SOMETHING BIG IS HAPPENING BETWEEN THE USA & CHINA | w/ Ali Wyne

本站添加: 2026-06-02

[00:00:00]Um yeah, it's good to be good to be here. Uh I think let's get started. You know, um quite a lot to talk about here and um well, I don't even know really where to begin, right? We've had the ongoing situation with the uh with the Iranian talks and we've also got the situation with Russia and Ukraine. But of course now uh the US and China have had a recent uh big summit and that was one of the biggest things I think in terms of how it affects everything else.

[00:00:35]So the purpose of this conversation that I want wanted to have for the next you know 30 35 minutes with you was just to understand really how it all uh filters into that complex and overarching strategic competition between the two.

[00:00:49]Um those of us watching we are joined today by Ali Wayne who is one of the earliest guests we have ever actually had on the Global Gambit about goodness two three years ago. I think you made a couple of appearances Alli. Um, and you're now the senior research and advocacy adviser for US China relations at the International Crisis Group somewhere that I also worked. I should be transparent about that, I guess. But, um, I guess the first thing I'm kind of curious for your thoughts on Alli is simply what was your takeaways? How did you evaluate the uh, visit of Trump to Beijing uh, a couple of weeks ago?

[00:01:27]So I think the best way to answer the question is to compare and contrast sort of the optics and the substance of this summit with the optics and the sub of the summit when President Trump made his first official state visit to China in November of 2017. So almost a decade ago. And in November of 2017, I think that most observers around the world would say would have said at the time China is a rapidly resurgent emerging power. But very few if any observers would have said at the time that China was a geopolitical equal or a near peer to the United States. And the Chinese delegation in November of 2017 expended a lot of effort trying to impress upon President Trump that President Xi was a near peer was his equal on the world stage and that China had confidently and capably arrived as America's foremost challenger. What was striking this time around was that the Chinese delegation didn't need to expand that effort because it was the United States of its own valition that acknowledged in the run-up to the summit, it was the United States that acknowledged China's newfound centrality within the international system. If you go back to the meeting that President Trump and President Xi had this past October in Busousan, South Korea, it was President Trump who said before he met with President Xi, the G2 is set to convene shortly. Now, the G2 for for folks who might not in your audience who might not know, the G2 is an idea that's big as big Rinski, Jimmy Carter's national security advisor popularized in the Financial Times in early 2009. He essentially was proposing that the United States and you know, China that they should informally, regularly coordinate to uphold the international system. And the idea was immediately swatted down in both Washington and Beijing. Washington swatted it down because it didn't want to suggest that Beijing was a nearper. It's really remarkable that an American commander-in-chief is favorably invoking the idea. So, number one, the Chinese delegation didn't have to expend effort to to demonstrate its centrality. An American commander-in-chief is favorably invoking, you know, the construct of a G2. And so what we really see here is I think a meeting of nearpeers in terms of the two leaders, a meeting of near peers in terms of the two countries. And then the last point I would make is I found it very striking that the Chinese delegation proposed a construct that now it's kind of the the phrase dujour. It's sort of the buzz phrase proposing a relationship of constructive strategic stability. And the White House not only didn't push back, the White House, I think, has actually been saying in recent days and weeks, the White House more or less agrees with that construct.

[00:03:52]Why? Some of President Trump's closest advisers may well believe that China has sprung a rhetorical and policy trap. But at at its core, I think that the construct of constructive constructive strategic stability more or less aligns with President Trump's own thinking about the relationship. I'll just make one last point. I promise there's a lot of thoughts that I wanted to get through. The last point that I would make and here I think it's it's a very important one. The term the Trump administration is something of a misnomer. It implies a degree of consonance between the way that the president thinks about China policy and the way that many of his senior advisers do. President Trump in Washington, which is where I'm I'm sitting right now. I think that it would be an understatement to say that he's an iconic class. He's a person of one. There is no other policy maker, there is no other lawmaker in Washington who talks about President Xi the way that he does, who talks about the USChina relationship the way that he does. President Trump believes that via establishing a strong working rapport with President Xi that he can fundamentally transform a competitive relationship into a cooperative one. So he really is a person of one in Washington.

