The United States we thought we knew is gone

Ajouté : 2026-05-18

[00:00:00]After America is made on the lands of the Bunarong and Warandre Warong peoples of the Cooland nations, we pay our respects to elders past and present and acknowledge that sovereignty was never seated.

[00:00:12]>> We are in a battle for the soul of America.

[00:00:17]>> This is a fraud on the American public.

[00:00:24]>> Hi, I am Angus Blackman and this is After America. Today I'm here with Dr. to Emma Short, Australia Institute director of international and security affairs for our 100th episode of After America. Emma, we made it.

[00:00:39]>> Us and David Atenburgh. Hey.

[00:00:40]>> Yeah. One of the other shows I produce for the Australia Institute, Dollars and Cents, uh the co-host, Eleanor Johnston Leak, would uh I think asked me to put air horns in at this point, but uh I might save the more demure, more mindful and demure listeners of After America at that particular experience.

[00:01:02]>> So, Emma, we're celebrating today with your favorite thing, and that's maths. M >> and that's because we've uh published some new polling about Australians views of Trump and the US relationship. So Emma, what do Aussies think about our mate Don?

[00:01:19]>> They're not super hot on him, I've got to say. Yeah. Um we've got some back some pretty interesting results that have changed uh a fair bit since last time um we pled Australians about how they feel about the alliance and Donald Trump. We asked Australians who they thought was the greatest threat to world peace. Uh, Donald Trump or Vladimir Putin, the president of Russia, or Xi Jinping, president of China. And 52% of Australians said that they thought Donald Trump was the greater threat to world peace. Um >> yeah, only 17% chose Putin and only 16% chose Xi, which I thought uh was particularly interesting kind of given, you know, the rhetoric that we always talk about around uh China in particular. I think Putin kind of makes sense because you know that unfortunately I guess that war has really fallen out of the news and lots of Australians would see that as you know very far away from us. But yeah, so so a majority think that Donald Trump is a greater threat to world peace than the leaders of the world's two most powerful authoritarian states, which I don't know feels significant.

[00:02:29]>> Yeah. Uh particularly for two countries who are supposed to, you know, supposedly share values.

[00:02:36]>> Uh it turns out if you go around starting wars, >> Yeah. illegal ones. Uh yeah.

[00:02:41]>> Yeah. Yeah. People react.

[00:02:42]>> And this is the second time we've asked this particular question. How does this result compare to uh the previous time?

[00:02:51]>> It's changed quite a bit. Uh I guess unsurprisingly, you know, we asked this same question about a year ago and the numbers fell then uh pretty evenly. So it was sort of roughly one/3 for each of those people. Donald Trump was slightly higher than the other two, but you know, it it fell pretty evenly. Uh so there's been a pretty big shift in that sense where um people are paying much more attention to Donald Trump and I think you know reacting really to the reality of what he's doing in the world.

[00:03:22]>> I'm interested in whether or not this is sort of isolated to Trump himself and you know the Trump administration or whether Australians views of the alliance the US relationship overall is changing. Do we have any information on that? Yeah, look, I I I think we do because we also asked Australians a couple of questions about the alliance and sort of how they feel about Australian foreign policy more broadly.

[00:03:47]So, we asked the question of whether uh people think Australia's interests are better served by a more independent foreign policy or a closer alliance with the United States. And 59% chose a more independent foreign policy compared to 23% who chose a closer alliance with the United States. Now it's difficult to you know you can't necessarily untangle that from what Donald Trump is doing because people are of course answering this question in in the context of Donald Trump but I I think especially in the commentary and um by other kind of foreign policy folk there's a real effort to separate Donald Trump from the broader alliance you know there's this idea that he is >> hopefully I guess temporary and so you have to think of them as two different things like you know it's that classic line that the alliance is above of presidents or prime ministers. Uh but I I think these numbers are reflective of a broad understanding that you can't necessarily do that in a neat way and that Donald Trump is actually quite dramatically changing the United States and how it behaves in the world and that's not just going to I guess revert back to to normal, you know, he's changing things quite radically.

