"Catalunya y la cuestión catalana". Et sembla bé?" | Ramón Cotarelo | Conferencia 📱

Hinzugefügt: 2026-06-03

[00:00:07]How are you? How are you? Today we are honored by Ramón Cotarelo. It is a conference organized by Glocal Consultores Asociados and Agenda MX. Today's conference is titled Catalonia and the Catalan Question. Ramón Cotarelo, as we have already introduced him, a Spanish political scientist, PhD in political science specializing in Germany, has been a translator of Javermas, Norbert Iar Elas, Diternen and a number of intellectuals. To avoid boring you, and with my participation, I'll pass the word directly to Ramón and thank, of course, as always, my friend and teacher Ramón Cotarelo, for his kindness and above all his wisdom, because it's a very important point, Ramón, at least for Veracruz. Veracruz has been the symbol and the creation of this country.

[00:01:04]The first municipality in Veracruz was founded here, and that's why we're very interested in hearing about the Catalan process.

[00:01:13]Thank you, welcome. Good night to you, my dear Ramón.

[00:01:18]Hello, thank you very much, Eduardo, for the presentation.

[00:01:24]I am delighted to hear from you and also delighted to learn that this is going directly to the people of Veracruz, who are, well, from what you say, the germinal trunk of the Mexican nation. Well, that's great.

[00:01:46]Thank you so much.

[00:01:48]And without further ado, I begin the lecture that I am supposed to give.

[00:01:56]Good morning in Spain, good afternoon in Mexico to everyone.

[00:02:06]And the conference that my good friend Eduardo has been kind enough to suggest to me is Catalonia and the Catalan question.

[00:02:24]I intend to address this interesting matter in three sections.

[00:02:31]One first, a general introduction to the problem.

[00:02:35]a second of a review of the historical evolution up to practically the present day. And a third part regarding how and in what state the situation is at this moment. I don't dare to talk about the prospects of what people call future prospects, as if there were prospects of the past. I don't dare to talk about the prospects because the situation of this particular problem is unpredictable.

[00:03:17]Getting down to business, introductory considerations, ah, you will have noticed that in Europe some states are not homogeneously national, right? The expression nation-state, which became widespread after the Peace of Vesphalia in 1648, is not entirely correct because there is no coincidence between the figure of the State and especially its territorial dimension and its national condition.

[00:04:08]Several states are multinational, for example, England, that is, the United Kingdom, which includes England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, not counting other territorial possessions, all of which in turn have a sense of nationhood, just as Great Britain claims to have a sense of nationhood. The same thing is happening to France.

[00:04:39]Everyone knows about France, the French, and few people know that Bretons, Breton nationalists, do not consider themselves French, and neither do Corsicans. And Cossack, after all, is important in France because it is the homeland of Napoleon, which points to one of the more amusing features of this problem of discord between the State and the nation. The same thing happens with Italy, the same thing happens with Spain. Spain has four nations within it. The Castilian nation, the Galician nation, the Basque nation, and the Catalan nation.

[00:05:32]If Spain, that is, the fact that Spain is obviously a state, a state in the legal and political sense of the term, is not a national state, but ultimately a plurinational state.

[00:05:49]The thing is, it's not a plurinational state like Switzerland, where three nations and three distinct national cultures coexist: French, German, French- German, and Italian. I was hesitating because there is also a fourth, small community that almost no one remembers in Switzerland, which is the Romanchi community, which, since the name does not appear on the legal tender banknotes, well, no one remembers it, but in reality it is a small national community that is not any of the others either. In other words, plurinationality is a common feature of some European states.

[00:06:50]The way in which these European states, as legal and political entities, as entities of power, as states, treat their national communities, the nations residing in their territory, ranges from an attitude of absolute ignorance and total contempt.

[00:07:19]from central power towards peripheral national manifestations such as France, to a basically correct treatment in which the national state respects the peculiarities of non-state nations.

