Virtual Briefing Series | Is the Iran War Triggering a Realignment in the Gulf?

Añadido: 2026-05-14

[00:00:00]All right, good morning and welcome everyone. Um, my name is Zana Alshabe.

[00:00:03]I'm the director of communications here at the Middle East Institute. Thank you for joining today's briefing. As a reminder, we're on the record and we'll be discussing the shifting alliances in the Gulf. The Gulf region is at the center of an alliance recalibration.

[00:00:18]Prompted in part by the Iran War, the UAE is taking the brunt of Tahran's attacks, pushing the government in Abu Dhabi to rethink its security ties. What does that mean for the region and how can Washington deal with these shifting dynamics?

[00:00:34]To explain all of that and more, we're joined by two great experts. Brian Culis, senior fellow for US foreign policy here at MEI. Uh Brian's career included time at the National Security Council, and we're also joined by Taiba, a fellow at the Middle East initiative at Harvard Kennedy School. D served for 12 years in the UAE government across economic policy, foreign affairs, and national security. Thank you both for joining me today.

[00:01:01]>> Thanks, Anna. It's a pleasure.

[00:01:03]>> Um, as usual, we'll have a Q&A segment uh during this session. So, if you'd like to ask a question, please feel free to type it in the Q&A chat box here on Zoom, and I'll be sure to get through as many as I can. Brian, let's get started with you. There is a clear split in how the various GCC countries are responding to the Iran war. Some countries have remained diplomatically engaged with Thran while countries like the UAE appear to have chosen a slightly different path. Um, according to media reports, what's your reading of what's happening on the ground?

[00:01:40]>> Great. Uh, thank you Zena and first thanks to all the journalists and analysts who are joining us on this call. Uh we know a lot of people know a lot about this topic and we look forward to the dialogue and a special warm regard to those who offer support to the Middle East Institute, those on the board uh people who offer uh financial support. We couldn't do I mean I couldn't do the work without your support and I think it's great. First first answer your question uh um Zana is I I propose that we banish the label Gulf countries as much as possible. I know we need to group these countries together and they themselves have grouped them themselves together in the Gulf Cooperation Council for years. But what I've noted over the last few years well before this war is that the differences of views, the unique uh nature of each of these countries, their own histories, how they view themselves, um their capacities and things like this was a feature well before the war. And I think what happened as a result of the security and economic strains um on these countries, it's exposed sort of some of these divergences. And I know we're going to talk a lot about um the UAE with our friend Tar here, but other countries like Saudi Arabia and when they've come together and when they're so so first I would banish sort of this label because even in the run-up to this war as we all know uh Oman uh played uh a role in trying to mediate between uh the United States and Iran not only this year um but but last year as well in five five rounds of talks. But I think before the war, if there was one common thread, uh, and Tark may disagree with this, I'm not sure, is that most of the Gulf countries, I think all of them were not supportive of, uh, military action that began on February 28th. That's my read of it. Um, I had the benefit of meeting with many top officials in the couple of months um, uh, in the run-up to this war. And if there was a dominant mode, it was deescalation and trying with diplomacy. And that was not because they loved or had a lot of confidence in the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It was just a pragmatic decision that went back several years to try to open up ties. Now, after hitting the rebind button, where are we today? I think clearly uh some of the countries um that have been hit hard hard and the UA has been hit hardest and Tark is going to speak to that. They have adopted a different approach or they did during the the period of active combat.

[00:04:00]um that I I look at whether or not these reports, news reports of military actions by the UAE and Saudi Arabia are true. I I look at them as a tactical response to try to impose some sort of deterrence and send a message uh alongside, but I don't see it as a move by these countries to to get into a wider regional cataclysmic, you know, conflict. It was to send a message. And I think in the case of the Saudis, at least I understand, it was aimed at actually in the service of trying to get to a diplomatic deal. So I think the war exposed and further scrambled some of the divisions between uh Gulf countries uh these days. Um and clearly, you know, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, uh they've suffered a lot of the cost in terms of physical damage, security uh risks, and economic risks. Um, but but I think each in of themselves have their own uh view.

[00:04:54]And I think if there's a dominant concern that I hear right now about how they relate to the United States and Israel as the as the two main actors in this war is perhaps a lack of strategic consultation about the endgame, which we'll talk about later. There's been extensive cooperation on the defensive and military front, which I think is one. There's been discussions also on the economic front and and things like currency swaps and other things. But this absence of clarity about the endgame um in in in Iran uh and the lack of consultation, which is not a new thing coming from the United States, I think is is a is a key concern about where all of this is heading.

[00:05:37]>> Thank you, Brian. Um talk to us a little about the UAE's thinking. What lessons has it learned from this war?

[00:05:45]>> Yeah, I mean, look, the the the UAE has always been good at adapting. Um, it it's a it's a, you know, it's it moves fast. It evolves, its policy is very fluid. Um, and its thinking has really changed with this conflict. Um, they focused a lot on resilience. They really want to uh both internalized their capabilities a lot more. We're I'm I'm betting we're going to see an emergence of a larger defense industry in the Emirates. Um they're putting money in a lot of ports that are avoiding the trade of hormones. So they're looking to if this were to be a long-term problem, how do we thrive in this environment? Um but they're also hoping to find a balance um in the Gulf and in this conflict. Um, nobody expected Iran to target the Emirates as much as it did or the other uh countries, but they had to adapt. Um, and they've proven to be resilient so far in terms of how their thinking has shifted in terms of the regional alliances. Um, conflict isn't new to to between the Gulf States. And Brian, I know you don't want me to use that word, but I'm going to stick to it for now. Um but they've always found a way to get back to um seeing each other. The way I like to see it now, I know a lot of conversation is on the Saudi Arai rift. Um there's a disagreement there definitely. And the way I like to explain the way they view the world is um Saudi Arabia is monarchical. It's conservative. It's slow to change. You know, they like the status quo. While the Emirates takes this Silicon Valley approach to foreign policy, right? if it doesn't work, we're going to shatter the model and build something new. And those two models fundamentally, you know, they they have friction with each other. Um, does that mean this is going to be a long-term issue? Um, I don't know yet. Um, I don't think so. The Gulf is very good at surprising everyone and, you know, shaking hands eventually.