[00:04:58]>> Yeah. And I mean that's the argument that you've been making since the start of the show. I mean certainly since >> Trump was reelected the Trump is radically reshaping the institutions of the United States and you know because he was elected in a second time that at >> some level the United States populace doesn't want a status quo option.

[00:05:20]>> Yeah. Yeah. Exactly. And and again, you know, I think that's reflected in these numbers. You know, Donald Trump has been actively threatening alliances. you know, he's pretty much ended the the NATO alliance. Uh he's he's literally threatened to invade uh one of his the United States NATO allies in in Greenland. And so Australians are are responding, I think, to that new reality. Um and so we asked as well, you know, uh do you think that the United States is a reliable or unreliable security ally for Australia? Again, you know, you can't necessarily separate out Trump and the and the broader alliance, but only only 13% of Australians said that they thought the United States was a very reliable ally. And and that's, you know, again, these are pretty significant numbers. More Australians thought that the United States was unreliable than thought it was a reliable ally. And again, that's just a reflection of reality and I think an acknowledgement, you know, as you were just saying that this is this is a bit this is bigger than just one individual.

[00:06:24]>> Yeah. And I mean, you get the sense that the Trump administration, the longer that it sticks around, however long that might be, >> uh, the the more significant that damage becomes and the more long-lasting.

[00:06:37]>> Yeah, absolutely. like it is I mean it seems to me that this is a fairly catastrophic uh loss of trust that can't just be fixed overnight. You know Americans especially American foreign policy types they love to obsess over American credibility uh and see that as one of the most important things which is you know very American about it's about image and about how how you're seen. Um, but it's not just a a matter of kind of rebuilding credibility with the election, you know, of a more stable president as it was with the election of Joe Biden after the first Trump administration. Like, I think these numbers reflect a recognition that that's just not what's going to happen.

[00:07:16]>> Yeah. And I mean, it was pretty clear after Trump got reelected for a second time. Like, as you say, Joe Biden was in lots of ways a very status quo candidate. And they gave him a turn.

[00:07:27]They tried it. the US people tried it and clearly didn't want it. You know, like obviously there are extenduating circumstances there with with Joe Biden.

[00:07:35]But if they wanted status quo, the you know, Kla Harris in lots of ways was that option as well.

[00:07:42]>> And you know, the way that the electoral laws are changing now and uh the idea that things are going to go back to the way they were, it's just less likely just even structurally.

[00:07:53]>> Yeah. Yeah. Absolutely. when there's a deliberate uh and so far apparently very successful uh effort underway to restructure uh the American electoral map exactly as you describe and and when you put that alongside the fact that the Democrats are also historically unpopular and aside from you know some obvious individuals as a party are not offering a a real alternative to Trump that is appealing to Americans like as you say you know there is no returning to the United States that we thought we knew.

[00:08:28]>> So I want to get into Orcus. That is for many people I suppose the most obvious and you know potentially the most expensive example of how the relationship the alliance particularly on a defense kind of level works. What are Australians telling us about their views on the Orcus submarine deal? Yeah.

[00:08:49]So, we we asked Australians about u the Orca submarine deal and whether they think pursuing it is in Australians interests and we've asked this question before of course. um 33% so you know a thirdish of Australians said that no or the Oca submarine deal is not in Australia's interests which is up 7% uh on the same answer in uh October last year and uh 29% so about you know relatively similar numbers uh still don't know or are not sure about um the deal and whether it's in Australia's interest which is relatively high for for this kind of question uh and 38% % have have said that they are in favor.

[00:09:30]So these numbers are, you know, I think we can say that they're moving when it when it's up 7% on the on the nose since October. Um, and again, you know, I think that's just in response to the reality of what we're seeing.

