Azawad's independence movement is back

本站添加: 2026-05-14

[00:00:01]On April 25th, 2026, the Azawad Liberation Front, known by its French initials as the FLA, captured the strategic city of Kadal in the West African state of Mali. The Russian troops in the city there to support Mali's military dictatorship were pushed out. And at least at the time I'm recording this, there seems to be a realistic chance that the government of Mali in Bamako will be overthrown. It's also possible that an unrecognized state called Azawad, which had a brief tenuous existence about a decade ago, might be about to reemerge. But that previous incarnation of Azawad, was not led by the FLA, which was founded less than 2 years ago. So, what is the FLA? Who are its leaders? And what are its political goals? Does it plan to rule Mali in conjunction with the Islamist insurgent groups that are currently attacking other parts of the country? Or is it solely focused on independence for Azawad? And who are the people of Northern Mali? And why would they want their own country? Stay tuned. I'll explain.

[00:01:16]Hi everyone, I'm Fredo Rockwell and in this video I'm going to try and do something a little bit different and cover the emergence of a new deacto state while it is in the process of possibly emerging. As is normal for my videos, I'm going to focus on the background issues and the politics of the FLA and Azawad rather than try and cover the uh military events as they happen. Okay, I mentioned in the opening that the FLA recently captured the strategically important city of Kadal in northern Mali. And for the moment at least, the FLA and its allies seem to have momentum on their side as Mali's military government and the Russian mercenaries propping it up struggle to respond. But this conflict, which is in part at least a conflict between the peoples of northern and southern Mali, is not new. Nor is this the first attempt to try and create a country in northern Mali called Azawad. Let's take a moment and explore the historical background.

[00:02:19]Mali has a population of roughly 20 million people, but the vast majority live in the south, which includes large urban centers like the capital city of Bamako. Northern Mali, which is classified as a hot arid desert environment, is very sparsely populated and much of the population is made up of nomadic peoples, most notably from the Tuare ethnic group. But there are also nomadic Berbers in the region known as Azawak Arabs. And just a side note here, the Azawak Arabs are named for a desert region known as the Azawak Basin. And this is believed to be the origin of the name for the proposed state of Azawad with a D. What this means is that the sparsely populated but relatively large territory of northern Mali with its own distinct climate, economy, languages, and cultures tends to be dominated by the much more numerous people in the distant south with their own very different climate, economy, languages, and culture. Add to this a highly centralized state, a form of government inherited from France, Molly's colonizers, and you have a recipe for near constant regional tension.

[00:03:28]France first arrived in what is now northern Mali in the 1880s, but its troops were unable to fully subdue the Tuare people living there until the early 1920s. Mali achieved independence in 1960 and almost immediately the Tuare began rising up against the new government in Bamako which from a Tuare perspective was just as much a foreign colonizing force as the French had been.

[00:03:53]A rebellion broke out in 1962 and a larger much more serious one erupted in 1990 which lasted for six years and ended with formal peace negotiations and a settlement. But violence broke out again in 2007. And then in 2012, yet another Tuareg rebellion erupted. But this one turned into a full-scale civil war. And if we're honest, the war that broke out in 2012 has really never ended. What's been happening recently in Mali is really the latest chapter in a 14-year long conflict. For that reason, I'm going to explain what happens from here on with a bit more detail. But just be aware that this is a really complicated conflict.

[00:04:38]By the 2010s, there were two major umbrella groups of insurgents in northern Mali. Tuare and Azawag Arab separatists who wanted to carve out their own independent country and transnational Islamist terrorist groups who wanted to implement Sharia law in northern Mali and then keep going and expand their territory as far as possible. These two groups both wanted to overthrow the government of Mali, but for different reasons and with different plans for what would happen next.

[00:05:08]The main Tuare group at the start of the war was the Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad, the MNLA, formed by Tuare soldiers who had previously worked for Libyan dictator Muamar Gaddafi. Gaddafi recruited Tuaregs from Mali into his army for decades. But after he was overthrown in 2011, they were out of a job and they started returning home and thus the MNLA was born. They formed an alliance with several Islamist groups, the most well-known of which was called Ansardin and together they launched a rebellion in January 2012. They saw immediate success and soon controlled large sections of northern Mali. Molli's army was not happy with this and blamed the leadership of President Amadu Tummani Toé for the poor showing and in March overthrew him in a coup. Naturally, the coup focused everyone's attention on events in Bamako in the south and with its opponent distracted, the MNLA and the Islamists successfully captured nearly all of northern Mali, including the major towns of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kadal.

[00:06:16]From what I've read, the MNLA was much more responsible for these military victories than Ansardine and the other Islamist groups. Professor Jeremy Keenan of the University of London School of Oriental and African Studies was quoted in the Los Angeles Times saying, "What seems to happen is that when they move into a town, the MNLA takes out the military base, not that there's much resistance, and the leader of Ansardine goes into town and puts up his flag and starts bossing everyone around about Sharia law."

