The promises and limits of the Trump Route for Armenia

Ajouté : 2026-05-11

[00:00:00]Hello and welcome to Civilet. Today our guest is Anahit Pilibosan, vice president of strategy and development for the independent think tank APR Armenia based here in Yervan. Apri has just published a study of the proposed Trump route for international peace and prosperity and what's needed for unlocking the south caucuses. Thank you for joining us.

[00:00:21]>> Pleasure is mine. APR's report states that while trip is necessary, it's not sufficient toward advancing regional stability in the caucuses. Why is that?

[00:00:32]>> So what we did, Paul, with this analysis is combined geopolitical and economic insights and into what the trip would provide. And the conclusion we reached was that indeed to achieve the very purpose of trip which is international peace and prosperity we need more than the trip. Um so what the Washington declaration that enshrined the trip did was to give us a bit of a pause in the sense that it helped significantly reduce the risk of escalation on the short to medium term and so contributed to stability. Um but at the same time you know it's 9 months later and what we can see is that the rhetoric from uh Russia and Iran has changed or is changing. I am referring to the April interview of the Russian deputy prime minister over Chuk that was pretty clear on on uh Russia's concerns um and dissatisfaction visav the trip but also when it came comes to Iran uh if they were reluctively constructive you know straight after uh August now uh this is likely to change uh because especially with the rise of the IRGC you know in the influence in in Tehran. So what we mean is that there are already geopolitical hurdles ahead that can hinder the realization of the trip and therefore the realization of its objectives. And when it comes to the economic benefits, we really took uh you know pre-existing literature and research on this the various statements and did our own calculation and the picture that we have economically is that the trip taken alone will actually not provide Armenia any new foreign market access. In other words, it will not help Armenia um get away from its current economic isolation. And uh it's all the more important as we have to really bear in mind that as we're speaking, Turkey and Azerban are also constructing a railway connecting uh each other. So cars to nahan bypassing Armenian territory while there is a you know workable existing railway going through Armenia. So this you know it's very important to highlight this uh issue of economic isolation of Armenia persisting with just a trip. And we also uh looked at the value it would generate for the region as a whole if we take just a trip. And that's about $351 uh million dollar a year. So um that's just a trip. But if you contrast this if if the trip is part of a broader border unblocking then the picture is really different because one it would of course uh help Armenia get away from its economic isolation. It would also generate four times more uh benefits, financial benefits, value to the region.

[00:03:51]Uh the and uh and it wouldn't be just transit revenues, it will be also trade and tourism revenues as well. And lastly, a whole unblocking will actually benefit not only the region but also the direct neighbors of this re region and also support connectivity not only east west but also uh north and south. Um so if I go you know square the circle back to the trip and what the trip was supposed to achieve and what we have also in the Washington declaration in terms of support to open all communications article three um it's really important to achieve this stability to focus more on the broader unblocking than the trip and the other element we also have to bear in mind is the sequence, the strategic sequence of all these openings or what is being realized because uh it may well be that if we push ahead with just focusing on the trip rather than try to find incentives and ways to unblock the region or in particular the Turkey Armenia border then would Azerban and Turkey have any incentives left you know to actually open the borders and you know so it's very important also to highlight the importance of the sequence and that while it's understandable that the political focus and momentum is on the trip, we should leverage this momentum to also focus on the broader border opening.

[00:05:25]>> So this is an incredibly complicated story with so many moving pieces. Uh it started out uh perhaps with this negative perception of Russia wanting and and Azarjan wanting this Zongzor corridor as they called it you know through Sunni and and some people like to just associate one with the other as if they're the same exact thing though they're not the same exact thing and what API is saying trip is good in theory but uh what what would how could this regional unblocking be achieved and in what order like I mean for I mean a big thing would be the opening of the Turkish border. But so far, I mean, we have not seen anything from Turkey. They were just here and they announced a uh re restoration of the ANI bridge and some uh international uh people are making a huge deal about this. This was agreed to 3 four years ago and it was never implemented and now they're finally implementing this, but it's it's symbolic. So, how do we get past symbol symbolic to concrete and and Turkey just seems completely unwilling. So I mean what's going on there?

[00:06:32]Um so uh I will refer back to our previous research report on Turkeykey's policy in the sales caucuses where we asked the very baseline question of what are the what are the drivers of Turkeykey's policy uh you know in the region and the conclusion we came to based on you know interviewing um uh either Turkish stakeholders or experts focusing on Turkish foreign policy and security policy.

