NATO is transitioning from a collective mutual defense alliance to a bilateral transaction model due to US leadership unpredictability, forcing European allies to pursue strategic autonomy despite the time-consuming nature of this transition; this shift is compounded by Russia's nuclear signaling strategy designed to exploit NATO's internal fragmentation and create hesitation in collective decision-making, while Russia simultaneously demonstrates operational weakness through limited battlefield gains despite nuclear posturing.
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Russia Goes Nuclear, Trump Fractures NATO’s FutureAdded:
How's it going everyone? Welcome to this solo live stream. I don't do these very often, but I thought it might make a little bit of a difference, a bit of change of pace to uh to talk to you guys just about uh the main topic of this channel, which is Russia Ukraine obviously uh and NATO. two major developments today that are sort of unlin but have intricate inter uh association because they both cover the same area of the world and well it's all integrated at the end of the day. Um coming to you from Malawi in Africa. Uh I came out here for some birthday uh celebrations and um well the world keeps turning as I said in my previous stream uh with Tritasi and Oran and I wanted to take the opportunity to just sort of try to do some of these live streams. So yeah settle in probably chat for maybe half an hour 40 minutes. If you've got questions drop them in the comments and um yeah let me know what you guys think of the situation. But uh yeah, I thought the the two main headlines that I wanted to to touch on were simply Russia has deployed nuclear munitions to Barus as part of its largest nuclear drills in years, mind you, and simultaneously Trump's chaotic announcement of about 5,000 troops being shifted to Poland after cancelling 4,000 the week before.
So this is the same what 24 hours and completely two different opposite directions. Neither are coordinated as I said, but they're both enormous. You could arguably say for for many reasons.
Um some of you have seen the interview I had with Wesley Clark, former NATO commander of um a couple of weeks ago.
So if you haven't seen that, I recommend you watch it. uh there's no one better place to talk about the uh complexities of uh NATO right now and what it's facing with Trump or not uh than him. Uh you might not like everything he has to say. He he said some things which I think a lot of us would disagree with but um or see differently but um I'm kind of curious what what story of these two the um Russia's nuclear deployments or uh Trump's NATO chaos which which worries you more or which do you think is more of a story? Um let me know in the comments. But um yeah, I I think it's uh I I I I think that the overarching question that sort of came to mind when I was reading these pieces was simply sort of are we watching a security architecture that is adapting or that's sort of quietly imploding uh in some ways because Rout's uh sort of reassurance to other allies within the NATO alliance was not the best. I to be honest with you I have reservations about Marta. I don't think he's a bad politician but I don't know if he's the best person to manage NATO. Um I don't really like the way that he's sucked up to Trump in any ways in the past two uh two years or whatever in the time that it was clear Trump was going to be running again and Rout took over just the whole daddy comment. It's just really weird. So anyway, um that's yeah, let me know what you guys think. But um to me it's well let's get let's get into a bit more. So basically what's happened so Russia has launched these nuclear capable missiles and has essentially issued nuclear munitions to some units uh which were part of some major exercises uh framed around preparing forces for the quote what they called the use of nuclear forces in event of aggression. Um, what's interesting about these exercises though is that they were completely uh unannounced. Um, there wasn't, as far as I was aware or anywhere else that I'd been following, uh, sort of scheduled nuclear drills for May. Um, it's usual strategic nuclear exercises or what's known as Grom. Uh, they're usually held in October or at least since the full scale invasion. um they've held these uh nuclear exercises, these nuclear movements, uh shows of force, etc., etc., in uh in in the autumn, not in the spring. So, this is quite interesting.
And there was um one of the senior military staff from Moscow's uh security architecture that said he thinks that the west or NATO or Europe specifically in Russia never been more than closer to war than they have been right now. So just a lovely sort of reiteration of a of a narrative and escalation wararmongering and etc etc. I mean they've said that for ages.
I mean, six ago, six months ago, I think it was a British diplomat or a British uh politician that said that, you know, we are effectively at war with Russia.
