Desempeño de la economía mexicana en la 4T. Charla con el doctor Bernardo Jaen Jiménez

追加: 2026-05-25

[00:00:02]Bernardo, can I make a joke about the title?

[00:00:05]Yes of course.

[00:00:08]Bernardo's chiaroscuro will call you.

[00:00:10]Here it goes. We're live now, okay? We 're live now.

[00:00:14]Well, good afternoon, friends.

[00:00:17]Good afternoon.

[00:00:19]Ah, welcome to another Plaza Hour program. From the small square.

[00:00:25]Oh, no more. It's because I spent so many years on that program.

[00:00:33]Hey, classroom in resistance.

[00:00:35]Classroom in resistance, sorry.

[00:00:38]Yes, we're in a hurry now and there are some confusions, this, about memory, about how we're going to get the program up and running. In fact, please excuse us because due to delays we started 10 minutes late.

[00:00:56]In fact, we were already here before, but we had some problems and we couldn't solve them, so it took us quite a while to get this program up and running. Well, on this occasion, we're going to have as our guest Dr. Bernardo Jaén, and my colleague Belinda will tell you about him in a moment. Hi Belinda, how are you? Here again is my colleague Belinda Cées accompanying us. Yes. And we are very grateful that you are joining us, and we also invite you to invite more friends. We are especially interested in reaching the University of Guadalajara community because Aula en Resistencia (Classroom in Resistance) is formed, driven, and carried out by colleagues from the University Front for the Dignification of Work. Our goal is to keep fighting and chipping away, not stone, but this mineral from a meteorite, because it is quite complicated to get our fight going, but we are persisting.

[00:02:13]All to improve the working conditions of the workers, both academic and administrative, and also to improve the conditions so that the university is truly a public university with free public service, but of quality, so that the investment goes directly to generating good academics, good researchers, technicians, etc. Okay, so without further ado, let's get started. Belinda, I'll leave you with this.

[00:02:49]Thank you so much. Good afternoon, teacher Bernardo Ya Jiménez. Welcome.

[00:02:55]Since this program began. Uh, I wanted to hear from him, we wanted to have him accompanying us on this interesting program that has emerged from this group of the University Front for the construction of work and so I have to read something about his economic, political, academic career and so on and I'm going to summarize by telling you what I wrote for him. Puse, without a doubt, has the best academic and legislative profile, because he knows the hard data, he knows the statistics that can easily lie or the big ones of economic science, but he also perfectly understands the political language and the legislative agenda. He knows how the economic package and the gross budget are approved and how every penny is negotiated there in Congress. Uh, Professor Bernardo has a doctorate in social sciences with a specialization in regional development from the University of Guadalajara. He has a master's degree in economics and technological change management at the Autonomous University of... Yes, he's from Mexico, the chapter or area in Sochimilco, right? In the Huan Sochimilco. The teacher is also a master in economics from the National Autonomous University of Mexico. He is a professor at Huanzo Chimirco, ITESO, Tec de Monterrey, Universidad Valle de México, and INAP. He is a columnist and analyst in various media outlets, such as the Moral newspaper, Radiometropole, Project 10, Partidero, and surely others. Uh, I'm going to make a joke here. And he shared with us that he is a speaker at more than 50, I mean, you can't tell us where our colleague has been to so many national and international forums and has published more than 40 works in books, magazines also of national or international stature. That's why I put 50, so he probably missed it. Uh, 50 is a small number for him, I think it's much more. Uh, he is a research professor in the economics department at CUSEA here at our University of Guadalajara. He has also worked as a public servant in the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Health, and as a parliamentary advisor in the Guadalajara City Council, the Congress of Jalisco, and the Chamber of Deputies. So then we're dealing with someone who is an expert, right? Someone is an academic, a researcher, a man who has been involved in various civic movements. I remember seeing it in different citizen groups as well. And so today we're going to touch on this topic of putting public money under a closer look, the money that our government has, the money from which we all eat, live, and depend. And we'll see about these promises, or not promises, or those fulfilled or not fulfilled, or what has been fulfilled of the fourth T, compared to the hard facts of reality, especially regarding what keeps us moving: the economy, the national economy, the big economy, the small economy, the little economy, I said small, but it's the one that hits us daily in our pockets with what we eat, with what we spend on the bus, with what we buy. We love the electricity or the dirty water that we don't want to pay for in Guadalajara. Well, maestro, you're in the right place. Welcome. This one, thank you, Hector. And welcome to all who will be listening and participating in this interesting topic that Maestro Bernardo Jael will be discussing with us today.

[00:06:52]Teacher, good afternoon.

[00:06:53]We heard it.

[00:06:55]Thank you very much, Ralinda. Thank you very much, Hector, for the invitation. It must be mentioned that one of the problems we have is that we fail to convey Bernardo's image. Uh, that's why we're showing his photo so you can, well, keep in mind who he is, and from now on I have to remove the photo to then present the graphics and the paintings that Bernardo, sorry, Bernardo, is interested in exhibiting. Go ahead.

[00:07:26]Yes, thank you very much. Well, first of all, I'd like to give a brief historical overview of how Mexico's economy has evolved in recent years, because we often forget where we come from, and to understand where we are, we need to know where we came from economically.

[00:07:46]Note that during Cheverría's six-year term, from 1970 to 1976, remember that it was a rather complicated six-year term that came after the massacre of students in 1968 during the previous six-year term of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz. So, Cheverría's six-year term obviously came with a very strong brand there, given that he was Secretary of the Interior during the six-year term of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz. Remember that, the third year of López de Echeverría, remember, 70-76 was quite complicated. He had a confrontation with the businessmen. It was during that period that, unfortunately, the six-year term ended with a severe economic crisis. Hey, remember that it was precisely on August 31, one day before he gave his last activity report, on September 1, 1976, Echeverría announced that the peso, the Mexican peso, was being devalued. Remember that it was fixed, the exchange rate was fixed for almost 25 years, from 1954 to 1976. The peso, let's say, bought 12.5 pesos for 5. It was a very long period of stability in the exchange rate, and when the Mexican currency devalued against the dollar, a whole chain of macroeconomic effects followed: the economy fell, unemployment increased, obviously incomes fell, the economy contracted sharply at the end of Echeverría's term, and obviously this generated a very high inflationary process. And remember that when there is inflation, obviously many families cannot keep up with the rising prices and fall into poverty, right? So, the six-year term of, let's say, Luis Cheverría ended in economic crisis. Then came the six-year term of José López Portillo, 7682. It was also a six-year term that had the good fortune of having enormous oil deposits. Remember the famous Cantarel, although it was discovered during Cheverría's six-year term, it began to be exploited starting during López Portillo's six-year term. That famous phrase of López Portillo still resonates a bit in history, doesn't it?

[00:10:04]When he said that we had to prepare to manage abundance given that enormous oil deposits had just been found. And yes, indeed, Mexico went overnight from being a global exporter and producer of crude oil. And during that period, both during the six-year term of López Portillo and that of Cheverría, external public debt grew incredibly, by about 50 billion pesos of dollars, given that many resources were required to boost the growth of the oil industry.