[00:07:46]>> Brian, do you agree with that assessment?

[00:07:49]>> Uh, I think that's right. Right. I mean, I think if you look at things like uh this rift between the Saud Saudi Arabia and UAE, it was just reported today that uh the two leaders had their fourth phone call uh since the war began. But one thing in the run-up to this war um on February 28th that I heard quite a lot from from top leaders was the concerns u between these two leading powers, I would call them in in the Gulf right now. uh largest economies uh in the region uh very much at odds on key geopolitical uh arenas questions like Sudan, Yemen, Somaliand and others.

[00:08:25]Those were the dominant discussion at least December, January, February in the run-up to this war with Iran. I think out of necessity because everybody was hit by Iran. uh and I you know heard from across the board officials in Qatar, in Saudi Arabia, everywhere that they would not move to a position where they were trying to pressure the United States or Israel to stop their action even though they weren't in favor of military action for fear that it would feed what the leadership in Thran wanted to do, which is essentially uh impose some sort of uh stress from the Gulf States on the United States and and and Israel for its military action. But these pre-existing conditions that were there um and were I think pretty dominant towards the end of last year earlier this year um I actually think were sort of natural for what we've seen from the Gulf. If you look at the long-term history, you know, the the close partnership between Saudi Arabia and the UAE in that period from say 2015 to 2020, I think was a unique feature of that time and those geopolitical uh conditions that existed at that time.

[00:09:31]What we're seeing right now in the run-up to this war and then in the aftermath where you see divergences between these two leading countries is sort of a return to some of the the the historical patterns that we've seen in that relationship. And some of this is quite natural, right? We see it even in the Western Hemisphere where US policy shifts towards its closest neighbors as well. It doesn't mean that we can't find they can't find room to cooperate as I think they have militarily on on many fronts. I think the United States and the role that SEC SEMCOM plays in facilitating sort of that cooperation for the common defense of of of all of these countries I think is a key part of the ingredient. But the real sort of questions I think are more long-term is where do these all of these countries see themselves going? How do they actually respond to the immediate crisis which is still ongoing? What are the lessons learned uh from this episode where Iran has closed the straight of Hormuz? And I I think all of these countries to varying degrees, Tar mentioned the word resilience. Uh I actually see in many of these countries, the label I would use is proactive resiliency at a time when there's so much uncertainty. Uncertainty about what Iran will do, what President Trump might do or Israelis next. Um I think there's this can do attitude which didn't exist uh always um in previous generations in in the Gulf of of trying to adapt pretty quickly and nimly. And yes, countries have different modes. I think Tar's characterization of Saudi Arabia is they're very monarchal. They they sort of are slower moving. Uh whereas I think UAE moves pretty quickly in trying to do things differently.

[00:11:06]>> All right. Um it in March you wrote a piece in Seaphore. Um you argued that the UAE is showing uh defensive might and restraints. Two and a half months later, do you still believe that to be the case?

[00:11:20]>> Yeah. So, I I know the media reports you're you're referring to about the Emirati strikes um and the Saudi strikes against Iran. Um look, I'm going to say something a lot of experts or so-called experts need to get used to saying, "I don't know if the strikes were happening." Um I wouldn't be surprised if they were you. There's a limit between showing restraint at the beginning and then once things come down, you know, they start again, you've got to show that there's a price to it.

[00:11:47]Um but again now I think what's happening is these states are trying to find um a solution that works long term for them right um you've got like the Qatari model bahin and Kuwait but they're approaching it differently you know they're stuck by hormos they have no choice except to deal with Iran um Qatar you know has a history of cooperation with the IRGC that's again um it's not political they just happen to share um some energy resources with them so they know how the system works better. I think they're looking at a way of how to protect themselves and we've seen assets you know successfully going through harmless despite the disruptions. Um Kuwait, Bahrain and the UAE are taking a stronger approach where they think no we want to see this fight through and what Iran is doing is is bullying and unacceptable. Um and they're going to take a more proactive approach. Um there was a a a gathering of media and influencers in the Emirates a while back and Dr. Dr. Anar Gargash from the Emirates he said something which I thought was was you know unprecedented for an Imirati official to say and he said you know the entire region's policy was about containing Iran.

[00:12:57]>> Um that policy failed and he said even the Emirati policy of containing Iran failed because when the war happened we got hit. Um, and now the Emirates is looking at, okay, so if containment feel failed, what are other options and the UAE, I think, is in a position where it has to show they've got some bite.

[00:13:19]>> Uh, the media reports were referring to are uh suggesting that both the UAE and Saudi have carried out uh retaliatory air strikes on Iran. Um, neither country has publicly acknowledged that. Um, I I I do want to stick with the UAE for a second before I uh uh before we talk about Saudi strategy. Uh, how far is the UAE how far would the UAE be willing to go?

[00:13:49]>> I mean, it's it's if they go as far, um, it's not going to be more than air strikes, right? Um, the UAE is not going to do and no country is going to do a ground invasion of of Iran. That's that's huge. Um but the Emirates is definitely going to try to find a balance that works for it. You know they they tried the Emirati model of peace through trade. You know went there. A lot of the trade people went there. Alan and Saba went to Iran as well. They met with these officials and they tried to find a balance that worked and it looked to be working. You know the proxy stopped attacking the Emirates. But this war you know the IATI officials call it a betrayal. They see it as um you know all their efforts with Iran with building this um just didn't work in the end. So they're exploring options.