[00:04:52]Yeah, there's a there's certainly a lot there um to to consider, Ali. And I I remember very much in our early conversations, you'd brain dump so much information early [laughter] on, not in a nasty sense, but in a in a in a in a incredible sense and just how much you have in your um you know, in your in your in your mind. So, one of the things I'm interested to understand more is we'll come to Taiwan later. I think that's probably the main uh crux of the conversation or where I'd like to steer it. But initially, I'm interested in >> Sure. what you think about uh Trump's overall approach to to Xiinping and and I'll um I'll expand on it simply by um explaining Trump seems to have I said this on a on a subset live yesterday which we're also streaming to everyone but um was simply Trump has a ideation for a huge admiration and ideulation for strong men and you know this debate over whether Xiinping is a is a sort of represents a a typical strongman in the same way Putin or Erdogan or Bolsinaro might um but clearly he has a certain appreciation for Xi Jinping in a way that it's just not reciprocated by shei um and you know I'm just kind of curious how you look at the personal relationship between these two men versus say Putin and she's because obviously Putin turned up in Beijing just a couple of days after Trump.

[00:06:18]>> So I think that the premise of your question is very important. He said he said talk about his personal approach.

[00:06:24]President Trump's approach to diplomacy to foreign policy. It is a highly personalistic one. Uh President Trump believes that he can compartmentalize structural tensions that might exist between the United States in a given country and his leader level dynamic with his counterpart. And I think that nowhere is that chasm more apparent than in the case of the USChina relationship.

[00:06:43]If you look at the if you look at just the structural tensions underpinning the US China relationship and it's it's notable that President Xi in in his meetings with President Trump, he invoked the notion of the Thusidity trap. The Thusidity trap is this idea popularized by uh my former boss at one time and and really distinguished political scientist Graham Allison referring to the structural tensions that inherit between an incumbent power and a rising or resurgent power. And President Xi said that we have to avoid the thusidities trap that historically has on far too many occasions has culminated in war. Uh but President Trump again he compartmentalizes structural tensions which are mounting between the United States and China across the full range of domains and his leader level dynamic with President Xi which he thinks is strong and which he believes will be the decisive dynamic in shaping US China relations for the remainder of his presidency. So I would make two points.

[00:07:35]One is as you mentioned you said that he you know he sort of has an admiration for for President Xi. President Xi is arguably the only leader whom President Trump considers a near peer when they when the two of them sit across. And I think that it was quite striking that when they met in in Beijing, President Trump was almost at pains to impress President Xi. So he >> so in his opening meeting he said you know President Xi I've brought with me uh in my delegation some of the world's most influential profitable CEOs and they are here to pay respect to you and pay respect to China. When President Xi invoked the notion of the Thusidity strap I think that President Trump I think he misinterpreted what President Xi was saying but he sort of took umbrage and he inferred from that remark that President Xi was casting America as a declining power. So, President Trump takes the truth social and he said, "President Xi very eloquent, you know, he gave this very eloquent disquisition and indeed America was in decline under my predecessor Joe Biden, but President Xi understands it under my watch.

[00:08:35]America is the hottest country on earth." So, he really was at pains to to to impress President Xi. Uh and what's striking is when you look at the flattery that he lavished upon uh President Xi, it's the kind of flattery that President Trump typically is receiving and it's the kind of flattery that he typically expects from other world leaders who are looking to curry favor with him. But this time the roles were reversed. Um the other point that I would make in terms of how the president thinks about the USA relationship and it's very much related to his I think personalistic approach to diplomacy.

[00:09:05]Most other folks in Washington, I would say actually virtually virtually all folks in Washington outside of of President Trump, Republican, Democrat, independent, they take a very expansive view of strategic competition. It's multifaceted. It's essentially it's a new cold war, a new twilight struggle.

[00:09:21]The president, by contrast, I think he takes a very narrow view of strategic competition. He has had for a long time two grievances against China. One, the size of its trade surplus, and two, its export of fentinel precursors. But if you look at other issues that have long dogged the relationship, Taiwan, which I know we'll get to in a little bit, alliances and partnerships in Asia, China's human rights abuses, those is those those issues don't really animate him. And so he takes a very narrow view of strategic competition. So if you look at his admiration for President Xi, his narrow approach to strategic competition, those two fundamental views of his, they really do make him an iconic class in Washington.