So, it just doesn't seem to stop with both sides sort of saying that we're at war. We're approaching war. We're in nuclear Armageddon. Um, which kind of makes me feel it loses its value. I'm not saying that Russia doesn't pose a or Putin doesn't pose a security concern for Europe, but I I think sometimes constantly claiming that we're an imminent phase of war, all out carnage kind of reduces the uh intensity when we genuinely are on that precipice. Um now, what's worth noting about these nuclear exercises is how much Barus was involved. Barus has sort of gone under the radar in the past year, two years.
is they haven't really been as mentioned in the media, especially I think it was late 23, early 24 when there was discussion over whether Bellarus was just going to get involved or they were just going to completely open their borders to to the Russians to use as sort of a training ground. So um yeah I uh I don't really know why suddenly they've they've decided but um it's also worth noting that these exercises followed the successful launch of the Sarmat the ICBM test launch that was on 12th of May um and that was after quite a lot of failures from what I remember some of you cast your minds back there was a silo destroying misfire in September 24 um So it's it sort of the Russians are very keen to demonstrate that they've made this progress with this hardware and um and get it working and we had a good uh we had a good conversation with Paul Woolberg. Some of you guys know me from him or uh know others know each other and he um yeah we I asked him about that. You can find a clip I think on the channel uh me asking him specifically about the SAP. Um yeah so h that was it the deputy foreign minister uh re ribof was the one who said that the strategic risks are mounting uh is is what he said a head-on clash between NATO and our country with all the potential catastroph catastrophic consequences that would entail that was that was exactly um that's exactly what he said but what Pescov said the spokesperson said is is arguably more revealing. Um he was asked during a press conference I think whether these exercises were a signal to Europe uh and NATO and he basically said that any exercises are part of military development and any exercises are a signal. So that's that's not really a denial. It's more just sort of admission just as a non-answer. Sort of a confirm nor deny kind of thing. Um, as I said about Barus as well, what's interesting is that the Sarmat is the well also as I asked Paul like sort of the archnic was everything that was the attention. Everyone freaking out about the capabilities of this uh intermediate range ballistic missile. Um, and suddenly that's been forgotten about and the Sarmat is the new thing on the block. Um and Barus seems to be quite keen to sort of host these. Maybe it maybe it acts as a sufficient deterrent.
I don't know. But um they they fear sort of Ukraine is going to invade Barus. Not entirely sure why Lucenko is so keen to host all these uh missiles, but um yeah, they've uh they've been uh happy to do that as well. And of course, as I made a couple videos on this in the past few days, um this all coincides with Putin's return from China where he came back with nothing. He went there to try to secure uh um the power of Siberia 2 pipeline and Xiinping basically just wasted him on his way, which uh was quite satisfying to be honest. Um not that I really expected that to happen, but Putin What what I think is interesting is that the circumstances around Trump and Putin was very similar in the way that she received both of them. But whilst a lot of agreements were signed with the Russians, they still didn't commit to the to Siberia 2.
So even though um she is making all these pleasantries about um what's to say like sort of the lifelong friendship or alliance that will never die, etc., etc. he's not willing to sign something that bene that would be one of the most critical benefits for the Russians. Um yeah, so that's that's just worth um that's just worth I think uh considering. Now there was a there was one um there was one assessment that I saw by I don't know if some of you guys will know the Institute of the Study of War and they have a a subdivision called critical threats which assesses a lot of the military capabilities and obviously the threat perception associated with military geopolitical economic etc. um and they they did an assessment of these exercises um and they were trying to sort of their their their claim was that they were trying to influence NATO's decision-m um by just masking Moscow's even greater weaknesses. So typical classical bravado um show as much military might as you can as a way to demonstrate that look NATO's got some internal issues but we have a a very functioning and united military capacity. So, do not even remotely think that you can go to war with us sort of mindset. Um, I I I saw an interesting post by another friend of the channel, Preston Stewart, uh, who was saying that the Russians after 2 and a half years of taking Bakmud, they have progressed a whole in its entirety of 14 kilometers westwards. That's it. 14 kilometers. Um and and therefore it's uh this idea everyone always keep actually on a side note everybody always puts an emphasis on the idea of a spring offensive coming through the the spring offenses of the Russians the spring offenses of the Ukrainians. I think that that kind of framing needs to be quashed a bit because firstly it doesn't work. We haven't seen a successful spring offensive really at all. And secondly, why would you telegraph that you're going to be launching some massive combat operation at this specific timing as we saw with the Ukrainians in uh their remarkable reacquisition of territory in late 2022.
