TRUMP EMBARRASSED AS IRAN TIGHTENS CONTROL OF HORMUZ | w/ Trita Parsi

Added: 2026-05-23

[00:00:00]ended. Yeah, I did just have a quick question for you. I was interested on, but we'll come to that offline because we are online with everyone watching now. Um hi guys. Welcome to the Global Gambit. My name is Peter hosting. We're joined by a reoccurring returning guest a regular Trita Parsi who is the executive executive director.

[00:00:22]I think that's the right word or executive vice president. I always get those terms confused. Executive vice president at the Quincy Institute and uh so you can see plenty of other great conversations we've had with Trita over the past few weeks and the nature of course which is the Iran war we're returning to.

[00:00:39]Point of note for those of you watching if you're wondering where I am and what I'm wearing. I'm actually in Southern Eastern Africa in Malawi for a birthday trip but the world moves nonetheless and so we're here to discuss Iran. So Trita in the run up to our conversation now um the Iranians have released the sort of there's lots of things about it but the the phrase that they used was difficult and significant differences remain over the talks and they used also the phrase weeks and months which is quite terrifying to me mainly because I need some decent sleep but do you really think that this could continue for another several weeks and months and then we can get into some other details as we go.

[00:01:23]Anything that is said by either side right now publicly is part of the negotiation. In fact it has been almost from the beginning because Trump has erased the line between private negotiations and public negotiations. Everything is more or less public.

[00:01:44]So when the Iranians say this it could very well be true. It could very well be that that is what they think is going to be necessary to get a deal.

[00:01:53]It could also be that this is a way for them to say look, we're comfortable if this goes on for 2 months. We have time.

[00:02:00]Do you?

[00:02:02]Um so, it's difficult to know exactly, but keep in mind that if some of the reporting is true, and some of it I think is true, that there may be an immediate uh principal agreement followed by 30 days or less of negotiations to hammer out the final details.

[00:02:24]Then we're still talking about weeks.

[00:02:26]That is weeks.

[00:02:27]I do know that there's elements who have been pushing for this second phase to be no more than 2 weeks.

[00:02:34]If I were any of the two sides, I would go for a very short time period.

[00:02:39]And I would do so because whenever you create a scenario like this in which you have a first agreement, and you've already kind of gone 85% of the distance, and then you're just going to focus on the last 15, you really give a fantastic moment, [clears throat] an opportunity for any of the spoilers to concentrate all of their efforts during that second phase. And if you make that second phase a long phase, you're giving them, you know, a Christmas Eve almost every day for them to be able to sabotage things.

[00:03:09]So, I I think it would be very unwise to have the momentum for a deal and then say, "Okay, let's hammer out the details for the course of the next 3 months."

[00:03:20]And let me add a couple of other factors as to why I think it would be unwise for both sides to do this.

[00:03:25]First of all, um I think it should be very clear Trump doesn't have much time.

[00:03:32]When you take a look at the economic considerations here on this side, the 10-year yield that has reached above 4.5 at this point, I think, um the 30-year bonds that are now being sold at five or at 5.18%, which is, you know, the highest they have been since 2007, and I'm sure everyone remembers what happened in 2007. You're starting to see clear signs that it that, you know, Trump may cross the economic Rubicon of this war at some point in the next 2 or 3 weeks, which means that once he's past that, even if there is a deal, it will come too late, and the economic recuperation that is needed is simply not going to happen in the manner that Trump needs it.

[00:04:15]So, I think from Trump's end, I don't think there is a lot of time. In fact, I think already we're beyond what I thought we was going to be possible.

[00:04:24]But also, it does not mean that the Iranians have much more time. And let me just add a couple of things as to why I think I mean, just beyond their own economic situation, which is also very dire, they can keep the population in check for period of time because it's war, but if that war ends up in a ceasefire that is several months long, they're going to have all of these other problems, many problems in that society, including what happened in January. Uh it's not going to be set aside indefinitely. It's going to come back.

[00:04:50]But on top of that, if Trump, which he likely will, loses the House and potentially the Senate in November, then he's going to be a lame duck president. He's potentially going to face impeachment. Even if that impeachment is not successful, it's going to consume the last 2 years of his in office. So, the maneuverability of Trump to be able to strike a deal, get massive sanctions relief to be put on the table, etc., is going to dramatically decrease. And this kind of deference that exists in the Republican Party towards Trump because he's just been the king is going to start to wither away.