[00:10:00]>> Yeah. I mean, I remember from the first time we met, I think we had a coffee on Connecticut Avenue in one of those um coffee shops that they opened uh in sort of at the tail end of his um uh first presidency. And yeah, he he has a stark contrast in terms of how he goes about foreign policy. But just on this, one of the things that I'm quite curious is is how you see his uh approach to ch um Iran and the relevance of China there.

[00:10:29]So right now we have an effective standoff between the Iranians and Americans over thisou. A reminder for everyone watching that anou is not a comprehensive peace deal. It's just a well it's not even legally binding. It's just a sort of we agree on this. Okay but we're not going to do anything. Just we agree but nothing's going to change but we agree. Oh okay that's great. Um but other than that there's not much else going on. But one thing I think is pretty clear is that this war has had China much more involved than they would have been. I don't know if you would agree with this, but from my perspective, the Chinese have been, I think, a lot more involved in uh helping the Pakistanis, right? The Pakistanis are not known, I think, for being the most effective mediators in history.

[00:11:11]Nothing, no offense to Karachi, but I don't think they have the most comprehensive track record. So, there's clearly another element to this. And I think, you know, given the unique relationship of Pakistan to China, I think the Chinese are, I don't know, elevating the Pakistanis reach, influence, capabilities. I'm not sure how you'd frame it, but what's your assessment there? Do you think there's any truth to that or is it overblown?

[00:11:32]>> Well, sure. So, the Iran So, I think that the the ongoing war between the United States and Iran has sort of further bolstered I think unexpectedly, but it's further bolstered Pakistan's role as as an intermediary. And as you said, I think that China, you know, I think China sort of took a wait and see approach. Once Pakistan looked like it was gaining momentum in establishing itself as an intermediary between the United States and Iran. Once Pakistan put forward a sort of a ceasefire proposal, then I think that China came in on the back end and prevailed upon Iran to accept sort of Pakistan ceasefire proposal which which I I think to to Pakistan's credit to China's credit resulted in it's now I think a ceasefire that's a ceasefire only in name. It doesn't really exist practically, but at least the ceasefire that went into effect on April 8th, it did it prevented what could have been and what what I think many observers were anticipating would have been a very catastrophic escalation in the conflict between the United States and Iran. The other point that I would make is and and here I I've just been I've been puzzling puzzling over this question and I imagine that many others have been as well. uh the war that President Trump has undertaken against Iran, it is precisely the kind of misguided war of choice, a foolish war of choice that he long campaigned against. When Republicans undertook that kind of war, when Democrats undertook that kind of war, if you look at President Trump's, you know, tweets and his truth social posts over over decades now, President Trump has said, "We need to extricate ourselves in the Middle East. We need to stop pursuing misbegotten foolish wars of choice in the Middle East." And now he finds himself having initiated one.

[00:12:59]Number one. Number two, when you look at some of the senior adviserss whom he appointed to a second administration, some of them belong to the so-called Asia first school of foreign policy.

[00:13:08]Europe, you need to deal with Russia, the Middle East, graveyard of empires, we need to extricate ourselves and we really need to focus on Asia. So, it's doubly ironic given President Trump's own proclivities and given the proclivities of some of his senior adviserss that we are pursuing a foreign policy that in many ways seems to run wholly counter to his own instincts. And I do think that while the war between the United States and Iran, I don't want to I don't want to say that it has been an unalloyed strategic benefit for China. It certainly has presented headaches for China. The longer the straight of Hormuz is closed, the more China's energy resilience is strained.

[00:13:40]The longer the war goes on, the more that China's relationships with the Gulf countries become strained because those Gulf countries are asking China, why haven't you done more to prevail upon Iran to stop attacking our military assets? And yet on balance, and I want to underscore on balance, I do think that the war has redounded to China's strategic benefit. First, it has further set back the long-standing US aspiration of pivoting or rebalancing to Asia.

