Победа Петера Мадьяра в Венгрии — конец 16-летнего правления Орбана | Диалоги с Миловым

Added: 2026-05-09

[00:00:40]Yes.

[00:00:49]Political capital for advanced studies. We Atlantic Council postenge.

[00:02:09]interviews.

[00:02:20]So, we're joined by Peter Ko, whom I'm very happy to see, and congratulations on on a historic historic moment in Hungary. Uh, I just wanted to begin with asking you a general question. What are your overall feelings? Because when I was watching this uh happy pictures of celebration on the streets of Budapest, I couldn't help but have this 1989 moment. This is to me something truly historic because I understand that Victor Orban didn't plan to leave by all means and uh uh what's what's the mood in Budapest? Uh what's next and how generally people are feeling at this moment?

[00:03:02]>> Yes. So first of all, thanks a lot for the invitation and I'm really glad to be able to discuss these issues. Um and and also I think yeah this is a timely conversation in many sense. I think I' I've heard multiple times in the last few years about Hungary that you know Hungarians are impossible to be brought back to democracy and it's like uh you know it's a country that uh in which the authoritarianism is culturally ingrained and also it cannot be changed. I think pretty much the same view um as about the Russians and my my point was always that uh no I I don't think that there is such kind of determinism that there are some countries that are doomed to live in autocracies and and I'm quite happy that that Hungary proved this theory wrong.

[00:04:03]Um I would say coming back to your question that uh that in the on the streets of Budapest, yes, as you mentioned, the mood was rather celebratory with with youngsters partying on the streets until 4:5 a.m.

[00:04:20]after the election night uh chanting Russians go home. by which of course they meant uh Vladimir Putin's influence into the election which probably we will uh touch upon later. Uh you mentioned um the the transition and I think it's a right parallel on the other hand in Hungary there hasn't been any turnouts on the elections that are similarly high as this one. So it was 80% practically in the time of the transition it was a bit higher than 60%. So I would say that it is probably the real transition finally that Hungarians feel that they have fought for because you know when when uh the transition unfolded in 1989 1990 and Hungary had the first uh pre uh transition elections in 1990 but then the feeling was that you know geopolitics have caused um changes in in the leadership and and guard and so on. But right now it was something different. Of course it was Hungar it were Hungarians who voted for uh Victor Orban um five times um overall since the transition.

[00:05:43]But on the other hand um in on these elections Orban was defeated despite the fact that he was supported not only by Russia, not only by United States but also more silently by China, by Israel and so on and so on. And it was a genuine and I would say sovereign decision of the Hungarian borders uh to uh say no to the urban government. And even if you know the difference between the votes are uh yeah it it was significant but not uh something like in Fidas disappeared like Fidas gained 39% of the votes on the uh party list and Tissa won 50% of the parties but still I think it's a landslide and I see zero chance for the future that Victor Orban is going to come back. So it is probably the most consequential posttransition election we have ever had in Hungary.

[00:06:47]>> Thank you. That's that's encouraging to hear. And what are the practical next steps? Uh when we hear that Petra MadiR's government might be sworn in in the 9th of May if I'm not mistaken. And what next? What steps do you expect and generally how difficult it will be to undo the basics of Orbin's legacy because authoritarianism as we all know uh entrenches very deep into the roots of society political and societal institutions what what kind of a challenging task lies ahead?

[00:07:23]>> Yes, great question. So the um government have been selected. So governmental members have been selected in the last few uh days and weeks. So we have a full list of uh ministers. We do not have the public list of the of the state secretaries but they are being chosen at the moment. Uh the deputy state secretaries for example they can remain in place even after the governmental change. I would expect that that they will be replaced um also in um high numbers may maybe all of them for the single reason that uh yes as you mentioned it was an authoritarian government and I think the um the officials who have served in high levels uh for this government I think most of them um for most of them the their lawyer is to a new government can be can be questioned and and in many sense there is a need for a restart. Of course it comes with some challenges already because um Orban is on power for 16 years altogether since 2010 which means that if you want to uh bring you know new leaders to the state they will be the ones who did not have you know direct experience with uh on how to governing uh uh how to govern the country in the last one and a half decade. Um so it is already I think one challenge that how do you replace the state administration how deep you go and how how do you do that in a way that it finally does not undermine the functions of the state and that that uh you do not uh you know destroy the continuity entirely. Um when it comes to other challenges um yes um you said um on the 9th of May um Peter Madar will be inaugurated and yes there will be a celebration on the yeah streets of Budapest. There's a 100 days plan with some quite ambitious goals including you know uh uh silencing the the uh state media as it is at the moment because it's it's a hot bed of of propaganda and I think um B I mean it's quite similar I think to to uh so-called public uh media in Russia in terms of its ideological stance and also in its uh terms of of uh of public discourse.