You don't announce those sorts of things. So, I uh yeah, I I just think that's rather ridiculous. But again, it just bottom line for me, I think you can summarize this these military drills and the the the bravado, the the hot air coming from Moscow visa through Bellarus as just an attempt to distract further and further from the economy. The economy is absolutely shocking. um more information I read, more information I hear. Um Constantine Somalio, another friend of the channel has, you know, he he updates me with things occasionally and and and it just boggles my mind more and more consistently how much the um the the the Russian economy just is is in a certain situ. It's just appalling.
So yeah, just uh can't can't really get my head around that ever to be honest with you. But aside from that, the other thing that I wanted to touch on was of course this uh troop deployment announcement. So this is really weird.
Um or perhaps it isn't because it's regarding Donald Trump and his U-turns, the tacos, the idiocy, but essentially uh the Pentagon had there was this idea of cancelling 4,000 troops bound for Poland. And now Trump has announced as of today or whatever the past 24 hours that 5,000 troops are going to Poland.
Uh, and this is all I think most people would agree this is I think Trump's personal preference for the um the leader of Poland, not uh not Donald Tusk, the um president nor rocky. I know that's not the best pronunciation, but given that he's a bit more nationalist and riotive center, Trump likes him obviously.
Um what's also unclear from my understanding is that it's it's whether these troops are going to be redeployed from Germany or whether they're just going to be new forces. There's obviously been a lot of um alarmism around Trump wanting to reduce forces in Germany and punish the states that have been most critical of him or or his war with Iran. But even despite all the threats, nothing's actually followed through unsurprisingly. But it's yet to be clear whether he is going to pull troops from Germany and sort of give them to Poland which does but I think in a broader point it shows more and more just how Poland is becoming a serious ge regional player in in Europe. You know you've got Germany obviously for the economic power in most ways but it's not that clearcut. France supposedly for nuclear power and just generally you know the FrancoGerman workhorse relationship of the European Union etc. Britain is supposed to be there, albeit I think Britain's in pretty terrible shape right now. Um, actually, we've got a video on that coming out tomorrow.
Sort of the rel relationship of Britain to foreign policy. A really good one.
Recommend you keep a look out for that.
But yeah, I just I think Poland's really coming through there. The economy has exploded in recent years. the expenditure on obviously defense is is incredibly important and they are just more and more just showing a willingness to lead or to say the uncomfortable truths to say the things that a lot of people are thinking especially Eastern European countries and communities and uh and and and take up the take up the mantle so to speak. So it's um yeah I I think it's yeah I think that's that's worth noting. So apart from the nor uh nori relationship which is not just transactional politics it's also because Trump endorsed him if you remember when he was running again to be President Trump gave him a lot of emphasis. So um sorry when Trump um yeah no that's right I'm just trying to I'm trying to cast my mind back to Trump's sort of uh how many times he's written in favor because he writes crap all the time. But the other thing and I think is more structurally significant is Poland has been as I say um the biggest defender and Trump has been wanting to get countries to pay more. And so I think this is just a case of Trump realizing that he can't punish other countries like kicking them out. Therefore, he's just going to try to relatively reward others which is just well it's not going to have the um intended effect I think. Um, what I what I find interesting is that when I was reading into this a bit further about beyond the headlines, it came out to me that I actually oppose Ukrainian NATO membership um and Polish troop deployments in Ukraine. So for Trump to be sending more American troops is um is a bit of a weird one. Um and then of course there's Rut or Mark Rutter. Um he he was at the foreign ministry meeting and he said that basically I think the statement or the line that stood out for me was simply that the um that the alliance is moving towards a quote less reliant uh being less reliant on one ally. that's um essentially conceding that the alliance cannot count on America. But we're still not in this situation where we can fully move on from it. I think it was less than a month ago, less than two weeks ago that R was trying to say to the broader world even that the US isn't going to leave NATO. It's perfectly fine and Europe needs to get its act together, but ultimately the transatlantic relationship will hold. But less than two weeks on, he's now sort of changed his framing a little bit and that Europe really needs to be um independent, which is kind of nuts. At the same time, we've had plenty of other people emphasizing that we need to find something outside of NATO, completely different kind of organization.