[00:14:38]They're exploring um how to see it through. And they've made the line very clear. Emirati officials are not mincing words. They're saying this is a red line. Hormones is unacceptable. No one is going to pay taxes. And you know Iran can't be the same threat um it used to be.

[00:14:55]um their philosophy is if if Iran could do this now, what could Iran have done 10 years from now if they had 10 years to increase those stock piles and increase the threat? So, at least from the UAE, and we're seeing this as well from Bahin and Kuwait, it's quite a pragmatic look at the Iranian threat and an understanding that they need to find a decisive solution to it if they want to get to a place of balance.

[00:15:20]and and if those strikes have indeed happened, how would they if they're confirmed? Uh how would they be received internally uh in the UAE?

[00:15:31]>> Oh, people love it. I mean, people really wanted to to punch Iran back.

[00:15:35]Like they understood the need for restraint, but there is huge support and not just in the UAE, by the way, Gulfwide, there is this hunger for, you know, getting a a price to the disruptions that Iran has done. Um, but so far Saudi and the UAE have taken a page out of Israel's playbook, and they are neither confirming nor denying anything that they've done.

[00:15:55]>> All right, Brian. The US uh reversed plans to escort ships through the street of Hermuz and abandon its naval operation, Project Freedom, following Saudi denial of airspace access. Um, how did this war on Iran impact US Gulf relations, particularly with an ally like Saudi Arabia?

[00:16:16]I I think it's uh several different impacts. First, I think it was the re-realization that the US security footprint, the fact that the United States does not have any other rival when it comes to external uh powers that have the relationships, the networks, the partnerships that we've built over decades. And this is successive Republican and Democratic administrations. Um, and despite sort of all of the politicized debates and political debates of the first 25 years of the century and concerned about concerns about Iraq and Afghanistan, the US uh really has been a mode of trying to deepen those partnerships to enhance the capabilities of countries like the UAE. And those investments, I think, have paid off. And every time I speak with top officials in any of the Gulf countries, a bottom line I think that still holds is that the United States is the preferred strategic partner of choice, especially when it comes to defense. And yes, I think one lesson learned from this episode is that they will continue to um um try to invest more in their uh own resilience and in their self-reliance and build things uh closer to home. And yes, uh they'll look for any other partners to diversify the relationships. So I think one reminder of not just the 2026 war, um which is a positive one for the United States, but also 2024, 2025, the 12-day war was that the systems that were in place and placed uh there, the training, the exercises, um it didn't stop all the damage, but it actually made things less worse. Right? So I think that's the positive. on the negative side and I think this is something you can say about the second Trump administration but it's a concern that I think is shared about previous administrations Biden Obama as well is just a a growing concern about America's strategic attention and focus and and reliability uh in the long run that despite our uh dominance in military affairs uh growing concerns about what uh people see in terms of our internal divides also you know we're speaking today is President Trump um pivots to China for a couple of days, but for decades countries, the United States saying that we're going to move away from the Middle East and pull back. That leaves a mark and I think I think very much a definite impression and then specifically to this war, Zaya.

[00:18:36]Um the lack of clarity about the preferred end state coming from the United States as an initiator of this conflict with Israel and still to this day. um and all of the different sort of things that come out of uh the White House and President Trump and then various administration officials. You could chart all of the statements over the last uh four to five months. Um and they're sort of all over the map. You know, President Trump one day saying that maybe we'll join with the leaders of Iran uh to to have some sort of toll booth for the Straight of Hormuz. Those sorts of statements, I think, are intended to get some sort of reaction and and effect like his Gaza Riviera idea, if you remember that. But over time, sort of turning on a dime and saying one thing one day and 180 degree the next raises questions about the big question is how does this all end? And that is a serious concern for all of these countries because if the north star of uh the UAE, Saudi Arabia, every one of these countries, their north star is to actually promote the economic modernization and transformation programs that have been underway for for for many years now. And this war has not helped that. But it has served to provide them with important lessons learned about how they need to actually uh use a strategy of proactive resilience of what they can do uh and to to change and update the ideas. If you're familiar with the India, Middle East, Europe economic corridor launched in September of 2023.

[00:20:09]All of these countries, I think, are very much looking at what's happened the last two, three months, worried about what's to come next, but already thinking about what do the 2030s look like and how do we actually have um more diversity of our supply chain systems and pretty rapidly and moving pretty quickly to address some urgent concerns, but with an eye to the bigger prize, which is uh regional integration and connectivity with the rest of the global economy. They've I I see them keeping their eye on the prize strategically um in ways that perhaps the United States and and other countries aren't these days.

[00:20:44]>> Right. Even countries that have historically had uh closer ties to Iran like Aman and Qatar were not spared from Iranian attacks during this war.

[00:20:57]What impact is that having and how might it change their approach going forward?

[00:21:01]Could that create a more unified position or at least uh a threat perception visa v Iran?

[00:21:09]>> Yeah. So Alman has been the one, you know, that's the the sort of the the joker card. Nobody's understanding exactly how it's settling, right? They they seem to be um taking on a policy of um not containment, but rather appeasement with Iran. And in all defense, it works, right? like they were struck a few times but it was you know more for show than actual damage and all attacks have stopped. Their trade is functioning fine. Um again in their defense they don't really have the resources or the defense capabilities that the rest of the Gulf has. So if they were under a full barrage under for example what the Emirates was was under Oman would likely have suffered a lot more damage. So they have to work with the cards they have. Um Katar again is in the same boat. They share energy resources with uh Iran. They are fully dependent on this trade of Hormuz and they're a small country, a very small country where damage goes a long way. So they just have to figure out a model that works for them and each of these states will will have an approach that suits their needs.

[00:22:16]>> All right. Um, Brian, the US to a certain degree is stuck in the middle between the UAE and Saudi.