[00:14:01]Number one. Number two, I think that China has been trying to cast itself as sort of a steadying counterweight to an erratic incumbent. And I think that the US war in Iran has further entrenched that contrast between a seemingly unstable incumbent and a steadying sort of aspiring counterweight in China. And I think also there are two other ways in which the war at least two other ways in which the war has redounded to China's strategic benefit. One one is that if you look at one of the critical ingredients actually the critical ingredient that goes into missile interceptors America's stockpile of missile interceptors in the Middle East has been severely depleted because of the skirmishes the war between the United States and Iran. Gallium is a critical ingredient the critical ingredient that goes into those missile interceptors. Which country produces well over 90% of the world supply of that critical ingredient? it's China.

[00:14:49]So, ironically, the war on Iran has introduced a further US dependency on China. And then the last way that I'll I'll enumerate uh I think that there is going this war will end. All wars eventually end. And the United States and China are already vying to shape the post the post Iran war energy order, the global energy order. I think that many countries around the world including crucially a number of close US allies and partners they now look at Middle East fossil fuels as an imable insecurity and they're saying to themselves how can we accelerate our clean energy transitions?

[00:15:23]Well, the only way that you can realistically accelerate your clean energy transition is by sourcing more green inputs from the world's renewable leader energy leader which is China. So for for many reasons and I'm sure that I could think we could both think of some more. I think that on balance the war on Iran, it redowns to China's strategic benefit. And I suspect that what China will do is if and when it seems that sort of the United States and Iran are perhaps converging closer to, you know, some kind ofou some kind of durable ceasefire sort of part two, China will sort of swoop in at the end express support to cast itself as a responsible diplomatic broker.

[00:16:03]the Chinese are benefiting from this.

[00:16:06]Well, it's not it's not just a case of they're winning and America's losing, is it? It's never that binary, but they they still have their own considerations. There's there's a time horizon on how much supply that they have in energy. Um I mean, China doesn't benefit from global disruption to the economy. Um but one thing I am curious for your take on is that some people who uh comment on things that frankly they have no idea what they're talking about.

[00:16:29]Um have proposed the idea that the United this war with Iran is all about some grand strategic plan by the Trump administration to you know whittle down China's assets and ultimately weaken China in some grand ultimate finale. You know that by taking out Venezuela by taking out Iran then they'll weaken Russia somehow even though Trump loves Putin. Um, so can we put this notion to bed, please? And can you explain why it's complete nonsense?

[00:16:54]>> Yeah. Well, I'm Thank you. Thank you for teing me up. I I was hoping that you would I was hoping that you would ask that question. So, two rebuttals. Um, the second is more important than the first, but let me begin with the first.

[00:17:05]So, the first rebuttal is it's very important to distinguish tactical maneuvers with coherent strategy. If you look at if you look at the strikes if you look at US military action against alleged drug vessels in the Caribbean, the ouster of Maduro, the strikes uh Trump strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, you know, last year. Trump likes to act quickly, decisively when he thinks that the target will have little if any option of pushing back so that he can so that he can say to the American public, look, I have unshackled American power. I've America is now operating unilaterally unconstrained by international law, unconstrained by allied considerations and look at how quickly and decisively I Donald Trump, President Trump can reconfigure the international order. Um, and I think but but I don't think you know China I would put in a very different category.

[00:17:57]President Trump and it's interesting actually President Trump despite his pretention to omnipotence you know he gave an interview to the New York Times a few months ago. I think it was at the beginning of the year and there was a very interesting question. I think it was David Sanger who asked him the question, President Trump, do you brookke any do you brookke any constraints on your power on the world stage? And President Trump said, "My own mind, my own morality, that's the only thing that can stop me." So he really does believe that he exercises something approaching omnipotence in international affairs. And yet, it's ironic given who he is and given his pretentional omnipotence that due to his foreign policy missteps, he's actually stumbled into a more realistic appreciation of China's centrality within the international system, its ability to absorb American pressure, its ability to counter American pressure. I don't think that President Trump believes that he can do to China. He knows that he can't do to China what he's done to say Venezuela or what he's contemplating doing in Cuba. So, I would distinguish.