[00:09:42]>> Yeah. And just to be clear, this question was asked after it was revealed that three Australian sailors were on board a US nuclearpowered submarine that sank an Iranian warship off the coast of Sri Lanka. uh in the early days of the Iran war in the early kind of week or so of the Iran Iran war. Is that correct?

[00:10:04]>> It was and we actually asked specifically about that incident. So we put to um the people we were polling that the Australian prime minister had recently confirmed that there were Australian crew on that US submarine that sank the Iranian ship. Uh and we asked them if they thought Australian crew should be embedded on American submarines under US command. Uh 46% said no, they shouldn't be there. Uh 29% yet said yes and 25% said they weren't sure.

[00:10:35]I guess the number that in that that stood out to me was we also have the results broken down by voting intention and 52% of Labor voters said that no, Australians should not be uh on on US submarines. So, I I think, you know, without wanting to draw too much out of these numbers, it's fairly clear that Australians are unconvinced um by the Orcus submarine deal or they're not sure about it. Um and it does seem to me that the more Australians know or the more is revealed about this deal, the more uncertain we become um about the nature of it. And I think, you know, we should also put that in the context of uh the significant lack of support for uh Trump and Netanyahu's war on Iran. Um 68% of Australians were opposed to Australian involvement in that war. So an overwhelming majority.

[00:11:30]>> So we had a really great question from a listener, Lara on Blue Sky. Is there a poll number that would prompt Labor to scrap?

[00:11:39]it seems like a complete vacuum of democracy on this policy and I think that's a really great question because it goes to I suppose what this polling all means and what it means for the prospects for change. Yeah, it's um such a great question from Lara and it's one I think about all the time, you know, and we talk all the time about uh the uh distinct lack of democratic accountability in foreign policy uh not just in Australia but in the United States as well where you know in both countries the executive can effectively decide to go to war without without consulting elected bodies without any kind of uh democratic accountability.

[00:12:18]So, unfortunately, Lara, I think the answer to that question is um I guess either I don't know. I don't know what the polling number could be. Like, how high would it have to be for that deal to be scrapped? we're not likely to get 100% opposition and even if we did like is that is that going to be enough or is a government just going to say well you know we are going to pursue what is in what we believe is in Australia's national interests and do that whole thing about that foreign policy national security thing that people love to do and say you know well you don't understand you don't know because we have all this secret knowledge and we're doing this in Australia's best interest and it's best that you don't know uh and that this isn't script scrutinized. I mean, you know, I suspect that is the case, you know, and it's I mean, at the moment that's happening not just in foreign policy. You know, the Australia Institute's done polling on things like gambling reform where there is overwhelming comprehensive support for gambling reform and the government hasn't moved on it. There's also of course a you know huge support for taxing gas and taxing Australians and gas exports and the government's not moving on that. So you know it's doesn't appear to be willing to move on poll numbers even in kind of relatively safe political terrain like gambling reform for example. So we don't have much reason to think that it would do that in foreign policy. Um and you know again that unfortunately that would be historically consistent. You know like I I came of age politically during really during the protests against Australian involvement in the Bush administration's war in Iraq where there was overwhelming opposition to Australian involvement in that war. There was overwhelming opposition across the world. you know, in some of the biggest de demonstrations the world had seen to that date and didn't change the decision of a government. You know, they went anyway uh against a democratic upswell of opposition and you know, viewed in the long term against I think Australia's security interests.

[00:14:32]Uh so I'm sorry Lara that's that's a depressing answer to the to the question but unfortunately you know that is the way the system is set up at at the moment where those kinds of decisions can be made without uh democratic accountability without democratic scrutiny. Um but you know it's worth emphasizing that that's that's not inevitable that can change.

[00:14:53]>> So what do you think would change things?

[00:14:55]>> I mean that's I suppose the overriding question for this series. is how does uh foreign policy become more accountable uh more responsive I guess to the democratic interests of Australians. I mean again like I wish I knew >> we're trying we're trying.