[00:06:49]Flushed with success and perhaps seeing themselves as the group mostly responsible for it, the MNLA unilaterally declared the independent state of Azawad on April 6th, 2012. It was at this point though that the diverging goals of the MNLA and Ansardine really started to become a problem and Ansardine and the other Islamist groups basically started pushing the MNLA aside as they pursued their goals of creating something analogous or somewhat similar to the Islamic State that then existed in Iraq and Syria.

[00:07:24]Tensions kept rising until on the 26th of June in the city of Gao, open conflict broke out between the MNLA and several Islamist groups. And the MNLA was defeated.

[00:07:37]Within a few days, the Islamists were also in control of Timbuktu and Kadal.

[00:07:41]And by October, the MNLA had been pushed out of all of northern Mali except for a few small strongholds.

[00:07:49]With Islamist terrorists in control of half of the country, the government of Mali did what the governments of former French colonies have been doing for decades. They turned for help to France.

[00:08:01]4,000 French troops backed by an additional 3,000 troops from an international coalition were deployed to Mali as part of Operation Serval, which commenced in January 2013. Over the next 18 months, the French forces successfully retook much, but not all, of northern Mali. One key exception was the city of Kadal. The Islamist base there abandoned the city shortly after the arrival of French troops. But before the French could take the city, the MNLA moved in and set up shop, and the French, more focused on flushing out Islamist terrorists, left them alone.

[00:08:38]At the start of operation surval in January 2013, a faction of ansardin led by al- kabas a tala broke away and created a new group called the Islamic movement of Azawad. In May 2013, this group moved to Kadal where the MNLA was in charge and merged with another Tuare group called the High Council for the Unity of Azawad. This is one of just dozens of organizational shifts that have happened during this conflict. But I'm bringing this one up because both Intel and the High Council for the Unity of Azawad will be important later on in our story. So remember them. In 2015, with French troops still working to clear northern Mali of Islamist militants, Mali's government and the MNLA signed a peace deal in Algeria known as the Alir Accord. The Tuare rebels agreed to stop fighting and in exchange they got effective control of Kadal. This allowed the French military to focus solely on attacking Islamist militias, most of whom united and rebranded in 2017 to form the Jamaat Nusat al-Islam while Muslim or JNIM.

[00:09:49]France was able to contain the JNIM, but it was never able to fully drive them out of the country. Basically becoming what is known as a forever war. And it might have continued forever, but in 2021, a series of military coups rocked Mali once again, bringing to power an army officer named Asami Goita.

[00:10:09]This coup really upset the international community that had been supporting Mali in its efforts to regain control of its country. President Emanuel Macron suspended France's military operations and announced a phased withdrawal to be completed over the next year and new president as Goa responded to the French withdrawal by hiring the Russian private military company then known as the Vagner Group. This involvement by Vagner was not officially acknowledged for several years. But by late 2021, with French forces being drawn down, Russian soldiers and military equipment started being observed in various places. And the Russian military presence and influence in Mali has only grown over time.

[00:10:52]Okay, so we've covered a lot just now.

[00:10:54]Let's recap before we move on to the next stage.

[00:10:59]Mali is beset by two types of insurgents. separatists who want to create a Tuare homeland called Azawad in the north and an Islamist group now known as the JNIM which wants to establish a theocratic state that could start in Mali and then be extended as much as possible. Meanwhile, Mali is now ruled by a military dictator who has turned his back on Mali's traditional ally, France, and instead relied on Russian mercenary forces to help hold back the insurgencies.

[00:11:29]Okay, so let's skip ahead a couple years now to a moment when President Goita did something which in retrospect was monumentally stupid.

[00:11:39]In October 2023, in contravention of the 2015 Alier's agreement between the MNLA and Mali, Mali's army supported by Vagner attacked the Tuare rebel stronghold of Kadal. At the time, the stupidity of this move was not obvious.

[00:11:56]The attack was successful and the MNLA, the High Council for the Unity of Azawad, and other Azawad independence groups were forced out into the desert.

[00:12:05]Vagner troops raised their flag over the city, the first public acknowledgement that Russian mercenaries were taking part in the conflict. And for the first time in over a decade, the government was in control of every major city in Mali. Happy days, right? Well, not exactly. Ripping up the peace deal with the Tuare militants effectively opened up a second insurgent front for Molli's military to fight. Yes, the Tuaregs had lost their stronghold in Kadal, but being forced to reorganize in the desert turns out not to have been a major problem for them. And the world learned this in July 2024 when an umbrella group of Tuare militias attacked a column of Vagner mercenaries, killing a claimed 84 Russians and 47 Malians, as well as capturing several Russian armored vehicles and other equipment. Further improving their readiness to fight. Four major pro- Azawad militant groups including the MNLA, the High Council for the Unity of Azawad, and a faction of the Arab Movement of Azawad unified to form the Azawad Liberation Front, the FLA. And remember Al- Kabas Aalah, the former Islamist militant who left Ansardine to join the High Council for the Unity of Azawad. He was appointed military leader of the FLA. See, I told you that would be an important fact for later on. Perhaps because Intel has ties to Mali's Islamist militias, the FLA appears to have been able to negotiate an alliance with the JNIM and another group called Islamic State Sahal Province, the ISSP. And whether Mali's government could have predicted it or not, this combination of forces, which may not agree on long-term goals, but were all united in wanting to see Mali's government overthrown, were about to launch a stunning three-pronged surprise attack.