[00:10:41]Furthermore, we still had a captive productive structure; we had a closed economy. There were still a lot of federal government structures that favored business growth through subsidies and tax breaks. In other words, remember that we were still in the final stage of stabilizing development, right? Or also the so-called Mexican miracle, when Mexico had strong economic growth. Despite the economic crisis that Cheverría and López Portillo experienced, on average the economy grew considerably during those two six-year terms. Even in 1981, the PIT growth rate was around 9%. In '82, when the crisis hit, remember also that López Portillo ended his six-year term with a severe economic crisis. In this case, it was caused by the external debt that both López Portillo and Echeverría had contracted in the previous six-year terms. That's why those two six-year terms are called the tragic dozen, right? Because they indebted the country exponentially. And of course, when the economic crisis of '82 came, then the economy had to contract again. Now there was a very sharp drop in the economy; the gross domestic product fell, inflation spiked again, the exchange rate devalued again, and income fell because unemployment increased significantly, and of course, this had very strong effects on the increase in poverty among the Mexican population. And that economic crisis was inherited by the six-year term of Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, who governed Mexico from 1982 to 1988.

[00:12:32]Remember that it was a six-year term deeply marked by the economic crisis. There was no end-of- term crisis under Miguel de la Madrid. The crisis lasted the entire six-year term. Well, the economy remained contracted during '82 and '83. It was combined with a natural disaster, remember, like the '85 earthquake.

[00:12:54]And let's just say that was a very big deal for Mexico, right? The earthquake that destroyed much of Mexico City and other cities in the country. Therefore, during Miguel de la Madrid's six-year term, the economy was practically in ruins throughout that period. I don't know if you can help me, Hector, with this chart I sent you where there's a table with the main variables and there you can see, right?, the performance of the macroeconomy in the three, right? It's not this post, it's the one I sent you, it's not the book, Hector, it's an S.

[00:13:29]Exactly. Thank you. Yes, you can see it there, right? As in the six-year term of Miguel de la Madrid, it was also called the six-year term of zero growth, given that the average growth rate of the P was 0.15%.

[00:13:41]Very practically nothing. And if we take into account the entire period, right?, from 1982 to 2018, the GDP growth rate was also 2.07%, very low. Well, Mexico has persistently had major problems in inducing gross domestic product growth. Well, in the last four decades, at least from '82 to the present, 2026, Mexico's GDP has grown in a meager way, but right here we're going to see an important change, aren't we?

[00:14:12]Look at the table here, what does it show, right? The inflation rate under Miguel de la Madrid, Salinas and Cedillo averaged 42.2%.

[00:14:22]Uh, and looking at the long period from 1982 to 2018, it was 25.4%.

[00:14:31]So, inflation was also high during that period. The exchange rate, as I had already mentioned, underwent an impressive evaluation process. If we take the entire period from 1982 to 2018, the exchange rate, peso against the dollar, devalued by 75,480%.

[00:14:50]A depreciation process and incredibly high, isn't it? One of the tallest in the world. An important characteristic of the neoliberal period that spanned from 1982 to 2018 was basically found in wage policy.

[00:15:08]Remember, for many years the minimum wage was practically compressed, depressed. There was an explicit policy on the part of the federal government that minimum wages should not increase because they thought, there was a whole strong ideology, right?, that had driven the neoliberal model that if the minimum wage increased, it would cause an increase in the price level, that is, inflation, right?

[00:15:37]So, of course, for example, in the six- year term of [name omitted], in the year 2000, well, here, now, if you want, Hector, the graph you're showing, right? The growth of wages in the book, the previous one, please. No, that's not it. There's the minimum wage growth rate, which shows how there's a huge gap between wage growth and the inflation rate. If you want to go to the graph, Hector, the medium one, the immediate one, where you can already see the trend, right? In the long term from 1980 to 2026, there is a strong trend in the fall of the real minimum wage level. He remained practically depressed, didn't he? From the 80s until 2018 it was almost a horizontal line, you see? a long period of time where the minimum wage was contracted and well, obviously from 2000 onwards with the entry of López Obrador in 2018 there is a strong recovery in minimum wages, right? Uh, thanks, Hector, if you want we can go back to the previous slide, please, to the table, the one you were on.

[00:16:56]Ah, yes, it's the table, that one for Gracias.

[00:16:59]Yes. So there you have it, right?, how minimum wages remained depressed. For example, during Vicente Fox's six-year term from 2000 to 2006, remember that this president, from the National Action Party, governed, he set the minimum wage at 35.12 pesos, and ended his term with 47 pesos. Enrique Peña Nieto took the minimum wage from 60 pesos and left it at 88.36 pesos. In other words, minimum wages were growing very slowly. Remember that minimum wages are authorized directly by CONASAMI, which is the National Minimum Wage Commission, a tripartite body made up of the Mexican government, the presidency of the Republic, the representative of the unions and the representative of the employers of the business chambers, of the companies. And well, they'll decide there, the increase in minimum wages was being decided, right? So the period in which minimum wages were stagnant was so long that, of course, poverty levels increased significantly, right?

[00:18:07]For example, in 2014, 46.2% of the Mexican population was living in poverty, which was equivalent to approximately 55.3 million Mexicans living in poverty, right? And another very important thing that contributes to poverty and inequality is precisely what has to do with tax collection.

[00:18:29]An important feature of the entire period from 1982 to 2018 was that there were tax breaks basically for large taxpayers, for large companies that paid practically no taxes. Uh, of course, that meant that tax revenue as a proportion of gross domestic product, it must be said that this is how it is measured, let's say, in macroeconomic terms and as an end for the purpose of comparison between countries.

[00:19:01]Tax revenue is measured as a proportion of gross domestic product and in the year 2000 it was 14% of GDP. So, that's the defining characteristic, right? That the neoliberal model prevailed from 1982 to 2018, where fundamentally there were governments that promoted a set of policies that essentially and ultimately favored the concentration of income, increased poverty, and fostered economic inequality. And of course, this type of model was quite suitable for large families and business groups in Mexico, but obviously it was very exclusionary in terms of generating poverty. To put it simply, uh, it was, we could say, a poverty factory, right? A factory for producing poor people, isn't it? The neoliberal model. So, I think that an important part of the model that began to be promoted from 2018 onwards with the arrival of López Obrador, there is also an important characteristic that the gross domestic product, as I was saying a moment ago, continues to have serious problems in triggering growth. During AMLO's six-year term, the economy practically did not grow at all; it grew by an average of 0.9% of the gross domestic product. Practically nothing. If you can see it, it's very similar to what was obtained during the six-year term from de la Madrid, from '82 to '88. Then, and also during the six-year term of Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo, currently last year, on the 25th, the average GDP growth rate of Mexico was 0.8, that is, it also did not grow. However, I think we economists have a part to play here, a task, don't we? We have an outstanding task in terms of, let's say, analysis, of studies, in greater depth as to why, if the Mexican economy is not growing, the rest of the macroeconomic indicators are stable; in other words, the performance of the gross domestic product in the 4T has been similar to that which occurred in the six-year term of Miguel de la Madrid. which has been the worst six-year term in recent decades.

