Religious institutions can serve as covert instruments of state influence, where spiritual authority is leveraged to extend geopolitical power under the guise of faith. Estonia's case demonstrates how democratic states must balance protecting religious freedom with national security when confronting foreign influence operations, as the Russian Orthodox Church has evolved into a geopolitical tool that blurs the lines between religion, intelligence, and foreign policy.
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Moscow’s church spy network in Estonia | Eastern ExpressAdded:
Hello and you're watching TVP World. I'm Diana and welcome aboard the Eastern Express.
Over four years into Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Europe has become very good at spotting drones, cyber attacks, and sabotage teams. But one of the Kremlin's most durable influence tools still wears robes, carries incense, and speaks in the language of faith. For years, Europe treated the Russian Orthodox Church as a religious institution with political opinions.
Estonia increasingly treats it as something else entirely, a potential extension of Russian state influence operating under the protection of religious legitimacy.
Estonia's internal security service now says that despite rebranding efforts and claims of autonomy, the church structure formerly known as the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchut remains effectively directed from, you guessed it, Moscow. Now, the argument is over whether the Kremlin has learned how to turn spiritual authority into geopolitical structure. In Estonia's view, the answer is increasingly yes. So without further ado, let's take a look at our latest report to find out more.
>> A recent Estonian internal security report offers a stark reminder that in the Kremlin's worldview, influence rarely arrives in only one form.
Alongside tanks, spies, and propaganda channels, sits another instrument of state power, the Russian Orthodox Church. According to Estonia's internal security service, the recently renamed Estonian Christian Orthodox Church may have changed its branding, but not its chain of command. Talin argues that the church remains closely tied to the Moscow Patriarchet, whose leadership has openly supported Russia's invasion of Ukraine and increasingly fused religious rhetoric with geopolitical messaging.
For the Baltic states, this is not simply a theological dispute. It is also a security question. Estonian authorities accused clerics linked to the Moscow patriarchet of participating in propaganda campaigns, maintaining ties with the Russian state authorities, and promoting narratives designed to deepen social divisions. Some clergy were denied residency permits or entry altogether over alleged security concerns. Particularly alarming were claims that individuals connected to a Moscow affiliated convent helped funnel support and equipment to Russian occupied territories in Ukraine. The timing also matters. Since 2022, the Kremlin has intensified efforts to frame itself as the defender of Russian speakers and traditional values abroad.
In countries like Estonia, where Soviet occupation remains a living memory, institutions connected to Moscow are now viewed through an entirely different lens. What once may have been treated primarily as a cultural or religious presence is increasingly scrutinized as a potential channel of influence. This places Estonia in a difficult balancing act. Democratic states must protect religious freedom while also confronting foreign influence. Talin appears convinced that the line between the two has become dangerously blurred. For the Kremlin, faith has become another battlefield in its confrontation with Europe. For Estonia, the challenge is ensuring that security measures do not undermine the democratic principles they are meant to defend.
>> And now let's take a look at the issue in greater detail. The Russian Orthodox Church is no ordinary religious institution. Under patriarch Curiel, it has evolved into something closer to a state ideological department with icons.
Now, Kuriel openly blessed Russia's invasion of Ukraine, framed the war in spiritual terms, and promoted the idea that Russian power carries a sacred civilizational mission. When Estonia looks at Moscow linked church structures, it's not looking at an isolated parish problem. It's looking at an institution tied directly to a regime conducting influence operations across Europe. And that is exactly why Estonia has spent the last year trying to untangle these connections legally.
Parliament passed legislation aimed at limiting the ability of foreign controlled religious organizations to operate under structures tied to hostile states.
Officials insisted the goal was national security, not religious persecution.
Now, the law specifically targeted situations where foreign spiritual authorities openly support aggression or violence. Predictably, the backlash came immediately.
Church representatives argued the Estonian state was violating religious freedom and discriminating against Orthodox believers. Bishop Daniel insisted the church was simply defending its right and identity as a local institution serving Estonian believers.
But Estonia's security services are unconvinced. Their assessment is blunt.
Changing the name and adjusting statutes did not fundamentally alter the church's subordination to Moscow. The Internal Security Service argues that the institution still operates within the influence orbit of the Russian Orthodox Church, which itself remains deeply intertwined with the Kremlin and Russian intelligence structures. And frankly, Estonia has historical reasons to take this seriously.
The Baltic states understand better than most that Russian influence rarely arrives announcing itself as influence.
It usually enters disguised as culture, language rights, historical memory, humanitarian concern, or spiritual unity. Moscow's modern hybrid warfare strategy depends on maintaining networks of social leverage inside neighboring countries. The Russian Orthodox Church has become integrated into the architecture of Russian state power itself. According to a Lancing Institute report, the Kremlin increasingly uses ecclesiastical authority as a geopolitical instrument, blurring the line between religion, intelligence, and foreign policy. And this is where the Estonian case becomes important beyond Estonia. Because the question now facing Europe is uncomfortable. How should democracies respond when religious institutions become entangled with authoritarian influence operations?
