Jeff Rich | Is China's Timidity In Face Of US Aggression A Mistake?

Added: 2026-05-14

[00:00:00]But we are here nonetheless. We're going to do the news. I see my guest is in the background and I would like to bring him on. He is a damn good friend of this show and he has a damn good show of his own. And of course I talking about the one and only Jeff Rich. How you doing Jeff?

[00:00:19]>> Very well Jamal. How are you?

[00:00:21]>> I am doing fine. I am doing fine and I'm glad that you can join me. Let me bring let me bring you in properly. We are joined with Jeff Rich Doc, I'm sorry, Dr. Jeff Rich. I always want to get that right. Um, Dr. Okay, I don't have my glasses. Dr. Jeff Rich. He's a historian, author, retired government official from Melbourne, Australia with a PhD in history and uh, what is this?

[00:00:49]and over third three decades of experience in government.

[00:00:54]He created the burning archive YouTube channel and Substack where he covers commentaries, book reviews and interviews, world history, culture and politics. He has written uh several books including 13 ways of looking at a bureaucrat and every time you come on I always in the burning archive is a damn good channel. It's one of those channels that I really really like. You cover history, you cover the interviews, all of these things. Um, and I find myself learning right much from your channel, Jeff. So, thank you for that.

[00:01:29]>> How are you doing today, by the way?

[00:01:31]This is evening for you. This is night time for you, actually.

[00:01:34]>> Oh, yeah. It's good. It's been a beautiful autumn day here in Melbourne.

[00:01:39]Had a little walk in the sun. So, yeah, it's been good. Um, but I guess all the action's happening somewhere in Beijing tomorrow.

[00:01:48]It it it is I mean I I want to hit you on two points. One, >> there was an article that came out in the Atlantic by Kagan >> and the article is named Checkmate in Iran.

[00:02:07]And he basically makes the point of saying that what Donald Trump has done has been the worst catastrophe that America has suffered. even going beyond the Vietnam War in regards to scale how bad it is. And the main argument basically was the problem is that you can't walk this back. It's a catastrophe. If you escalate, it doesn't fix the situation, makes the situation worse. By the same token, how do you not do something like meaning you're Trump is in a bond?

[00:02:46]Um, and Kagan's point was there is no clear way of getting out of this without the US suffering a catastrophic defeat.

[00:02:55]Meaning this is a checkmate and if it's not a checkmate, we're damn close. Give me your take on that, especially the fact that Kagan, Arch Neoon, is the one that is making this case.

[00:03:08]>> Yes. Well, I I think his article did not mention uh for example America's strategic defeat in the war in Ukraine sponsored by his spouse Victoria Nuland.

[00:03:20]But uh that aside, so his the accuracy of his claims may be disputed. I'm not 100% sure this is such a checkmate for the United States. It's not to say it's a catastrophic or a terrific, you know, strategic blunder, but I don't know if they're quite in the a position of really being defeated as opposed to being frustrated perhaps in achieving all the aims that they they set out to achieve. And I guess one of the ways you have to test whether it's a strategic defeat is to ask what what is the strategy that they were really pursuing uh beneath all the the shift in claims and the shift in rhetoric and you know has that has that strategy been terminated by Iran's actions or is it just been delayed or put off or redirected? uh and I'm not convinced that strategy has been defeated. There's been a a fantastic piece by uh uh another substract writer Neil Benila.

[00:04:33]I've had her on my show and I think she's been on Pascal Latar's show neutrality studies and a few other other things as well.

[00:04:41]and she's gone through a lot of the sort of um you know US military um doctrinal documents, the sort of training documents, the meeting records over the last 10 years ago or so and has identified this real shift in American strategy since the shale oil revolution of um actively pursuing sort of energy strangulation of both China and you know the other uh the other geopolitical rivals of the United States around the world with a uh I don't know a a growingly reckless abandon about the consequences on the rest of the world. So, so the I mean that strategy is not necessarily going to go away even though they might need to press pause for a while on the sort of immediate hostilities around Iran.

[00:05:43]So, I'm not sure uh Kagan is is not sort of overegging the pudding and really saying, you know, put me in Victoria, Newland and others back in charge.

[00:05:58]um which of course none of that is to endorse what America's done, but I think it's also perhaps not to get carried away with uh um uh how much of a setback this is going to be for the United States.

[00:06:15]So I think the main point true I agree with you >> that just because America was let's say um you beat back the bully doesn't necessarily mean the bully stops. Agree.

[00:06:28]Yep.

[00:06:29]>> Yeah.

[00:06:29]>> But I think I do agree with the piece and it's America.

[00:06:38]I've said this morning one time, shadow is a power um shadow is a I mean a power is a shadow in the wall. M >> and you know it's one thing for America to threaten and Iran was responding to the threats if we think about it before the war where America would say well we want a deal we want to negotiate we want to force you to have x amount of nuclear you know enrichment or whatever and Iran was agreeing to many of the terms despite the fact that America shouldn't have been able to tell Iran to do It's the issue of the war and the moment that you let's say partake on that war and you're not able to accomplish your objectives.

[00:07:26]Okay. Then the demands change. You can't get what you wanted to get before and not just not get what you wanted to get before. You now lost something materially in that conflict which was the straight of moose that Iran now knows you can't do anything about. So there's you've lost something in the context of the war in a way that beforehand would have never taken place. I I think that's the point that they're making. It's like not only can you not escalate because if you escalate this issue of let's say um opening the straight becomes less relevant because there is no oil to get through the street in the first place because they've destroyed the oil infrastructure. Meaning anything that you do in the situation is bad.