[00:07:49]even to considerable and highly commendable extremes, as is the case of Great Britain, which went so far as to accept a referendum on self-determination in Wales, uh, sorry, in Scotland. It is certainly true that the Scottish nationalists lost it and now they are preparing to try to repeat it. If they can, just as the Welsh intend to do, it is evident that the British authority treats non-English national communities with a consideration that is not the one given by the French authorities, for whom France is a unit and the non-French national manifestations—Bretons, etc., Occitans and Corsicans—are remnants of the past, of people who speak vernacular languages, or as they say with a certain pathetic contempt.

[00:09:02]The case of Spain is intermediate. Spain has taken a long time because it is a state built on the French basis, because it is a Borgia state and therefore unitary and with a clear tendency towards centralism and to ignore the nations that coexist within it to such an extent that until recently, until the current Constitution of 1978, the legal personality of these peripheral nations has not been recognized, except for the really regrettably brief period of the Second Republic of 1931, 1936 or 1939, in which the Constitution did recognize these personalities of the non-Castilian nations, of the population that does not belong to the Castilian nation. Since 1978 these peculiarities have been recognized, but not with the magnanimity with which the English do so, and from a legal point of view in a statute of decentralization notably inferior to federal systems.

[00:10:34]In other words, Mexico is a federation, Spain is not. Although many authors argue that the level of actual decentralization achieved by the hm communities has federal characteristics. But this can only be understood metaphorically. In reality, Spain is not a federation and the states do not have their own constitution; they have statutes of autonomy which are special laws, but they are not constitutional.

[00:11:13]In summary, therefore, that is the structure of Spain. It is not a state, it is a state that calls itself national.

[00:11:21]There is a nation that claims to be the Spanish nation. When Spaniards speak, they talk about the Spanish nation, but in reality, the Spanish nation includes other nations that are very proud of not being Spanish, some of which, Catalonia in particular, pose serious problems, not only for the political stability of the Spanish system, but even for its continuity.

[00:12:00]If we put ourselves in the shoes of the two contenders to reduce the issue now to the problem between Catalonia and Spain, that is, Catalonia and the Spanish State, because the other two communities with their own historical personality, the Basque Country and Galicia, eh, pose fewer problems to the Spanish State. In fact, the problem that Catalonia represents throughout history, because it is not a problem that has appeared now, the problem that Catalonia represents throughout history is a problem that calls into question the very existence of Spain as a state. I 'm not exaggerating.

[00:13:03]Whenever you want, go into Google, type in "the problem of being from Spain" or " being from Spain" and you'll see what you find. You will find a veritable saga of considerations of all kinds by authors of all kinds and from all times, speaking of the fact that the real problem of Spain is Catalonia.

[00:13:35]And why is that a problem? Because Catalonia has a clear tendency, a dynamic, an inertia towards its assertion as an independent state or, in other words, to become independent from Spain. The two actors, Spain or the Spanish State and Catalonia, have two opposing views, as always political. There is no one side's vision and the other side's vision, or if you prefer, no friend-enemy status, as Carl Smith put it.

[00:14:12]For Spaniards, Spanish nationalists, for those who believe that Spain is one whole nation, ah, Spain is a unit and Catalans are part of Spain. Many believe that the fact that some of its inhabitants speak a different language enriches Spain's very condition and is therefore part of its plurality and cultural richness.

[00:14:49]That's something the Spanish are very proud of, and rightly so; the country is very pluralistic and has many cultural traditions. I was just thinking, for example, that we're talking about the living, but we can also talk about the traditions that history brings us, the importance of culture. The Muslim presence in Spain is immense; it can never be exaggerated, it can never be discussed enough. The Jewish traditions are also cultural traditions that have enriched the awareness that Spaniards have of being a nation.

[00:15:40]Opposite this is the consciousness of the Catalans, who see themselves as a nation with a right to constitute themselves as a state, a nation that has been subjugated by the Castilians, by the Spanish, forcibly integrated into the Spanish State, and that aspires to independence on equal terms with other states.

[00:16:10]uh Europeans. Of course, when I speak in one case or the other of Catalans or Spaniards in this issue, I am trying to talk about Catalan nationalists and Spanish nationalists, because there are also many Catalans born in Catalonia, who speak Catalan, who appreciate Catalan culture, but feel Spanish and therefore are not only not in favor of Catalan independence, but are opposed to it.