There's no easy answer. But at the same time, Europe has also learned that Russia weaponizes openness. The Kremlin operates through ambigrity. It thrives in gray zones where governments hesitate to act because every response risks appearing excessive or intolerant.
For Estonia, this debate is ultimately about sovereignty. about whether a small frontline democracy can determine where political influence ends and legitimate religious life begins. And for Europe as a whole, it's another reminder that modern security threats do not always arrive in military convoys and sometimes they arrive carrying candles. And now here to shed more light on the issue is an Shabbachuk, a faculty member at the John Paul 2 Catholic University of Lublin and Thomas Dunek at the Baltic and Nordic Analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs.
Gentlemen, thank you for being uh my guest here today on Eastern Express. Um so I'm going to begin by asking you the following. Now, Estonia's internal security service is definitely raising alarm bells over what it says are continued and non-stop Kremlin links inside Estonia's Orthodox Church. And this, despite, of course, formal claims of independence from Moscow. Now, of course, like I mentioned, the findings are raising uncomfortable questions about where faith ends and foreign influence begins. Gentlemen, what do we know? Is Estonia dealing with a religious institution or what security officials are increasingly seeing as a channel of Russian influence? Maybe uh Tomas you can uh you can begin.
>> Okay. So like um in uh Estonia we have two uh Orthodox churches. So this is the first one is uh uh Estonian Christian Orthodox Church which is mainly Russian speaking and which is connected to the Moscow patrihead and we also have the smaller smallest the smaller one but um and also Estonian speaking Estonian um apostolic uh Orthodox church. So now like there is no problem with the apostolic church which is Estonian speaking uh cooperates with the government and and so on but we have the problem and the Estonians have problem with the Russian Orthodox Church the Estonian Christian church Orthodox church uh which is still connected to the Moscow the of course the after the fullscale invasion and the changes in the uh law uh a severe the ties with the Moscow but like it's it's regarded as a Russian church simply now so this is the main problem so we have the two churches >> uh Anjay maybe I can ask you now because your colleague here did mention uh you know the the the patriarch so I want to ask you um has the Russian Orthodox Church actually now become a geopolitical tool for the Kremlin I think uh that Russian Orthodox Church has been this tool for for decades in fact and the problem is much broader than than only Estonia because it's also connect with situation in Ukraine, Latia, Belarus, Lithuania and uh and I I think you must uh understand that from the beginning of this full scale Russian invasion patriarchy simply uh support uh support uh uh Vmir Putin and this war and try to show this war as a kind of escalatoric fight between evil and goods and I think it's also connected with his story because we must understand that uh from the point of view of Moscow pat Estonia Latia and Lithuania and also Belkraine are part of canonical territory and that's why uh that's why uh uh Russian Orthodox Church try uh is in kind of conflict with uh Constant Patriate because what is interesting from the polit of of pol of Poland in 1924 when Polish Orthodox Church gets out of the pat of Constantinople. Uh in this Thomas we can read that uh local that patar of Constantinople decide to withdraw his decision from 1686 which allowed Moscow Patier to temporarily administrate over territory of Metropolis of Ke and uh Metropol of Ke this day cover uh present day Ukraine, Belarus and Baltic states. So in fact today all Orthodox churches in this territory can apply for autophily from uh Constantinople that's one of the main uh issue in conflict between uh Moscow and Constantinople >> Thomas now we are let's let's stay on the patriarchet for a moment now patriarch let's take here the the the lead chief here for a moment patriarch Kiril of Moscow Now he is the head of the Russian Orthodox Church for our viewers who don't know and who reportedly do correct me if I'm wrong was an operative for the Soviet KGB in the 1970s.
He had used the code name MKO and this is something that declassified Swiss archival records show about his espionage work which actually involved leveraging his diplomatic status to influence international religious institution. And now as uh as Anjay you mentioned uh of course the how the Russian patriarch openly backs the war in Ukraine. My question to you now Tomas can the church actually still claim political neutrality and in the case of Kil right the patriarch of Kil. Um what do we know about the influence that he's actually had uh on the war in Ukraine and of course uh the the impact that it's had in in Estonia.