[00:18:50]So the first rebuttal, we have to distinguish between uh to to quote or to to borrow a word from the name of your program, tactical gambits and considered strategy. And I don't think that there's any evidence I don't think that there's any evidence that he looks at China the same way. The second rebuttal is that this notion that he is buying time by sort of taking out China's partners or neutralizing China's partners on the world stage that he's buying himself time to pursue a a grand strategy of containment against China is it ascribes to him an objective that he plainly doesn't have. It ascribes to him an objective that in fact he is very explicitly rejected. President Trump in his first term, and I want to emphasize here that the the notion of a Trump administration is a misnomer because even in his first administration, he he allowed some of his senior adviserss to pursue more confrontational policies toward China even though he himself didn't subscribe to those policies. It's it's much clearer now given that he's much more politically powerful and much more prescriptively power. His own views on China policy are much planer to discern and much harder to oppose. He's made it very clear that he doesn't sort of harbor any containment objective and in fact he wants to pursue a dant uh not only in in the trade realm he wants to pursue a broader day. If you look at the speech that secretary heath gave at the Shangerla dialogue just very recently Secretary Hegsth it's clear that he has gotten sort of his marching order from up high that you need to speak in more consiliatory language towards China. I think that the pres I think that the president he wants to negotiate with President Xi on those two narrow issues that I mentioned uh the size of China's trade surplus China's export of fentinel precursors but there's no evidence at all to suggest that the president is trying to buy time for sort of sort of a longer term patient containment campaign. So, one, we have to separate tactics and strategy, and two, um, we shouldn't ascribe to the president an objective that he's made very clear through his rhetoric and actions that he doesn't harbor.

[00:20:48]>> No, absolutely. So, okay. Okay. So, you mentioned the G2 at the beginning, and this is something I made a recent video about because I think the idea of a G2 world is I don't know. I sometimes wonder whether it's sort of academics trying to sort of recycle terminology or sort of repackage things that have kind of already been established before. The idea of a G2 world kind of echoes what a Cold War is, right? I mean, I know it's different context, but it's two overarching powers that perhaps aren't quite as at competition with one another, but they aren't in great lock step either. So, it's sort of like, okay, they're going to globally administer the international community and system. Okay, but it's sort of how's that any different to a bipolar world? But theories aside, all of this, of course, is I think reflected most evidently in Taiwan. Trump's comments in the few days after the summit were quite um wow. I mean just sort of he acknowledged China's view of Taiwan the relationship of uh you know um the unification the gradual sort of gradualization of it and um one party two systems sort of one nation two systems right so I just take me through your your reactions to the broader comments by Trump is this him literally doing his own form of strategic ambiguity which completely conflicts with the actual policy of strategic ambiguity because I don't think the two are aligned Right.

[00:22:16]Trump's uh Trump's lack of clarity over his view of Taiwan and China's relationship is not the same as the official policy position of the United States government.

[00:22:26]>> Sure. So So President Trump I think President Trump would be sympathetic to that you to that interpretation and he says that you know one of the principal tools in my foreign pol in my foreign policy arsenal is that I keep my cars close to my chest. I keep you know I keep all of my interlocutors guessing. I think the problem is that we now have a very a very extensive record of statements and actions dating back to his first term. It it's his views of Taiwan are are clear. I think his views of Taiwan are are clear even though he would now I will say so I want to be I want to be objective. I want to be fair.

[00:23:02]On some occasions when President Trump has asked how he would respond if China were to attack Taiwan. On some occasions he has said and he gave an interview I think a couple of years ago in which he said um President Xi will not authorize a Chinese attack on Taiwan because he knows that I'm crazy. Crazy is President Trump's word not mine. And so he's he doesn't want to make me angry. He knows that I'm crazy. So he he may he might he may authorize a Chinese invasion attempt of Taiwan after I'm no longer the president. But while I'm in office, he doesn't want to make me upset. And sure, he's made statements to that effect, but those are more one-offs. The more consistent statements of Taiwan reflect a very myopic view of Taiwan. He views it principally, if not exclusively, through the lens of his chipmaking capacity. But think about the statements that he's made, and then I'll come to some of the statements that he's made subsequent to his meeting with President Xin Beijing. Um, for years now, dating back to his first term in office, he has said he has accused Taiwan of having stolen America dubiously. He has accused Taiwan of having stolen America's semiconductor industry. He has said that Taiwan doesn't spend nearly enough on on defense. Taiwan presently spends about two and a half% two and a half% of its GDP on defense. He has said that Taiwan needs to spend 10% of its GDP on defense, which is just it's it's not feasible. He has deputized his commerce secretary, Howard Lutnik, to onshore 40% of Taiwan's semiconductor production capacity to the United States by the end of Trump's second term. Again, completely infeasible.