And so, he's trying to emphasize, no, no, no, no, it's about it's about NATO.
We we NATO is the answer. I'm also hearing some very weird noises uh coming from uh so I'm sitting in like an open room bar uh and I don't know I can hear like a screeching noise so there's also bugs flying around so you can probably see they're all attracted to my uh to my light but I can do it in the dark and that might not be a very enjoyable stream but anyway as I said the world doesn't stop moving and events don't stop happening so we still need to do a stream occasionally Now, the thing I wanted to do is sort of bring in the the two headlines together because to be honest, like these two stories aren't really separate, even though they're being treated as such.
You could argue that they're effectively a call and response and Moscow especially, I think, is is listening to both. Um to understand how the Russians look at nuclear weaponry, you have to understand that their signaling strategy, half of obviously nuclear warfare or nuclear stuff is is is signaling is um is telegraphing and their approach has always been about political cohesion, not military capability. The Russians like having 15,000 nuclear warheads because it sounds really good and forces them to be considered a big power. But as some people have debated on on this channel and and we've had well I think it was me and James Kenzie or Michael Rossi or other people having simply having a massive nuclear arsenal doesn't necessarily determine you to be a very powerful nation. Um because strip that away and what else do you have? Um, it looks good optically, which is why the Chinese are proliferating their arms because they want to be seen as a as a major power and sort of status is speak. And so to only have 500 warheads when the Russians have 5,000, 15,000 or whatever or did that the basically the Chinese need to proliferate more nuclear warheads just to say that they have as many as the Americans and the Russians and therefore on the same uh playing field. But in this case, as I say, the Russians, it's not necessarily only about that military capability. It's more about the political cohesion.
It's not to make NATO think that Russia will actually launch. The goals, as I think we've largely come to expect, make NATO hesitate, to increase that um fragmentation uh and to make the cost of almost any decision feel too high. That's why we've seen the amount of incursions continuously because so many nations, especially in Western Europe, I think, do not want to be the one to say, "Okay, the Russians have launched a jet which is violated Baltic airspace." Oh, let's just shoot it down. But that's largely what should be done. Um, I made this in another video several weeks ago now, but Turkey did this a few years ago when the Russians put a jet into Turkish airspace. They just shot it down. we just shot it down and the Russians were outraged and the relationship between the Turks and the Russians was never fully healed. It's never been the same again. Um, but they didn't do anything.
If anything, I think they I think they sent a strongly worded condemnation to the UN, which is kind of ironic considering how much they criticize it for being a western or US imperialistic uh space.
So the the the Russians or the Kremlin knows that it can get away with more provocation by just pushing the boundaries, testing the waters and ultimately NATO is not going to do anything partially because of the fragmentation but also partially for fear of repercussions which is not a it's not really deterrence then is it?
It's quite pathetic. Um, what if you think about it from the Russian perspective, what have they actually seen on top of everything else that Trump's doing with with Iran, etc., China, they saw the Pentagon cancel the deployment to Poland, watch various people, especially Republicans, call it an embarrassment, and then see Trump reverse it, of course, via social media.