[00:08:20]Like there's no way out of this without looking bad. And I think that's kind of the main point that Kagan is making.

[00:08:27]>> Yeah, look, I agree. And I think definitely America's authority. Um, and this is what you say about, you know, power is a shadow on on the wall.

[00:08:38]>> Um, you know, you can't just claim authority. You know, people give authority to you. And I think one of the consequences of uh particularly this war against Iran has been you know a real loss of American authority around the world and you know perhaps to some level a loss of fear but I I think people I mean that's where I think people to also perhaps just be a little bit cautious because you know who knows how America might react to that. I mean, who knows what Trump's going to do after the meeting uh with with, you know, the Chinese uh leaders on the next couple of days, whether he will, you know, engage in another escalation to sort of reassert his uh uh authority and masculinity. But I think this is the point that Kagan is making that there has been this sort of uh what does he say? He says, "America's allies in East Asia and Europe must wonder about American staying power in the event of future conflicts." So, he's he's sort of to me he's using the embarrassment of the Iranian strategy, if you like, to sort of make a case for for America musling up in, you know, a continued effort to global primacy. So, so it it's it it's it's a sort of a a positioning effort, I think, really on his part rather than a genuinely um frank and honest sort of analysis of the situation.

[00:10:24]>> Yeah.

[00:10:25]>> And you know, I guess the other thing is it's um you know, uh that there's not really a secure settlement of what's going to be happening around the Hormoo Strait, etc., uh or Iran's, you know, continued future security or the relationships with all those other states around the Gulf. So, so it's going to be, I don't know, it could be quite some time before this really gets to the point where people can declare clearly well, what has been the outcome of this conflict rather than sort of calling the board a little bit too early. And I think this is uh one of the things at the moment because you know America is pursuing the or the USA is pursuing these conflicts everywhere around the world. It's not to my mind it's not really like a world war. It's more like this sort of rolling series of small wars uh which get you know turned the heat gets turned up and down on them uh depending on circumstances and it's just so so very dangerous and and I just don't think uh despite the uh I guess the positive signs about Iran's resistance and all that sort of thing uh despite some of the successful outcomes despite the strikes on the bases etc. It doesn't mean the USA isn't going to sort of reorganize and reposition and find another way to sort of hit hit its um opponents in a different sort of way and with a different set of tactics.

[00:12:11]Uh and I really think I mean you know uh this you know bridging into the US uh US China meeting I do think um you know the the big states around the world who have got an interest in a genuinely you know fairer better system of international relations um you know do need to think about how do they deal with this violent lawless United States you know it's I mean I I I've wondered for some time whether China is really being consistent with its principles of you know global governance initiative and global civilization initiative and all these you know you things um when it's you know doing deals with Trump about you know soybeans and critical min minerals uh in the midst of a war that even acknowledges is a aggressive illegal war against uh one of its critical allies.

[00:13:18]It it just does seem it doesn't there's just too much of a gap I think between principled rhetoric and actual substantive action >> for me to feel entirely comfortable with the way the way China is doing it.

[00:13:38]>> No, that is That is a fascinating question and I've had that question with the guests who cover Asia also. Basically, how does a country that claims to believe in win-win relationships deal with a country that don't believe in win-win relationships? That is that's the zero sum country. We the win or lose. We're not playing go, we're playing chess.

[00:14:03]>> It becomes that and that is a fascinating dynamic to me. I mean, for the first time, at least in my lifetime, the United States has to deal with someone as a peer, not as a subordinate.

[00:14:16]>> And China continuously makes that point over and over again. And it comes across as they're a little insecure about that point, if that makes sense. But they make that point emphatically. We are not as board. This is not the 1980s. This is not the 2000s. You're going to deal with us as an equal. But as you point out, it gets super interesting when you have to deal with them as you're widely considered losing a war to a regional power.

[00:14:47]>> So the the mechanism that the US uses of threats and bullying looks absurd in the context of you dragging yourself to Beijing after losing a war. I that's fascinating to me. Give me your take on this meeting between Trump and Xi Jinping. What do you think Trump is trying to get out of this? I mean, they're supposed to meet tomorrow. Uh well, I think Trump is trying to get some good domestic outcomes in terms of a polit, you know, political wins for him ahead of the uh the midterm elections to look like he's winning as well as to generally, you know, assert I think to assert himself as, you know, um the G2 concept, you know, doing the big deals with the big big players like Xiinping.

[00:15:40]But the the this I've been checking a lot of the think tanks and uh some of the American media about how they're interpreting this meeting and what would be a successful outcome. And you know, the Atlantic Council for example basically says the successful outcome is if Trump doesn't stuff up um with really I mean there's I think five main issues that people are really talking about the Iran war uh where you know there seems to be some suggestion that maybe just maybe Trump wants to somehow get China to put a little bit of distance or a little bit more pressure on Iran uh you know support them but with some sort of pressure >> uh and then and then there's all the sort of trade issues as well. Uh and but a lot of that seems to simply be extending the trade truce on the tariff war that began uh you know sort of late last year in the in the summit meeting in Korea between uh Xi Jinping and uh Trump. And a lot of the practical outcomes people are talking about there are just sort of process issues like having a a meeting, you know, that can coordinate things and whitelist certain products off the sort of tariff list uh or agree to things that um you know there was disagreement on last time uh after the previous summit meeting. And then there's the Taiwan issue. There seems to be a lot of anxiety in the American security uh securitytocracy that uh uh Trump might sort of soften the language on Taiwan or do some sort of uh arrangement around the Taiwan defense spending.