[00:10:02]courses it is uh pushing for. Um uh also there are some plans to open files uh about you know people who collaborated with the secret services before the transition. Also there are some plans to bring back home the EU funds and so on.

[00:10:20]So so it's very ambitious. The government did not uh the new government did not really ask for some patience.

[00:10:26]Why? I do think that there will be some difficulties with with you know establishing a new government after 16 years and when it comes to more practical it is on where the main challenges lie I think uh I I always characterized Hungary as um as a so-called information autocracy following up on Sergey Gurv and Daniel Tresman's uh term which is a kind of regime that did not use open violence but more the manipulation of information and systemic disinformation which means that the legacy of disinformational autocracy still in the hearts and minds of people. So, uh, campaigns that were breeding hatred, uh, anti- Ukrainian campaigns, for example, uh, uh, Kremlin disinformation all along the public, uh, uh, scene, uh, and also, I think, a highly damaged public discourse with no real, you know, direct um, experiences on how to do good public debates in politics because it it is something that in the monologues of Fidas have practically disappeared. So I think the main challenge will be to how to undone the damage in the hearts and minds with the state sponsored disinformation and also how to in establish new institutions including the public media not to fall into the trap of further politicizing the the public discourse and not to take a revenge uh against Fides by you know using a bit of same tribal logic in politics and and this is this is something where I think some some challenges lie ahead especially given that Beta and Modar have won a landslide. It's a constitutional majority with the biggest uh largest ever share of of uh votes and um and and Pan Modar is the only strong man in his own parliamentary group. So I think you know some some dangers of of reautoization are present even if I would suggest that let's wait and see and uh and the I think the um the the uh plans that the government have announced so far are rather promising in the sense that they really want uh to redemocratize uh Hungary. Well, thank you very much. And that paves way into my next uh question because I wanted to ask about Petra MadiR and the Tisa party because many of those people including himself were very recently part of Victor Orbin's Fides.

[00:13:10]Uh so uh how sincere are they uh in ensuring the true democratic transformation of Hungary and undoing all these uh autocratic era institutions or will it be just some cosmetic changes like we've seen in many post-autoc transitions and also you mentioned a very important point also vital for us Russians how not to let all this post-autocratic cleanup up uh and transitional justice slid into uh revenge uh against uh people who were associated with all power which which is like a downward revenge spiral in a society that might not be productive in any way. And also um you mentioned that um many people who are working in government on the secondary uh positions uh representing the the old Victor Orbin's government they might be still continuing into this new era and uh do we trust them? uh what if what if they sort of uh invoke a quiet sabotage if you will. So many questions here.

[00:14:20]Obviously transition of such a scale is difficult and there are many challenges but uh do you see um Hungarian civil society being aware and specifically addressing these challenges?

[00:14:33]Brilliant questions and uh I I would say that we really have to wait and see because um I'm not sure we can predict it well at the moment where this new transition is going to develop and I do think that there are dangers like with the previous transition in the sense that there are too high expectations maybe too deep changes that some of the uh some parts of the society looking for some stability just can't digest and uh also how to avoid the pitfalls of reaction.