So, that's not really how you go about deterring. uh that's called improvisation and um complete uh moronicness if that's a word like idiocy. So the Russians don't look at what's happening and this isn't it's that's mainly the American front but it does of course affect how the allies within NATO how Europe feels like what the hell are we supposed to do with this are we and that's why Rut said what he said so essentially steelman the other side right now one piece I saw earlier which was quite interesting and I can put in the chat if people are interested but there was an argument that Trump's unpredictability is therefore the deterrent a rational predictable adversaries easier to game theory than an erratic one. Um, if Moscow can't model or map out uh Washington or specifically Trump's behavior, uh, then that uncertainty basically will make them restrained.
But I don't think that's one logical, two accurate, or three, the way that the Russians would build a a strategy of this level. Um, deterrence requires credibility for one, and credibility requires consistency.
So, you can't deter sort of I don't even know how to put it like vibes. You you Trump's Trump's deterrent strategy is vibes. Um, you you can't you can't build an effective counter strategy by just being like, oh, oh, he's tweeted this today. What's what about tomorrow? So yeah, that's not deterrence theory and escalation ladder and all these sorts of things are some of the areas of international relations or or strategic studies which I did specifically. I find it really fascinating because there's such a human psychology element always been really interested in psychology. Um so yeah there's a good book as well I read about that once about deterrence theory not just in a geopolitical context but like in corporate environments you know conflict it's yeah it's all about that so it's basically the moment and and and you know your opponent your adversary decides to test to test this sort of ambiguous commitment you either have to back it up or you don't and if you don't then any remnants any remaining level of deterrence that you had is is is is gone. Um it just it just collapses. So to bring this back round to sort of the Polish NATO Trump element and and in the context of Russia, like Poland is visibly one of the biggest um uh barriers for the for the for Putin if there were to be some kind of campaign, which I remain very skeptical about anyway. Um, Poland is not going to be the place you want to start. You know, it has the troops, it has the relationship, it has the spending credentials. The Baltics, on the other hand, don't have any of that. Um, and we continue to see these uh more more games mapped out of of Putin, you know, talking about invading or doing something. I think there was one UAV incident in Baltic airspace earlier in the month. Um and and generally they just seem to be at the forefront of Russia's u provocations more than sort of around even Muldova or Transnistria or the Black Sea more generally.
So I don't know if you're Estonia or Latvia right now. How do you feel about article 5 and Trump's commitments to sort of what it becomes Poland's responsibility as the regional power to protect its surrounding states which I guess they have said to an extent but that's still it's still a big commitment to do and it it remains to be seen whether Poland has that capacity. Um the last thing I just sort of wanted to do really in this was simply look at where this could go because obviously a lot is happening right now with Iran. Um, the war in Ukraine has I think it's been a lot of exchanges of of strikes and there was one piece that I I noted about just how fearful a lot of Russian senior personnel feel about Ukraine's broader growing potential capacity to strike even further into Russia or not even about distance just more and more about precision. The one thing that Ukraine has been developing more intensely that I I understand is precision um attacks, not just you know depth into the Russian state, but how well that they can pin take out a very minute target within a a heavily urbanized area for example. Um but yeah, basically we've got two things happening simultaneously. Russia is performing this nuclear strength from a position of what is operational weakness. It's made, as I said, 14 kilometers since Bakmoot three years ago. Um, one thing Constantine did tell me and I've had other friends tell me is recruitment is absolutely terrible right now. The Russians are or the government is struggling insanely to um incentivize people to sign up to fight even with these massive bonuses or uh financial incentives.
And it all the while it needs to sort of try to reinforce to the to the Europeans especially that escalation is is is is is really risky at least from the Russian perspective. They need to constantly emphasize that the West is escalating and therefore it's the duty of Russia to to be at war to to to be conducting the SMO and be protecting against the uh the NATO encroachment etc. So that's an incredibly dangerous combination because weakened actor with nuclear leverage and incentives to use it.
That's uh yeah, not the not the best uh situation you want. And I think what's even more interesting is simply that Putin is he's in China. He makes these occasional visits. He makes these what I what I'm noting about him now more than even in recent months is he only appears at big public engagements.
He's only ever at the International Economic Forum in St. Petersburg.