[00:17:42]Again, you know, um a lot of it is is pretty minor um issue. or or minor progress or issues, minor changes I guess in position like uh you know oppose or support you know slight slight nuances of words about how America refers to Taiwan.

[00:18:07]>> Yeah. Uh and then there's some issues around AI and tech and also sort of the the old perennial of China US uh summit meetings in recent times which is fentinel.

[00:18:21]Um and um I noticed the Chinese media was making a big deal about a joint sort of drug bust between US and Chinese drug enforcement agencies just in the last few days. So, so it seems atmospherics of process on the other hand there's a lot of talk about China wanting stability, stabilization of the relationship particularly for the broad economic environment, export markets, energy costs, all that sort of thing.

[00:18:55]Um but you know uh stabilization and Donald Trump's presidency seem to be contradictions in terms. So I uh it it just seems to me to be perhaps a uh another one of these summits that will get slightly different interpretations of those outcomes on on issues that you know have significance I think and certainly the Taiwan issue is very significant but the actual actual changes in positions being discussed uh in the meetings between leaders is are really uh to my mind at least or my assessment at least are a are pretty minor uh and then we'll get pumped up by Trump is you know 13 out of 10 for his meeting that sort of thing.

[00:19:50]So, you know, I think it's probably the most significant and historic meeting between a US and China leader uh but since Joe Biden's uh meeting with Xiinping in San Francisco. Do you remember that one Jamal?

[00:20:06]>> In San Francisco.

[00:20:09]>> There you go.

[00:20:10]>> The meeting in San Francisco. That's right.

[00:20:12]>> This was during Joe Biden's ter.

[00:20:14]>> Yeah. Yeah. I I I think I think all of us will be saying the same thing about this meeting in six months.

[00:20:22]>> Oh, okay. Like Yeah. What like really they were met in so >> Yeah. No, they met in San Francisco.

[00:20:29]There was a lot of uh effort and pressure by the I think it was in the last year or so or the the year before the election year in the United States.

[00:20:39]There was a lot of effort and pressure to get Xinping to go to San Francisco.

[00:20:43]They had a big meeting.

[00:20:46]you know the usual talk and the issues were pretty much the same. you know, Xiinping gave him a lecture about steering the great ship of uh, you know, US China relations and there's some talk about, you know, cooperation on fentinel. Uh, but nothing terribly important really happened and the same old institutional um, positions sort of rolled on uh, with the different different conflicts. So, I think, you know, it'll be interesting to see how it goes. I'm worried that, you know, Trump will get through this, make his announcement and then engage in more aggressive action against Iran and then Cuba or whatever because that seems to be his operating style. But I don't think it's going to lead to anything substantial and enduring.

[00:21:40]Uh and I think there's just probably I think probably from both China and certainly from the United States too much emphasis being placed upon you know the the the two most powerful countries in the world and the leaders sitting down with each other and working it out rather than the sort of deeper institutional issues to do with how the inter international system works and international law works. And unless we start to sort of refocus our attention on that, I think these sort of um headline grabbing meetings between China and the USA are uh are not really going to change anything or or deliver on China's professed goals to develop uh you know uh an international system consistent with the principles of its global governance initiative.

[00:22:37]But see, I don't know how China would accomplish that objective anyway with the US. Like, meaning >> no, >> but this this is what I mean. It's sort of like it's sort of playing along while uh the US acts the bully to the whole world. Yeah.

[00:22:57]>> Uh and it's, you know, to my mind at some point it needs to much more decisively, you know, break with that and say, "No, look, you know, unless you start behaving like this, uh, all deals are off, you've just got to start behaving like a civilized country, um, or at least a country that's compliant with basic international norms." And, you know, >> that's that's the rub, I think. Yeah. If you think about it, What China has done, China has effectively said, "Look, we're not going to give you rare earths because ultimately we don't want to give you stuff that you're going to use for missiles to attack us later." So there's that, right? Then you have this kind of situation where China hasn't acquies to let's say US demands per se. Now they they may and they may talk this thing of well we believe in so and so and so and so. I think your point is but you haven't done anything to further that >> like meaning sure you could say we're not going to go along with the US's ability to build weapons that's going to attack us. So we're going to put a slowdown for that stuff. And China would even make the argument, we believe we have a strategic win because for all intents and purposes, you can't attack us in this moment without effectively losing and we will continue to develop and make relationships where we will get to the point that you we are unassailable, meaning it becomes clear that you can't attack us. It seems like they're playing for time until they grow to the point where they believe that they're unassailable. That seems >> well that and look that may be true, but I guess this is where I'm wondering where it's exposing, you know, and and you know this I I've been wondering about this. I'm not 100% sure about this. You know, like you know, I've spoken over time with Warrick and Warrick Pal and KJ know and and others about this this whole dilemma. Many of whom say, well, you know, China's you following a principal path and, you know, now's not the time to add to the, you know, throw throw fire on the flames.