[00:05:29]And he's going to be challenged in a different way that he has been so far.

[00:05:33]And that's not even taking into account that in the next couple of weeks, the Israelis are in a very vulnerable position because of their elections, in which none of the political candidates want to have an open fight with Netanyahu and with Trump, including Netanyahu. And I just point to one thing that has happened recently, which is I think kind of out of the blue Trump started to say that he's very popular in Israel.

[00:05:56]And that if he were to run for office in Israel, he could win almost any office position.

[00:06:01]I think that was a warning to the Israelis. That's him saying, you have elections and I'm extremely popular in your country. And if you pick a fight with me, I can ruin your political career.

[00:06:13]That won't last, however, after November.

[00:06:16]So there's a lot of factors that actually makes it much more feasible for both sides, much more valuable for both sides to get this done now rather than let it wait.

[00:06:27]Well, I mean, there's there's a lot to say there. The the Israeli elections, I remember vividly the last one because it was the last one, which was one of the very the very first things that we covered on this show.

[00:06:39]Um I remember it very uh very um intricately.

[00:06:43]Um but I I just don't see the the political appetite in Israel really shifting from Netanyahu. He seems to have such a a stranglehold on the situation even if he's supported by the ultra-nationalists. I just don't know whether the Israeli electorate has a desire to shift towards something more I don't know, centrist or moderate like uh what like Naftali Bennett or that sort of collective group of of characters. Uh you know, you're welcome to comment on that, but the the other thing I just wanted to quickly get your take on is of course it seems like Tulsi Gabbard is going to be stepping down uh from her position. Do you think that has anything to do with what we're seeing right now in Iran or the just general sort of deterioration of Trump's political standing?

[00:07:31]Look, I I won't comment on Tulsi directly, but just let me give you a an assessment of the larger picture. There is a tremendous amount of frustration inside the US government, particularly in the intelligence side of things.

[00:07:44]Because their intelligence assessment of this war was very clear-cut.

[00:07:50]Very clear warnings about what would happen. The Iranians would close the straits. They would attack the other GCC countries. Taking out uh Khomeini would not bring down the system, but actually would cause a rallying around the flag um a phenomenon. A lot of things that have happened that were called out by the uh US intelligence services warned about, but Trump chose to listen to the Israelis instead.

[00:08:15]And now a scenario has emerged that in many ways is frankly worse than I think even the intelligence services thought it would be.

[00:08:23]So, there's a tremendous amount of frustration that um this is the the way the intelligence services have been treated um and that it was easier for the Israelis to get to Trump than it was for the US intelligence services themselves. And of course Joe Can't puts this out very clearly, and part of the reason why he resigned, of course.

[00:08:44]So, I'm not surprised that we're seeing that a lot of exodus taking place. We should also note that this is now reaching We're getting closer to the 2-year mark for this administration, a year and a half, but we're going into midterms, etc. So, some of these resignations will probably have happened anyways. It is a very tiring uh job for many of them.

[00:09:05]But, I think undoubtedly the Iran factor is a big factor, but it's not just the last couple of weeks. It is a lot that has happened ever since June of last year.

[00:09:15]Yeah, no, certainly it's it's been a long time coming. So, one of the other things that I just before we came on air, um I just said this to someone else actually, which is for me this and and I'd like your your view on this, but for me this seems increasingly just a tug-of-war between the egotistical um obsession or unwillingness of Trump to relent versus the existential fight for survival that is the Islamic Republic's government. One of them is much more malleable than the other though, I think, right? The other one has been This is the hour zero for the for the IRGC for the Islamic Republic. Whilst Trump he has to give. The problem is it's not like he wants to make any sort of just seek peace on any form, concede defeat. He doesn't want to make whatsoever. So, we just seem to be going round and round in this perpetual merry-go-round.

[00:10:13]And I just don't see any off-ramps.

[00:10:15]So, how much do you think There is a question in here, I promise, which is simply how much do you think the the Qataris joining the Pakistanis in these current peace efforts right now can make a difference?

[00:10:29]So, it's a good question for um there is very good reasons to be skeptical and be very, very careful.

[00:10:38]But I think also uh there's a lot of reporting that is just not true.

[00:10:44]And it's not true because they're trying to be mendacious towards the US government or the Iranian government. It's because the two governments have also put out an image um self-serving for both of them, but nevertheless, that is making it look as if there has been less progress than there has been.