[00:15:16]I would um to on your first question is is it a genuine change? I would say so even if Peter Madar is a nationalist and even if Peter Madar is a populist it does not mean he um he follows Orban's footsteps uh when it comes to implementing uh uh policies. There are a few fields like foreign policy where he said there will be less of a U-turn but in some um some directions including you know uh keeping up some energy ties with Russia certain level of continuity but at the same time I do think that that the political economy of this government will be just totally different than the previous one. uh and also the voter base of this government younger better educated more diverse is different than of the previous one. So if Patan Madar wants to keep the power I don't think he can go into a highly ideological governance and I don't think he can just continue what Orban have done. he will be very much interested in in you know in destroying Orban's corruption machinery because this is something that have you know benefited him and will benefit his possible future challenger even if I don't think as I said before that Orban has the real chance to come back to power but he has to I think change the system as such in a quite deep manner again this is There, you know, some siren songs of doing uh a strong uh um uh political uh um change in which you you strengthen your own positions uh can come uh uh to to picture. But I would rather say that um Pan Mad even if he comes from the inner circles of Fides, he got so distant to Fidas, he changed quite a lot since he stepped on stage and and the expectation from voters is that he does a direct and dramatic change and um and so if he does not deliver on that, I think he will be punished by voters and And and the last point there are these conspiracy theories and they are widespread in some parts of the Hungarian society as well. Not everyone is happy with Peter even in the uh non- Orban camp and there are some conspiracy theories that you know he's finally the man of Orban and you know all the changes are just you know a kind of play all of the changes are just a facade but in fact there is a continuity of the regime. I I disagree with that. I don't think I don't think uh he's Orban's puppet at all. I I think that that this change is genuine and I would expect that in you know less than one year maybe some criminal charges can even be uh launched not just about you know cronies of Orban but probably after Orban himself. I think it will be a big test for how dramatic the change is. it will seem like a political revenge. But on the other hand, given how widespread corruption have become in Hungary, in that sense, I think Hungary have become increasingly similar to Russia. Given how widespread and how nepotistic this corruption become, I think some kind of legal consequences and criminal consequences would be inevitable. And I I think this is what we can expect and maybe it will be something that will dissolve these uh conspiracy theories that of course emerge in in a society that has been you know conditioned to believe in conspiracy theories for 16 years.

[00:19:21]>> How actively Hungarian civil society is ready to engage permanently because obviously it looks like a vital component of success of posturban transition. You mentioned exceptionally high turnout of 80% but was it just like a one off one time onoff thing you know or people are really ready to engage and participate long term and will the civil society be revived uh because we know to to what extent the destruction of civil society institutions happened under Orban uh I think to me it looks like a a very important criteria for success it's not just about Peter Madiar Ortisa party or his government but also how the change will be assisted by broad society. I mean is is this enthusiasm of Hungarians to stay? Will they be ready to organize and actively engage in in change? How do you assess the momentum here?

[00:20:21]>> Yeah, again great question. I think um when it comes to civil soc Hungary and civil society in a broader sense. I mean the whole society I think as I said there are very high expectations. On the other hand, you know, after 16 years of an illiberal rule, uh you can ask for a prolongation of a honeymoon, political honeymoon as an incumbent saying that you know uh the the uh budget is empty.

[00:20:50]Uh you know, the the international relations are ruined, the state administration is still full of loyalists of Fidas and so on and so on.

[00:20:58]Uh so that's one thing. The other thing is that if you can implement some uh um some popular measures and bringing the funds at home and maybe starting you know some renovations in the healthcare sector for example could be something that of of symbolic. It can also buy you time and and the third thing is that uh the new government is quite strong on symbolism as well. As I said, opening up the files, the secret service files before the transition is something that is a long awaited, you know, demand of anyone who wants a real genuine system change in Hungary. And may maybe it does not come with a huge cost but on the other hand it can um still you know entertain the public and also uh um entertain a public in a way that that makes you know breaking with the uh previous regimes I would say more obvious and also if there will be some legal consequences of the corruption issues I think it's one more thing that can uh keep up the enthusiasm of the public. I think at the moment the support behind TISA is irrationally high 66% versus 25% of of it won't stay that way and honestly I do think in a democratic country it shouldn't remain that way. So I think I really hope that Hungary will head towards a more pluralistic uh uh uh political system where there are serious challengers of this government not only on the right side of the political spectrum as it is at the moment. Uh also we I I'm not entirely sure that that Fidas will remain or sorry that Tissa will remain a homogeneous party. Maybe it will break through factions as well. But um and and the response of the civil society will I think will uh be uh decided on on the basis of how successful this this interaction is. On the one hand, the government has to deliver on a few fronts. On the other hand, I think the public has to manage its its expectations as well. The panel government is a black horse. We have to say we just don't know how they will deliver. There are some very good you know experts appointed to ministers will be they able to you know manage the state administration.