Um yes. So like the patriarchic is not the only one KGB operative in the Russian Orthodox Church. It was very common to for the Soviet secret policy to uh to use the Orthodox priests in operative work work. Um now uh for me and also for like for the Baltic states um the Russian Orthodox Church is a completely political organization which is a tool for the Russian policy foreign policy and security policy h which is used to in the even in the hybrid warfare. So the most meaningful case is Ukraine of course because there is a lot of cases uh about espionage about like some kind of sabotage which was done by Orthodox priest connected to the Russia Russian patri head and also this is the like argument of from Estonian government from the ministry of internal affairs that um Russian Orthodox Church is not neutral religious organization. It is like kind of governmental institution of Russia and we can see also it in their narrative about the holy war in Ukraine and also I have to mention that it's this this kind of narratives which are which are made by Russian Orthodox Church the prer ker are not um connected to the religion at all like this is not the canonical thing to say that the war is good uh in the Orthodox Church. So, um it's completely political organization and uh that's why uh that's why Estonia and other Baltic states wants to get rid of it on their territory.
>> And Tomas, what is Estonia doing? What steps is Estonia actually taking to be able to, you know, to slowly uh rid itself from this uh from this influence?
So yeah there is like um kind of idea to connect two churches as I said there we have like the apostolic orthodox church and the Christian Orthodox church. The apostolic one is connected to the patut of Constantinople.
And there was an idea of connecting these two um these two um organizations with some kind of autonomy for the Russian speaking population and for the Russian right of the Orthodox Church because the apostolic church is like going with the Greek right of liturgical uh working and there will be like kind of there was a kind of idea of an autonomy within the apostolic church for the Russian speaking and also for the monastery of the Pukit.
So the like the Kurma monastery. Um and there was also an idea to cut the the whole ties uh with with the Russia with the Moscow. Um and there is the problem about the Kurama um uh monastery because it is strictly um like connected to the patcher head not even to the Russian Orthodox Church but to the patcher head and the patcher hat hero is controlling like uh the Kurama monastery. Yeah. So there was like idea of connecting to these two things and cutting all ties with the Moscow. Mhm.
Anjay, if I can ask you uh for a moment, um we do know that at at one point in time, I personally don't remember exactly what year this happened, but at one point we know that the Ukrainian uh the Ukrainian Orthodox celebrated Christmas uh in January and after the full-scale invasion, again, correct me if I'm wrong, um now they moved that calendar and are celebrating in December. Now my question to you because you know there was of course reports that Ukraine wants to as well um you know separate itself from absolutely anything that's Russian at this point.
My question to you is do you think that Ukraine underestimated the political role of the Moscow linked church before uh Russia's full-scale invasion?
>> No I think uh Ukraine is not under estimate. The problem is different. Uh the problem is that uh the topic of religion, freedom and political issues connected with with this war are also connected with Russian lobbying. Russia is lobbing around the world and try to show that uh Estonia, Latafia, Ukraine persecute Christians. they they uh it's very u very broad campaign uh connected with uh conservatives for example in the United States so Ukraine or Estonia must be very careful uh every decision every law must be consult with lawyers and it's it's very sensitive topic and that's why I think Estonia is so Estonia and Ukraine is slow in introducing of this uh laws which which try to force local outlooks church to cut the ties with Moscow because we must understand to apply for outfit you must simply send kind of statement of your of of of the church to your mother church in this case it could be Moscow and Ukrainian church and Estonian church didn't send the statement Latin church already send it so uh if if they want to get this autofili, they must simply want it. They must simply send it. That's why I think it's the main issue that Ukraine and and Estonia couldn't force this local local church connected with Moscow to do this. There's also other option.
They can apply for out from uh Constantinople, but they don't want it. So now the situation is very difficult especially ina in case of Ukraine because it's connected with end of the war and situation of uh Russian population in Ukraine but similar situation as as as I said is in in Estonia large Russian speaking population it could be used as a kind of tool in hybrid war against Estonia.
>> Let me broaden this beyond Estonia for a moment gentlemen. Now across parts of the postsviet space including countries like Armenia for example uh we're also seeing growing tensions between governments and influential church institutions over questions of political influence whether it's national identity or any sorts of external ties. I want to ask you, are we witnessing and do you think we're witnessing a wider regional shift in how states view religious institutions through a national security lens and particularly I mean if we take Armenia's case for example we need to remember these are uh this is a this is a country that is extremely religious right with the with the Armenian apostolic church how do you view this >> the the main problem is that church can support some civilization uh uh choose of the government or state. So for example, some churches in Ukraine support pro pro- European uh pro-western uh integration. other church support Russia integration with Russia and the same situation is in different states on the territory of this posit country postitaria and I think the same is in Kaukazus Armenia Estonia some uh uh members of the clergy support integration with Russia and some some support integration with the west so it's not only the problem of religion is problem of the future of the country theuture of the states uh because if we allowed to operate church churches which which are support uh for example integration with the Russian Federation which is not in interest of particular country it could be uh danger from the point of view of national security >> right thank you so much gentlemen an Shabbatuk faculty member at the John Paul Catholic University of Lublin and Tomas Zunic, Baltic and Nordic analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs for breaking it down for us here on Eastern Express today.
>> Thank you.
>> And that's all for this episode of Eastern Express here on TVP World. I'm Diana Sky. Thanks for watching.
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