[00:21:26]However, I repeat, in other macroeconomic variables the economy remains quite stable. For example, no, the inflation rate here in the country, adding up, right?, that of AMLO and Claudia Sheinbaum so far in this period, practically a year and a half of the current president's government, the inflation rate has been 4.9%, that is, it is relatively low if we compare it with that of other countries. The exchange rate, I think, is a very important part here. The exchange rate, you see, in the last six years we have been used to seeing our currency weaken against the foreign currency, mainly the dollar, with continuous and persistent processes of evaluations or depreciations. For 36 years we watched our currency weaken against the dollar, and now we have this situation where the exchange rate has been appreciating, right? López Obrador took the exchange rate from 19.5 pesos to 17.3 pesos to 17.3 pesos, meaning there has been an appreciation process of 11.5%.

[00:22:39]Our currency has gained ground against the foreign currency, which is basically the dollar. And I think the important part has to do with the increase in minimum wages. I believe that's where we can locate the fundamental part of the change in the economic model, in the wage policy versus what was promoted during the neoliberal period.

[00:23:04]Look how the minimum wage during AMLO's six-year term increased by 248, sorry, it increased by 248,696 pesos. He took it at 102, right?

[00:23:17]Remember I mentioned it a moment ago, right? When Peña Nieto finished his six-year term on December 1, 2018, he left the minimum wage at 88 pesos. Immediately in January, obviously with AMLO's six-year term it increased to 102 pesos and when his term ended in 2024 it was already 248.96 pesos, that is, a significant increase in the minimum wage, right? And well, contrary to what was being said throughout the period, that if the minimum wage increased it would cause inflation, well, surprise, there was a significant increase in the minimum wage and there was no increase in inflation, which shows that we were being deceived all along. The population believed it. Many economists and media analysts always repeated the narrative that suited the government, saying that minimum wages should not increase because that would cause inflation.

[00:24:21]And well, another important thing, I mentioned that the radical change in the model, from my point of view as an analyst, I see it in the labor sector, not only because of the increases in minimum wages, but also because there was a reform in the labor law and subcontracting was eliminated, the famous outsourcing, which was a huge drain of money for the working class, given that this type of contract did not allow them to receive profit sharing, for example, they were deprived of vacations.

[00:24:53]Obviously, social benefits and medical insurance were also frequently, let's say, taken away from the workers, to put it colloquially. In other words, there were a lot of situations that were against the workers and in favor, obviously, of the concentration of wealth in a few large companies, right? And of course, as a result of all those kinds of labor policies, poverty decreased significantly, uh, significantly. More than 13 million people escaped poverty in the period from 2018 to 2024, right? In 2024, for example, with the set of reforms that took place in the labor sector, poverty stood at 29.6%, equivalent to 38,500 people. Compared to the 55 million people living in poverty during the six-year term of 1900, in 2014, for example, when Felipe Calderón was already in power, there was a significant change in the decline of poverty, right? So that's a part, I think, that really needs to be highlighted and repeated, right? The reduction in poverty has perhaps been one of the most important achievements of the 4T governments. We also need to understand that. Poverty and economic inequality are among the factors that have triggered the levels of violence that our country has reached in recent years.

[00:26:24]Violence, the increase in crime, obviously has socioeconomic determinants, doesn't it? And one of them has to do with low wages, economic inequality, right?

[00:26:34]And one important thing to finish this slide, Hector, is that tax revenue grew exponentially, right? Since López Obrador came into office, remember, there has been a very tough policy of collecting taxes from large taxpayers.

[00:26:51]When we talk about large taxpayers, we are referring to companies that have annual revenues of 100 million pesos or more. And those large taxpayers in the neoliberal period paid practically no taxes. And in this period, you can see how in the year 2024 tax collection as a proportion of the gross domestic product of GDP already went from 14% to 18.3%.

[00:27:20]In 2018, this group of large taxpayers was charged 84,387 million pesos, and in 2025 it increased to 349,970 million pesos. In other words, those groups of big businessmen who were used to not paying taxes, including of course Ricardo Salinas Peliego, are now forced to pay taxes, right? So I think that's the most important result, the most important balance, right? What are the economic implications of this regime change? There is a very important turning point. There is a break in the way the economy is managed and viewed. There is a breaking point in the way economic policies are designed. Well, it's clear that policies are now aimed precisely at beating economic inequality, reducing poverty, and obviously increasing the population's well-being. If you want to lower it a little, Hector, the sheet downwards.

[00:28:25]Uh, here it is, right? Okay, now let's move on to the topic of debt, shall we?

[00:28:30]It's quite a controversial topic, isn't it? In recent years, especially during López Obrador's six-year term, it has been said that the external debt increased considerably. Yes, it did increase, especially in the last year of López Obrador's government and in the year and a half that Claudio Shiman Pardo has been in office; the external debt has indeed increased significantly.

[00:28:47]Primarily because large infrastructure projects that are very expensive are being promoted: the Maya train, the construction of the Dos Bocas refinery, the Felipe Ángeles airport, the interoceanic train, and now with Claudio Sheman Pardo, the expansion of the train network, right?

[00:29:07]The train that's coming from Mexico City will pass through Querétaro, Irapuato, Salamanca, and will pass through here in Guadalajara and will continue its journey towards the western state of the country, right? And there's also another train that goes all the way to the northern border, right?

[00:29:23]Well, that part requires large amounts of resources, but something needs to be pointed out here as well.

[00:29:30]External debt is also measured as a proportion of gross domestic product.

[00:29:35]What does that mean? This means that GDP represents the amount of income generated by an economy and debt represents payment obligations.

[00:29:46]So, what this graph we have here is showing, the international comparison of gross public debt as a proportion of GDP, shows that indeed in 2026 Mexico's external debt represented 53.9% of the gross domestic product, but compared to other countries it is relatively low and manageable.

[00:30:11]That's what's important, isn't it? In my economics classes, I always equate these types of debt-to- income situations with a family, right? If a family has a large debt, but a high income, then obviously that debt is manageable for the family and will not generate any crisis. The problem arises when the relationship between income and debt repayment obligations becomes unmanageable. And well, Mexico has indeed significantly increased its external debt, but it's still within very manageable limits, right? If you want the sheet below, Hector, please.

[00:30:52]And well, here it shows the net debt of the federal public sector in absolute terms in millions of pesos. Uh, here it shows in the long term how it has been growing, right? It has been growing and yes, it is obviously shown that there is strong growth, but it turns out that if we look at the graph here, the strongest growth of the federal government's external public debt was not during AMLO's six-year term, it was during Felipe Calderón's six-year term.

[00:31:22]If we look at it here in absolute terms, but if we look at it in the slide below, Hector, if you go down there, please, you can see how the debt is by six-year periods. The blue line represents the growth rate of public debt and the orange line the average growth rate of gross domestic product.