[00:16:41]Similarly, there are some Spaniards, no more than one or two or three, I think, who think the opposite, that is, that Spain is a nation that oppresses other nations that do not have a state, taking advantage of this circumstance of being stateless nations to keep them in a colonial regime as is the case of Spain. But these are the opinions of both sides. We are going to try to present it in a neutral, impartial way.

[00:17:20]In other words, they are two opposing views.

[00:17:22]Spanish nationalism believes that Catalonia is part of Spain and that Spain has no meaning without Catalonia.

[00:17:33]And Catalan nationalism, Catalan separatism, believes that it is the opposite, that Catalonia has nothing to do with Spain, that it has been conquered, dominated, subjugated and oppressed by the Spanish and that it has the right to independence in the exercise of the right of self-determination of peoples, which as we know very well is recognized in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

[00:18:03]of the United Nations, of which Spain is a signatory party.

[00:18:12]These are the two opposing ideas, and they have been in conflict for centuries.

[00:18:21]And this struggle is no small matter, because when we talk about Catalonia we are talking about approximately 16% of the territory of Spain, but 22% of its gross domestic product. In other words, Catalonia is a geographical part of Spain that contributes a wealth to the maintenance of the Spanish State, which has other parts that are in deficit and does not receive, or believes it does not receive, the corresponding compensation.

[00:19:10]Ultimately, these two visions, the Spanish vision and the Catalan vision, clash. They have been clashing for centuries.

[00:19:21]That clash, as I say, is no small matter. It calls into question the survival and permanence of Spain.

[00:19:35]And the curious thing is that neither side seems to have enough strength to prevail over the other.

[00:19:48]Neither the Spanish state, with its Bourbon and centralist roots, can impose its French-influenced model on Catalonia, which is what it has always tried to do, as we will see below.

[00:20:05]Neither the Catalans, nor the Catalan nationalists and separatists, seem to have enough strength to leave Spain, to become independent from Spain. And this is the tragedy of the Catalan question, the problem. There are people who say that this issue of a technical tie, we could say, could be resolved in the future by means of force, which is what is happening at present and not only in Spain, but throughout Europe.

[00:20:46]In fact, it is the massive influx of foreign population via immigration, via political refugees, or via economic immigration.

[00:21:02]Uh, this, as in all of Europe, I repeat, in Spain and in Catalonia specifically, this circumstance of immigration has some special characteristics.

[00:21:21]Most Spanish immigration, most immigration to Spain, comes from Latin American countries due to the obvious shared language.

[00:21:32]and from North Africa, the Maghreb and more specifically Morocco, a country with which Spain has always had very conflictive relations, very difficult to understand, but whose geographical proximity and historical ties of all kinds explain why it is a major component of immigration.

[00:21:59]These two major components of immigration are even more prevalent, if that's possible, in Catalonia and at the same time also more potentially conflictive, because Latin American immigration in Spain has the advantage of a shared language, but not in Catalonia, where another language is spoken.

[00:22:28]Muslim immigration does not have a mandate for language in either Spain or Catalonia, but that factor is important and that leads us to the second part. In other words, the situation is like this; it's a situation, let's say, of a technical tie between the two forces. It has these characteristics and that leads us to the second part of our presentation, which is the review, the historical review.

[00:23:00]Brief brushstrokes so we don't get lost in the mists of time.

[00:23:06]Spain, and Catalonia in particular, is a very old political entity.

[00:23:15]In fact, it has had its own legal personality for 1000 years longer than Spain.

[00:23:25]There is Catalonia, although not as its own independent state because 1000 years ago, besides, the idea of ​​an independent state wasn't common, but it was a certain existence.

[00:23:45]Catalonia appears as a political entity within the European framework of the Carolingian Empire and forms a prominent part of what was called the Hispanic March, that is, the border area between Carolingian Europe and Muslim Spain, which in the time of Charles V was indeed part of Muslim Spain. Remember that the Muslims were going to conquer Spain between the year 711 and the year 732, more or less 30 32, when continuing their advance to conquer Europe, having passed the Pyrenees, they were decisively defeated by Charles Martel, Charles the Hammer, in the battle of Pugatieri and From which the Muslims abandoned the project of conquering Europe by arms in those years and were confirmed content with Spain.