[00:25:22]>> Yeah, that's their take. Uh but you know I guess whose house is burning down right now you know who beds are burning uh it's maybe it's not China's although it's certainly having an impact and at what point uh you know is there a greater expectation from the world uh that there will be stronger stronger I guess resistance of some kind and you I'm simply not in a position to know well what's an effective strategy or anything like that uh no longer work for governments um and no longer you know have access to the kind of information that might enable those sort of judgments but I just can't believe that there can't be more done and especially like sometimes when you read the Chinese media rhetoric uh about the meetings with Iran and the upcoming meetings with with uh with uh with with Trump, you know, it it feels like it's disconnected with reality. Uh you know, it's sort of all these high-minded principles.

[00:26:40]>> Okay, but what are you going to do about you know, this problem and this problem and this problem and this problem? And um you know I think uh I think it's a question worth asking even if if we don't necessarily know what the answer is. I think it's perhaps not unreasonable to say you know is it just okay for China to play for time while other countries around the world uh are really struggling. I mean in India uh Narendra Modi's sort of you know there's the increasing the sort of fuel sort of soft rationing and getting people to work from home and you know is having really quite significant impacts etc. And that must be the case all around the world. It is >> um yeah and you know and in in the somewhere in the you know Pacific Ocean there's a El Nino effect which apparently is brewing which could potentially be a very bad Elnino effect which may have you know dramatic um you know drought weather type impacts especially on a place like Australia which you know sometimes has really dead you know dreadful droughts in an agricultural country like Australia has dreadful droughts every now and then with the El Nino effect. So there's some, you know, I just feel at some point uh I remember, you know, sometimes when you have a crunch decision in government and uh you really need, you know, you you're faced with a difficult choice cuz there's no really good option and someone might come in and start talking about high mind principles of this and that and this and that And you know the ministers will just sort of kind of roll their eyes and sort of you know turn away and say can we have the next uh presenter please we need to talk realities here kind of thing >> and I just get the feeling >> sometimes when I listen to Chinese officials um it's a bit like that reality >> yeah and it might just be there's a public facade and a a very different discussion privately but you know why why why is that the case >> I guess your thing is you don't see is it that you're thinking of China as a hedgeimon or as >> a hedgeimon in in training in that sense >> I mean because China always makes this argument we're not a hedgeimon we're not trying to be a hedgeimon that's not what we're effectively trying to do it's like but dude >> whether you are trying to or not >> a the US thinks you are >> and B you seem to be going in that direction even if you're trying to be this kind of benign hedgemon which I'm not sure exists. I think the thing your point is the US has taken has removed all notions of international law >> and has become a force unto itself and has gone rogue >> and has decided to just randomly attack countries in a way that is Hitlerian in its in inspiration. Meaning the US doesn't seem to be constrained anymore whether they're going after Cuba, Venezuela, Yemen, Iran, or whatever other actor that they necessarily want to go after. And even in the context of the Ukraine war is fully backing that war and seems I've just given it over to the CIA to continue to go along with it or given it over to Europe. This is outrageous behavior.

[00:30:27]>> And the other force in the world seems to be out to lunch or at the very least seems to just be making proclamations about we think this is bad. We think that's bad. We don't think you should do this. Let's have a conversation about other stuff that doesn't really entirely pertain to this.

[00:30:46]>> I I understand your point. It does seem disconnected.

[00:30:50]>> Why do you think it's disconnected?

[00:30:52]Meaning, >> yeah, >> why do you think they seem to be missing this moment? Or do you think they're missing the moment at all? Like, as you point out, maybe there's a difference between what they say versus what they're doing behind the scenes, >> but we can't see what they're entirely doing behind the scenes. We would assume that they're working with Russia and China, but we don't entirely know that, >> at least not in their rhetoric.

[00:31:17]>> Yeah.

[00:31:17]>> Why do you think there's this disconnect? Well, and look, there's there's also been a very long tradition within the United States, uh, sorry, United States, within China since, you know, the mid mid70s with Dang Xiaoing of of, uh, I guess cooperating more with the United States rather than with the first Soviet Union and then with, uh, Russia. uh uh you know um and there's certainly a lot of cooperation between China and Russia, but there's also a lot of uh interests and interests in in the United States. Um it could also I mean the American strategic culture I think has revealed you know over the last 10 20 years these sort of blind spots about its assessment of the world, the relative power of different countries, the capability of the United States, its ability to do everything anything it possibly could do, the the the inherent sort of belief that everybody in the world looks to America as the perfect example of everything, which is not the case, at least not in this part of Melbourne. And uh you know, I think especially in China, which does have uh without getting into the whole democracy autocracy type debate or or or suggest it's as simplistic as that, you know, it has a more closed political system.

[00:32:51]government has a different kind of political culture.

[00:32:56]Uh it may be that there are some other some similar kind of strategic blind spots. I mean, I I I think the whole rhetoric about China being, you know, this um 5,000y old civilization state with enduring values and has never never, you know, always pursues peace and harmony and never fights wars and never has aggressive intentions towards everyone is a a bit of a, you know, as much of a mythology, a political mythology about China's history as as, you America, the indispensable nation, the perfect republic is about the United States. So maybe there's some strategic gaps there.

[00:33:41]Maybe it's also just I mean it is very difficult.