[00:31:43]And it does show, as we had already confirmed in the case of López Obrador, that there is a relatively low growth rate of external debt and very small GDP growth, as we already said. But you can see how the growth of the debt mainly occurred during Felipe Calderón's six-year term.

[00:32:03]So, well, external debt continues to be a problem for Mexico. A significant portion of the external debt has been growing primarily because the federal government has low revenues, even though we showed a moment ago that tax collection has increased thanks to taxes being levied on large taxpayers, large companies; Mexico still has very low revenues.

[00:32:34]Uh, I didn't show it on the slide a while ago, but when we show the tax revenue that Mexico has compared to Latin America, it is very low. In Latin America, the average is 21%, while OECD countries average around 46%.

[00:32:51]So, we have very low revenue. The issue of taxes has been a topic of debate for decades, decades. Uh, I still remember when I was an economics student, the prevailing idea back then was that the federal government had to implement tax reform to increase the tax rate and obviously charge higher taxes to large taxpayers, to high-income families. And it wasn't done, it wasn't done with La Madrid, it wasn't done with Salinas, it wasn't done with Cevillo, with Fos, with León, with Peña Nieto, and neither with AMLO. Nobody wanted to take on the task of promoting a tax reform. There are a lot of proposals to increase revenue. For example, it is suggested that the federal government may impose a 1% tax on large fortunes. 1% 1% annual. I don't know, Carlos Lin has a net worth of 160 billion dollars. Well, let him pay 1% of that wealth annually to the federal government, in addition to the taxes he pays.

[00:33:54]periodically. Well, those kinds of proposals don't usually get off the ground, do they? Because obviously, promoting a policy of this type would imply confronting large companies in political terms, and we know that large companies, in addition to having economic power, also have political power, right? And of course, nobody wants to, as they say colloquially, put that top on their fingernail, right? Nobody wants to confront the large business groups that are very powerful in Mexico, right? So, the problem of debt remains a problem. We're definitely going to be dealing with this for much longer.

[00:34:31]A large part of the federal government's funding goes to continue supporting Pemex and the Federal Electricity Commission. In other words, these are state-owned companies that accumulated enormous debts during past six-year presidential terms. And well, obviously it's up to the current government, the AMLO government, to pay the commitments made by these two large companies, right? So, that's why there's an imbalance in public finances, right? Because a good part of the resources will be used to finance the growth or maintenance of these two large state-owned companies, right?

[00:35:06]So, if you want to download the next slide, Hector, please.

[00:35:11]And well, here's the issue of foreign direct investment, right? There was a lot of debate about whether the arrival of the 4T would scare away foreign investment, both domestic and foreign, right? Given that a populist government was obviously coming in, a left-wing government, a government that squandered public resources, according to the criticisms of the opposition.

[00:35:40]However, this table, which is from the Ministry of Economy, clearly shows how foreign investment in Mexico has continued to flow, even in amounts greater than in the previous six-year term of Enrique Peña Nieto.

[00:35:53]Foreign investment has not stopped; it continues to flow significantly into dynamic sectors of the economy, as shown there. And well, the United States is still obviously the main country driving foreign investment in Mexico, right?

[00:36:12]It's clear, then, that these large companies that make their decisions and decide to invest in Mexico obviously don't watch the news network promoted by Lores de Mola or the TV Azteca news programs, right? Or they don't get on Twitter or X, right? where the picture shown there is of a Mexico in catastrophe, in free fall, destroyed and obviously that information can generate economic uncertainty, right? And to scare away foreign investment, but it's clear that these types of companies make their decisions rationally and don't see this kind of catastrophic news, right? So, foreign investment is an important variable, not only in terms of the amount of investment that comes to Mexico, the generation of jobs, the generation of products, it generates exports, obviously increasing volumes of exports to other countries, right? But it is also a symbol or a symptom of confidence in the performance of the Mexican economy. It is a symbol of confidence in the stability of the main macroeconomic variables.

[00:37:19]These macroeconomic variables, which are fundamentally the interest rate, the exchange rate, and the inflation rate, have remained relatively stable over the last 8 or 7 and a half years of the 4T. So, therefore, let's say that foreign investment also represents other things, not only in terms of numbers, it also represents in terms of confidence, how international investors view the Mexican economy, right? If they saw it destroyed, if they saw it bankrupt, if they saw it in total crisis, they wouldn't come.

[00:37:56]Instead, they see a growing domestic market, a domestic market that has been growing in recent years mainly because the demand from Mexican families on average has increased significantly, primarily due to social programs.

[00:38:14]So, if you want, let's go to the pages of the book, please. Okay, um, next one, please, next one, please.

[00:38:29]Look, one important thing that has happened in recent years, fundamentally since the López Obrador government (2018-2024), is that public investment in infrastructure generation has been directed mainly to southeastern Mexico.

[00:38:44]These tables you are showing are from an article that we published jointly, Dr. Enrique Cuevas Rodríguez and Dr. Jorge Reinoso, both from CUSEA as well. Uh, a book that was published just two months ago in the Department of Economics, and we contributed an article analyzing the effects of wage policy and social program policies on increasing the well-being of the population in Mexico, right? This table summarizes an important idea, doesn't it? What is shown here is that since infrastructure investment was concentrated in the southeastern states of the country, remember the Dos Bocas refinery in Tabasco. The Maya train covers five states of the country, which would be Chiapas, Tabasco, Campeche, Yucatán and Quintana Roo. It's roughly 15 km of railway tracks for the Maya train and also, let's say, the interoceanic train, right?, which goes from the port of Cuxacalcos to the port of Salina Cruz in Oaxaca. It was also a very large investment. So, in recent years there was a process that hadn't been seen in decades: the southeastern states of the country were taken into account by federal policies with public funding. Well, traditionally infrastructure spending went to the central, western, and northern states of the country. And of course, obviously for those reasons the levels of development in those countries were much higher compared to those in the southeast, right? But what the table shows is how GDP growth in those southeastern states, which we call the mesh train here, right? The term "Tren Maya" is used colloquially to simply indicate the states that make up the south and southeast of the country.

[00:40:35]GDP growth was 10.09%, 9%, that is, a very high rate. So, what does this show? What this very high growth in gross domestic product in the southeastern states is showing is that those very unequal levels of economic development that were observed in previous decades will tend to decrease with these types of policies, that disparity, that heterogeneity in the levels of development of the states of the country. So, obviously, from my point of view as an economist, that's a good policy because you can't aspire to long-term economic development if you keep dragging along entire regions of the country with low levels of development simply because there's no spending on infrastructure.

[00:41:25]So, infrastructure spending will certainly bring more economic growth in the future.

[00:41:31]Private companies and foreign investment will see that there is economic development resulting from the government's investment, and obviously that will generate positive effects in the long term, right? So, that part seems very important to me, the fact that the federal government has deliberately decided to change the direction of public investment in infrastructure.