[00:15:17]>> Yeah we're we're trying really hard.

[00:15:19]Look, I I think in that sense, you know, Donald Trump is an opportunity, right?

[00:15:24]because uh uh opposition to the way that foreign policy is done uh is I think swelling around Donald Trump and the alliance in particular and that opposition is reflected according to reporting um that I've read you know within the labor caucus uh particularly since uh Israel's war on Gaza and the genocide in Gaza there's been much more attention on the importance of international law the importance of you know democratic uh values embedded in international law. So, you know, I think there is that ground swell building outside of parliament, inside parliament, inside uh the Labor Party.

[00:16:05]Um, and I think change is entirely possible that way. Uh, but you know, I guess to flip what I just said earlier, change isn't inevitable. You know, there are certainly interests who are coalesing around locking down foreign policy, locking down Orcus, you know, doubling down on Australia's alliance with the United States. Um, but, you know, they're they're worried like they're getting >> they're getting annoyed uh at people paying attention to foreign policy and national security.

[00:16:35]>> Yeah. And I mean the heroic effort of some in the foreign policy commentary, foreign policy community to separate out what's going on with Trump from the overall relationship, from the overall alliance.

[00:16:49]>> Yeah.

[00:16:49]>> You know, trying to make the case that the United States isn't going to be an unreliable ally for us. Not for us.

[00:16:55]We're different.

[00:16:56]>> Yeah. We're special.

[00:16:58]>> Yeah.

[00:16:58]>> Yeah. Are we different to Canada? Are we different to Greenland?

[00:17:04]>> I don't know. I guess we'll find out.

[00:17:07]>> Yeah. Yeah.

[00:17:08]>> Well, as you know, President Trump has directed US Central Command to restart the free flow of commerce through the street of Hormuz under the umbrella of Project Freedom.

[00:17:18]>> It could happen any day. Could and it might not happen, but it could happen any day. I believe they want the deal more than I do.

[00:17:26]>> I want to move now to the war on Iran.

[00:17:29]What's the latest there? It seems from the outside like Trump is just cutting and running or at least trying to not succeeding.

[00:17:37]>> Yeah, I I I think that's, you know, what he wants to do. He wants to talk about the ballroom uh and be able to say that he's won in Iran, whether, you know, in reality he has or not. So there's been a lot of light and noise uh around Iran and a potential peace agreement, you know, again in the last couple of days, in the last couple of weeks, but pretty much it's as you know, our colleague Alan said on this show, what was it a couple of weeks ago? Um that not much has changed. You know, there's a really a stalemate. There's no incentive for the Iranian regime to let go of control of the straight of Hormuz. Um the US under Trump is engaged in maximalist aims keeps ch keeps changing the goalposts and has no interest in committing you know to their genuine diplomacy that would be needed to find a way out. Uh so really you know again light and noise but materially not much has changed.

[00:18:35]>> Yeah. And is the same true of Israel's war on Lebanon? I mean, it seems like, you know, the ceasefire is on again, off again, if it was ever really on.

[00:18:46]>> Yeah. I I mean, if it was ever really on, I think is is the question. You know, Netanyahu um and Trump, for what it's worth, keep saying that, you know, the ceasefire is in place, but Israeli strikes killed more Lebanese people over the weekend. Uh strikes continue. Um there have been strikes on Iran uh for the same reason. and Trump literally went on ABC and said the ceasefire is still in place. You know, this was just a love tap. Uh so I I I mean when Yeah, it's so gross. Um when it when is a ceasefire not a ceasefire uh is the question. When strikes are still ongoing, Trump is still threatening to use overwhelming force if the Iranians don't do what he wants. Uh which changes all the time. uh and and people are um being subject to extraordinary or I guess maybe ordinary now suffering as a result of that.