[00:22:26]How can the Trump administration balance the partnerships between the two allies?

[00:22:33]>> I think you know the Trump administration u first did a very important thing in its first year which was um go to the three of the leading countries in the Gulf. was the first trip that President uh Trump took scheduled um in his May trip and that I think was an important recognition in everything that was done there in recognizing that uh the three countries Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE that he visited um are all uh trying to play roles beyond the traditional role that they've played with the United States in energy markets, oil and gas uh on in in the common defense against adversaries like Iran and and terrorist terrorism and things like this, but looking to new frontiers. And it's not a new thing.

[00:23:16]President Trump did this in his first term. I think the Biden administration, it took him like a year, year and a half to recognize the promise and potential there. But here in America, when we are so focused on a lot of our divides and have elections every two years or so, we often forget about the things that are consistent between uh the different administrations. And the one thing that I think again different tactics, operations, methods, but the last two administrations at least have recognized this, the growing global strategic importance of the Gulf. And I think that was an important first step um by the Trump administration um at that time.

[00:23:55]And I think the questions of these divisions between uh the United States and excuse me, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, I think the the Trump administration quite rightly has sought to build the bilateral partnerships that it has with both of these countries to the common benefit of the agendas that these countries all have. You know, Saudi Arabia has its vision 2030. Uh, which in my view there's win-wins for the United States as well as Saudi Arabia in trying to move forward in helping Saudi Arabia achieve those aspirations and and reforming their economy. Similarly on uh the UAE again a lot of these partnerships and the ideas of them generated over several years the idea of I2U2 um which I think in some ways Israel, India, the United States and the UAE working together on clean tech and broader conceptions like trying to again think beyond the current moment and look to build a silver linings playbook for the region. Now the two countries obviously are at odd odds on on key issues like Sudan uh Yemen and Somali Somal Somalia Somali land but all of these things I don't think the United States can expect to sort of mediate between these two countries. These are grown-ups that actually need and do talk to each other on those sorts of issues to the extent that we can uh help them you know lessen the tensions on those fronts. Some of it I think may be very difficult. Um but but on the bigger sort of broader sets of issues on the global sets of issues where we cooperate regionally and then bilaterally with these countries I I think you know the Trump team needs to do that and if anything as I suggested on the Iran war what's missing a key component is strategic consultation with all of them about okay where does this all go and what's an ideal end state. Uh because I think it's sometimes very confusing the different statements that come out of the United States these days.

[00:25:51]One more followup and then I'll go to T because I have several questions from the audience. Um >> so also based on media reportings we know that um at the end of last year NBS asked Trump to impose sanctions on the UAE.

[00:26:08]It's a pretty uh the US administration is in a pretty tough spot. How do they navigate something like that?

[00:26:15]Well, again, I I think um they did not impose sanctions. I I understand that that was uh quite likely a request that was made um uh heard it confirmed from many different sectors, though you get a different line from some Saudi officials uh about that. Uh and like everything these days in the Middle East, there's 10 sides to every story. um that you know that issue was related mostly to the uh devastating conflict in Sudan and the very different positions that those two countries have and how has the Trump administration dealt with it. Uh it's dealt with it in ways that I don't think it often it doesn't get enough credit for. It actually gathered those countries together in a in a in a format here in Washington DC just a few months ago to try to talk about the endgame and and to produce a solution. I think they pragmatically recognized that trying to impose costs on one of our partners like the UAE was not the wisest course and a better course would actually uh be to sit down and talk things out and and try to sort things out. But I think there's a pragmatic recognition that there's such a divergent set of views from Riad versus Abu Dhabi on on tough problems like Sudan that you know and especially I think the Trump administration puts a lot on its own plate on its own domestic agenda internationally as well. So I think they've engaged it but they they haven't seen much major diplomatic success. And by and large, you know, in the day and age where we are, I think these countries who are quite assertive in advancing their own interests actually need to to sort things out. And I think the Trump team, you know, very quietly has tried to have those conversations. Um but understanding that maybe we won't be able to bridge those gaps because the the world views, I think, have become u pretty divergent.

[00:28:04]>> All right. Um T I have a question for you from um Muhammad Abu Basha. How do you imagine the UAE dealing with current Iranian regime post the conflict and how can it balance its security and economic stability against a hostile regime?

[00:28:20]>> Yeah. Well, the continued hostility is just not acceptable for for any of the countries in the region. I think for anyone in the world, that's just not good for the global economy. The way the UAE will do it is it'll either come to a point of balance with whoever emerges as in charge in Iran and it's still not clear who's in charge in Iran. Um or you know wait it out and and see if there are signs that the that you know an opposition is organizing or a regime is is is near its end and that's less likely. So I think the first option the most likely one is just see who emerges as in charge and then figure out a balance that works with them. Um, if the US and Israel don't see this through and and get rid of the regime fully, then you know, you have no choice but to work with your neighbor.

[00:29:08]>> All right. Um, I want to stay with you for a second. The UAE left OPEC recently.

[00:29:13]>> Mhm.

[00:29:13]>> And they openly criticized the response from um some of the UAE's Arab neighbors uh to Iran's attack on the country.

[00:29:22]How has the regional picture changed in regards to the UAE and its neighbors?

[00:29:28]>> So there there seems to be a group of states that are very US aligned um in terms of outlook for the region. You know it's not just the the Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, you've got Morocco, Jordan, Egypt to mixed and varied depending on where the wind blows is also in the picture sometimes. Um but the UAE has sort of had this moment of realization where they're like look our economy isn't dependent on our neighbors. Our economy isn't integrated with the Arab world. Um we work with the West, we work with the Far East. So let's let's go fullon in that relationship. You know, our relationship with the US is a lot more important than our relationship with um Arab countries in the region. Uh and it's working for them. It's it's become a good economic partnership. The UAE has started to develop its own technologies as well. um and is focusing on leveraging that relationship and that new industrial capacity to build on the resilience that Brian and I touched on.