[00:41:55]Let's remember that now, in purely theoretical terms, right?, the determinants, the growth of the PIL in the long term, one of the most important determinants is precisely the creation of infrastructure. And well, this part shows that public resources flowed abundantly to the southeastern states and therefore GDP growth compared to the rest of the states in the country was much higher. So, that 's the balance sheet, isn't it, for the six-year term? Yes, there are light and dark sides, we can say that, right?, in the six-year term of the 4T, AMLO and Claudia Shembau, in the sense that they have managed to modify the orientation of the economic model. Well, hours, deliberately, the aim is to favor the most vulnerable sectors, the most vulnerable families, and as a result, as we have seen, poverty has decreased. By focusing solely on the poverty variable, we can say that we have found the right recipe.

[00:42:55]So, if we look at it from a future perspective, right?

[00:42:58]How can we reduce or continue reducing poverty in Mexico? Ah, well, with the policy that was promoted with López Obrador and with Claudia Shen Bampardo. I'm increasing the minimum wage, right? Of course, it is an important variable, reforms to the labor law that favor the development of workers, that increase their productivity, that eliminate, obviously, the abuses that companies make of workers. There needs to be much more oversight, I believe, from the perspective of the Ministry of Labor, the conciliation and arbitration boards, which are also responsible for addressing workers' labor demands, so that companies obviously do not continue to abuse their workers as they have been doing in previous administrations, right? So I think if we look at it again from the point of view of the recipe or what the basic ingredients are for poverty to continue to decrease, I think we have already found it. Look, and if we lower poverty again, let's say during Claudia Sheinbaum's six-year term a percentage similar to that of López Obrador, we will be ending in the year 2030 with poverty levels that reach 20% of the total population of the country. A radical change compared to the 50- something 46% that existed in 2014, isn't it? or the 53 million people who were living in poverty in 1914. So I think we should hope that these kinds of policies will be sustained over time and, of course, allow poverty to continue decreasing, right? And just to finish up, Hector, I don't know if I can go back to the previous slide where that publication that was given so much attention appears, right? Next time, please.

[00:44:49]This one, that's the last one, the other one, the other one.

[00:44:54]Not that one. Yes, I don't know if you remember that flyer, right?, that circulated widely here in Guadalajara in 2018.

[00:45:06]In 2018, remember, there was a very tough campaign against López Obrador's candidacy.

[00:45:13]Uh, this propaganda was being distributed in flyers, I received it on the street, by the way, but this flyer was also widely distributed on social media networks. As you can see, their purpose, their fundamental objective, was to generate fear, right? I was saying, that's what Mexico would be like if AMLO governed, right? The first year I would say, uh, let's see, I can't quite see, excuse me. The first year the dollar was at 30 pesos, right? With inflation at 10%, foreign investment falling by 5%, tourism falling by 7%, the worst start to the six-year term is in 70 years.

[00:45:50]The second year again presented a catastrophic picture, didn't it? The third year, the fourth year, I mean, you see, right?, how propaganda was handled with the aim of discrediting or stopping the growth of a candidate, right? Uh, this, remember, this wasn't new. In 2006, when Felipe Calderón won the nomination, uh, do you remember those years, it was that phrase, the danger for Mexico. And now this type of advertising was being distributed abundantly in 2018, wasn't it? Well, as you can see, they painted a really bleak picture for Mexico, didn't they? If López Obrador won, he would become president of the Republic. And well, we already saw with the statistical information that none of what they mention here came true.

[00:46:42]That catastrophic panorama, right?

[00:46:45]In macroeconomic terms, Mexico is doing well.

[00:46:47]We could do better. One outstanding issue, as I already mentioned, is the very low growth of the gross domestic product. We need to continue boosting the engines that drive GDP growth, which, as I said, would be infrastructure spending, investment in human capital, basically education, health, and also increasing the benefits that workers have, so that their productivity levels increase. So, obviously there are factors here that are still not working. I say it often, do n't I? The engines that drive GDP growth are not working in Mexico yet. There are many shortcomings, and of course the outstanding issue is that Mexico's gross domestic product will grow in the future, because if the economy doesn't grow, obviously we won't be able to, let's say, eliminate those very strong shortcomings that we have been accumulating for decades, right?

[00:47:48]Well, in the end, when one compares with other countries, we see that the current international outlook is not very promising either.

[00:47:58]Well, many countries around the world are suffering significantly in terms of prices, inflation, and their economies are also declining. Many countries became heavily indebted after the COVID pandemic in 2020. Remember that there was a heated debate here in Mexico, right?

[00:48:15]Business groups were pressuring the federal government to support them, to bail them out, to save them with public money, or if there wasn't any public money, to go into debt. And well, López Obrador said, "No, I'm not going to go into debt." And well, the COVID crisis was overcome with many difficulties. We all know that already. There were many deaths, there were many infected, but in the end when the pandemic came to an end, Mexico was one of the countries that contracted the least external debt during that period compared to other countries.

[00:48:49]So, well, as I said before, there are light and dark sides, right? In general terms, the economy is doing well, it 's strong, there are obviously some dark clouds on the horizon, right? In the sense of having a neighbor like Donald Trump who is using political and economic power to exert pressure and modify the policies of countries like Mexico or Latin America to favor them, the United States and its companies, right? And obviously resisting that kind of pressure is no easy task, is it? So, in general terms, Hector Belinda, that would be the approach.

[00:49:31]Pelinda, your microphone is off.

[00:49:33]Yes, thank you, teacher. Very interesting.

[00:49:37]For those of us who are not so close to this topic. I took it upon myself to ask people who were both for and against the 4T, and I want to share what they told me. In fact, the first thing they send a greeting to is a student from the Manantlán mountains, a classmate who is in the library there at the Manantlán high school. When I sent him the invitation, he sends his regards, professor. This is the teacher Tomás now. There he is, but he told me, "He was my teacher." So please accept that big hello from your colleagues over there in Aguas de la Sierra.

[00:50:21]Uh, I'm going to go for it. Well, there are three questions that were asked of me and I'm going to ask them. One has to do with what you're saying, that it's very important to see the infrastructure, that is, a piece of data, a sign of the future and of the possibilities for infrastructure growth, as is the case with what you 're saying about having invested in the southern zone. However, as you said, and as others have also said, the pandemic situation caused everything to change, or at least appear to change. But these big Chinese companies, which take so long to bring a ship here, have come to Coahuila and Chihuahua and are doing these North Suries or N-type operations. I'll put it in very simple terms: it's about putting the company closer to home in our country, because the closest consumers are here, from Mexicans to Americans, for the construction of automobiles and the manufacturing of various electronic goods and other things.

[00:51:35]And the question is, what happens if all these manufacturing companies or these gigantic business groups put their platforms in these northern and southern cities? You are saying that the train is being put in place to locate, among other things. But where are the jobs for young people?

[00:51:58]How are they going to make that growth reach the south?

[00:52:04]What would happen? How can you understand it?

[00:52:06]Or how does he explain it to us? Those two things.

[00:52:11]Yes, Delina, I think that's how I mentioned it, right? These types of infrastructure development projects also take time before they start attracting new private investment, both domestic and foreign.