[00:11:04]And also at this point when Trump says that there has been progress, no one takes him seriously any longer and that that's understandable.

[00:11:10]The bottom line is there actually is a significant degree of flexibility that both sides are showing right now.

[00:11:17]On the Iranian side, the mere fact that they are considering what may end up being a 10 to 12-year period in which they won't be enriching any uranium is astounding.

[00:11:31]Let me explain a little bit of the history of this.

[00:11:35]In 2003, the Iranians agreed through the mediation of the Europeans. The Europeans, that's when the E3 was formed.

[00:11:44]Intervened and they tried to prevent George W. Bush from extending the war of Iraq into Iran.

[00:11:50]And they thought that if they could just get the Iranians to suspend enrichment, it would really take a significant amount of the justification of war out of the picture.

[00:12:00]And the Iranians agreed to voluntarily suspend enrichment for the duration of the negotiations until these negotiations reached a final conclusion.

[00:12:12]That turned out to be a very unwise formulation.

[00:12:17]Because as soon as Iran had suspended enrichment, the Europeans had achieved their key objective.

[00:12:25]The suspension meant that there would not be any war.

[00:12:28]So, the Europeans had no incentive to move forward on this issue particularly fast.

[00:12:35]So, they slow walked everything and in fact, perhaps even wanted to prevent the final agreement because a final agreement would likely have entailed some degree of enrichment.

[00:12:45]And it was better for them to be in this intermediate phase.

[00:12:49]This frustrated the Iranians and they realized that it had at a minimum had turned into a trap. Perhaps it was intended as a trap. Perhaps it wasn't, but at a minimum had turned into a trap.

[00:12:59]In August of 2005, 2 years later, they announced that they will restart enrichment. In January 2006, they do so.

[00:13:08]By February 2006, their case is sent to the Security Council.

[00:13:14]And a series of UN Security Council resolutions and sanctions are imposed on them.

[00:13:19]The cost of restarting enrichment was much higher in their narrative than the cost of having continued enrichment.

[00:13:29]Since then, they have not agreed to any type of suspension.

[00:13:33]So, the fact that now they're agreeing to whether they call it a moratorium, suspension, whatever it is, the fact that they will not enrich uranium for 10 to 12 years is astonishing.

[00:13:46]I really did not think that that would happen.

[00:13:50]Part of the reason why it's happening is because the Trump administration is just showing flexibility on a different issue to far larger extent than any previous president, which is that he's putting sanctions relief, primary sanctions relief, meaning allowing American companies and lifting all of the banking sanctions on Iran to be lifted. Trump is not attached to these sanctions in the way that previous presidents were. Nor does he think that it's a very costly thing for him to do politically.

[00:14:20]So, there's far greater flexibility on the American side on that issue.

[00:14:24]And then even now on the stockpile issue, which has become the toughest one, I'm detecting some flexibility um that I also did not detect at all 2 weeks ago, for instance. Uh in which the Iranians are now more open to considering solutions that could entail the full stockpile being shipped out.

[00:14:45]But again, it all depends on what the price is. Whereas 2 3 weeks ago, it didn't matter what the price was.

[00:14:52]It wasn't open. Iran wasn't open for it.

[00:14:53]So, I I think we're seeing some significant changes here.

[00:14:58]Both sides, or at least the American side in particular, still speak as if it's just dictating terms. No one is dictating terms. If it was so easy that the balance of power was so tilted in one direction, this issue would have been over with long time ago.

[00:15:12]It isn't.

[00:15:14]What's the incentive? Why have they changed their minds so much? What caused the economies in such a bad way? What's what's changed the Iranian calculus? The Iranian calculus?

[00:15:23]I think there's a couple of things.

[00:15:25]First of all, part of this is is a bit speculative on my end, but part of it is at least indirectly confirmed to me.

[00:15:34]Is that, you know, the Iranians recognize to various degrees at least, that a latent nuclear program was not a deterrent against an American or Israeli attack.

[00:15:47]Having a stockpile was not a deterrent against a conventional military attack. Some of them still believe that the stockpile could be a deterrent against a nuclear attack. I don't understand necessarily why it would be.

[00:15:59]Um so, this type of a situation, unless it is fully resolved, is going to be a scenario in which Iran is going to be at war every year or so. This is unacceptable. This is unsustainable for them. They have come to the end of the road of this idea of no war, no peace.

[00:16:15]It's either war or it's peace. And beyond that, I think they've come to the end of the road of the idea that there can be peace or even ceasefire without reconciliation.