[00:30:28]>> All right. Um I have a question for both of you from Lieutenant General Nagara.

[00:30:33]Um assuming Russia and China will try to restore or perhaps even strengthen their previous positions in the Middle East once the current conflict ends, how do you expect that to be received by the countries of that region? Brian, can I start with you and then we'll go to T.

[00:30:48]>> Uh, sure. It depends on how they seek to double down uh on that. I mean, I as I understand first on China, um, President Trump has a long list of issues he's seeking to engage uh, President Xi on and Iran is one of them. And the fact that China has offered support uh, for years to Iran and busted sanctions, bought oil uh, from Iran and basically fed the regime. Um, I can only imagine how that's viewed. um across the Gulf from Arab states that were just hit uh for for weeks uh by the Iranian regime.

[00:31:22]Um the question is how China might seek to engage and double down on that in that context. I know they were very proud in the spring of 2023 when they announced the restoration of ties between Saudi Arabia and and Iran at the time, but again going back to a point I mentioned and General Nagata, you know this very well. Um, immediately after that announcement, another thing happened. The Saudis came to the United States looking for an article 5 defense treaty from the United States and guarantees. So, they didn't put much stock uh in uh the the leopard changing its spots in the in the form of the Iran regime. So, China clearly has had a long-term strategy in its belt and road and using its uh economic um agenda and economic statecraftraft as well as technology to actually build ties with countries uh like the UAE, like Saudi Arabia. And that's where I think there's a new great game that's underway and this war could shake things up. Um but we'll see on Russia. You know, my view is that Russia itself, except for a few places maybe in the Horn of Africa, but it's been severely constrained by its own um missteps in Ukraine and the costs of that war uh on them. Now, now granted, the last couple of months with the run up in oil prices, the reduction of some of the sanctions the US had on Russia, they've benefited in some sort of way as I've written about recently um uh from the Iran war.

[00:32:52]But I don't see Russia um building sort of a stronger role or profile for itself uh in the Gulf or with Iran right now.

[00:33:02]In part because I think it's it's heavily constrained uh at this time. But all of this adds up to that what I think your question points to which is where the bigger picture is um with the United States and how we're seeking to relate uh to the rest of the world. I think this week will be a pivotal one um for USChina relations, but that'll have spillover effects. The big question mark in my view for Trump's second term foreign policy is that despite the aspirations and his stated goal of ending the war in Ukraine, it continues to this day and it continues to to high costs of Russia, which I think will limit its ability to to to have a footprint in the Middle East, but it also has high costs for the transatlantic relationship and and Ukraine itself as well. Um so bottom line is I think China is perhaps poised um when the fighting starts when there's more clar stops uh when there's more clarity uh to to actually position itself with the relationships it's already created and deepened um through economics and through technology whereas Russia I think will will probably face more constraints in in part because of the strains it's it's facing in its own immediate neighborhood.

[00:34:11]>> Yeah. So, >> so the way I see this question, there's two parts to it. There's the the China and Russia relationship with the Gulf States and then their influence in the region. In terms of their relationship um with Gulf States, all Gulf states are internally just like the US, you know, officials are divided. You know, some want to be more hawkish against Russia and China, some want closer integration.

[00:34:34]Um Russia to a lesser extent. um the US the US's role and its relationship with the region is is really um untouched.

[00:34:44]It's it's at the top. It and I don't think it can realistically be challenged. Um Russia and China have proven to be really bad allies to their their small pockets of influence in the region. They never stepped up. They did minimal effort to support uh countries that were considered very close with. Um and even when conflicts broke out with their interests, they sort of stayed silent or or withdrew or just observed from a distance. That's not a behavior of a state that can challenge um American hijgemony.

[00:35:14]Russia had a bit of a base that they were trying to establish in the Red Sea with the Sudin army. Um but that didn't really go anywhere with Ukraine. Again, they they ran out of resources. So, I really don't see their influence in the region expanding at all. Um, in terms of China, China's a massive market. Uh, and countries have learned over time that they're good to do business with to a certain degree. If you know how to do business with China, but beyond that, um, political security integration, I don't really see that happening. The only state in the region that has had a little more security um, integration with China has been Saudi Arabia and getting some of their defense purchases from them. Um but all these conflicts have shown and nothing beats American hardware or the American relationship.

[00:36:04]>> Let me stay with you to I have so many questions on this topic. Uh the UAE is doubling down on its ties with both the US and Israel. Um, Israeli America Israeli and American officials said that Israel provided the UAE with Iron Dome batteries and personnel to operate them, which is the first time Israel deploys to an Arab state. What opportunities do you see for that relationship to develop and what are its limitations?

[00:36:31]>> Yeah. So, so I heard the thing about the Iron Dome. Again, it hasn't been confirmed and I'll I'll I'll repeat again. I don't know. Um, I know the the UAE was interested in buying the Iron Dome early days of the Abrahamic Accords, but I don't know if it's been delivered. Um, if experts were there with it, I can't confirm that. Um, but Israel and the United States were fantastic partners to the UAE and to honestly any of the Gulf states that requested um assistance and they were very ready. there were is no bureaucratic red tape and these countries you know came out they reassessed those relationships and realized look the US and Israel are good partners. So, I see that relationship expanding, you know, in in a time of of crisis. Nothing brings two countries closer together than than sharing a crisis like this. Uh, and Israel and the US to their credit, they they stood up.

[00:37:22]They they rose up to the occasion when other states um shied away or waited for things to cool down. So, it I think it's very logical that we see that relationship further expand.

[00:37:32]Uh do you see do you see that relationship expand uh at the expense of uh partnerships with other Gulf countries?

[00:37:41]>> I don't think so. Look, the the Gulf has never been very integrated militarily.