[00:07:01]is that Turkey is driven by a Baku first uh you know um mot driver and and that entails that uh Ankara is likely to continue waiting for the green light of Baku to really bulge on the significant you know pieces that would really move forward the uh the normalization discussion and um it's you know you refer refer to the fact that the restoration of the Annie Bridge was something that was announced with great fanfare but already sort of agreed way before. I can also refer to the July 2022 agreement between Armenia and Turkey whereby uh you know third party nationals and diplomatic passport holders would would also be able to pass through the border. And here we are we have this you know the date of the implementation is a moving target at the end of last year we heard 1st of February and then later we heard it's the 1st of March of 2026 and nothing is happening um and so you know um it's uh um our uh um belief is that um one uh this is I would say a degen um a disingenuous um circular argument that we have from uh Turkey because they are saying to have normalization with you or even to do all these things we agreed upon you need to agree to have a peace agreement with Baku before that. But we know the hurdles to have this uh peace agreement signed because of the precondition or the pretext of a precondition of the changing the constitution. And what is also very interesting I find is that um while we have this position uh from the Turkish side, what we hear now from the other Beijan side when we discuss with counterparts uh from Baku is we are okay with partial border opening with Armenia as in we're okay with the trip which is you know partial border opening without having the peace agreement signed. So why is it that Baku is dissociating uh you know in its intellectual argumentation or its diplomatic argumentation you know the uh border opening lane and the peace agreement lane or normalization lane and Turkey isn't doing the same while saying they are following you know very close to to Baku. So I think it's really highlights that um Baku has a strong influence on Turkey and um and the way we believe so what can we do about it? Um I think that Armenia has done a lot to demonstrate its willingness and it's how constructive it has been to sort of unlock this situation. Um but I believe that we need the support of other partners who are al equally invested in opening up the region and I would highlight particularly the US and the EU and I would call on you know on these two uh diplomatic partners of the region as a whole to really you know work towards supporting the at least the border opening between Armenia and Turkey. Well, when it comes to these uh outside partners, uh when we look at the transit fees that trip would get for the United States and Armenia, there's going to be a joint company that the US has the majority uh share of it. Uh it would be perhaps 10 million a year, 15 million a year. People are estimating. Yet the US is planning to invest hundreds of millions if not more into building trip.

[00:10:58]So that calculus doesn't work unless there is this wider opening or all they're doing is basically a favor to Turkey and Azar Beijan by allowing them to have that connectivity and then use that railroad that they're building.

[00:11:10]>> I would like to if you allow me to go back to what sort of economic opportunities the trip will bring and square that against you know the Turkish Aerbani line of the Zangizo corridor and what the US should do about it. Um so you know we discussed this already but the trip will bring economic opportunities uh only indirectly and it's important to stress that and um and that is also how we can read the active efforts the current government is undertaking to really portray Armenia as an FDI destination. you know, so we have this good momentum about the trip and so we're calling on our US friends and other friends to invest in Armenia. So it remains to be seen if that campaign will actually you know uh reap fruits but that's certainly a very active uh file. Um there is a concern uh you know on how the trip as it been envisaged in the Washington declaration and the implementation uh framework document uh will really and how it squares with the Zangzo corridor and um and I think it's important to um discuss about that as well. Um so what we have is on one hand our you know there is nominally the expression or the affirmation of Armenia's sovereignty um uh exercised through the trip uh you have it in both documents but on the other hand we know that words are not enough to actually materialize things. uh in the same Washington declaration that Azerban has signed it also affirms the respect of the principle of territorial integrity and sovereignty and yet Azeran let's remember is occupying 200 square kilometers of Armenian territory and it's also sponsoring up until now um you know campaigns claiming that Armenia or parts of Armenia are western Aerbejan so that doesn't square Uh and so based on our uh conversation with other Beijani counterparts on what Azerban means with Zangzu corridor is two things. One is an impeded access from uh Azerban proper to Nakavan and the second is no Armenian interference, no Armenians whatsoever as the as good and um people, you know, go through uh Armenia.

[00:13:55]>> Why do they think they deserve that?

[00:13:57]That's not how international relations work between countries.

[00:14:00]>> Well, uh if you don't >> How can they demand that, you know?

[00:14:03]>> Well, because they can. nobody's stopping them. Um so uh so there is this uh you know extra territorial element clearly outlined in their perspective and so if you take that and compare it with what we have with the trip is article 4 of the Washington declaration does provide unimpeded access with the reciprocal benefits of Armenia and we keep forgetting that and we don't know where it's going on that front by the way. And then the second aspect of no Armenians whatsoever is not really met because when you look at the trip uh implementation framework document signed in um January.

[00:14:45]uh we have this front office back office model outlined and according to which Armenian authorities would be in the back office which would mean monitoring reviewing and ultimately deciding who you know who is going through the trip.

[00:15:03]So that's where we are. Um there there is a concern that we shouldn't dismiss uh on human security and psychological safety. Uh and there's been actually a research by the Eurasian Partnership Foundation about this on the the sentiment of border communities about the trip uh that really highlights this that there is a concern of human security and safety.

