man pads and air defense systems shipped during the ceasefire. Um so I think the um militarily not being emboldened that's temporary but I think they will be very very soon because they've also took away the biggest card that Israel had. Israel had the biggest card they had is hey if you get into a direct war with us uh big brother would join and that's a hell of a deterrent.

[00:30:16]Well, now big brother's not going to join because they got a blue eye and they'll never want to get into this quagmire again. And Iran knows that. Um, so this is the the the issues that that's why Iran could now and a lot of it depends on Mushtaba's mindset and it doesn't seem to be different from his father. He already talked yesterday, not him. IRGC commander said yesterday the region will not see peace until the Zionist entities eliminated. Mushaba said similar statements before. So their mindset, even though I think they're more pragmatic than what you said, the esquetology of it, etc., which is true, but I think the war has shown more pragmatism than I expected, but definitely not the pragmatism you see from the Gulf. Um, talking about the wiping out Israel is not it's not a path to peace. I I made a post a few days ago. I said, "Look, the only way regional peace could be achieved is for Israel to recognize Palestine and Iran to recognize Israel, which both I don't think will happen." Um, >> so that's what that's why I'm really worried. If you get Iran rearmed heavily, the US knowing they won't touch Iran, Iran knowing the US won't touch them, Israel still facing the Hezbollah threat, but Iran deterring Israel from striking Hezbollah and rearming. And then you've got the the Gulf countries trying to figure out what to do with this new new regional world order.

[00:31:27]Turkey might want to expand their influence. Pakistan is could get more involved and they've been very close to Iran. You've just got all that hands in the pot and you've got a massive shift now. The US could be pulling out there from the region. has been talked about for a long time. This deal may include speeding up the process and it's going to lead that period of change is going to lead to a lot of instability and the new world order. Who will have more influence than who? That's where my pessimism comes. I get criticized a lot by my audience for being the optimistic person. Even before the ceasefire when Trump was talking about wiping out a civilization, I'm like, "Guys, this is great news. That's probably him looking to offramp because he's not going to suddenly go insane and become genocidal." Um I've been optimistic on that front short term but long term it's um there's like two paths one where the having various polls of power will lead to Iran being more careful because they don't want war with Israel and the Sunni axis. The Sunni axis will be more more will be careful because they never wanted war. The Gulf country's always been >> for peace. And then Israel, I'm very critical of Israeli foreign policy, but I think they've got a bigger deterrent now with Iran >> being more willing to step in maybe in Syria, but more importantly in Lebanon and Turkey maybe step in when it comes to Syria and that might deter the hawks within the Israeli government. So if you put all these things together, that's the optimistic path that that will lead to peace. The pessimistic path is all of them would want um would want influence.

[00:32:52]By the way, just for a quick update, there hasn't been any update since our what we said at the beginning of the show regarding the back and forth between Trump and Iran. Nothing since that uh post that announcement by the Alazer journalist. So, just for the audience to know there's no no progress and I don't expect any progress really much today to be honest on the um on the peace deal front after that to tweet that post by Trump. But um would love to get your thoughts on this. It's kind of same question but kind of trying to figure out of um how the region would look like.

[00:33:22]Well, I think a lot's going to depend on the Israeli elections. I mean, don't forget they're coming later this year.

[00:33:27]Um, and there's every chance that Netanyahu, Smatri, Benir, and the rest might be might be on the outside of government, which I think gives a window. Um, certainly where Israel can reset, and I think that's badly needed both by Israelis and by by everyone they're fighting right now, is because they're the IDF is exhausted.

[00:33:49]They're drained. You know, you've got reserveists who've done hundreds of days of of duty. Um, you've got uh businesses that are suffering. You've got families that are suffering from having their husbands and wives away constantly, you know, and the sheer expenditure of that conflict is is costing a fortune, too.

[00:34:06]And if if there's any scope for a kind of at least just a breathing pause, that's no bad thing whatsoever. Um and and I think you're right. There are instances certainly with this particular cabinet where they dragged on the war in Gaza for way longer than they needed to um for political reasons. And I've spoken to Yo Gallant, the former defense minister who said in his many words that Netanyahari was torpedoing peace deals and hostage exchanges in order to keep Beng happy. So you know that that's from the inside of the Israeli government.

[00:34:34]Um, but look, I I think the key point here is that if if if nobody attacks Israel, they won't attack back, you know. And yes, their response, I think, has been in some cases uh badly judged and they've they've committed themselves to campaigns that that frankly they can't win. Um, you know, in terms of achieving their strategic goals because they, you know, they don't have the ability, for example, in Lebanon to solve the Hzbala problem militarily.

[00:35:02]Like, you can't just kill them all. that doesn't work. You know, there needs to be some kind of external factor here.

[00:35:08]And I think the international community, I think, has a role to play here, particularly in Lebanon, >> uh, in terms of supporting the Lebanese state, in terms of supporting the Lebanese armed forces to the point where they can actually take the fight to to Hisbala because this is a Lebanese problem ultimately and it needs a Lebanese solution, not an Israeli solution.