[00:13:58]On April 25th, the JNIM launched a fierce attack on Bamako and the South, initiated by a suicide car bomb that took out Mali's defense minister. The JNIM has since seized checkpoints on major highways around Bamako, effectively laying siege to the capital.

[00:14:16]Simultaneously, the FLA attacked Kadal, forcing a retreat of the Malian and Russian forces based there and in the surrounding area. And once again, the FLA are in control of the city.

[00:14:28]Meanwhile, in the Far East, the ISSP, at least temporarily, took control of Manaka. It's a very complicated and fast-moving situation. And because of the delays between me filming, editing, and publishing this video, it's unlikely that any more up-to-date information I give you will be accurate by the time this is published. So, instead of talking about the specifics of the military action, I'd like to talk about the differences in structure between the attacks of 2012 and the ones that happened in April. The most important difference in my opinion is that unlike 2012 where most of the fighting was concentrated in the north of Mali, the three insurgent groups have mounted a coordinated campaign across the entire country. This opens up some fascinating possible outcomes I'll discuss in a moment. Secondly, unlike 2012 when it was my impression that the MNLA led the attacks and were supported by Ansardine and other Islamist groups, this attack appears to be led by the Islamists in the JNIM who not only launched the critical attack on Bamaka, but are also reported to have provided support to the attacks in other parts of the country.

[00:15:37]And lastly, unlike 2012, if Molli's government finds itself overwhelmed, it can't realistically turn to France for support. Yes, it is getting training and some support from Russian mercenaries, now reorganized and renamed the Africa Corps following the June 2023 Vagner rebellion. But so far, Russia's support hasn't been very effective. So, as long as the alliance between the JNIM and the FLA holds, the situation for the government of Mali is really serious. It may not hold. This alliance may break just like the one between the MNLA and Ansardine did in 2012.

[00:16:16]But what if it doesn't? What if the JNIM takes Bamako and is then happy to consolidate power in the much more populous South, leaving the FLA to rule a newly declared Azawad in relative peace. It's not a crazy scenario. And if this happens and if a new deacto independent Azawad emerges, well, I think it might last for a relatively long time. Here's why I think that the newly renamed Africa Corps has been effective at helping Molli's army combat pockets of rebellion. But Russia, especially with its war in Ukraine going badly at the moment, almost certainly lacks the manpower and money to help Mali fight the much larger war it is now facing. France is unlikely to support Goita's dictatorship. But even if France could be convinced to support Mali's government, and I think this is very unlikely for the foreseeable future, but bear with me. Even if France did enter the fight, their first priority would be to ou the JNIM from the capital and the rest of the densely populated south, not ending the FLA's control over what is in effect a remote desert region. Lastly, Molli's military government does have allies in power in Nishair and Burkina Faso, and there are reports of Nishair's air force bombing insurgent positions, but the region that the FLA controls is bordered by Algeria. And since 2012, Algeria has positioned itself as a neutral arbiter between the government of Mali and the insurgents. That's why the 2015 deal was negotiated in Alers.

[00:17:51]So it seems unlikely that the Algerian military will be intervening on behalf of either side in this conflict. All of this means that a newly declared Azawad, if that happens, may not face any immediate threat to its territory from any direction.

[00:18:08]All of this is highly speculative and it's going to be weeks, months, maybe years before it's really clear who controls what territory in Mali. But I'll be doing my best to follow events in Oswad and I will make more videos when there is more news to cover.

[00:18:25]There's also one other side of this very complicated conflict that needs to be discussed.

[00:18:31]Ukraine.

[00:18:33]In July 2024, following the successful Tuare attack on the Vagner mercenary column, Ukrainian intelligence spokesperson Andre Yusov was quoted saying, "The rebels received all the necessary information they needed to conduct a successful military operation against Russian perpetrators of war crimes." In other words, it looks like Ukraine passed on intelligence about Russian troop movements to Tuare militias. Molly has gone further, accusing Ukraine of supplying the FLA with drones and other equipment. Ukraine has denied this. But even if it's only intelligence that's being shared, it's a fascinating example of how Russia's inability to defeat Ukraine is once again restraining Russia's ability to project power around the globe.

[00:19:20]Okay, that's it for now, but I'll be updating this story hopefully in future videos and also in my new free monthly newsletter, which you can sign up for using a link in the description. And I'll see you guys in the next video.