[00:16:26]Meaning that it's not just a confrontation between the US and Iran that is avoided or tensions that are reduced, but there has to be something that genuinely puts an end to 47 years of enmity.

[00:16:40]The other thing, which I think is on the positive side of it from their standpoint, and let me say this before I I take your follow-up.

[00:16:48]Iran through this war has gained a lot of chips.

[00:16:52]But what's the point of having these chips if you're not going to cash them in?

[00:16:57]And you can only cash them in through a deal. It's like going to Vegas. You get all of these chips and then you're sitting there and you're really happy about it, but you're actually not willing to cash them in. The chips have no value in and of themselves. It's only what they can translate into that is valuable.

[00:17:13]This is the mistake the US did.

[00:17:15]Because the US fell in love with its own sanctions.

[00:17:18]And it was so happy that sanctions were hurting the Iranians that it wasn't willing to use them for what they were at least theoretically supposed to be, which was leverage. What is the point of leverage? The point of leverage is that you can actually change it, that you lift it in return for something. But if you're not willing to trade it in because you think that in of itself itself is so valuable, which of course some in the US system did. They wanted the sanctions to be permanent.

[00:17:43]Um ultimately it's going to backfire.

[00:17:45]And that's the problem, the mistake the Iranians will commit. If they now have a lot of chips because of the outcome of this war, because of the Strait of Hormuz, but they fail to translate that into a new cemented situation that is non-contested.

[00:18:00]Mhm.

[00:18:02]It makes me think a little bit about this concept of near nuclear capable or threshold power, right? Because there's a lot of debate around, okay, you have the capacity to build the bomb, but you don't have the capacity to deliver it.

[00:18:14]That's what was the distinction with North Korea for so many years. It had the ability to build the nuclear warhead, but it took them another what, 15 years to really deliver it properly and and and and consistently. I mean, the 2000s are dominated by headlines of failed nuclear missile tests in the Korean Peninsula or whatever save Japan.

[00:18:34]Um so, I'm just going to curious how you see that plays into this. But also, I mean, you you talk about this this desire to maybe give away the enrichment, but is that in exchange for complete and utter control of the of the Strait of Hormuz or something like that? Because I I named the the title of our conversation about Iran expanding its control. And I saw in the run-up to the chat as well, a New York Times uh headline about the Iranians and Omanis in direct talks about facilitating some kind of toll booth. I mean, this has been an ongoing talking point for months at this point, or weeks since the war began.

[00:19:10]Is that realistically what's going to happen in your mind? And you know, the Iranians will give up that enrichment capability as long as they can have unprecedented control and determination over the Strait of Hormuz. Is that enough of a reasonable trade-off for them?

[00:19:26]Uh they're not going to give up their enrichment capability. They may give up their stockpile of enriched uranium, but they're not going to give up enrichment capability. I think that will never happen.

[00:19:36]Uh the mere fact that they're stopping enriching for a period of time is in and of itself very, very significant, but that's still not the same thing as giving it up altogether.

[00:19:46]So, no. I don't think they're going to do that. Uh I do think there's going to have to be a deal on the uh straight that likely will look much, much more similar and in reality be much closer to what the Iranians are insisting on than on anyone else's uh preference.

[00:20:04]Uh the Omanis have been in conversations with the Iranians for quite some time about this issue, very early on.

[00:20:10]Um they have floated an idea. At least it's originating with them, but it's which is that this would not be um a toll, but rather this would be essentially a management and environmental management fee. Because there's a very significant traffic of ships going through that strait.

[00:20:28]And it's mainly Iran and and Oman who's been handling some of the repercussions of that. And this is much easier for many other countries, including China, to be able to accept. It doesn't set the same precedent. It doesn't have the same international law implications.

[00:20:42]The American preference it's not preference, but acceptable solution is for that to be regionalized.

[00:20:51]Meaning, it's not just Iran and Oman.

[00:20:53]It's the other states of the GCC as well.

[00:20:56]That's the way for the American side to say, "Oh, we didn't give up control of the straits to Iran. It's it's the entire region that does this." It makes it much easier for the American side to handle that scenario. The problem is the UAE is dead set against it. Saudis have publicly rejected it. I don't think the Qataris are excited about it either.

[00:21:15]None of the others are particularly excited about it except Iran and Oman.

[00:21:20]The question is what are you going to do about it?