[00:24:27]And on many occasions he has said well if if he said I hope China doesn't attack Taiwan but if it were to attack Taiwan you know America is thousands of miles away China's much closer there really wouldn't be much that the United States would be able to do and then if you take some of the comments that he's made you know more recently you know he's gone even a step further so now President Trump has said I'm willing to negotiate future US arm sales to Taiwan with President Xi thereby essentially nullifying the second of the second assurances the second the six, excuse me, assurances that the Reagan administration gave to Taiwan in 1982.

[00:25:00]So, the second assurance of those six asurances essentially said that the United States will not place the subject of arm sales to Taiwan. The United States is not going to to negotiate those with China.

[00:25:13]President Trump said, "Why should I be beholden to a press that was in ' 92? President Xi and I will talk about US arms sales to Taiwan." And then in the interview, I believe it was the interview that he gave to Brett Bayer, Fox News, he went even a step further and he said, uh, there's this arm sales package worth $14 billion that the president has held up.

[00:25:32]It's ready to go. It has state department the state department's approval. Congress is very supportive, but the president is holding it up. And the president has said, well, this this delayed arm sales package, it's a very good negotiating chip. It's a very good bargaining chip. So he's now he's now not only saying that we are willing to that I'm going to negotiate I'm willing to negotiate future US arm sales packages to Taiwan with President Xi.

[00:25:54]He's now explicitly saying that those arm sales packages are are a negotiating chip. So I think that despite what Secretary Rubio might say, what Secretary Hegsth might say, if you're in Taiwan, ultimately you're paying most attention to the words of the commander-in-chief. And the commander-in-chief is making clear that he takes a pretty dim view of of Taiwan, a pretty transactional view of Taiwan.

[00:26:14]So if I were sitting in Taiwan right now, you know, I would be saying to myself, despite everything that I've despite everything that President Lie has said, everything that President Lie has done, he doesn't seem to be able to move the needle with President Trump. So I would be nervous if I were in Taiwan right now that the president is potentially contemplating negotiating crossrade issues with President Xi and doing so above the head of Taiwan. So I would be nervous if I were in Taiwan.

[00:26:41]>> Yeah. And it gets more complicated when you think about the head of the um should we say party that leans slightly more favorably towards eventual unification. I believe the leader she was in China just last month which was quite a big deal really. She's never done that before. Um how much do you think Trump is really selling out Taiwan? Although to be fair, the Taiwanese are not helping themselves with this sort of uh inconsistent approach to the bill.

[00:27:09]>> Right. So, I think the Taiwan, first of all, Taiwan's internal politics are, I think, right now, very dysfunctional. If you just look at, if you just look at all the wrangling back and forth over the special defense budget, I think it was initially marked up to be $40 billion, and I think now they they've gotten the special defense budget across the finish line, but I think it was worth substantially less than the original $40 billion figure. So, first, Taiwan's internal politics are are quite dysfunctional. Um, I think what's interesting is what what I would do if I were were President Xi. There's been a lot of speculation over, you know, is President Xi sort of contemplating a Chinese move on Taiwan because he looks at America's domestic politics. He looks at Taiwan's domestic politics and he feels that perhaps he now has a window of opportunity during the remainder of Trump's presidency that he's never going to get again. And I'll actually take a I'll take a somewhat counterintuitive view, maybe even a provocative view, which is I actually think that the short-term likelihood of a Chinese move on Taiwan has actually diminished for a couple of reasons. The first is that the PLA is especially the top brass of the PLA is it's in a state of total disarray. If you look at some of the senior officials whom President Xi has purged, critically some of the senior officials or some of the senior generals whom President Xi has purged would be the generals who would be authorized with overseeing a Chinese campaign against Taiwan. Um, so I was skeptical even before some of the recent purges, even before those purges, I was somewhat skeptical about that President Xi is going to try to do something by 2027 because first of all, it's not clear to me that President Xi would publicly articulate sort of a timeline and say that I'm going to take this potentially catastrophic action and I'm going to announce the timeline. But even if he even if he privately at one time had subscribed to that timeline and said that I have to take action by the end of 2027 at this point the PLA just doesn't have anywhere near the operational capacity that it would need. Uh it's going to take a very long time for President Xi to reconstitute the top brass of the PLA and critically the individuals the replacements for the the generals he's fired um they won't have had combat experience unlike the generals who were purged who did have combat experience. So one, the PLA's operational capacity has has declined significantly. The other point that I would make, and again it's perhaps a bit counterintuitive, some people might say that President Xi looks at he has a commander-in-chief in the United States who advances very little interest in Taiwan security and he looks at Taiwan's domestic politics and he sees a state of dysfunction and so he's probably saying to himself, it's now or never. Uh but again, I'm but keep in mind and here I'm going to quote and I think I'm going to quote him verbatim. I think that one of the best distillations of the Taiwan challenge as President Xi sees it comes from John Culver who is a longtime intelligence analyst in the US intelligence community. He served in the intelligence community for 30 or I think 35 years. And John Culver says that when President Xi looks at Taiwan, he doesn't see an opportunity to be seized. He sees a crisis to be avoided. And the upshot of what Calver mean, John Calver means by that statement is this. The one outcome that would potentially do more than any other outcome to jeopardize China's present trajectory and potentially even jeopardize Xiinping's grip on power would be a failed invasion attempt of Taiwan with all of the attendant military, economic, and societal consequences. President Xi recognizes and he's looking and he's you mentioned Russia a couple of minutes ago. He's looking at the difficulties that Russia is having in Ukraine.