[00:52:24]Uh, I think they will flow. There are already many industrial parks being built in the south of the country. Um, this also coincides with the arrival of Claudio Shiman. Let's start a great project, which is the Mexico project, which basically consists of starting to replace imports of a large number of products that we can produce internally, and also, obviously, to seek sovereignty in certain key sectors such as energy or food.

[00:52:55]So, that will also, of course, boost the growth of the industry at the national level. However, there is reluctance on the part of business owners to invest. Just a few days ago, the president mentioned that she had once again called attention to the large national banks because they have not released credit.

[00:53:15]Banks have a very important task; they are financial intermediaries. They receive savings from the public and channel them through loans, obviously, towards society, to investors. But they put up a lot of obstacles, very high interest rates, and that doesn't favor the growth of investment, right?

[00:53:36]So, the part, let's say, is that national entrepreneurs have to do their homework, the banks have to do their homework, and so far they haven't done it. So, for that reason, Belinda, the growth of private investment in the southeast is still going to take a little longer, but I'm sure that it will take off in the coming years and that, of course, will generate jobs and many young people will be able to find work opportunities, right?, in the southeastern parts of the country. And in that regard, teacher, thank you for answering, it's in the northern parts, well, there's a lack of water, there's a lack of laws that aren't modified, because foreigners feel uncertain about the changes in laws and geographical conditions, I mean, it's not just that, because there's no electricity, no water, there's nothing, so how? And the legal situation. So there are also things that can't be guaranteed. First, what can you tell us about that as well?

[00:54:38]Yes, unfortunately I don't know if colleagues have just found out, but just last year, in December of last year, new laws regarding water were already approved. The creation of the General Water Law, which had not been done for many years, was pending, as was a reform to the national water law, the famous LAN. So that reform, that law, basically what it did was privatize the water resource, and obviously it favored the large concentration of water by large consumers, large companies. So this type of reform, I believe, will also help to ensure that little by little water, which is a vital resource, right?, for businesses, but also for families, begins to arrive in more abundant quantities to many municipalities, many states of the country, especially in the north and central parts of the country, which suffer from frequent droughts, right? The word " liquid," which is water, is currently being reformed. Well, I insist, the law was modified just a few months ago and it's going to take a while, they 're just being worked out in the Chamber of Deputies right now, but just last week there was a meeting where they are drafting the secondary laws of those laws that will obviously allow the application of these new laws to be operationalized, right? So, water is a fundamental resource, Belinda, and I believe that this reform will help ensure that water reaches more Mexican families, right?

[00:56:12]And the other one, Hector, you leave me alone because I forget it like you forget the other one, teacher. Uh uh they also questioned me because the truth is that I didn't know how to answer it and that's why I'm passing it on to you. The question is, when is it going to stop? That's what they say. So many years have been invested in Pemex and in some other refineries, or in the construction of the other six or eight that are out there, or especially in Pemex, and they were asking, well, when is it going to happen? It has been invested in. They say it's the one that has received the most subsidies. He says, "When is he going to give money to Mexico?

[00:56:55]What about that? What's happening with this part?

[00:57:01]Yes, remember, right? That Mexico, Mexico had six refineries, and with López Obrador's administration, the Dir Par refinery in the United States was purchased, and the Dos Bocas refinery was built in the municipality of Paraíso in Tabasco. And it's a very large refinery, right? That will fundamentally allow the production of gasoline, right? And that refinery, as you know, took time, it took several years to start producing, about three years from when it was inaugurated during López Obrador's term until it formally began production. But if you look, check the statistics, they're there, they're visible, they can be easily found.

[00:57:43]Mexico's gasoline imports have begun to decrease significantly. When López Obrador took office, we were importing almost 80% of all the gasoline we consume in the country, and now it has already..." Production has dropped significantly to less than 50%, and the Dos Bocas refinery still hasn't reached its maximum capacity. At the same time, the other refineries that were neglected throughout the neoliberal period also began receiving additional resources to modernize, to update, because they were truly becoming scrap metal.

[00:58:15]Remember that in the neoliberal model, the main objective was to eliminate state-owned enterprises, and companies like Pemex and the CFE were being divided up piecemeal, primarily to private companies, right? So, that scheme, that model, also underwent a very important change with López Obrador, which I agree with. As an analyst, how many marches did we hold, Héctor, protesting the gas price hikes back in Peña Nieto's term, remember? Yes, the energy reform that was approved in 2013 promised the moon, right? That gasoline and petroleum products were going to increase in price. Well, absolutely nothing happened.

[00:58:55]On the contrary, right?

[00:58:57]Gasoline prices kept rising and rising, causing side effects like increased inflation, right? But we marched, we protested, we held many protests against Peña Nieto's energy reform because we obviously perceived that they were destroying a very important public company that was created, started by Lázaro Cárdenas in 1938, right? I mean, that company has a history, right? And no, of course, as researchers, as economists, as ordinary citizens, we didn't agree with destroying that company, and they were doing it, they were doing it. They didn't finish it off completely only because the company resisted, but they were going to finish it off, right? So, I think the process is slow. Uh, Linda, I think there are still many things to see in the growth of the oil industry.

[00:59:48]Uh, there will still be good results, I think. You're already seeing it, but there's still a way to go. These are infrastructure projects that require calibration so that the machines start working properly, and It takes time. It's not an easy task in the short term. I'll give you the last question, and you can continue, Hector. Although they made me study, teacher, they made me study.

[01:00:14]Go ahead.

[01:00:14]This, uh, while ECLAC establishes that a very large number of people did indeed escape poverty, or we did escape poverty, because this idea that the poor are over there, right? Here we are, some of us who escaped it, you gave the statistical data. Uh, I was asked two things, or we were analyzing two things. One is, while there is enormous support for the different vulnerable groups, not just vulnerable, as they always want to call them, for senior citizens, for young people, for schools, there is enormous social support, we already know it and we feel it, many of us have already felt it, but the money is going to illness, it's going to the purchase of private medicines, it's going to private doctors because the health system is broken. I have ISE and well, I don't want to go to ISSSTE. I have a problem with my lung. And I've even had a year where they don't give me the results until August, and that's just me. Now imagine everyone else. What's going on? Why, if that money is being spent, don't they offer it?

[01:01:31]But the health system is really in crisis, and there's a lack of funding for it.

[01:01:38]I feel there's an imbalance there, you know? And the situation regarding investment in health is serious. What can you tell us, teacher? And that's it, Héctor, you'll continue, otherwise you'll hang up on me.

[01:01:51]Yes, I'll answer you quickly. I think you're absolutely right. The public health system in Mexico is one of the major outstanding issues of the 4T (Fourth Transformation).

[01:02:04]The criticism of the service provided by public institutions like ISSSTE (Institute for Social Security and Services for State Workers) or IMS (Mexican Social Security Institute) has been quite strong, and they're absolutely right. However, we also have to look at the numbers, right? Right now, there's been a very strong process of growth in hospital infrastructure.

[01:02:20]During the neoliberal period, they were left abandoned, neglected.