[00:24:57]They did not abandon, incidentally, the project of conquering the rest of Europe by force, but it took them a while to recover it. They did it again in the 15th century. The Turks attempted to conquer Europe by entering through Vienna.

[00:25:16]They were defeated, and they were defeated again some 50 years later in the same attempt. In other words, the attempt by Muslims to conquer Europe by force of arms has been repeated; it has happened three times so far in history.

[00:25:37]Nothing prevents there from being a fourth one at some point. Sure, but for the moment the fact is that of the two entities, the two entities that are facing each other, the oldest being Catalonia, it is 1000 years old and its institutions are also secular. It has a constitutional tradition through the so-called Catalan constitutions that date back to the Middle Ages and are therefore earlier than the Spanish ones. It has various institutions of which Catalans are very proud and which show that for several centuries, until practically the 15th century, the Catalans within the kingdom of Aragon were a powerful entity in the Mediterranean.

[00:26:45]They have the first maritime trade code in history, the Book of the Consulate of the Sea, which was in force to regulate navigation of the territorial sea, the Mediterranean Sea, for centuries. It has its own right, it has its own language, which is not a dialect of Castilian, it is a Romance language derived from Latin with the same dignity as Castilian, Portuguese, French, Romanian or Italian. It is a Romance language, it is a language in its own right, which is also demonstrated by the fact that it also has a brilliant literature, an exposition of the manifestation of the Catalan spirit in its own language, very worthy and very appreciable.

[00:27:54]All of that predates the existence of Spain, because when this happens, Spain does not yet exist. There is the kingdom of Castile, the kingdom of Aragon, there are the states, the Muslim taifas, but not Spain.

[00:28:23]The idea that Spain arises from the personal union of the two monarchs, Isabel and Fernando, Isabel of Castile and Fernanda of Aragon, the so-called Catholic Monarchs, is generally accepted, but not unanimously, and from which it is usually said that Spain appears, although I insist, this is not unanimous. There are many people who say that even then, an entity that could be called Spain did not appear. Not before either, of course, but in any case it is clear that Catalonia has its own personality, roots and history that are worthy of having had better luck in history, without a doubt.

[00:29:15]And that peculiarity of Catalonia, those four, those almost 1000 years or 1000 years of real independence, of de facto independence of a culture and a language of its own, come into collision at a certain moment with the reigning Spanish dynasty. I'm going to be a little more specific about this. From the union of the two people of Isabella and Ferdinand, the crown of Castile and the kingdom of Aragon until the beginning of the 10th century, that is, practically 200 years or something like that, Catalonia barely survived in that union. It survived uncomfortably within what had begun to be called Spain.

[00:30:34]H maintained some of its peculiarities, maintained its constitutions, maintained its, of course, its language, its law, uh, and almost all its peculiarities, but it was systematically plundered.

[00:30:56]to finance the war projects of the Crown of Castile and its territorial and overseas expansion.

[00:31:08]The idea that this union of Castile and Catalonia, which harms Spain, is a happy union, like a family of members who respect each other.

[00:31:25]That idea is so manifestly wrong that there was a happy coexistence between the coincidence of objectives between Catalonia and the rest of what was called Spain, that only one fact demonstrates its fallacy.

[00:31:53]Catalans were forbidden to trade with America, with Spanish America.

[00:32:02]Trade with Spanish America was a monopoly of the House of Trade of Seville, which acted under the direction of Castile. And the Catalans, who as you know are a very mercantile people, very given to commercial interaction, who have traded throughout the length and breadth of the Mediterranean. Catalans cannot trade with America and can only do so secretly, pretending to be from another country and another place.

[00:32:46]That doesn't exactly speak of collaboration between Spaniards or Castilians and Catalans.

[00:32:57]The question of why the Spanish were in America is not something that needs to be addressed here, but it is obvious. What were the Spaniards going to America for? It is also evident that the fact that they excluded the Catalans from that plan means that they wanted to keep the monopoly on the scramble, as they say in Galicia, the plundering of the riches of America.