He goes to China. He's at Victory Day parade.
Everything else you don't really see him. You don't see him wandering around.
I think there's been some pre- determined shots or like pre-prepared shots of him in a factory somewhere or meeting some uh you know babushkas or something. But essentially he doesn't make many public appearances right now. Um making people wonder of course you know where is he?
Is something going wrong? But I I I think he's I think the the paranoia isolation there was a really interesting piece in the Financial Times about a month ago I think 3 weeks ago discussing just how much Putin's inner circle not just his inner circle in terms of the elites or the people who support him or his you know Shroyu or his friends like that more simply his inner circle of his literal security network his security apparatus the people around him even even smaller Putin's effectively making mini purges within his own uh security detail uh and really um reclusive um what's the word?
He's uh he's sort of you know really internalizing and and and becoming less and less engaged with people that he might have even remotely before engaged with is what I'm saying. I I think that this is a demonstration of everything that we're seeing in Russia's foreign policy and its military actions uh in the rhetoric that it's stating it's um yeah I I see less of him and just much more of the mouthpiece is doing the commentary really really managing the sort of the house so to speak like Pesco or uh the the other the others I forget the names to be honest.
Um now I wanted to also so the two things that are happening so on the one hand you've got Russia with the performing nuclear strength but from operational weakness on the same hand you've got NATO that is what seems to be transitioning from this what is supposed to be the collective mutual alliance to sort of what some people have called the bilateral transaction model and essentially sort of what that means is that on the one hand you've got the rest of NATO and America well just Trump, Trump and NATO and Rout or whoever trying to sort of manage that uh that deteriorating relationship. What's worse is that you used to have people like Maloney um or maybe Mccron, couple others helping to try to massage that, but given Trump's comments over the Pope or anything, whatever Trump said, uh he's burnt the bridges to the point where even Maloney was like, "No, that's not okay." So, it's it's very much just NATO and Trump or NATO versus America.
And as we've said before many times on the channel, I'm sure some of you have commented even now, you know, Ukraine is is sort of more of the main ally to NATO, but isn't in NATO versus the US.
Um, so the uncomfortable conclusion is basically Europe is being pushed towards this is strategic autonomy which I think it absolutely should damn well be pursuing but it not because it wants it or wants it yet or is ready for it but because it well it can't not afford to have it anymore. And that the problem with that is it's not the intention or the in principle. It's that it's going to take time a decade maybe a bit less. Right? We're making efforts to see uh rearmament and independence or decoupling of certain American industries or tech or diversifying to China or India for economic opportunities etc. But meanwhile, the window of potential maximal vulnerability or escalation with Moscow is is still there, right? We don't know what Trump's going to do in the next few months if the midterms are a complete dump dumpster fire for him, which looks like he will become a lame duck president. He could lose the House and possibly the Senate. Someone told me earlier they think that is literally that possible.
That doesn't give Europe much um cushion. They don't have the luxury of time basically to take their time to decide what they want to do. And even if we are in the best case scenario of getting things refined, improved, um taking all the necessary steps and policy shifts, that's still going to be ages. It's still going to take years.
And the fact that we've got sort of the British uh what what did the British government do yesterday? they they uh they quietly I I can't remember if they canceled it completely or just diluted it. Um sanctions on Russian energy effectively. Basically they have um made it easier or less punishable to to to for Russian energy uh because of the cost of living crisis and situation like that. Oh yeah. So they've diluted uh sanctions as fuel prices. Right. So they've diluted oil sanctions against uh the Russians sources. Yeah, this was two days ago they did this. Um yeah, they made plans to impose a ban on UK imports of diesel and jet fuel made from Russian oil in third countries had been more watered down. They haven't done it directly from Russia, but they have diluted down plans to to to um you know cut off even more areas that could have alleviated the the Putin's economic conditions. So that's not great. And it's this inconsistency which is part of the problem I think worries about NATO or European ability to go alone so to speak.
So yeah, lot happening.