[00:23:33]Will the uh um will be will Peter Madar be able to deliver on some of his promises? So it's it's a we cannot judge it at the moment. um but uh it will be a huge um experiment in many sense and and you raise the parallel with the transition. I think it might be a bit similar to the transition process which is like an imperfect transition and I think this is where managing expectations becomes extremely important. When it comes to the you know official civil society or the institutionalized civil society there are great expectations that there will be more open ears on the side of the government and I can tell you know from this side of a of of of a think tank I'm leading a think tank called political capital institute in Hungary and you know think tanks typically you know not just u publish uh reports but also have policy papers and suggest recommendations ations to the decision makers. These doors doors were totally closed in the last few uh years. So we do hope that we can shift towards a more open decision making where at least some of the you know some of the recommendations from the experts will be will be listened to. Um but again we don't exactly know how it's going to develop and you know there is also a big quite of I would say challenge uh that the civil society is facing at the moment you know how to get over this enthusiastic you know euphoric mood getting back to normal where you evaluate what the government is doing and you criticize what the government is doing if it's going against your key principles and and suggestions and this is something we have to you know learn again because um we got used to in the broader civil soc to criticize what Fidas is doing because it went against the democratic principles the foreign policy uh principles the economic principles that we believed in. This is a new era and we have to relearn you know this kind of more democratic uh more pluralistic uh modus operandi in a more normal setting.

[00:25:52]But this is probably yeah learning process of of of a better of a better one and and yes again we have to see how the next government is going to uh to deliver. Do you sense uh some intention to seriously help and engage from European capitals from you know panuropean democratic community which had all eyes on Hungary obviously in connection with these elections. I've been since uh Petra MadiR's historic victory, I've been to several European capitals and I sense a strong mood that they understand that what's going to be happening in Hungary is very important and all democratic Europe is obliged to help this transition. Do you sense that there will be so so Hungary is not alone in doing this that there will be a a panuropean solidarity in assisting Petra Madier's government in reforms? uh to what extent this factor might matter.

[00:26:50]>> Yeah, great question, Vladimir. Um I I think that there is uh a broader alliance. I would say a pro-democratic alliance partially within Europe, partially outside Europe. Just one important note and it's uh I know it can fuel a lot of conspiracy theories but um but it's important to mention. So the reason why Russian influence into the elections while uh Putin tried it big time uh the GRU tried to you know uh um influence the election results. SVR tried to influence the election results.

[00:27:28]Social design agency you know on the payroll of the of of of the Russian administration wanted to influence the uh the election results and they were all unsuccessful.

[00:27:41]uh why was that? I think the primary reason is that European secret services and British secret services have released some information before the election that have been published in Washington Post, in Politico, in Bsquare, in in Hungarian media outlets, financial times that revealed these plans and given that these conspiratory plans have become open uh then it was impossible for the Kremlin and for the Hungarian proxies to uh to do the plans as it was uh it was written down. So uh Europe and the democratic world have already uh helped Peter Modar before they came to power not by direct statements from uh you know politicians of the commission. there was no European politician coming to Budapest before the election which is atypical but uh they did not want to fuel Orban's conspiracy theories that uh that you know Peter Mer is just a man of Brussels so they stayed silent but at the other hand there was some helping hand in the campaign by you know publishing uh uh also audio conversations between Victor Orban and Vladimir Putin audio uh conversations between Sergey Lavrov and Hungarian Prime Minister Hungarian foreign minister Peter Cartto.

[00:29:08]So all of this information was coming from the democratic community.

[00:29:13]Democratic community will keep helping Hungary. I think on two main fronts on the one hand we can expect a goodwill from the commission side uh on releasing the frozen funds of Hungary. the funds have been mostly frozen because of the corruption issues and rule of law issues. And uh the second front is going to be I think trying to help uh um Peter M and his government with with a lot of suggestions and ideas. How open the new government is going to be for that? I think it's a question because there might be you know an attitude and I think there is an attitude on the side of the Hungarian uh new governmental members that this we can show the world how to change things. It's not that they have to show us how to how to change uh things. So um but but this interest towards Hungary will absolutely remain here. Um and um and of course everyone was looking at Orban so far. So Peter Moder I think has a huge uh chance to bring his name into the uh international scene. On the other hand he wants to remain predominantly a Hungarian politician and he he said that he wants to stay in Hungary in 99% of the cases and and do politics in Hungary. It was the recipe for his success. He did not move around in international intellectual circles but he was doing the hard work in Hungary and I think he has to uh keep uh doing the hard work in Hungary. One important reason for the failure of Victor Orban was that he just spent too much time with building alliances with the Maga camp in the United States, with Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel, with Putin in Moscow, with sea chimping in in Beijing, and he did not have enough time to deliver on Hungarian issues and to to target the concerns of the Hungarian voters. And I think this is a pitfall that Peter Madar wants to avoid quite consciously.