[00:37:45]They they did some cooperation. They had a few exercises and operation in Bahrain or two and there's always been talk for integrated air defense system. I think this conflict will probably push that uh forward. Um I don't see how it would harm the relationship. A lot of countries um look to uh the US as the power that controls the region's security that's in charge of the Middle East, right? And just like France in in the Sahel, for example, and they'll follow the US's lead. If the US says, you know, doing this is good for regional security, I think most countries would would cooperate.

[00:38:21]>> All right. Uh uh Brian, same question for you. This is from uh Christie u Ledridge. Will this potential new alignment impact UAE's uh place in the GCC?

[00:38:35]>> I think there's open questions about what the future of the GCC actually looks like. You mentioned um the UAE exiting OPEC and it has its own reasons, but I think also as we saw in recent Gulf meetings, um Oman not showing up at one of them. Um there's I think tremendous strains where there's you know uh this this notion of we've got to take care of our own and take care of our own interests. Um so I think there's some questions about you know the future. Tar talked about sort of military cooperation and the necessity for that between different countries on that front, but there's really open questions about uh the new alignments in the region and and uh where you know whether sort of the UAE will will partner with countries that we saw recently with Jordan announcing things like a highspeed railway system. I think we're in a period of complex multipolarity when it comes to geopolitics, but also some of the broader regional economic schemes that I think is worthy of a separate discussion. you know, all of the ideas that have unfolded at a time of war about how to diversify supply chains and notions that need to be updated to make sure that the choke point that the straight of Hormuz um is and and the devastating impact it's had on uh the global economy and economies in the region, there's already been fastmoving thinking about how we can avoid that in the future. um hoping and assuming that that this straight is opened, but how do you diversify that security network uh across the region? So, I think we're at a period of flux. It's quite different than it was say uh uh 10 years ago uh in the in the mid 2010s when there was a different alignment uh that brought Saudi Arabia and the UEE closer together on the one side with Egypt and with Qatar and Turkey on the other side. And the risk of any Middle East analyst is to look at sort of the short-term shifts and the winds that are blowing as a result of different events in a particular year and not see the bigger picture. And to me the bigger picture is there's still a dynamic whether it's in the UE or other places that these countries want to become much more integrated with the global economy and much more interconnected beyond uh fossil fuels and energy and each have their own different approach and I think that's a positive thing that if we get through this period of uh war and conflict and I think we will that there's tremendous opportunity in in the 2030s in particular um for the rest of the world but also countries within the region And each will have their own way.

[00:41:08]They'll come at odds with each other as we've seen between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. But I think having that longerterm view at a time of war and crisis is is essential.

[00:41:20]>> Uh a question for you T. In light of the ongoing conflict and limited linkage linkages to regional economies, would the UAE consider withdrawing from the GCC at some point?

[00:41:32]>> Yeah, there's been a lot of talk of that. I think the GCC is the least likely of the organizations. I think if I were to rank them, maybe the the Organization of Islamic Cooperation would be the highest and then Arab League and then GCC. Um, but the UAE historically has has been very pragmatic in in the steps it took. The reason why OPEC made sense is because there were economic benefits for leaving OPEC. So, it it just made sense for where the UAE's economy currently was to leave it.

[00:41:58]leaving those organizations would be a purely political move that would only aggravate um any tensions with other states. So, I don't really see them doing that if they don't have to, right?

[00:42:12]Like what's the benefit of leaving the the GCC or of leaving the Arab League?

[00:42:18]Unless the cost benefit analysis shifts towards leaving, I don't really think that would happen. What is likely to happen is they'll disengage. they'll send less and less senior people and they would just won't take any of the initiatives coming from those organizations seriously.

[00:42:34]>> Brian, a question for you. Will the Abraham Accords survive the war?

[00:42:39]>> Uh, yes, they have, and I think yes, they will. Um, on the fifth anniversary of the Abraham Accords, we put out a video uh at MEI with yours truly describing a different period of strain on the Abraham Accords and that was uh more than two years of the war in Gaza and coming up to that and and and the tensions there. And I just think the countries that signed uh the Abraham Accords in 2020, UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, um they see strategic benefit as we just discussed with Tar um in terms of military cooperation and other things.

[00:43:12]They weren't meant to solve the Palestinian question. I do think that there's a there's a limit. There's a ceiling on how far they might be expanded or even if they're labeled Abraham Accords if Saudi Arabia and Israel uh ultimately normalize their relations. But yeah, I think they will not only hold but they will they will deepen. The the question we haven't addressed at all because we're focused understandably on on Iran uh here at Zena is the question of what happens next on Palestine and I know we at MEI make this a priority and the Israeli Palestinian question I think necessarily is uh equal uh to uh the question of what happens with Iran when it comes to the stability of the state system. I think there's a difference of views among Gulf Gulf states about how to prioritize that and whether what I just said was true or not. And last year Saudi Arabia spent much of the year um campaigning for a symbolic recognition of the state of Palestine and put an emphasis on the two-state solution in ways that other Gulf states did not. But back to those two Gulf states in Morocco that have the Abraham Accords. I think that this war plus the the the very devastating Gaza war, all of the conflicts and the criticisms, even including, you know, after Israel struck Doha on September 9th of last year in the midst of negotiations with Hamas and all of the countries in the region.

[00:44:36]Remember that moment when all of the uh Arab states as well as Iran uh came together to condemn that action? All of these things you you could look at sort of in the context of where they're at.

[00:44:47]All of these things did not lead to the breaking of the Abraham Accords and I actually see them quite likely deepening and broadening. But the key factor in addition to Iran is this question of Palestine, all of the conceptions of the board of peace, what happens next? And I understand why it's a lesser priority for some Arab and Gulf states than others, but I I happen to believe it's an essential part of US policy in the region and that we need more follow-up and attention to that as well.