[00:21:22]The United States cannot militarily open the straits at an acceptable cost. It will require the occupation of Southern Iran.

[00:21:32]And the blockade of the blockade is only making matters worse. We should discuss this several times on your show of how that is actually pushing oil prices up even further and leading to a scenario in which the Qataris for instance are now faced with an 8% GDP contraction.

[00:21:48]The Saudis have not fared as badly. They can actually sell their oil through bypasses because they have the pipelines that bypass the Strait of Hormuz and they actually made more money because oil prices are so high. But the other ones, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, they're suffering tremendously.

[00:22:04]So, a blockade of the blockade is not the solution either. So, there's going to have to be give and take and the leverage is clearly with the Iranians.

[00:22:11]Um I don't think it will be just them and the Omanis at the end of the day.

[00:22:15]It's going to probably have some sort of a regionalization, but it may not be the entire GCC.

[00:22:20]Well, how does this work with the intricacies that we've been hearing about Saudi um uh backdoor diplomacy with the Iranians?

[00:22:29]There's been a lot of communication apparently.

[00:22:32]Uh they've been sending a lot of, you know, details or preferences or perspectives to the Pakistanis which we know have quite a strong relationship given their strategic pact that was signed back in November. So, what could we actually see some kind of normalization of ties between the Saudis and Iranians in a very unofficial sense?

[00:22:53]Well, I mean the Saudis and the Iranians have already normalized. So, that's already there and even the war has not undone this.

[00:22:59]But if we rephrase your question like you are we going to see a reconciliation between them?

[00:23:04]Um, it's going to be hard. It's going to take some time. But again, one can be very angry and many of them have a right to be. In fact, all of them have a right to be including the Iranians. There's a lot of stuff that has been going on and particularly part of the reason why there's elements in Iran that actually would welcome another round of fighting is because it would give them an excuse to really go after the Emiratis. They believe that they let the Emiratis off the hook in this previous war.

[00:23:29]And and part of that is because more and more evidence has emerged that has convinced the Iranians that the Emiratis actually played a much more active role in striking Iran than what the Iranians first thought.

[00:23:41]So, look, there's a lot of anger on on all sides. But the question is what are your options?

[00:23:48]If the United States, the superpower of the world, could not be a security guarantor for the GCC states, could not protect them, was not willing to protect them, but even if it was willing did it not have the full capability of doing so against the Iranians.

[00:24:08]And the US itself is no longer an option.

[00:24:12]Who's going to replace the US or actually be better than the US to actually fully live up to that? There is no one.

[00:24:18]They don't have any other such sugar daddy or opposite of a sugar daddy, I guess, um, that would be able to come in and provide that security. So, they're going to have to diversify their security basket and they're going to have to have a combination of some deterrence against Iran, but also a lot of integration with Iran.

[00:24:38]And it may take time. It may be more easy for some than it is for others.

[00:24:43]Um, some of them will not even want to go in that direction perhaps. And others will be having an easier time going in that direction. But that will be the direction, I suspect.

[00:24:53]Because you're not going to see the Chinese come in and say, "Okay, we'll protect you against Iran." They're they're way too smart to do that.

[00:25:00]The Russians don't have the capability.

[00:25:02]The Turks and the Pakistanis may put troops there, etc., etc., but, you know, honestly, do you think they're going to go to war with Iran on behalf of Qatar?

[00:25:10]I just don't see that happening. They can They can be part of an arrangement in which because of the integration that will take place, the risk of war will be so much lower that they are willing to make certain commitments because those commitments are not going to be too risky because the risk is just so low for another eruption of war because of other factors. But, for them to go in into a scenario in which the the structure is designed to contain Iran, sustain a hostile environment, and then on top of that, commit themselves to defending these countries in a war with Iran, I just don't see that happening. They don't have the credibil- capacity to do so.

[00:25:48]They're They're smart enough not to want to do so, nor do they have the political uh capability at home necessary to be able to get away with something like that. I mean, there is um a degree, you know, as you know, there's a lot of Shia Pakistanis as well, and and there's uh there would be a significant challenge for the Pakistanis if they were to go into this direction uh and put themselves on the firing line with Iran.

[00:26:13]So, I think in some ways, for better the war or worse, the region is doomed to actually get along. And that's actually a great thing.