[00:31:28]>> Thank you. And my next question will obviously be about Putin because uh I'm from Russia and I hear a lot of feedback from Russian sources. Believe me uh Petra Madar's victory inflicted a lot of pain in Moscow like a lot of pain which they still reeling from. However, we should not underestimate that Kremlin is very skillful in uh sly regaining control through all these hybrid warfare instruments. And uh I'm sure that there's you know a myriad of open FSB Guru and Sware operatives in Budapest and they will be engaged in all sorts of uh information psychological hybrid warfare against Hungarian society to s disillusionment in uh MadiR's government and the reforms and to stir up the traditionalist sentiment and anti-European anti-Uran Ukrainian mood and and and so on. Uh or Putin also has the energy leverage. Obviously, we we all know that this is a big risk. I'm sure it's also understood. But how do you assess this situation and how this threat of Putin's covert influence is perceived now? And will MadiR's government be doing a cleanup of all the Putin's agents in Budapest and across Hungary which are present there in big numbers? No question about that.

[00:32:59]>> Yes. Um this is I think it is going to be fundamental and I think it's in the best interest of Peter Modak to get rid of you know the networks that Russia built up in Hungary in the economic front on the energy front and on the political and diplomatic front as well.

[00:33:18]uh for a very simple reason. I don't think he will make he will be able to make a similar friendship with Vladimir Putin that Victor Orban was able to. And yes, as you said, there are there is some pain in Moscow. Um there is some Yeah. And there is some pain I think uh in in in the United States as well in in Washington. But I but of course I mean it's it's a many sense easier because you can just change change the relationship and and Donald Trump have already announced that he's open to set up new good relationship with the with the new prime minister. I think for Putin it is going to be much more difficult. there will be a lot of suspicion from the Hungarian side and I really do hope that uh that the new government will do its best to cut off ties with uh Russia. Um and um and it has already been announced as a plan uh given that how overpoliticized the issue of uh of the Orban's connection with Putin have become with youngsters chanting Russians go home. It's it's um I think it is a clear indication that uh that Peter Mad also can gain some popularity with with uh reducing the links uh to to Moscow. I think it is going to be difficult. I think these secret services and intelligence services are also infiltrated with with Moscow's interest. The media is infiltrated. The diplomatic corp is infiltrated. So I think it will take time to clean it up. But uh on the other hand uh I think this election also proved that Vladimir Putin's Russia is not omnipotent when it comes to influencing elections in other countries. It was unsuccessful in Muldova. It was finally more unsuccessful in Romania. It was unsuccessful in Hungary. Yeah. And it is successful at a few places. Maybe Bulgaria. Um but um I do think that uh we have overestimated uh or sorry I do think that we have overestimated Putin's ability to influence elections outside uh uh of Russia and this is what I called in an article in Journal of Democracy authoritarian inflation. Uh Russia is very good in uh Putin's Russia is in showing itself stronger than it really is. And we could we can see it in Ukraine that it's much weaker than we assume to be. We we we have seen it in Hungary as well that it's much weaker than we assumed uh it to be. And I think this is a lesson that that uh uh European countries and countries in the democratic world have to uh learn and also to to you know learn that self-confidence is uh I think justified.

[00:36:20]I as as I mentioned before there were some helping hands behind Peter as well on the election. I think they proved to be much more successful than than uh the helping hand of Russia on the side of of Victor Orban. So uh what I'm suggesting here is that maybe the networks of Putin will be also not that difficult to get rid of because if the influence efforts were so unsuccessful, I can easily imagine also that you know uh uh some of the former loyalists of of Vladimir Putin uh will be happy to you know abandon uh him just simply not believing that Russia is you know resourceful and important. ally and to you know broaden it to the European level you know Robert Fitzel have just recently announced that yeah he's going to meet with Vladimir Salinski and also to uh you know to uh uh not to block you know uh the attempts of Ukraine to join the European Union. So I think uh maybe Andre Babes, Robert Fitzu, but maybe the new Bulgarian government will learn as well that if you uh put your bet on Vladimir Putin and that he's going to save you on an election, you bet on the wrong horse and maybe it's better to have a healthy uh bigger distance from Putin's Russia. So I think Putin's Russia is getting will become even more isolated in the European fronts and these tentative attempts to open up good relations again with Russia maybe will will be reversed uh as a result of the of the Hungarian elections.