[00:15:33]So uh going back to your question on what is it in in the US or what should the US be doing? Uh I really think that the US and not just Armenia should really call on Azerban and Turkey to stop calling the trip the Zangu corridor or that the trip is part of the Zangu corridor. And in fact the vice vice president Ilmas who was here at the EPC summit on Monday later this week if you look at Azerbani press coverage has called the trip Zangzo corridor. All right. So we should really you know push the US to really understand that this is not for their benefits at all that uh you know a a cosignaturery and an ally of the cosignature keeps calling it the Zango corridor and also I think that the Armenian government should really look at addressing the concerns of its local population uh around you know concerns of human security and also what it can perceive as a bit too vague and a bit too abstract, you know, when it comes to the actual exercise on the grounds of uh of our sovereignty. And so it should be really demonstrated to the Armenian people.

[00:16:48]>> And by that same token, I should also mention the EU because you mentioned them. What could the EU be doing in this case? They're not a party to the trip, but they're still involved in the region.

[00:16:58]>> I mean, you know, uh I think they're doing already a lot to be uh honest. uh you know they just signed the connectivity high level agenda earlier this week and uh so they are uh demonstrating let's say their willingness to constructively engage with all parties to make this work. Um and and so we have this um you know connectivity agenda.

[00:17:26]It's framed as part of their global gateway initiative. they keep referencing it in the uh when they engage with central Asian countries. Uh back to the middle corridor, what I omitted to say is that in the joint statement of economic cooperation between the US and the five central Asian countries that was uh signed in November last year, there was uh a point in that statement referring to the middle corridor or the TransCaspian international uh transport route [clears throat] uh connecting the supply chain of passage of critical minerals from central Asia to uh through the trip to Armenia. So that's another point that we tend to forget. There is an eye in trip.

[00:18:15]There is international. It shouldn't be for the exclusive use of Aerbianis or Aerbiani goods, right? And so um these are all dynamics we have to remember and and and really stress to all our counterparts. Um but I be fur. So back to the EU uh working a lot with Armenia through the connectivity agenda and also supporting investing or funding uh infrastructure projects in Sunni and highways and also we know that um Bejan has asked uh the EU to fund the railway of Nakvan.

[00:18:54]Um so uh but I would say generally and this is also something we had observed back in 2023 2024 when we did uh research on EU Armenia relations that the EU tends to use more carrots than sticks and I think that uh it's also demonstrates the limits of the geopolitical power let's say you know the of of the EU because uh by being overly constructive in a region where um this uh you know uh that is not so constructive. I don't think it's actually getting the objectives that they would like to see.

[00:19:36]>> I think we saw that a lot in the term of Charles Michelle where a lot of carrots to Azarjan and Azaran throwing sticks back and really nothing really happening. One more thing I want to bring up is a lot of this bases on the fact that the opening of the Turkish border is is a good thing for Armenia.

[00:19:52]And yet I was at a a conversation recently with some scholars and they were all completely opposed to it and were giving some very very uh negative interpretations of what might happen. So I I am curious just from that perspective. Uh well, one of the things that is a real concern is the Armenian agricultural industry and other industries that would be overwhelmed by Turkish goods that could more easily now come into Armenia. So what do you say about that? Is there as much of a threat as some make? And what's the costbenefit analysis?

[00:20:23]>> Um [clears throat] I think it's it is a sensitive topic that's worth uh you know looking at and and not blindly. So or not and so that's why in our analysis we were very keen to actually combine geoeconomic and geopolitical insights. We tend to look just at one rather than the two. And um I think uh also it's important to look at the applied aspect not just the academic aspect. So uh and so what I mean is uh if I have to boil this concern down legitimate concern down to what it means it means there is a risk of competitiveness of the Armenian industries such as agricultural industry and how it will be affected if the border opens with Turkey. Um and so there is actual research uh you know evidence-based research that's been done about that not by us that demonstrates that that risk can be manageable. Um so access which is a local Armenian economic distinct thing the Armenian center for socioeconomic studies recently published actually a piece of research on uh looking at the price the of agricultural products in Armenia and in cars and some uh Turkish goods such as tomatoes would be cheaper than those sold right now in Armenia. But some other agricultural goods such as beef are cheaper in Armenia. So it's not a black and white picture according to this uh you know piece of research.

[00:22:06]But also let's remember that economic policy tools exist you know to actually counter these sort of risks and you know and we do have the such tools in the pallet of uh the Eurasian Economic Union. So I'm referring to dumping measures such as quotas or tariffs on foreign goods. Um so we have to bear that in mind and to that's why you know to have a more applied perspective on things. Uh but um I also want to highlight with this issue of export versus local production that it is a more broader problem. It is certainly a problem when it comes to Turkish goods, but generally speaking, Armenia structurally is ex is uh uh importing more than it is exporting and that's a so the risk of competitiveness of the local industries is not you know just a Turkish Armenia problem.