[00:35:26]>> I've got a piece of I've got a piece of news for you, Andrew, just quickly mention it to you. Just came out. Um, the UAE, so we know we're talking about did the UAE strike Iran and there's all that talk. Um, the UAE carried out dozens of air strikes against Iran during the war, including the including strikes after the ceasefire announcement in a deeper role than previously known alongside the US and Israel. According to the Wall Street Journal, the strikes were coordinated with US and Israeli intelligence support and targeted sites including Kashm Island, Abu Musa, Band Rabbas, energy facilities on Lavan Island and the Asalu petrochemical complex. Some attacks targeted Iranian energy infrastructure in retaliation for Iranian strikes on Amirati oil and gas facilities. The strike on the Alusha petrochemical complex carried out with Israel triggered international criticism and reportedly prompted Washington to ask Israel to stop targeting Iranian energy sites. The So apparently the Gulf the UAE was part of it. Jesus. The operations also exposed divisions among Gulf states. Saudi urged the US to pressure the UAE to help the attacks warning they risked wider retaliation against regional energy infrastructure and global markets. UAE president became frustrated with Saudi Saudi's crown prince refusing to join coordinated military action against Iran.

[00:36:40]Now we understand why assuming this report is true. We understand why the uh the Iranians were just were so adamant at targeting UAE. Um striking the UAE during operation project freedom. Um Iranian national TV shooting at the UAE flag. I was always surprised about this.

[00:37:02]Um when I speak to people in the Emirates in the UAE that we had to retaliate to deter Iranian aggression and when I speak to people from Iran they're like the reason there's aggression is because of Emirati the Emirates getting close to Israel the Emirates encouraging the war and participating in the war. So I don't know how it's going to look like how the Emirates was close to Iran. This is very surprising to me. I don't know how that's going to how those two countries are going to find peace long term.

[00:37:26]That's surprised to me. Well >> yeah. Um, just to check, you're breaking up to me. Am I breaking up to you?

[00:37:33]>> Yeah, I think I'm back. Yeah, you know, I'm back. My team told me it's my internet's bad. Can you hear me now?

[00:37:37]Okay.

[00:37:38]>> Okay. Yeah, I can hear you fine.

[00:37:39]>> I'm in the I'm in the UAE. I'm in the UAE, so maybe they just cut the cables.

[00:37:42]Everyone cut the cables in the straight of wood for all I know. But what else?

[00:37:45]It says, "I just read a report that the Emirates attacked the UAE dozens of times, including the prochemical um infrastructure, the petrochemical complex that was blamed on Israel and the US apparently told Israel to stop attacking targeting loc sites like this, energy sites in Iran." Turns out according to the Wall Street Journal, the UAE was part of it. And the last thing I was saying is when I talked to the Emirates, they're like, you know, we had to retaliate to act attacks on us.

[00:38:09]And when I speak to because they were close to Iran before, they did a lot of business. Iran avoided sanctions through the UAE. When I speak to people in Iran, they're like, "The reason we're targeting the UAE is because the Emirates encouraged the war. They're very hawkish towards us. They participated in the war and they uh they got closer and closer to Israel. So, I don't know how these two countries are going to mend relations for the sake of the whole region.

[00:38:32]>> Yeah. Well, the UAE seems to be heading towards slight outlier status anyway.

[00:38:36]You know, this this catastrophic falling out with the Saudis, it's going to be very very hard to come back from that, I suspect. Um, look, it's I I suspect some dust will settle on this one. Like Iran has no real incentive to keep striking the UAE if the UAE aren't replying. Um, you know, as part of a wider ceasefire deal, I think this is actually one of the easier problems to solve. Like Iran has no kind of philosophical disagreement with the UAE at a fundamental level. They might not like some of their foreign policy choices, but but you know, there's there's no real kind of eternal enmity between the Emiratis and the Iranians.

[00:39:16]So, this feels to me like one that a bit of oil poured on those waters, if you'll excuse the terrible pun, um will will go a very long way when it comes to fixing fixing if if not fixing the relationship, at least creating a position where there can be a degree of stability between the two the two countries. But it's going to be far far harder by contrast for Israel and Iran to to come back to a status of you know managed I wouldn't say peace you know managed deescalation that's going to be far more difficult.

[00:39:48]>> Agree. Um I've enjoyed that conversation. Um that UAE news is uh is going to shake up the region. That really surprised me.

[00:39:58]Really really surprised me. I remember when I first someone told me, Mario, the Iranians are claiming the UAE just struck them after the ceasefire. I'm like, there's no way that's true. And then I had someone check with someone else here in the UAE. And they had a no comment response. I'm like, no way. No freaking way. That obviously doesn't mean they're saying yes. They're not confirming it, but the fact they said no comment type approach, >> um, it was a really big shock to me. Um, I just think the UAE needs they need to create deterrence. That's important. and I've I've defended their alliance with Israel to improve their air defense system. I said, "Look, it's a pragmatic decision, but I would not I don't advocate for them attacking Iran. I think it's a bad idea and I think they should improve even though they were attacked. I just think strategically it doesn't make sense and they need to improve relations with Iran and I think they will. under the Gulf, even Saudi and UAE after this war. I'd be surprised if they don't all, you know, for the sake of their, you know, their own defensive interests, they um, you know, get closer again and stabil and stability and profits. These are all powerful powerful motivators.

[00:41:06]>> Um, Andrew, pleasure to have you on the show. I'd love to have you again whenever you have time. It's been a pleasure to speak to you. Thank you.

[00:41:12]>> Thanks so much. Really enjoyed it.

[00:41:14]>> Thank you, Andrew. Um, all right, guys.

[00:41:16]Um, Nothing else coming in. That that UAE news really surprised me. Um I'm gonna we're going to be going live again in uh three minutes with Randy Manor who's a regular on the show to continue discussing this and how a world would look like. Thanks guys. Thank you so much. Bye.