[00:30:27]Remember when Russia invaded Ukraine in February of 2022, most Western observers weren't even the United States wasn't contemplating in Europe wasn't contemplating seriously in the initial days and weeks after wasn't contemplating sending weapons to Ukraine because the thinking was there's such a huge imbalance between Russia's conventional military capacity and that of Ukraine that even if we were to provision weapons to Ukraine, by the time they arrive, they're not going to make any difference because Zilinsky will have been assassinated, the regime will have been decapitated, and Russia will have installed a puppet government.

[00:30:57]Now here we are. The Russia Ukraine war is grinding on its fifth year. Ukraine is now pushing back more and more against Russian incursions with increasingly sophisticated drone warfare that now is sort of the envy of the world. And that's a land invasion. If you're Xiinping and you say, "Gosh, if Russia is having this much difficulty with a land invasion of a territorially contiguous neighbor, imagine now I would have to, if I were to authorize an invasion of Taiwan, the PLA would have to traverse the straight of Taiwan, which our head of Indoaccom, Admiral Sam Paparo, has vowed to make a hellscape. I would have to traverse that maritime hellscape. Then I would have to brooach the porcupine defenses that Taiwan is erecting around its perimeter. and then I would have to deal with very very formidable formidable intimidating geography. So I think that he recognizes and he also can't c he can't dismiss the possibility of US retaliation. So I think again just to quote John Cullber, President Xi, he wants to he wants to ratchet up pressure on Taiwan. He wants to intensify the strangulation campaign of Taiwan. But if he can find a way of avoiding an all-out invasion, I think he would prefer to do so. And so I think that I'll just conclude with this point.

[00:32:07]I think that if you're President Xi, you leverage the state of American politics and you leverage the state of Taiwan's politics to say, "What can I do given this favorable environment to ratchet up pressure on Taiwan in a way that's low risk and low cost?" And essentially what that boils down to is continuing this multifaceted pressure campaign that I've been undertaking with very little risk and very little consequence for China.

[00:32:29]>> Yeah. But at this rate, Alli, isn't Trump just effectively giving Taiwan to China, right? based on what he said, the way he behaves, he just sees Taiwan as a porn within a greater strategic competition, great power politics. He's a transactional guy and oh, let's be honest, he doesn't give a he doesn't care about Taiwan. He doesn't give a about some small island in the middle of the China Sea. Um or does he?

[00:32:54]Because it's um the semiconductors and therefore that affects business and America's economy and therefore his money.