[00:33:28]The Catalans finally acquired the right to confirm, to trade.

[00:33:35]The ban was lifted and they acquired the right to trade with America when the Spanish lost America, they lost the colonies and were left only with Puerto Rico and Cuba. So they authorized the Catalans to trade with Cuba, which the Catalans did with great enthusiasm. And of course, the history of Catalan participation in America is not included in what the Mexican authorities are now asking the Spanish to apologize for, etc. It does not fall under that chapter, except in the case of Cuba, which is Spain's last colony in America.

[00:34:31]So this story, which is presented in official books as a shared history, is not shared. It has never been shared.

[00:34:50]Moreover, during this time, Catalonia has functioned practically for the 200 years that go from the end of the 15th century and the beginning of the 10th, that is, the time of the Habsburgs in Spain.

[00:35:17]It is a story of constant disagreements.

[00:35:26]The expansion of Castile and Spain, the overseas expansion we just discussed, was complemented by the maintenance of Spanish hegemony in Europe and Spain's permanent intervention in the reigns of Charles I and V of Germany, Emperor Charles V, and Philip II and the rest of the monarchs in Europe, where they entered into all kinds of wars, representing and defending the Catholic cause, especially in the religious wars, which were the wars that caused the most damage in Europe at that time, especially the Thirty Years' War, which was the culmination of this whole episode of centuries of, well, more than a century of religious wars.

[00:36:37]Spain, Castile intervened in these wars with the Castilian tercios, the Spanish armies financed largely by the Catalans, who were required to pay taxes to finance Spanish war ventures in Europe in defense of the Catholic faith against the Protestants and also to exempt Catalans from military service. In other words, those 200 years were 200 years of coexistence, yes, but a coexistence subjected to mistreatment and permanent plundering of Catalonia by Castile, uncomfortable and unfair.

[00:37:35]But things escalated, because with the end of the Habsburgs following the death of Charles II, known as "the Bewitched," the War of Succession broke out in Spain to determine who would sit on the throne of Spain: a Frenchman, a Bourbon, or an Austrian.

[00:38:05]or descendant of Austrians such as Archduke Charles, the Habsburgs and the Bourbons, two very different conceptions of the territorial organization of the world. The Habsburgs, as is well known from their tradition, have a confederalist tendency.

[00:38:31]Switzerland was a confederation until the constitutional reform of 1848, which transformed it into a federation.

[00:38:40]Germany, the Holy Roman Empire, was actually a confederation. The aces are used to this political game of what Hegel called medieval polyarchy. This term has later been adopted by some highly relevant political scientists such as Robert Dall to designate democracies as polyarchies, that is, a multiplicity of powers, right? In contrast, the Bourbons, the French vision was that of centralism. There is no plurality of power at the same level. There is a higher power that is central. Look at France today and you'll see that in France it's really just Paris and practically nothing else. The rest is territory dependent on Paris, not autonomous.

[00:39:51]These two conceptions clash, and two pretenders, Archduke Charles and Philip, who later became Philip of Bourbon, who would later become Philip V of Spain, clash in a war in which many European states intervene because they all have different interests. Some support the French and others support the English, that is, the French pretender or the English pretender. The English support the pretender, uh, sorry, the Austrian pretender. The English support the Austrian pretender, the French the French.

[00:40:37]And that war is also being decided in Spain.

[00:40:43]In the end, the last episode of the war was Catalonia's resistance to being defeated by the armies of the French pretender.

[00:40:58]Catalonia hoped to maintain its relative independence and even increase it if it won the war with the help of, among others, England.

[00:41:12]England, however, which had been favorable and had willingly supported and helped the Catalans, the Catalan separatists against Castile, ended up betraying them, making a pact with the French.

[00:41:33]In exchange for withdrawing their support for Catalonia, the English would obtain Gibraltar, the rock of Gibraltar that they still retain, by a treaty in which the King of Spain granted Gibraltar in perpetuity to England and the island of Menorca. They left the island of Menorca after 100 years or a hundred and some years because they weren't very interested in it, it had no strategic importance, but Gibraltar did.