[00:33:47]U but I do feel also in in a way under Dang Xiaoing uh the uh China did you know it sort of chose the United States you know to some degree. Uh uh uh I mean it I I know at one point we talked about you know collapse of the Soviet Union and and Gorbachov etc. I mean Gorbachov went to China in mid 1989 and you know some of the protesters in China were celebrating Gorbachov and uh you know uh the Chinese elite were contemptuous of Gorbachov um perhaps with some justification but you know I wonder if they'd been a little more pro-s Soviet Union at that point, less pro-America, they might have um had a had a dramatic impact on the world. I mean, it's total total speculation, but you know, there are these um I guess cultures, habits or habits of mind that sort of or dispositions that develop over time.

[00:35:03]>> Uh I think as well as just factional interests and all that sort of stuff. Um but I I just feel there's too much um you know it's presented as strategic patience and long long-term thinking but it might just be you know um uh an overconfidence in its its judgment about its ability to control a long-term future which may be as equally mistaken as some of the misjudgments being made by by the United States.

[00:35:40]>> Is it possible that it's not overconfidence, but it's insecurity?

[00:35:46]>> Meaning we're assuming that China is because all of this stuff is power.

[00:35:53]It's a presumption of power. It's meaning it's this um this appraisal of countries and their relative strengths and what they can accomplish within the context of what we believe those strengths are.

[00:36:07]>> And when we're looking at China, we're hearing them say things like um look, we are equals. We are um going to be regarded as equals. We're dealing with you as equals. And maybe they say that, >> but who knows if that's what they're assuming their position to be. Like maybe they're assuming their position is weaker than what they may be boosting it as and what they're saying it as. In which case they're like, "Look, we are not trying to engage in this moment.

[00:36:40]This is not where we are. Sure, we would say that. Sure, we're becoming something, but we're not entirely comfortable with dealing with the US, especially when it's effectively unrestrained in the way that it's unrestrained.

[00:36:56]>> Yeah, >> we can manage our power. We can get to the point where we will be there, but we're not there yet.

[00:37:02]>> Is it that?

[00:37:03]>> I mean, >> I think it I think it could be that. And and that's a reasonable doubt. And this is where I say, you know, like uh I'm simply not privy to some of the information, but if you put yourself in China's shoes, you got the Japanese, uh Philippines, uh other American bases all around you, um pointing various weapons at you and and constant uh hostile rhetoric really from uh pretty broad range of people in the United States as well. So uh and you know very old old you know crusading sort of ideological rhetoric and you know always think about Steve Bannon and his sort of take down the CCP nonsense and all of this sort of thing you know uh but uh you know an influential voice and there's a lot of people who sort of you know uh are sort of almost emotionally driven in a way to sort of view it in that way of of you know freeing China from the the evil communist influence. Um but I do think there is an element of insecurity there perhaps a quite reasonable in element of insecurity. Um and but I think it's also worthwhile people you know there tends to be I think in you know some of the alt media uh commentary space a a a presentation of you know United States as wild reckless stupid incompetent all of which is probably true uh but uh uh a counterpresentation of China is you know uh confusion long-term planners, perfect insight into the future, master diplomats, all this sort of stuff, you know, uh uh the the um you know, wisdom of the ancients of the ancients and you know, perfect judgment and that's you know that's just never going to be true. So there are there are I think blind spots in China's strategic culture. There are misjudgments about the changing world in China. Um there are recalc you know there are there are countries around the world particularly in South Asia etc who are and in the Gulf States who are probably making recalculations about you know uh relations with China as well as with the United States as well. Uh so um I just feel it's it's a pretty murky world and I think it's it it's worthwhile in our sort of discussions of these issues to just think well you know maybe maybe both China and the United States are pursuing you know um uh uh uh poorly adapted strategies for the changes that are act actually happening in the world and to some degree To me, it sometimes comes out in that insecurity you're talking about also sometimes comes out in China's response to you know the remilitarization of Japan and you know um like the the reaction to the Japanese prime minister's comments about Taiwan which I think some commentators view is you know perhaps a somewhat clumsy mistake um but the reaction ction in from some of the Chinese commentators has been really fierce. I mean I remember watching a discussion >> well well but it's it's also um almost well there was a discussion between Rick Sanchez and Victor Gale >> uh where he said uh he he was saying if uh anything like that I'm not exactly sure what the specific thing he was referring to should happen then China will insist upon its rights as a victor power in 1945 to do anything that is necessary >> yes >> to destroy Japan and it's sort of like whoa that escalated quickly sort of thing >> and to me that that is a response I mean I I get I totally understand the historical trauma, the emotional context, all that sort of stuff. But uh you know it is 80 years later uh and uh the current um people in Japan are nothing like the people who were running it in the early 1940s.

[00:42:05]down, >> right?

[00:42:09]>> I mean, I mean, come on. Like, what what Japan did um either to Korea or to China is >> Oh, I look I I I don't I don't dispute that. But >> yeah, >> but for for China which is talking about rebalancing the international system to you know uh reflect the realities of the changed world to be invoking uniquely privileged powers of a victor power in 1945 >> based on the organiza the situation in 1945 I think is is is is >> too low, >> too far. And you know, I I think at some point you know uh part of moving beyond I guess the 1945 settlement. I mean the world is slowly breaking out of that sort of 1945 world order settlement simply through the growth of so many countries around the world including China but not only China uh you know the the the changed distribution of power around the world all the rest of it and part of that has got to be acceptance that you know is it really still appropriate for both Japan and Germany to some degree to be living under a you know uh American imposed constitutional and security and other sort of arrangements that uh were were the outcome of war in 1945 or do we need to sort of gradually move our way to uh a different set of arrangements where I Japan can come into uh its own but not in the way that it was in the 1940s but in uh new sort of more peaceful development of itself uh in its own similarly you know with Germany I mean I'm not an advocate of militarization or anything like that but you know Germany is the you know geographically central economically central culturally central um country of Europe.