[00:33:00]>> Right. So he does so he does. I mean you made the well so you you made two critical points. One he does care about you know semiconductors. He I mean if if god forbid the United States and China were to go to war over Taiwan and if basically then the global semiconductor industry overnight is is decimated and the global economy is plunged into a depression. So President Trump wants to avoid that outcome. The other point that I would make is and and here's one reason why if you're President Xi, you you want to think you would want to think sort of carefully about sort of authorizing a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. President Trump bristles when you think about how much he bristled at this acronym taco the taco acronym which is essentially I'm forgetting what it stands. The idea is >> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. We know >> you take action and then you chickenen out. Um President Trump >> Exactly. Exactly. President Trump takes extreme umbrage at being seen as weak at being seen at at the perception that he's been outmaneuvered. So if you're President Xi, one sort of one kind of wild card that you have to keep in mind is sure President Trump he's to date he's evinced very little interest in in Taiwan security. But if I, President Xi, if I were to interpret President Trump's seeming lack of interest in Taiwan security as giving me a green light to authorize an invasion and if I authorize an invasion and if the overwhelming reaction from US allies and partners and then also from the Congress and from the American public, if the overwhelming reaction is, President Trump, you got played, President Xi made you look foolish, he made you look weak, President Trump may well sort of do a 180 and said no one is going to tell me that I'm going no one is going to tell me that I'm weak. President Xi has personally betrayed me just like he did with the coronavirus pandemic in my first term and I'm going to show him who's boss. And so there's a risk then that he could go from his present posture which is he seems to be selling out Taiwan to a posture in which he says I'm going to do everything possible to demonstrate President Xi should know who's in charge. I'm not weak. So I think the president has to keep that in mind. So what I'm worried about is not so much the possibility that he greenlights a Chinese invasion. What I do worry about is that over time because he still has about let's say two and a half years left of his second term maybe between two and a half and three years.

[00:35:08]What I worry about is does he incrementally through sort of slips of tongue throughatively over time for the remaining two and a half years that he's in office? Does he cumulatively shift the cross straight balance in ways that are permanently or seemingly permanently disadvantageous to Taiwan? Um, and here's and I'll give you just a couple of examples. If I were President Xi, what I would say to President Trump is, "Look, President Trump, you already have taken certain actions that I think are are conducive to a political resolution of cross differences." Mr. President, I would just encourage you to codify those practices. So, uh, at a sensitive juncture in the US China relationship, you advised the president of Taiwan, William Lie, not to make a stopover in New York. Mr. President, I would encourage you to continue telling President Lie not to make stopovers in the United States. So, codify that practice. Mr. President, you've expressed a willingness for us to negotiate uh future US arm sales to Taiwan. We should uh we should codify that practice. So, I think that what President Xi will do visav President Trump is he I don't think as as much as he might want the United States to change official declaratory policy, that's actually not my big concern. My bigger concern is if President Xi slowly, incrementally gets President Trump just to act on certain instincts in a way that cumulatively shift the cross balance. So, I don't think that President Trump is going to greenlight a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. But I do think that incrementally, cumulatively, he will take steps rhetorically and and prescriptively that could undermine Taiwan security.

[00:36:41]>> You see, you always talk with such eloquence there, Alli. I put myself on mute just to digest what you're saying.

[00:36:46]But no, absolutely quite the uh quite the point, I think, by which to to end on. I I you know I think it's pretty clear that some of she's comments to Putin uh and one that I think was made public that he simply said to Putin you know he Trump will regret um or is regretting his his war with Iran. I mean, I think that's part of the reason there's no coincidence that less than a week after the summit, Trump is suddenly pushing and we've got an MOU and the closest of any substantive progress towards a draw down in escalations, hostilities and so on. But um not making any direct uh causation, just more correlation. But everyone, thank you very much for watching. It is a pleasure to be joined by Ali Wayne, senior analyst at the International Crisis Group. And I look forward Alli to having you back. Certainly I do want to do more on China, Trump, the United States because I think uh when and if this war with Iran is stabilized for lack of better word, I think we will see a a quite concerted effort and focus pivot perhaps towards uh China which was supposed to be what the national security strategy and such referenced but here we are attacking the rest of the world. So uh Trump having his way with everybody else but uh thanks everyone for watching. If you enjoyed it, then do like the video, do subscribe, uh, and we'll be all back with regular programming. I'm now back in the UK, uh, after my trip around Africa, but we'll be back with regular program programming, excuse me, this week. Six.