[00:45:17]>> That speaking of deepening and broadening relations with Israel, uh what opportunities uh are there for Israel to strengthen ties with other countries in the region, not necessarily just the UAE?

[00:45:30]>> Yeah. So, I think there's at least two strong contenders in the the the Middle East that will most likely normalize with with um Israel. Um or that at least have high potential where that could happen. Um but Israel is stuck between, you know, two very hard places, right? It wants to deepen its integration with its neighbors, but it also wants to guarantee its security understandably after the the horrible terrorist attacks in October. Um but it needs to get the job done first, right? Israel needs to secure itself, secure its border and and end the conflicts quickly. Um until that's done, until we see those, you know, images of of destruction stop, I don't really see that expansion happening um yet. Um but there are good contenders and and people are I think overplaying the Gulf and underplaying Israel's immediate neighbors. Um Lebanon, Syria, you know, they increased integration with them, increased trade, ending these long simmering conflicts now that the Iranian proxies have been weakened or removed.

[00:46:37]Those really are prime for Israel to at least start making some diplomatic leeway with them.

[00:46:45]Uh Brian, uh what does a potentially emboldened Iran mean for the various Gulf countries?

[00:46:53]>> I think that's the scenario that uh all of these countries fear the most. Um and they have a different definition of what it means to finish the job. But basically since 1979 uh all of these countries have in one way or another uh felt direct threat and have been attacked uh by the regime the Islamic Republic of Iran and it's uh very radical ideology to try to export their revolution. And now we we see a scenario as I've written with Alex Vatanka our colleague and a few others that Iran even before this latest war uh is at its weakest point uh since it came to power in 1979 the Islamic Republic of Iran um but that disequilibrium and the open questions that still remain the the questions about its military capacity if you've seen the recent reports about US assessments that essentially say the weapons arsenals that uh Iran has that could continue to threaten its closest neighbors and the UAE being the target of the the most number of attacks in this most recent war. I think it strikes fear in the heart of uh many of our partners in the region that we don't have strategic clarity about that question about what Iran has done and still could do if it stays in power. I think a second thing that strikes fear in the hearts of all of our partners in the Middle East, especially Israel, is where are we going with this um overarching question of Iran's nuclear materials, the highlyenriched uranium, the things that were um reportedly in US sort of strategic communications. We were repeatedly told that this was obliterated or destroyed, but as we know now, that's not the case. And as we know now, there's not um a clear answer, at least I can see, if diplomacy does not succeed, military options aren't great.

[00:48:46]And then lastly, but most urgently, is the question of the opening of the straight of Hormuz. Um, we're in this limbo period where I think President Trump was hoping that his pressure, his zigzags, uh, the improvisation that he does and he's so good at it, the uncertainty that he strikes that perhaps this would lead the Iran's leaders to be pragmatic and make a decision to reopen and it didn't work. So, we'll see what happens when he comes back from China.

[00:49:15]But all of this um, that's the worst possible scenario. Next to that is the the idea or the notion that chaos or some sort of civil war inside of Iran that spills out of its borders um uh worries a lot of uh the folks that I talked to in the region. And that's where I think it's essential uh for the US to be clear because it's still the dominant leader uh in in the Middle East, but to be clearer than we've seen over the last three or four months of trying to define if not publicly, but at least internally what is a realistic end state because we've zigged and zagged from regime change to well, we can work with these guys to we've obliterated their weapons, but no, it's still in a mountain buried somewhere, their their nuclear material. And that's where I think consistency of of of voice and then other thing which I've stressed is consultation with those of our partners who are in the neighborhood that that actually will have to live with the consequences. Um that sort of coalition building I think is is a key ingredient that we've seen in the military realm but we haven't seen in the broader diplomatic and strategic realm on Iran.

[00:50:20]>> All right. I just shared in the chat box uh an article that Brian recently wrote for Al Majala touching on this topic.

[00:50:27]Um, and now I have a question for you, Todd. Um, uh, how should the US and its allies restore freedom of navigation in the Gulf and through the straight?

[00:50:38]>> That's a very good question.

[00:50:43]I mean, look, there's there's no easy question to that. It it looks easy in a map because the straight looks this big, but 50 km of open water um is is a very hard place to secure fully. Um, it doesn't help that uh all of the Iranian missile and and uh sort of drone capabilities are right there on on the straight.

[00:51:03]The way to do this is to end the war one way or another. Find a way to end the war um uh by either defeating Iran fully or getting Iran to agree to to back off or to take over Iranian territory in the region and control it. Right. But um that's a tact that's a tactical uh uh solution.

[00:51:28]Iran remains unpredictable so far, but we don't know how the government is going to stabilize, right? They're still on emergency survival mode. Um for all we as much as we know, um even governments don't really know what's happening in Iran right now. I know they fragmented. Uh there's some players that are emerging that look to be in charge.

[00:51:48]They're not really all agreeing even publicly with each other. Um the IRGC seems to be the winner so far, but they're being um disagreed with by former officials who are surviving. Um until that stabilizes and and a clear winner emerges or a clear leader, it's going to be very difficult to to make a solution. Their standing orders was fragment and create chaos. Uh so what happens if you make a deal with 80% but 20% are still attacking this trade of hormones? Um the the short answer of this ramble is we wait for Iran to stabilize.

[00:52:27]>> Brian, you've mentioned a few times that Trump is in China uh on a state visit.

[00:52:32]>> Uh Iran is an ally of China and questions remain about whether Beijing assisted Iran during the war. Uh but Beijing tried also to push Dhran to accept the first ceasefire proposal. Um how will this influence Trump's trip and can Trump convince she to put pressure on Tahran to open the straight for example?

[00:52:56]>> Yeah, let me ask let me answer on China but if I can offer a comment what what what you just asked um Tar as well on the street of Hormuz. You know, I think clearly the United States with being the dominant naval and aerop power, we need to uh figure out some sort of pathway there. I think Trump was hoping at least at this phase since the ceasefire and since he extended it, that there would be a diplomatic pathway. It's not apparent to me that we're getting there.