[00:38:08]>> Yeah, let's hope for a fast cleanup of Putin's influence networks in Hungary.

[00:38:13]However, this is a challenging task and we all have to be vigilant. My final question will be about Ukraine. We saw a lot of tension between Orban's government and Zilinski and there was a hysterical anti- Ukrainian propaganda in Hungary stirring the trion syndrome and the issues of Hungarian minority in Ukraine. Will this hostility go away?

[00:38:38]Because we we all understand that Petra Madiar is presents himself as a nationalist Hungarian politician. So there are some objective issues between the countries. how easy will be uh to to dismantle all this tension that was stirred by Orban in relations with Ukraine and how it generally will look in the coming months and years.

[00:39:00]Yes, great question again because it's I think it it will probably still remain a complicated bilateral relationship where there are going to be some disagreements over minority language rights for example in Transpathia where there are a lot of ethnic Hungarians are living but also maybe about uh the um plans for Ukraine to join the European Union where the uh incoming government have also uh expressed some reservations uh and um beta himself did not promise a U-turn when it comes to the uh relationship to Ukraine. Uh on the other hand there are openness on both sides to normalize relationships. on the on the side of Ukraine, of course, it's it's it's very important because um if Hungary just does not block important decisions when it comes to Ukraine in the European Council, it's already a huge gift and it it you know really is quite a lot of diplomatic capacities and resources that Hungary have have burned uh in the last uh years and be because it was a most tense relationship of Ukraine within the European union. One thing uh on the um on the other side uh on um on beta and madar's side, I think there is a willingness to to normalize relationships first of all not to have this tense bilateral conflict that again can eat up many resources from the Hungarian side and on the other hand um Petar's TISA party is a member of the European people's party that the most crucial issue for the European people's party at the moment is support for Ukraine and uh I don't think uh um I don't think European people's party would tolerate an anti- Ukrainian policies and I do do not want to suggest that there is a real demand for that on the on the TISA side the new foreign minister of uh of in the new government Anita Orban who has been a a Euroatlanticist in in her foreign policy career have already uh uh yeah had some uh conversations with the Ukrainian counterpart and there are preparations for a possible Zelanski petard meeting.

[00:41:30]The the venue was suggested to be transcarpet yeah by the by the Hungarian side. We have to wait and see if if Ukraine you know accepts that. But what I mostly hope for is that even if Hungary will not become like Poland, like the Baltic states with this enthusiastic support for Ukraine, the historic relations are more uh uh tense and and also there is damage that the Hungarian government's propaganda have done in the last decade. But if you know it becomes an issue that is much less in the uh forefront of attention and relationships can normalize on the level of ministries and on the uh level of the state bureaucracies and this issue stop being the number one policy issue foreign policy issue I think it would be already a huge gift. So some kind of depoliticization I think would be helpful in foreign policy. If if things are too much in the focus of the attention, it does not always help to to to solve the problems.

[00:42:37]And given that how uh weak fidas have become uh right now, maybe they can challenge less a more pragmatic but more cooperative that the new government is I think expected to have uh with the with the um with the Ukrainian administration. So I I in short I do hope that things will uh become normal maybe less visible than before.

[00:43:05]>> Thank you Peter. A lot of encouraging signs. Let's hope for the best. Many thanks for a great conversation. We hope to see you again on the transit channel and uh thanks to the people of Hungary for bringing hope back onto the global menu. These are the times in the world where hope is in shortage and uh thanks for thanks for giving us this gift and all the best of luck to Hungarian democratic post autocrat transition. I hope to to visit Budapest sometime soon again. I haven't been for a long while and uh thanks again and best of luck to you and your colleagues and hope to see you again.

[00:43:43]>> Thank thank you very much Vladimir. you will be more than welcome in Budapest and keep up the good fight. And also I do hope that the encouragement comes from Hungary uh can lead to other democratic transformations in other other parts of the world sooner or later. So uh thank you very much for the opportunity and uh and see you next time.

[00:44:06]>> Yes. Hope for that. Keeping the faith.

[00:44:08]Keeping the faith. Thanks Peter. See you.