[00:44:36]Um and at some point, you know, it's it's its full strategic um uh identity perhaps needs to be enabled to move on from the sort of the history of uh before 1945. Which is not to say, you know, go back to, you know, the years between 1933 and 1945.

[00:45:04]Not at all saying that. But but part of accepting the changes of the multipolar world also is it's not just our favorites in the multipolar world. It's is everyone, you know, India's changed its role and Japan's changed its role and Africa's changed its role and Indonesia's changed its role. all these sort of sort of things. So uh this this tendency I think for China to sometimes um sort of close the discussion down to the 1945 victory to the the you know being one of the victor powers to being you know one of the big four with the United States and the British Empire uh and the Soviet Union in the in during the war is I I think it's it's a it's a I guess a strategic thought pattern that I think is ultimately not well adapted to the different world and I'm not saying by any means you know go back to Japan and of 1930s 1940s or Germany of that period but you know we also need to accept that those countries those societies the political cultures of those countries has changed fun, you know, very very significantly over the last 80 years and and their embeddedness in a in a big world is is very different as well. So the fears that you know uh a few words here and there suddenly going to bring back you know Japanese militarism as it was expressed you know in Nanjing and Shanghai you know Shanghai and all this sort of stuff. I I just think that is that's that's uh that that's a sort of inappropriate sort of activation of a historical trauma to >> trap you in a in a sort of strategic situation >> because I can make a counter argument on that one. I mean, so I I point that the the world is different.

[00:47:22]>> We're not in the same world they were in the 30s or 40s. True. Fair enough. But if you think about it, let let's take it to a different context.

[00:47:34]>> So, Russia was invaded multiple times to the tune of 30 40 million people and it was used basically invaded through Ukraine multiple location, multiple times.

[00:47:50]>> Um, Russia is now once again fighting a war in Ukraine.

[00:47:58]So this is on three occasions. The first two times you can say the Germans did it. If you want to add the war debt or the war guilt um on the Germans, I think it's more complicated. But just for the sake of argument, two wars that were effectively started in Europe by the Germans. And the Russians are fighting in Ukraine right now. this time basically with the backing of America and all of Europe going after them with Ukraine as a tip of the spear to do it.

[00:48:28]The US effectively used Ukraine as a tip of the spear to do it.

[00:48:33]>> The you the United States is also heavily involved in Japanese politics and Japanese militarism using Japan also as a tip of the spear to threaten China.

[00:48:47]This is after a bitter and vicious war that was fought by China also meaning I understand the point that the world and the context of the world has changed but from the standpoint of an empire that is using proxies to affect its political objectives against countries that don't like for example China or Israel with Iran or Europe or this matter in Ukraine with um Russia. All of this is dangerous. Like meaning if you're China and you're looking at this, you're seeing what the United States is effectively doing in Russia, you know you're next. You see what they're doing in Iran, you know you're next. And you know that if either of these countries, let's say, fall or the leadership changes, you're the next target. Why shouldn't they be hyperactive about the things that Japan is saying when it knows Japan's policy? It's not entirely Japan's policy.

[00:49:50]>> Yeah. But I mean, I think what they should be hyperactive about is, well, tell America to get the hell out of the West Pacific 80 years after the >> World War II and, you know, enable um positive cooperative relationships between the Koreas and Japan and, you know, uh, China and and Southeast Asia, Philippines, etc. I mean, uh, you know, uh, I live in the, you know, southwestern Pacific. We really don't need the United States to make life good down here. So, you know, Yankees go home. But uh but but I I feel I feel in a way they uh I I worry that China, you know, um jumps at shadows a bit about uh Japanese militarism and then aggravates the politics within Japan about that because everyone in Japan says, "Oh, well, you know, that was 80 years ago.

[00:50:56]You know, what are you talking about?"

[00:50:58]And and whereas the real issue is why is why is America attempting to have this sort of military web over the entire world across all of Eurasia. So >> I mean to me the the better move is for you know and Russia and China at times have talked about this of you know a Eurasian security architecture um with without the same level of external involvement and that means the United States and perhaps that is you know what is so significant about just coming back to the Iran thing because the the countries of that area are definitely saying, "Well, the US bases weren't much help." Where really were they? Um, uh, and that's one of the pillars of the sort of American occupation of Eurasia, if you like.

[00:51:56]There's there's the European one, there's the West, you know, Southwest Asian one to some degree. There's significant presence in South Asia as well. And, uh, clearly also around around the the West Pacific and China as well.

[00:52:13]And so it's this this um this uh containment I mean it is literally a containment strategy.

[00:52:22]Uh and and it appears now to be militarily not so well adapted to modern warfare.

[00:52:35]uh and it's not really helping helping diplomacy and positive cooperation uh between many of the countries. I mean, you know, maybe maybe if America withdrew from West Asia, uh, you know, uh, and a solution was found around, you know, the Israel sort of issue. Um, those states could develop in a in a in a different way. And maybe that's what the horn is straight solution ultimately is that there is a uh an arrangement between Oman and Iran maybe sponsored and supported by someone other than the United States that leads to you know the the you know safe passage of trade through the Hmoo straight without threats of American violence or any other violence. Um but I I feel uh the nature of the societies in South Korea and in uh Japan and probably also in China but you know I guess we're you know I'm not so uh familiar with that. Um uh you know they're not the same sort of societies that were waring in the 1930s and 1940s.