[00:19:40]>> Yeah. So before we move on to kind of the last part of the show, we talked last week about the Supreme Court's gutting of the Voting Rights Act and what that might mean for I guess uh the US electoral system and uh US democracy more broadly. There have been some developments on that story. What's the latest with these attempts to redistrict? So, as we um we talked about last week, uh a bunch of states have already begun redistricting uh you know, effectively gerrymandering Democratic seats out of existence and quite deliberately disenfranchising uh African-American voters in particular in places like Louisiana, in places like Alabama. And then Democratic efforts to counter that redistricting which has been happening obviously for for quite a while even before this Supreme Court decision uh are also facing obstruction by Republican courts. So there was an effort to redistrict in Virginia that was approved it was put to voters in Virginia and they approved of that redistricting that was then struck down by a conservative Supreme Court in Virginia. Uh so you know the court system I think is well it's increasingly obvious that that court system is you know totally in sway with the Trump administration across a number of levels uh and is interested in influencing the midterms in in that way and and holding on to power. So you know there there are a lot of moving parts. Of course the midterms are still quite a while away and we don't know exactly how this is going to play out but uh it's not it's not great. We're coming to the end of this episode and you know it is our hundth >> and I just wanted to take some time I suppose to reflect on uh all of the crazy stuff that's happened >> in the last >> couple of years. We launched this I think on the 1st of July 2024. So there's been >> uh an election and you're in the United States for the last couple of weeks of that.

[00:21:42]>> Mhm. It's been a It's been a wild ride since uh Trump's come into office as well.

[00:21:48]How does it feel to have been right, Emma?

[00:21:51]>> [ __ ] sucks.

[00:21:57]>> I mean, look, I think I think I would say that none of none of this was difficult to predict. you know, if you spend time >> uh thinking about observing US politics and US history, it was clear um from 2024 and and even before, you know, that there was a very real possibility that Trump would come back, you know, that he would ride ride those waves of American history all the way back into the White House, you know. So, it's like we use the phrase shocking but not surprising all the time. And I think the same is true of what's happening in US politics more broadly. You know, much in the way that uh experts warned what would happen if the United States attacked Iran. Uh that you know, people who pay attention, who study this could predict like with a reasonable level of certainty what might happen. I I think the same is true of US politics. And for whatever reason, you know, institutionally across democracies, not just in Australia, um, but across the traditional allies of the United States, that's been something that's apparently impossible, you know, to predict and plan for and then deal with. Uh, and that is I mean, I I guess, you know, either those institutions within governments uh didn't see it coming or they did and warned governments and governments didn't do anything about it. I'm not even sure.

[00:23:28]What's worse? Um, but it's dangerous certainly for uh the traditional allies of the United States.

[00:23:35]>> Yeah. And I wanted to get to some of the I suppose criticism of the concept as well of the after America concept. We do see a bit of it and it's uh often seems to fall into that kind of false binary that we talk about all the time. That you talk about all the time. this idea that somehow you're arguing that we have to completely jettison the United States or that that the only choices are totally go with the United States all the way with the USA or total abandonment. Like >> there's a little kind of peak behind the scenes. The at the beginning of this series before we launched it, you and I actually had different ideas for the title. I wanted to call it something else. Um is another classic Emma shortest being right situation >> and really stubborn.

[00:24:19]>> Your words, not mine.