[01:02:25]Old scrap metal, unfinished construction, many hospitals that López Obrador began to rescue. But it has been a rather slow process, because we are talking here about very large amounts of investment that are required. I don't know if you saw it, but just recently the creation of a whole project to promote the construction of new hospitals was announced. The plan is to build more than 9,000 new beds. Remember that in the health sector, the quality and quantity of services are measured in beds, right? So, in this six-year term of Claudia Sheinbaum, the project aims to build a little over 9,000 new beds, which, combined with the 5,000 beds built during López Obrador's term despite the pandemic crisis, essentially triples the number of beds produced or built in previous administrations, like those of Peña Nieto, Calderón, and Vicente Fox, who hardly invested anything in health. There have also been many problems hiring doctors, specialists, general practitioners, and nurses, given the bottleneck at the universities.

[01:03:38]Remember, here at the University of Guadalajara (UDG), we also experienced this, with a large number of students, in quotes, rejected, right?, who no longer fit in the classrooms.

[01:03:47]Medical specialists are very important, and so there's a great shortage of specialists, doctors, and nurses, and that's one of the reasons why Cuban doctors are being imported. That's one of the reasons. Why? Because many doctors who are hired by the Local Health Services (LIMS) or the Local Health Services (LE) obviously don't want to go to remote communities, right? Why? Because they have a middle-class standard of living or live in big cities, so they don't want to leave. And obviously, there's a shortage of doctors. There's also the issue of medicines; that's another pending matter, but I'll say it again: we have to review the numbers, we have to review Statistics, you have to look at the information. Right now, unfortunately, we're being bombarded by a lot of lies and misinformation.

[01:04:41]And that clouds the picture and prevents us from seeing the real data, the hard data. No, you have to review the government statistics, and there you can see how investment in educational infrastructure has also grown a lot in recent years, but the deficit, the backlog that accumulated over more than three decades, is so significant that reaching satisfactory levels of public health care isn't going to be easy; it's going to take years. I put it in colloquial terms, like in my economics classes, right? That economic disaster that was simmering for more than three decades, the recovery and getting out of that situation isn't going to be short-term. It's going to take us the same amount of time, 20 or 30 years, if these policies are maintained, if they remain well-focused, if It's that they remain well-designed, if there are sufficient public resources. Then we can see a better public health system in the future. I think they're laying the foundations right now. I'm confident; I've been looking at all the information, and I'm confident that the foundations they're building now are adequate, but it takes time to see results. So, Belinda, this is still going to be a long process. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Go ahead, Hector.

[01:06:09]Bernardo. Uh, I have several questions. One of them is—well, there are three, so I don't ask you to invest any more time than you've already offered.

[01:06:25]The first question is, has poverty been reduced? Has tax revenue increased? Has a whole project to increase the country's infrastructure been carried out? However, what I don't understand, and it seems to be one of the reasons why the right-wing media and right-wing opposition parties question the lack of economic growth, is this: How is it possible that we see these very positive situations?

[01:07:01]Poverty reduction, increased tax revenue, infrastructure, construction of new infrastructure. However, as you showed us in the graphs, the economy isn't growing. Why is this?

[01:07:15]Yes, I was just saying that a moment ago, right? We economists have a pending task here: to delve deeper, to analyze these kinds of phenomena, right? How is it possible that an economy that isn't growing—and I repeat, we have similar growth to what Miguel de la Madrid had in '82-'88—why are the results so different? Why?

[01:07:42]Why are unemployment levels at 2.7%, which is one of the lowest in the world, why is the inflation rate also one of the lowest in the world, and why has poverty fallen so significantly with such meager GDP growth?

[01:07:58]Well, the truth is, I haven't found any clear explanations yet.

[01:08:03]We can go back to the president's statement, right?

[01:08:05]Well, avoiding corruption and waste also yields results, right? And that's how we can explain why, despite scarce resources, they've been used appropriately and all these benefits have been achieved, right? But today we have a task ahead of us. There's still more research to be done. I'm just offering an opinion; I don't yet have precise statistical information on why the economy's performance, even though it's so weak, has a positive balance. There are other factors. Look, for example, at the exchange rate, right? The exchange rate has been appreciating. Right now it 's at 17.60 pesos, I think, yesterday or today. We have a strong peso, a peso that has strengthened. And economic theory, or the theory of international trade, says that when the exchange rate appreciates, the level of exports decreases and imports increase. Well, it turns out that exports in Mexico have continued to grow in recent years.

[01:09:07]So, there's a way to... A clash with the theory, right? There are a lot of things, Héctor, that we still need to explain, because there aren't clear answers as to why this phenomenon occurs. And it's not because the instruments or methodologies used to measure this respond to a different economic model, one that isn't exactly more inclined to benefit the popular sectors, like the 4T model. Yes, of course, right?

[01:09:42]That could be a quick answer, right?

[01:09:44]However, I insist, there's a lack of studies to support that type of analysis, a lack of studies to support why, let's say, but also an important point: the external debt, as I mentioned, has grown a lot in the last year of López Obrador's administration and in the year and a half of Claudio Chema's term.

[01:10:03]However, it's still very manageable compared to other countries. But yes, I repeat, you're right in your question.

[01:10:13]We have to look for the answers elsewhere. Right? Why is the economy performing this way, and with a GDP that we can't seem to grow? That's been the big problem, right? The big challenge?

[01:10:28]How do we make GDP grow? Well, unfortunately, we haven't managed it.

[01:10:34]Yes. Another question is, how is that possible?

[01:10:39]Well, that also relates to something like that, but why did the economies of the neoliberal period show GDP growth?

[01:10:53]Despite having extremely high inflation and enormous devaluation. I mean, why? Well, that also relates to what you mentioned, but it's also difficult for me to understand. And this whole thing about saying that the economies were strong—well, the economy was strong back then, and now, I don't know if you can still say that it's a strong economy, you already mentioned it—but then, what were the other economies like in the other periods?

[01:11:28]It's the same, because of how the other periods were.

[01:11:32]Yes, we also have to understand that it was a different world. Remember that even during the Cheverría and López Portillo administrations, for example, we had a GDP growth rate of 9%, right?

[01:11:44]We had a closed economy, a captive economy. A large part of the external public debt that those two governments incurred was to boost the growth of national industry with subsidies and tax breaks. In other words, there were obviously deliberate policies to stimulate economic growth, but the world was also growing during that period; it wasn't exclusive to Mexico. Remember that one might think that Mexico has always fared poorly economically, but no, right?

[01:12:12]Remember that there was a period when Mexico was even called the Mexican Miracle, right? Where Mexico had a very high growth rate.

[01:12:20]Precisely the one I mentioned a moment ago, right? But it was a different world too. When the economy began to open up, when the world's economies began to open up with the famous phenomenon of... Globalization, well, one of the effects of globalization is the economic interdependence between countries.

[01:12:38]Governments lose, let's say, autonomy to design their economic and monetary policies, and we are already being affected very directly by the decisions made in other countries.