[00:23:08]So um the Armenian government seemed to be aware of this concern and they did publish an expert uh strategy last summer but we do have to do a lot more work on this to make sure that it is uh looked at and also let's remember that it's not just about the bilateral trade right you know if hypothetically we have the border open with Turkey that would also mean Armenian uh products would may have more access to European markets, right? And and so helping with their own competitiveness.

[00:23:45]So, you know, I wouldn't call it doomsday or it's like terrible, but it's certainly something to look at and they are existing tools in place to manage that sort of risk. You mentioned the EPC, the European political community summit that was just here in Armenia and really solidified Armenia's importance uh in the region just like how all these different potential uh pathways going through it uh shows Armenia is uh more and more geopolitically interesting to the world. Uh the the international press was saying so much about Armenia has now fully pivoted to the EU. It's it's really it's its future is with Europe but we have the biggest trade partner Russia to the north saying not so fast. Uh so where are things going with Europe? What is there to to gain and how is it possible to balance that with Russia?

[00:24:37]Um I I want to take actually one thing you said is how the international press has been portraying Armenia and um but actually in practice Armenia hasn't pivoted to the west and I think it really shows how important it is for local actors like you and I or civil net and a Armenia to have exposure and have this engagement with international foreign policy influencers so that they have a more accurate portrayal, a more nuanced one of what's happening here.

[00:25:12]So, you know, the way we qualify all this uh, you know, confusing picture when it comes to Armenia and its relationship with the EU and Russia and others is we call it western focus diversification, which means that Armenia is uh seeking to engage in some shape or form with all the cardinal points. uh but at the same time there's a very clear strategic focus or moving uh track with the US and Armenia. So what is next or you know what does it mean for the future of EU Armenia relations? Um and I think we need to then ask ourselves what can you know prospects of membership uh and candidacy and we really have to look back at the Copenhagen criteria and um first so what's on paper and also when we discuss with actual European-based legal experts on accession it is pretty clear that Armenia has to take three steps before even considering applying. So first step is actually implementing fully the bilateral agreement that is the cement that's the very base of emenia relations which is the sepa the comprehensive and enhanced partnership agreement we haven't fully implemented it although it was supposed to be fully implemented by 2021.

[00:26:40]Uh the second step is to complete visa liberalization.

[00:26:44]Sounds like we're on track on that. And the third step is to exit the Eurasian Economic Union. So far the Armenian government is stating no interest in doing so.

[00:26:55]>> [snorts] >> So while it's you know we should appreciate and comment the very positive constructive and multifaceted uh dynamics of Armenia relations and all the strategic papers being signed. We also have to finally uh you know take a step back and work on what we have already committed in the past you know before sort of jumping to the next wagon. we really have to actually focus on what we already have. So, so that's something quite important that we, you know, going forward finish past work. So um when it comes then to you know balancing out uh Europe and uh Russia I think that Armenia so far has been doing this and to a certain degree but it also depends on what is the ultimate goal of this western focused diversification.

[00:27:55]you know is it a means to an end or is it an end to itself and and is the end ultimate end actual accession to the EU so then we can think how Russia will react to this you know so if it's candidacy yes certainly you know it's quite logical from Russia's perspective this is Armenia moving to the enemy's camp and you know joining the sanctions more you know uh embracing it much more strictly and um really you know really you know clearly uh divorcing from uh Russian connections and kicking out all type of Russia Russian presence from here. But if the goal of all this all these papers and all this is to pursue its own relationship with the EU without candidacy separ implementation visa liberalization Russia has stated that they're okay with that. You know there is no issue for them about this. Um so where are we is actually a very hard question to answer.

[00:29:04]uh because I would say that the Armenian government is sending mixed messages.

[00:29:09]You know, on one hand, you do did have uh the adoption last spring uh last year of this law on accession uh to the EU which does signal consideration to you know uh apply for candidacy and we have seen the Russian reaction. We have also seen the EU's reaction and we're surprised by the EU's mild reaction by the way and at the same time even you know throughout this week or at the dialogue that was uh following the EPC summit and new Armenia summit you know Armenian officials including the prime minister said we are pursuing a balanced and balancing foreign policy. So that would mean diversification not a pivot or not a western focused diversification even. So this ambiguity is very nebulous and it is both for us you know Armenian society and I think also for our partners diplomatic partners and uh and there might be a point where Armenia will have to make it clear what is the end of this diversification.

[00:30:20]Anahean of Apria, Armenia. Thank you so much for helping to clarify what is clearly not a very clear situation at all. Thank you for being here.

[00:30:30]>> Thank you. And thank you for joining Civilet.