[00:42:09]Now, when the Spanish bitterly protest that Gibraltar is a colony and that it must be decolonized and returned to the mother country, etc., they deliberately forget that there is a treaty in force by which the Spanish accept losing Gibraltar in perpetuity.

[00:42:33]So I see that solution as difficult, but in exchange for those betrayals, the English let Catalonia fall.

[00:42:43]Catalonia still resisted the invasion of the French Castilian troops with exemplary heroism, but finally fell defeated.

[00:42:58]and the repression of Philip V, not only on Catalonia, but on the rest of the Catalan-speaking countries, which the Catalans call Catalan countries, which includes Valencia and the Balearic archipelago. In these countries, all of Catalonia resisted the entry of the Castilians, of the Spaniards, until the very last moment and suffered a repression of such cruelty that it is difficult not only to forgive, but simply to understand.

[00:43:49]Valencia lost everything.

[00:43:52]They lost their privileges, they lost their rights, they were savagely repressed, tortured and murdered. The same thing happened with the Catalans, but they didn't lose it; the language wasn't lost in Valencia either. Its use was prohibited, its teaching was persecuted, its quoting was persecuted, and books were written in vernacular languages. They wanted to Castilianize it.

[00:44:19]to the Catalan countries. They wanted to deprive them of their history.

[00:44:27]They lost their institutions, they lost their national constitutions, Catalan institutions. They lost practically everything, except their language and civil law. Incidentally, Catalonia has its own civil law within Spain and they maintained their language and so it lasted until the result of this war, the defeat in this war which the English, by the way, recognize, even the English Parliament expressly recognizes that Gibraltar is the product of a shameful betrayal and that Great Britain has a duty to the restoration of Catalan liberties.

[00:45:25]And so they went through the next 200 years, practically between 17 and 1900.

[00:45:35]In 1800 is the period that Catalan historiography knows as the period of decline.

[00:45:43]Catalan writers felt compelled, and wanted to have readers, to write in Castilian Spanish. The newspapers were in Spanish, everything was in Spanish. People continued to speak Catalan, but with danger and being subject to repression. Education was not provided in Catalan. It was given in Spanish. It was about exterminating the national consciousness of a people, assimilating it, integrating it, forcing it to be Castilian.

[00:46:20]Now, many epigones of the Francoist dictatorship and of the most unrepentant Castilianism and Spanish nationalism, which is not true, the proof that this did not happen is that Catalonia still has its language, its Yes, yes, that is true, but that is not thanks to the magnificence of the conquerors, but thanks to the resistance of the conquered, who have been able to maintain their language against all kinds of pressures, repressions and threats.

[00:46:58]So let's say this is the historical brushstroke that places us at the beginning of the 19th century, well, the end of the 16th century, the beginning of the 19th century, in which a historical event of paramount importance to our history takes place, which is the emergence of nationalism.

[00:47:23]It begins with the independence of the United States of America. It continues with the independence of Latin American nations. It continues with the Constitution of the German State, which had practically never been a single nation-state.

[00:47:48]and with the Constitution of the unitary Italian State, which finally manages to take shape first as a monarchy and then as a republic. In other words, nationalism is a unique phenomenon that occurred throughout the 19th century.

[00:48:09]The consciousness of nationhood emerged fully articulated in the French Revolution. It is in the Constitution of 1789, where it states that the French people are the French nation in relation to the monarch. The question then, at the end of the 17th century, was to determine in whom sovereignty resided, whether in the monarch or in the people. The revolution declares that the nation is in the people and calls that sovereign. It is, in reality, if you will, to elevate to the status of a right what the Americans had already done, in fact, when they declared themselves independent from England, from George I, the British monarchy, and inaugurated the national liberation struggles of the peoples, whether you like it or not.

[00:49:10]And you also notice this emergence of the nation in two moments that are relatively parallel and that I always like to remember as parallel, which are Catalonia and the European Jews. We are not going to dwell on the history of the Jews, which is also thousands of years old, but we are going to emphasize one aspect.