[00:53:58]I think there's more than enough uh possibility if you sort of take the United States and its guns and its bases and its gunboats out of the picture and its nuclear missiles out of the picture.

[00:54:13]Uh then perhaps those countries can actually find a genuine more peaceful cooperative arrangement given the extent of cultural ties between them. So, you know, um, uh, yeah. So, I mean, that's sort of >> obviously true. I mean, like it it's the blank check thing again, like it's >> if I if I give the Philippines, if I'm the US and I say, "Hey, Philippines, we're going to back you militarily.

[00:54:40]>> Does that make the Philippines more boisterous when dealing with China?"

[00:54:44]>> Yes. Same thing with Japan, right? It's not like Japan has Japan could not hold a candle to China at this point.

[00:54:52]>> No.

[00:54:53]>> However, if you're the US and you back them, does Japan get more boisterous believing that it has the blank check of the superpower?

[00:55:00]>> Yes. Same thing with Ukraine, right?

[00:55:02]Would Ukraine negotiate if Europe and the US pulled out its support? Yes.

[00:55:08]>> It's the issue of the blank check thing.

[00:55:12]Hey, we're a superpower. We're going to back you against whoever you're fighting. Oh, great. Now we have the backing of a superpower. Let's go and be, you know, be strong now that we have the backing of a superpower. It's that >> it's like I had this argument with somebody who I was pointing out that these countries could get along if it didn't necessarily have the backing of other countries egging it on um as opposed to trying to come to some level of resolution, prevent a war.

[00:55:41]>> Yeah. Yeah. It it's that if if the U if the US put it this way, if the US collapsed as an empire, >> the world immediately gets brighter in regards to its ability to negotiate and reconcile. It's just involved in everything. I mean, if you think of all the wars, I mean, hell, even what was taking place in the Sahel >> where you had this attack on um >> on Mali, >> these were like westernbacked terrorists that were rumaging and trying to overtake the country again and return it back >> to its control by France or control, you know, by proxy. I'm saying like you're right, but our it seems like it's this mad grab for hegemony or this mad grab um to maintain this kind of primacy >> where the world seems to be trying to move on >> and this naked violence seems to be this kind of you know the fall of soft power.

[00:56:43]It it's now this kind of hard we're going to control things. We're going to take the oil. We're going to take the energy. we're going to control the energy markets. We're going to do blah blah blah blah blah. I'm saying it seems that that is falling apart or the very least we don't have the capacity to do it in the way that we might have done in the 80s.

[00:57:01]>> Yeah.

[00:57:01]>> And that's what it seems like. I guess the question becomes how long does this last? And and look, there's this weird idea that's really quite common in particularly realist um like near Shimemer and stuff like that, realist international relations theories that the United States is like the pacifier of Europe. And I guess it also thinks of itself as maybe the pacifier of Asia somehow keeping you know Japan and China, you know, apart somehow. But uh you know the it's really quite deeply like you hear it a lot in the sort of geopolitical commentary space this idea that without the United States Europe would just be you know fighting each other like they have done for centuries kind of thing.

[00:57:44]uh and it's I mean it's it's a misunderstanding of those uh you know those great wars of the 20th century of the social revolts of the 20th century of the United States u involvement in all of that uh the United States um you know um similarity with so much of European national culture its participation in colonialism and particip ipation in global war, global small wars and all that sort of thing. Uh but it's still this pervasive idea of uh you know being the pacifier of the world, the the indispensable nation. That's another way of interpreting interpreting it. The one that somehow secures you know the pax americano that's never actually been at peace because it's been at war for all but you know whatever it is 10 years of its existence.

[00:58:41]Um and uh but it's it's really a pervasive idea even in like you know uh critics of American foreign policy that that um you know the the the hopeless Europeans or the pathetic Japanese uh if the Americans left they some somehow just revert to the the sort of ancient tribal hatreds that America imagined exist. existed before America got involved after 1945. And it's just I mean it's just it's one of these sort of um zombie ideas I think that really uh the American strategic culture should sort of let go so that it can just enable some of the other countries around the world to sort of you know come up with regional solutions on its own. I mean, you know, that's perhaps if there is ultimately some sort of brokering of an agreement around uh you know uh um free or you know you know safe passage through the hom straight for commercial traffic and all the rest of it and you know peaceful peaceful zone. People have talked about a replication of the Montro convention, which is the thing that sort of deals with the the Turkish traits from like the 1920s, 1930s.

[01:00:16]Um, then, you know, I think that would be a good thing. Uh, and it's it would be a model for how some of these uh, you know, it we don't need the US Navy to secure trade around the world. We probably need the US Navy to, you know, go home and fix American cities rather than patrolling the Homage Straits or or the Malaka Straits or the the Bass Strait or wherever they want to uh sort of, you know, check on the rest of the world and and keep us all in line.

[01:00:57]>> Yeah, agreed. And by the way, it would be better off for us also.