[00:26:21]Now, how that will happen, how difficult it will be, how long it will take, it will be difficult, but there's an option that existed in the past that allowed for the luxury of not reconciling. And that was that you could hide behind a superpower that would protect you. When that superpower is no longer there, that you cannot hide behind that any longer, you don't have the luxury of just saying, "This is a giant neighbor of ours, but we're not going to have good relations with them. We're not even going to try."

[00:26:56]>> I think I lost you for a second. I know you did, but I mean, we all coming streaming from Africa, so it might have happened occasionally. I'm impressed with how well it's done so far, but no, I mean, look, I think the idea of a multinational force, all these sorts of ideas of large-scale task force forces made up of multiple nation states is is a pipe dream.

[00:27:18]We've not seen that happen over the war in Syria, where you nothing ever came of situation in Gaza. I mean, DRC and and and the wars across the world. We just don't see that appetite for that, let alone in specific context like R2P or responsibility to protect. So, to me, I I like the idea treaty very much of a sort of Middle East which is more unified or at least less prone to to escalations and and conflict, but how can we how can we guarantee that that is is the case? A lot of people could argue that this entire situation we're in now is a long time pathway from because Trump left the JCPOA in 2018, right? Up until that point, the IGC, Islamic Republic, and the Western Coalition had largely been working in lockstep. Um so, I guess I'll rephrase I'll put the question simply. How can we trust that the IGC will not seek to get a nuclear weapon even even despite everything that they say? Cuz that was one of their Trump's biggest concerns.

[00:28:26]So, that to a very large extent will depend on the inspection and transparency mechanisms that will come through the nuclear deal.

[00:28:36]And this is one of those areas I don't have full clarity, but we have heard very little publicly or privately as to what the degree of inspections regimes will be, and whether that will be as strong as the JCPOA or perhaps even stronger.

[00:28:51]But that was the critical element of the JCPOA. It was the inspections and the transparency. The IAEA had eyes in every layer of Iran's nuclear program.

[00:29:00]And it had instruments in there. So it's not just inspectors. So if anything fishy was going on, these instruments would pick it up almost immediately and they would send electronic signals to the headquarters of the IAEA in Vienna, Austria. So it wasn't relying on actual inspectors going in there. It's a completely different system. If you have something like that, this is as close as you get to a guarantee that there is no push for a nuclear weapon.

[00:29:26]Now, if at the same time the Iranians are not enriching uranium for another 10 years, if they're not having a stockpile on their own soil, etc., you know, you can't build a nuclear weapon out of thin air, right? So if the ingredients are not there, etc., that gives you a very, very strong position to be in in terms of feeling confident that the pathways are blocked.

[00:29:50]Uh I don't think you can go much further than that. You can't really have a guarantee that is stronger than that.

[00:29:55]That's part of the reason why a lot of the criticism against the JCPOA were quite unfair because there was never There had never been a deal and arms control deal that was stronger than the JCPOA in terms of its inspections regime.

[00:30:13]Fair enough. Um I guess my penultimate question to you simply, Trita, is you know, there's been a lot of debate internally about the decision-making and the unity, the unified front presented by the government.

[00:30:27]Now we know the situation with Trump.

[00:30:29]It's a dumpster fire, I'm honest. But it's not plain sailing for the IRGC. So what's your assessment right now? I think we touched upon this maybe a month or so ago when some information had come out about Mojtaba and his influence over there different parts of the of the government. What's your assessment now?

[00:30:48]How how how unified are they? Is there a lot of unity or is there still divisions over how much we should negotiate with the US on what terms etc. You know, the closer you get to an agreement the more prominent and visible those divisions will become.

[00:31:04]Because once you're close to a deal in which the details are hammered out, that's when crunch time arrives and you have to make a decision and people have to decide whether for or against it. But right now on the critical issues, should there be negotiations? I don't see any divisions.

[00:31:20]Should there be direct negotiations with the US? I don't see any divisions.

[00:31:25]Should there be should Iran give up enrichment? There's no division.

[00:31:31]They're all unified on that issue.

[00:31:33]So so on a lot of these different things or should they give up the Strait of Hormuz? I don't see a single voice saying that they should give up the Strait of Hormuz. But you know, an an mechanism even a regionalized mechanism is not giving it up.

[00:31:49]They're still in control in many different ways. They're just not in control alone and it's way beyond what was the case before the war.

[00:31:56]So I don't see a lot of divisions there.

[00:31:58]I think some of the biggest divisions, most crucial divisions will emerge after the war. Because that's when they have to deal with the internal situation.

[00:32:08]That's when the excuse of war is no longer there.