[00:24:21]But I suppose we, you know, we don't usually want to talk about ourselves during the show, but >> like I wanted to ask you about that title and kind of explain like what that actually means and what what the idea of after America means to you. I guess I always thought with the potential second election of Donald Trump that that if that were to happen that would represent a pretty radical shift in what the United States is and how it behaves in the world. And again, that's not like that's not particularly insightful. That was obvious just from what Donald Trump was saying. And and I guess that led me to after America in that, you know, particularly viewed from Australia, viewed from the traditional allies of the United States, the America that we were used to, the America that we thought we knew, you know, whether we thought that was good or bad or somewhere in between, that was gone and that wasn't coming back. you know, Donald Trump, the Trump administration, the movement that supported him would change that quite radically, which is which is not to say that uh there is a historical break, right? You know, we talked a lot about how Donald Trump is the product of American history. Uh and the movement that supports him in particular is the product of American history. That's obvious, you know, in the Supreme Court's gutting of the Voting Rights Act. You know, this has been a project of conservative and far-right America really since, you know, not just the civil rights movement, but the end of the Civil War, you know, a civil war that that movement lost uh and but fought in order to preserve the institution of slavery, right? That those parts of America still exist. I'm not suggesting that they're they are going away, but they are ascendant and and that means a different version of America, a different version of post World War II America is what we are dealing with. And so we have no choice really but to face a world that is after America. That doesn't mean America doesn't exist. It means it's playing a radically different role to the one we've been used to since the end of the Second World War. And that's true. I think regardless of what happens next, you know, even if Donald Trump goes away tomorrow, even if the Trump movement loses power and something else emerges in its place, there's there's no going back to a previous version of America. It's something different. You know, it's potentially an even more insular America that's seeking to rebuild its own institutions of democracy and focus on fixing its own quite significant problems and entrenched inequality. and in doing so is changing its role in the world dramatically. You know, even if in the I guess most radical imagining of a different United States where a social democratic movement emerges triumphant, you know, much as it has in New York, which is a harder scenario to imagine, but it's not impossible. That's also a radically different version of the United States that we, you know, will have to rework our relationship with.

[00:27:30]And so, you know, I think I think the title stands up kind of whatever happens, we do have to grapple with a world after America, after the version of America that we are used to. And that in many ways is an opportunity, you know, if we are willing collectively to break out of those like really [ __ ] tired old binaries of, you know, it's either America as you say or it's nothing or we're it's abandonment. And I think as we've said, you know, over and over again to recalibrate our relationship with the United States. So it is based on shared democratic values.

[00:28:08]Um, you know, on some days it's pretty hard to imagine that we might seize that opportunity. Uh, it's pretty easy.

[00:28:17]>> We did have a question from Allison on Instagram asking, >> "How do you not lose hope slash get incredibly frustrated about everything?"

[00:28:26]Um I I am incredibly frustrated.

[00:28:31]Hopefully that comes through sometimes that you know it is incredibly frustrating um when institutions and commentary is so stuck in old ways of thinking like despite a you know what we think is a a fairly obvious reality that things are changing and we have to adapt. Um but I guess you know there in lies that opportunity right that you know we do have this historic opportunity to rethink you know the way we behave in the world uh our collective institutions of international law. Um and I I mean I hope that's not an naive hope. Uh I would frame it as actually a historian colleague of mine in the states frames it as as radical hope. you know that it's based in an understanding of what we face and how dangerous it is.

[00:29:23]But in that lies a radical hope that you know collectively things can change. Uh so there is you know there's always hope. There has to be like what's what's the alternative?

[00:29:36]>> Well Emma I think that's a really nice and uncharacteristically hopeful note on which to end our 100th episode. Thanks so much. Thanks so much and uh congratulations on 100 episodes to you too >> and you thank you so much for listening to our 100th episode of After America.

[00:29:54]Whether you're a new listener or if you've been here from the beginning, we really appreciate your time so so much.

[00:30:00]It means a lot to us both that you spend half an hour with us or so each week to tune in. Um this show is really important to both of us. Um and yeah, it just means the world. If you want to read more about the polling we've just talked about or any other Australia Institute research and analysis, whether that's on gas or this week's federal budget, uh, and much much more, you can find it at australiainstitute.org.au.

[00:30:24]And if you'd like to get in contact, you can reach us at podcastsustraliainstitute.org.au.

[00:30:31]This episode was recorded on Monday the 11th of May. After America is supported by the Andrew Faren Foundation, and we'll be back next week. I'm Angus Blackman. Thanks for listening.