[01:01:04]>> Oh, absolutely. Absolutely. But the scary thing, the scary thing, uh, and I mentioned Neanella's work as well, and she's going to be bringing this out in some some, uh, essays soon, but the scary thing is there's like you hear all those technobros and their weird sort of libertarian sort of, um, you know, stuff society sort of visions of how America could go. uh there's there is this conscience sense of uh amongst the American strategic elites of pursuing these violent destructive strategies even though they know it's going to have a terrible consequence on the rest of the world and have a dreadful consequence on the society of America and you know America's society like its health care system etc is is you know not not the role model for the world.

[01:02:04]Everyone around the world thinks, you know, American society is not actually something that they they want to recreate in their own states. They they want to pursue something different. But but the problem with a a powerful transnational set of elites, you know, transatlantic elites is they've got a lot of institutional power, a lot of institutional inertia around them as well. So, it's very very hard to hard to displace. And I think that's just where where perhaps, you know, I'm just some, you know, writer in the South Pacific somewhere.

[01:02:48]But I really think, you know, it's not unreasonable for citizens around the world to perhaps ask a little bit more of China and of Russia in a way rather than sort of indulge the or or sort of play along with these grand strategy games of u the sort of American security elites.

[01:03:11]>> Yeah. Well, I would say there are two things that are, let's say, leading to that world.

[01:03:21]>> Unfortunately, they're going through a war in Ukraine and a warrant.

[01:03:27]And I would argue that this was god I don't want to say necessary but the US was not going to give up a strangle hold on the world without a fight for that strangle hold like can you imag like and I guess this could be the last question is there any situation where countries or um let's say political entities give up control or power without some kind of conflict in doing so. And this may just be the thematic struggle that has taken place that let's say rebalances the way the world sees its power arrangements. I mean are the Gulf States really going to look at the US as a protector after this?

[01:04:12]>> I don't know. Maybe not.

[01:04:14]>> What is Europe going to do when this war ultimately ends in regards to Ukraine and Russia? I don't know. But is Europe still going to go along with this idea for America after America effectively left the in the lurch to be burned down um a Russian giant on this border? Like I hope you get what I mean. Like is this >> the turn of the worm where the world recognizes, okay, well these bases weren't protection.

[01:04:42]>> Um Taiwan can't be defended.

[01:04:45]um Japan will get crushed in any kind of conflict, especially after seeing what took place in regards to Ukraine or for that matter what took place in regards to >> um um America dealing with um Iran and particularly in regards to the Gulf States. I mean, for God's sake, the US troops fled their bases to run to hotels for protection.

[01:05:08]>> Like that's outrageous. like like they're trying point of a military base is to be able to use it to attack and these bases were crushed. Do you think that this is a rebalancing or do you think that the world just tries to hobble back to its safe daddy America?

[01:05:25]>> Uh look, I don't think there's really any realistic prospect of the safe going back to America. I mean like the way I've observed just the response say in the Indian media over the last 12 12 months or so.

[01:05:40]>> Yeah.

[01:05:40]>> There was a fair bit of sympathy towards America at the early um part of the Trump administration and there's not now. I mean there is always some but there's a significant move on from that.

[01:05:55]uh the mood in Australia, you know, the the general sense that America is both untrustworthy and incapable is pretty ubiquitous. So, and people are just realizing they've got more scope for initiative and cooperation and and you know, more tools in their toolbox than perhaps they realized perhaps you know, previously. So, I just can't see it coming back. But but I also can't see the American elite sort of going gently into that good night. So I do feel it's going to require something a bit more painful than just a strategic defeat. Um for that to happen, uh there needs to be some sort of shock. Um, I wish I knew what that shock could be uh with the least amount of pain and the most effect. But that's also what sort of um scares me to go back to the Robin Robert Kagan article as well because fundamentally he's saying um you know Trump was hopeless. let's get rid of Trump and we'll get back to the good old American strategy of dominating the whole world again, you know, rocking all around the world. Um and it I think it's that mindset that needs to be um dealt with in the American political culture in in the same way as you know pretty successfully really Germany and Japan have dealt with their uh in different ways have dealt with their legacy of you know supremacist imperialist sort of militarist ideologies.

[01:07:46]there is a supremacist militarist um uh sort of ideology uh imperialist ideology that is you know u in the bones of the American political elite and it just it's just got to go and uh the world will be a much safer place when it does.

[01:08:09]Um, Jeeoff, I'm going to let you go, but I do want to point out that The Atlantic has an article out called China believes America will flame out.

[01:08:17]>> Beijing real political restraint is all part of a long-term plan. And I think this is what we were talking about in this conversation. We nailed, you know, conversations that >> um Jeff man, always appreciate talking to you, Dr. Jeff Rich. And just to give your bio, I have my glasses now so I can read this. I'm gonna have to give you a shorter bio.

[01:08:41]>> No, no, it's fine. I just I just didn't have my glasses. Um, Dr. Jeff Rich, he's a historian, author, retired government official from Melbourne, Australia with a PhD in history and over three decades of experience in government. He created the Bernie archive YouTube channel and substack. Both are fantastic. Again, I say it. I say it again. When he shares comment, he shares commentary, book reviews, and interviews on world history, culture, and politics. Has written four books, including 13 ways of looking at a bureaucrat. Jeff, you have my appreciation, man. You be safe and thank you. You have a good night. Okay.

[01:09:20]>> Thanks, Jamal. Ciao.

[01:09:21]>> You have Bye-bye. All right, we have come to the end of this