[00:32:11]And a lot of these wounds, completely unhealed wounds of what happened in January will come back to the fore.

[00:32:18]And that's where I think you will see even greater divisions than you will see right now.

[00:32:22]I would say that based on what I'm you know, their system may be slow. Perhaps some people in the American system interpret the deliberation um process over there as being either too slow or a sign of divisions. And it could be.

[00:32:39]But I think some of the divisions on the American side are much, much easier to identify and much deeper in many different ways. Um when Rubio is talking about the position of the Strait of Hormuz, it sounds very different from when even Trump talks about it or others do. And I do know that there are real divisions on some of these different issues. And there's going to be There's a realization amongst almost all of them that a deal may be unavoidable, mindful of the dramatic problems the United States is going to face with economically and politically if there isn't a deal. But that doesn't mean that they're all in agreement with the same type of a deal.

[00:33:17]Or that some of them don't want to negotiate more or longer. Or that some of them don't think that another round of warfare is helpful for the negotiations.

[00:33:27]Are you essentially saying then that the the Iranians can hold themselves together, but when a when and if a deal is reached, that could actually make the situation worse in Iran? At least domestically.

[00:33:37]>> Well, in terms in terms of regime unity, once there is a deal, I think undoubtedly you're going to start seeing um both that certain divisions within the system will start emerging. There's been uh you know, look, once you're in a war situation, there is a discipline that gets established, particularly when everyone feels that it is existential, that simply cannot sustain itself afterwards. And there's no need for it to sustain itself afterwards.

[00:34:03]So, I think you will see uh divisions coming up uh within the elite, but also the gulf between the society and the government. Whatever it may be at this point, it's not entirely clear. If there is a gulf, undoubtedly.

[00:34:19]And how this ends will also determine what that gulf will look like. Because if there is a deal that entails a lot of sanctions relief and the economic situation improves, that will have a tempering effect. It's not going to take away a tremendous amount of anger, of course. Tremendous amount of anger that exists.

[00:34:35]But it's a different scenario in which the war is over, there is no sanctions relief, the economic situation is even worse than it was in in December. And on top of that now, you're dealing with uh the fact that there is a sea of blood between uh the government and big parts of the society.

[00:34:52]So, the biggest divisions, I think we will see after the war, not during this period.

[00:34:57]Okay, fair enough. Cuz I've always been interested in this idea of reformers or moderates, or as I prefer to call them restrainers versus the hardliners, because some people claim that they don't exist, it's all the same thing, and it was all a ploy to try to put smoke over the eyes of Western negotiators, but maybe we can debate that another time. I guess my last question for you, Trita, is simply just where do you see this going? What would you encourage people to look out for?

[00:35:20]Typical looking forward question uh before we have you back in the next uh you know, week or whatever.

[00:35:29]Um Always a >> I find it very interesting that the volume among some of the hawks in Washington in terms of their worst fear that the that Trump would actually strike a deal with Iran. You're starting to see some of the hawks use language that is more directly criticizing Trump than you've seen before.

[00:35:54]And that in and of itself is a sign that they're starting to fear that there is a deal in the making. Doesn't mean that it's going to be struck tomorrow or even next week or so, but there is some significant movement. I would also point everyone to pay attention to the very significant regional involvement that is now taking place in the diplomacy. It's not just Pakistan, it is Turkey, it is Egypt, it is Qatar who's playing a very crucial role. And further behind all of that, you see the role of China. Very quiet, often times invisible, but emerging perhaps even as an indispensable diplomatic actor in the region at this point.

[00:36:32]China's buying on this is going to be crucial.

[00:36:35]And, um so, I I think there's a lot to to look at. Unfortunately, we're in a environment almost everywhere that is far more noise. So, it's it's really to be able to separate the noise from the real important indicators. But, I would pay attention to how some of these hawks in Washington are conducting themselves, and look at their language, and how that may differ from what it looked like last time they feared that there was going to be a deal. To me, it sounds more desperate, and more directly attacking Trump in a way that I've not seen before.

[00:37:07]Very curious. It reminds me kind of what's happening in Moscow at the moment with more and more elites publicly criticizing Putin. But, Trita, been an absolute pleasure. Thank you so much for your time. Everyone >> Thank you so much Bobby.

[00:37:19]Yeah, absolutely. Everyone do check out the Quincy Institute, and Trita's work, and we'll see you all soon. Um but, take care, everyone. Have a good Thank you.