[01:12:51]Why? Because we have much more integrated economies; we now have, due to trade liberalization and financial liberalization, these kinds of phenomena that are summarized as globalization have caused what we are seeing now. And these kinds of phenomena, well, obviously, for obvious reasons, did n't exist in the late 70s and 80s, right?

[01:13:13]So I think that also has a lot to do with it. In those presidential terms, the economy grew strongly, it grew a lot, although it collapsed at the end of the six-year period. Cheverría López Portillo, also remember Salinas de Gortari's term and the famous December mistake.

[01:13:29]In December of '94, the economy also collapsed. So even with all that, the economy grew under Salinas de Gortari. Quite a bit. Why?

[01:13:38]Because it took advantage of, let's say, the benefits of trade liberalization that Miguel de la Madrid primarily promoted with Mexico's entry into the ALCA in '86. And then the signing of the trade agreement, which came into effect on January 1, 1994, favored economic growth under Ernesto Cevillo and Ponce de León. Even though other variables plummeted, the economy had a relatively high average growth rate, right? And we can't see that kind of situation in the recent period. I mean, it's very difficult to achieve a growth rate that even exceeds 2%, right? Right now, it's projected that the GDP growth rate for 2027 will barely reach 1.7%, which is very low, right? So it's still a challenge that they haven't found a way to regain GDP growth.

[01:14:27]And in terms of our country's economic situation, will we be ready to perform better, the same, or worse than other countries? Are Latin Americans prepared to face all these conflicts happening worldwide?

[01:14:45]I think so. Now, when we start comparing ourselves, we say, we're doing more regularly, right? But when we compare ourselves to other countries, well, we are much better off than many other countries in Latin America, right? And in the world. And even though we have the United States as a neighbor, nobody has the United States as a neighbor, let's say, since we are a middle-income developing country, we're not Canada. And fighting or confronting that ogre that currently governs the United States on a daily basis is no easy task.

[01:15:18]And from my point of view, the president has faced it, as she says, with a cool head and making good decisions without openly confronting Donald Trump, because ultimately we have to understand the asymmetries, right? We have a lot to lose, and despite that, we have managed to cope, right? But other countries aren't; other countries are suffering, right? In terms of economic development, for example, Mexico has had a better outcome; poverty has decreased, In other countries it has increased. So, I think that in the end, if we compare ourselves to Latin America, at least, the balance is still much more favorable.

[01:15:55]And finally, Bernardo, you've already shown us that there has been a lot of investment and work done in favor of the South; however, we have many sectors on the left, local sectors, and right-wing parties have also wanted to get involved to contribute, to reap benefits. What could you answer from your position as an economist, based on the information you've given, about whether it's good or bad? Because for them it's bad. Yes, destroying the environment, destroying the culture—that's the argument they make. What would you say to them about development, the development projects that the 4T (Fourth Transformation) has for the South?

[01:16:49]Yes, I would tell them that there isn't a single infrastructure project in the world that doesn't have some side effect, a negative effect on the environment. It doesn't exist. I mean, you think, for example, of China, right?, which had 12% growth during 2020. Years and overnight, now in just a few years, it transformed remote areas of the country with hills, mountains, and rivers into enormous cities. Obviously, that had negative effects on the environment, right? So, there isn't a single infrastructure project worldwide that doesn't generate side effects. However, of course, there are processes, right?

[01:17:34]There are protocols that require, that obligate, construction companies, and even the government itself, to conduct environmental impact studies, of course, right? However, even when they conduct those environmental impact studies And even if it's a requirement to make investments, there are always negative impacts, always.

[01:17:55]But that's where one has to put the balance, right? We'll see what we can do in the balance sheet. So, the other way is to not invest anything, absolutely nothing in the southeast, to leave them abandoned from public and private investment because it will generate collateral effects on the environment. So that's what you have to weigh up, right? The positive effects and the negative effects too, right?

[01:18:18]That balance is not easy to strike.

[01:18:21]Look, taking advantage of this space, we send greetings to Julio Antonio Salmerón, who asks you a question, and also to Enrique Cuevas, who sends us his comments.

[01:18:35]The exhibition was very interesting. Greetings to my colleague Bernardo Jaén. With the 4T governments, the paradigms of orthodox neoclassical economics have been broken. It was said that wages could not be increased because it would cause inflation, and recently the interest rate has fallen and inflation has not increased either. And in Julio's case, Antonio Salmerón asks, how do the rating agencies affect our companies like Pemex and the Federal Electricity Commission?

[01:19:01]Yes, thanks. Many greetings to Enrique and of course to my friend Julio who lives all the way in Cuaxacalcos, Veracruz.

[01:19:08]He knows the situation in the southeast very well, which is what I'm talking about. And well, I think the answer was the reason Moody's ratings just yesterday, right? Yesterday it did not issue a negative rating towards Mexico. This always happens. Well, it's important to understand that the Ministry of Finance has already responded to that low rating given by this internationally renowned rating agency to Mexico, right? And basically, Pemex's response is that the public resources managed by the federal government continue to be channeled significantly towards Pemex and the CFE.

[01:19:44]Therefore, it obviously leaves public finances vulnerable. That's true, they are vulnerable, aren't they? But I believe, based on what I have seen in recent years, that in the face of this vulnerability, the management of macroeconomic policy is adequate. In other words, up until now, the finance secretaries we've had in Mexico, I believe, have promoted a good policy and haven't made mistakes, and have weathered, have overcome, let's say, those critical phenomena we've had, such as the increase in the external debt of Pemex, of the CFE, which have left them in a super indebted situation, we have to understand that. And these governments have, by the way, we also have to look at the data, been lowering Pemex's external debt, little by little, but they have lowered it, but even so it is still very high, isn't it? So, of course, we also have to understand that those rating agencies have their own agenda, uh, they 're not exactly charitable souls, are they? The rating agencies are also on their own agenda, but you're right when they do their assessments, aren't you? And but I think that so far the Mexican government has been successfully navigating them, right?

[01:20:56]Hey, Berinda, I'm leaving the closure in your hands.

[01:21:01]Yes, it was very interesting, very enlightening, very relevant for understanding this macroeconomic life in simple, citizen-friendly terms at different levels. We are very proud that one of your colleagues from Cuatzacualco is watching us. We've already reached beyond Jalisco.

[01:21:26]Thanks a lot. Good evening, teacher Bernardo, friend, colleague.

[01:21:32]Thank you for participating. We always wanted to hear from you, and we did, and you did, by sharing your knowledge and what you do with passion. Thank you so much to everyone who listens to us, whether live or on the replay. See you next Friday. Today was Friday, May 22nd, 2026. We send you a hug wherever you are.

[01:21:58]Hey, Hector, good evening. Maestro Bernardo, thank you and thank you to those who wrote to us, the two colleagues or those who were left wanting to write, but please do, subscribe to the Aula en Resistencia channel. Good evening and we'll see you next Friday.

[01:22:14]Good evening, everyone.

[01:22:15]Thank you, Bernardo. Thank you. See you later.

[01:22:18]An honor. See you later. See you later.

[01:22:21]Thank you.