NATO is essentially run on bilateral deals. Every other week there's a sort of well, if you give me that, I'll I'll I'll allow you to do this. Um Russia just casually threatening nukes or intensifying its use of nukes if it's losing or when it's losing on the battlefield. And uh Europe struggling to figure out what it should be doing. as usual, strategic capacity where it should have been probably quite a few years before, but negligence and preference for welfare and markets like that. Welfare instead of uh defense is is is not great. But yeah, um that's that's largely it guys. 35 minutes.
That's a good I think we've got a good um I think we've had a good chat. Any of you if you had any questions? I'm just checking through here.
I disagree that drones are all that matter. I I've seen people make this comment and sure in many ways it my hair is very uh I need to I need to I'm looking through the comments. Some of you guys you you went online with that hair. I mean you know it's it's what do you want from me?
It's uh it's it's 10:36 on a Friday night in Africa. What do you want? Um you're lucky I'm doing a stream at all.
um or that I have the uh the um internet connection to to do that. Right? So anyway, as I was saying, basically um look, drones are the definitive factor in modern warfare, but I don't think that they fully replace manpower. Uh and I don't think um what's happening in Ukraine, it can be made applicable everywhere else. Um a lot of wars aren't fought necessarily directly. They can be fought quite um independently or like indirectly and and and drones.
I don't know. It's I'm not a military analyst, I'll be honest. And and I don't feel confident enough to say that I know that the the I can't predict the future or whatever of of direction of drones.
Simply all that they are doing is wreaking havoc in Ukraine, increasingly wreaking havoc across Russia. Um, and there seems very little to be able to intercept them, apart from, of course, if you are Ukraine and your capacity to intercept. So, yeah, that's uh that's what I'd say. Um, I don't think Putin was uh double.
He is um I I've never believed this idea that Putin has a sort of a body double or a triple or whatever. It's um yeah, I think it's uh I think it was Putin to be honest and I don't see why that would happen. Um looking through some of your other comments, yeah, that's the the drones in in Eastern Eastern Europe and the Baltics. That was part of the problem. Um that was the uh that's what I touched on in some of my other points earlier. Um we'll just have to see where this goes.
I I personally I think that this is just going to continue round and round. Trump likes to give his attention to other things. One minute it's about Iran and he's just commenting about how useless NATO is. He hates all of them because they haven't done the right thing of getting involved with his war on choice and therefore he's going to try to punish them. But he's learning very quickly that that's not how it works.
And ultimately, I mean, NATO will be fine. I I think that NATO minus is is a is a feasible concept, but also I just think that NATO is too big to fail in some ways. Can it be severely undermined and depleted out sort of a husk? Yes.
But does that mean it's not going to work at all? No. I think it can still exist. Um, and I think it's important for it to be molded more. I said this in a video I recorded about a month ago that if anything, it could potentially give NATO greater clarity with a lesser involved United States. It means that then Europeans are the ones primarily determining where NATO focuses. And that means on Europe instead of getting lost in conflicts in the Middle East in the past 25 years.
So you can focus on issues such as your southern border and migration flows or threats of terrorism. You can focus on your eastern flank with Putin, but also you can focus on your northern flank with the Arctic and the situation there where of course the Chinese, the Russians, uh the Americans of obviously Greenland. Uh this allows NATO without the United States to be a lot more um clarified, have greater car strategic clarity is is is the term, I think. Uh but yeah, that's that's what I that's what I'd say to that.
All right, guys. I'm going to I'm going to give it a land there. Thanks for watching. Let me know what you guys think of well all these stories today. I thought they were worth noting in a live stream.
I might post a video with some of my thoughts in a separate one tomorrow. But otherwise, uh yeah, thanks for your support and birthday wishes. It was kind of you, all of you support. And um yeah, of course, do do give the video a like.
Do subscribe if you're new. I mean, I usually do better streams than this, but I thought I'd just jump on relatively casually and have a have a sort of quick chat with you guys and hear some of your thoughts and share some of mine. But otherwise, speak to you soon. Have a good one. Take care.
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