[00:53:23]Uh what I think we should watch for is what he does militarily, if anything, next. And if you remember about a month, month and a half ago during the height of the conflict, they very uh vocally announced the deployment of expeditionary forces, ground forces. And some of the discussion, at least I've I had with people in the US government, uh planner types were looking at scenarios where those troops might be used in some sort of way to uh to secure territory inside of Iran near the straight of Hormuz to try to create it. that these sorts of things I think could take a very long time which is why I think a diplomatic uh solution and resolution is more optimal. Second thing before I get to China is that the reason why I think it's essential to consult with our Arab partners and Gulf partners is it's not only their neighborhood but they know a lot about the regime. And yes, as Tar said, this regime is fractured. It's changed, but they know a lot more than we do. And to me, I you know, I know we're relying on Pakistan right now. No disrespect to Pakistan, but other countries that have a history and experience um with uh Iran and we know Saudi Arabia for instance is continuing to keep its channels open um throughout the war. Uh less so UAE. Oman is perpetually the the mediator and offering its services and did I think quite a good interesting uh uh job in the run-up to this war. And we might look at what was on offer back then in February and compared to what we achieve. But main point there is that we actually need to strategically consult with those partners in the region. on China. I think President Trump is going to continue to press uh China uh and and perhaps this has been made moot by the by by the uh blockade that the United States has imposed and the recent reports that Iran is not getting any of its oil resources out because this is where I think we are in the Iran approach by President Trump is he's moved from maximum pressure and then to to to war to now a new phase of super maximum pressure where they're trying to really squeeze economically the regime and change the calculus there. I think he will have high on his agenda talking to shei first and not about necessarily their help in opening the straight of hormuz but their help in stopping to fund uh the the regime and to support the regime. Good luck in that because success of US administrations have tried to get Beijing to work with us on strategic policy questions like this one or China's support for Russia with with very limited success and then good luck with that as well. my assessment, not not sort of an institutional view, but Trump is arriving at Beijing, I think, as we speak, uh, with a much weaker hand uh, than he had hoped he would because of the way that the Iran war has played out, because of the implications on his own domestic standing, the economic pain for America and other places. So, I think he'll be asking things like Beijing to cooperate. For me, what I'm watching closely is what does Beijing not only say, but what will it do uh with Iran, with Gulf partners in the months ahead while we have this cloud of uncertainty about the endgame in Iran.

[00:56:30]>> All right, T, a question for you from El Touch and then I'll go to Brian to get his take as well. What role could Europe play and particularly France in the recalibration of alliances of the Gulf countries?

[00:56:43]Yeah. So, a lot of the European partners um were were fantastic uh in the in the war with uh at least from the Emirates side. I'll be honest, I don't know as much about the other countries and their relationship with Europe. Um France, Italy, uh Greece, um the UK, they all rose up. Again, these states, they sort of have limited capabilities at this point when it comes to to fighting wars or or defense, but they gave what they could. um to to help support their partners. Um Europe is also going through a very exciting time of uh rearming itself and re-industrializing. You know, Germany is taking the lead, but Italy in particular is really stepping up and so is France.

[00:57:29]Um and there's definitely role there uh of engaging with the Gulf. Um, a lot of the larger players in the private sector in particular have developed really deep relationships with their counterparts in the region and in the Emirates. And this is beautifully primed to really build synergies on this um European reawakening and gulf uh sort of um entrenchment and and and industrialization that they all hope to get. Um the partnerships work well um in a in a scenario where Europe and the United States get along. You know, the US has also a great role to to bring in capital and and really get those three things together. Um but it'll depend on on how the US and Europe cooperate. But again, this isn't a two or threeyear thing. Um I really see a a good uh opportunity particularly for business and industry for the next at least uh 1 to 10 years and moving forward. if these states continue to play the cards right and they have been so far.

[00:58:36]>> Brian, anything to add?

[00:58:37]>> Yeah, just briefly I think Tar was right to put the focus on the longer term because short term when I look at a couple of factors. One that the United States remains that dominant military actor in the region um there's only peacemeal things that can be done uh to support Gulf states and other Arab states from the European perspective.

[00:58:57]But some of those things can be important. noteworthy to me was Ukraine given what it's learned on how to defend itself against drone attacks and how it's offering support to Saudi Arabia. I think in the last week uh the Saudis and Ukrainians signed an agreement to talk about cooperation on this front and I think that's really noteworthy at a time when there are big question marks to this day about whether the United States is supporting Ukraine in its own defense against uh Russia. So the world is rearranging itself in that short in the short term I think there's limited um um things that European countries can do in part because they have their own distractions and divisions. Yes, France, Italy, others have offered support but early in the Iran war uh the European Union chief diplomat proposed expanding the mandate that uh Europe has uh its 27 member states uh from the Red Sea to the straight of Hormuz and they just couldn't get unimity. Um so there is strength in numbers but there's such disunityity inside uh inside of Europe on on a lot of these questions but there are countries like Italy uh that I think have have been playing their hand very well and building relationships um with countries across the region France as well. So in this period where countries in the Gulf are looking very carefully at what's going on inside the United States and seeing the divisions, seeing sometimes the dysfunction of our own politics, I think this long-standing trend of Gulf states very wisely trying to diversify their sets of relationships um in the longer run will be a key feature of how they approach things. And I think Europe necessarily could be a key partner in that, but they have a lot of issues of their own, including the Ukraine war to deal with.

[01:00:39]All right, unfortunately we've reached the end of today's webinar. Thank you to the audience for the great questions and a huge thank you to our speakers Brian Culis and Tata for their time and valuable insights. I hope you enjoyed today's session and we look forward to seeing you next time.