Why Does Russia Keep Bombing Civilians?

Added: 2026-05-28

[00:00:00]I don't know about you, but I am old enough to remember all the way back to May 9th and the ceasefire that allowed Russia to hold its annual Victory Day parade and all of the discussion thereafter about how there might be a longlasting air truce between the waring parties. Yeah, that did not last. One of the largest air strikes on Kev occurred on May 24th, including the use of an archnic missile in the region. Archnik, of course, is the one that Russia loves reminding the world is capable of housing a nuclear weapon, even though that is meaningless unless it actually has a nuclear weapon on it when it is fired. Point is, Kev is regularly the target of bombs, which raises the question of why that is the case. And while it is tempting to have a knee-jerk response of, of course, Russia is hitting the Ukrainian capital. This is a war. The full answer is more complicated. That takes us to the question for today's edition of the geopolitics helpline. I understand how Ukraine bombing Russia's oil infrastructure shifts the balance of power in Ukraine's favor, but I struggle to see the upshot for Russia by means of bombing apartment blocks in Kev. The reallocation of resources to account for the damage inflicted seemed too low to be of strategic value, and I imagine it will strengthen the rally around the flag effect for Ukraine rather than weaken it. Well, it is true that strategic bombing campaigns have a reputation for being ineffective.

[00:01:31]Look no further than Iran for some contemporary evidence and that skepticism goes double for a strategic bombing campaign that targets a city.

[00:01:41]However, many of those negative claims are about countries exclusively using bombing campaigns. Russia, on the other hand, is doing much more than just bombing, which means that we should take it seriously. And indeed, there are a few reasons why Russia might want to try a strategy like this given the current situation. To sap morale, to undermine the targets economy, to force the redistribution of defenses, and in a more recent turn of events, to damage the country's defense base. Let's start with the rally round the flag effect part because that is simple enough. The first time that a foreign adversary starts striking civilian targets, if the population has any faith in their government, then yeah, you would expect a significant rally. After the 10th time, it might start to get on their nerves. After the hundth time, you are liable to have a significant portion of citizens wanting to just have their normal lives back. Whether citizen morale breaks like this or not is critical for the country to maintain its political cohesion and thus its coercive bargaining capacity. I can at least give you a personal anecdote of what this looks like in Ukraine's case. Last year, my self-respecting academic alter ego gave a talk at the Kev School of Economics. Up until the end, it was a fairly normal talk other than the fact that it was digital. It takes a long time to physically get to Kev between flying to Poland and then having to take a train across the border and into the city. I discussed the basics of crisis bargaining theory, explained its practical relevance to the ongoing war at hand. Can't imagine why they'd be interested in that, and then I transitioned into some Q&A. About 15 minutes later, someone asked a question as usual, but then the proctor jumped in and said, "William, this will be the last question. We just received an alert on our phones that there will be some incoming missiles. We will soon need to head underground.

[00:03:39]That was the first time that one of my talks has ended in this fashion and Lords of Cobalt willing, the last of my talks that will end in that way.

[00:03:47]Nonetheless, as I answered the question, what struck me was how indifferent everyone was to the whole situation. For me, this was utterly bizarre. And had I been there in person, I probably would have been sprinting for the staircases.

[00:04:02]But for them, it was a Tuesday. The point is that Ukrainians have been socialized to the hardships of civilian life while your country is engaged in a full-scale war. I cannot speak for how things have changed over the last year, but I can say that the Kev School of Economics was hit for the first time in those May 24th strikes.

[00:04:23]Second, there is an economic component to the decision. As Russia is now learning with its refineries continuously offline, you need money to fund your war effort. Wealth does not come from the front lines or the countryides. It comes from the population centers. Well, if you bomb your opponent's population centers, you might destroy some of the infrastructure that drives economic growth. You might also scare all of the human capital into the countryside, which is a win in its own right. I should note that this is not an effective strategy in the current case. Yes, the invasion smashed Ukraine's economy as one might expect given that the vast majority of the war has taken place on its soil, but Keev has plenty of funding from the European Union to keep things afloat. The war would be an economic calamity if Ukraine was on its own, but it is not, and so that hypothetical is irrelevant. I want to further note that Europe's financial assistance to Ukraine is public information. So do not think that Russia is bombing Keev in the hopes of making Ukraine go bankrupt. Instead, ask yourself the harder question of why Russia continues to pursue the strategy despite knowing that.

[00:05:33]Third is the reallocation of defensive resources to population centers. If Ukraine only protects battlefield targets, then the cities become easy targets. So, Russia launches missiles and drones at cities, forcing Ukraine to peel back some of its forces to protect civilians. And the strategy has 100% worked. Think about all of the drama that has surrounded Ukraine's procurement and use of Patriot interceptors.

[00:05:59]Now, this point raises a broader strategic answer to the original question. I frequently discuss the default defensive posture that states should take where defensive forces should be assigned in a way that makes everything equally vulnerable. The reason is because if you overdefend the most vulnerable targets, something else becomes the most vulnerable target.

[00:06:20]Russia exerts all of its effort targeting that and you wasted a portion of your defensive assets protecting something that did not get hit. In turn, the cheeky answer to the question is that Russia targets cities because Ukraine's defensive posture makes them as good of a target as any. The less cheeky point is that the rest of my comments today shape what the vulnerability of a given target looks like, which then determines the orientation of the defensive posture.

[00:06:47]Finally, part of the answer is to disrupt Ukraine's defense production.

[00:06:51]This would be an utterly bizarre sentence to utter only 5 years ago, as defense production was normally based far away from cities. This was in part because you did not want your cities to become collateral damage and in part because weapons factories used to universally have gigantic footprints and so cheap real estate was part of the business model. Then came the drone revolution and the ability to produce meaningful material within a basement.

[00:07:17]Now it is really hard to tell whether the Kremlin is actually intending to strike any such facilities when Russian bombs come raining down into cities.

[00:07:25]Clearly, that is not the only thing that the Kremlin is intending to do. It is just hard to assign any percentage to what is the intent. That goes double given how inaccurate Russian weapons are, which might make it impossible to actually strike the small target that the Kremlin might intend to hit. And that raises the broader point about the sensibility of trying to hit a city to destroy Ukraine's defense industrial base when there are still better targets out there. Regardless, I think that this is worth flagging as a side effect of the recent shift in war technologies.

[00:07:56]Things will not revert back to the way they used to be anytime soon. And so this might become important later, even if it is not now. So looking back at the original question, I think that the viewer's understanding of the first principles of city targeting is accurate. But there is a layer of strategic complexity added when Ukraine internalizes those first principles and plans its defenses accordingly.

[00:08:20]Everything tends to become a wash, which makes it hard for us to observe whether the strategy is more effective than the alternative.

[00:08:27]Meanwhile, I have two alternatives for you. This pair of excellent books about the origins of the war. Check the video description for more information about them. And if you enjoyed today's video, then please like, share, and subscribe.

[00:08:41]And I will see you next time. Take care.