[00:49:41]It is said that the Enlightenment is the mother of the French Revolution and therefore of the nation, and that in Europe there have been two Enlightenments, the French Enlightenment and the Scottish Enlightenment. That 's true, but it's not the whole truth. There has also been a third enlightenment, the Jewish enlightenment, the HaSkalah, that is, the Jews who lived in Europe, who had arrived in Europe after the Diaspora and after the expulsion of the Spanish Jews in 1492, the Ashkenazi Jews of Europe and the Sephardic Jews took hold of the Enlightenment and turned it into a rational, enlightened phenomenon, characteristic of Judaism and the idea of ​​nation as well.

[00:50:44]And that's where 19th-century European Jews begin to think of themselves as a nation.

[00:50:53]The problem is that they do not have a territory or a state, and therefore, as a nation, they are entitled to have a state. It's the same thing that Catalans began to think in the 19th century.

[00:51:09]The cultural renaissance that was called the queen, the floral yoks, the recovery of the traditional culture of Catalan literature, gave rise to a nationalist movement in Catalonia that was supported by something that the Jews did not have and the Catalans did, their language.

[00:51:37]The Catalans had preserved their language and within Catalan nationalist ideology, the preservation of the language means the preservation of the spirit of the nation.

[00:51:50]This is not the whole story either, because the Jews did not have a common language.

[00:51:55]They spoke the language of the countries where they had assimilated.

[00:51:59]Rabbis and some particularly educated classes spoke Hebrew, and the rest of the Jews in Central Europe spoke Yiddish, which is a mixture of German and Hebrew. There was no single Jewish language.

[00:52:19]However, there was indeed a very strong national consciousness that was articulated in the birth of Zionism, which today has a very bad reputation because current anti-Semites often call themselves anti-Zionists, but which has been the axis of the creation of the State of Israel, a nationalism just like Catalan nationalism that was politically articulated at the end of the 19th century.

[00:52:49]and in the early 1920s with aspirations to do the same as the Italians, the Germans, the Latin Americans had done, that is, to constitute themselves as a state given that they were a nation.

[00:53:06]And so things remained in the 19th century and then at the beginning of the 20th century, the Israelis obtained their state thanks to the Valfur Declaration of 1917 and from 1948 onwards they had their state and the Catalans did not.

[00:53:28]The Catalans failed in their attempt to form an independent state from Spain. They tried several times.

[00:53:42]The eventful 20th century lent itself to many interpretations, but the fact is that Catalan nationalism, until the end of the 20th century, failed in its attempt to become an independent state.

[00:54:10]The Spanish continued to boycott all types of political organization by the Catalan separatists.

[00:54:21]Of course, there have been two military dictatorships in Spain in the 20th century. The dictatorship of General Miguel I de Rivera between 1923 and 1929 and the dictatorship of General Francisco Franco between 1936 and 1975.

[00:54:46]If you do the math correctly, for more than half of the 20th century, that 20th century of the Enlightenment, of freedoms, of I don't know what, for more than half of the 20th century, Spain has been governed by military men, deeply anti-Catalan military men.

[00:55:09]General Primo de Rivera had been the military governor of Barcelona, ​​he knew very well the Catalan nationalist and separatist fervor and the first thing he did was to literally and completely dismantle all the Catalan political institutions that could give rise through evolution to state organizations such as the Commonwealth, which was a kind of attempt at Catalan protest made by the nationalists.

[00:55:51]Needless to say, General Franco was much, much worse.

[00:55:58]Needless to say, although it does need to be said because it's not usually said.

[00:56:05]And it is not often said that the Spanish civil war was not only a war of the employers, the landowners and the priests against the working classes, but also a war of the Spanish against the Catalan nationalists.

[00:56:28]And this second aspect is probably as important as the first.

[00:56:34]Because? Well, because if the first aspect is understood as it is generally understood in Western historiography where everyone forgets about Catalonia, if it is understood that the civil war was a war of the democrats and the revolutionaries and the leftists against the fascists and that the war against Catalan separatism was a war of the Spaniards against the Catalans.

[00:57:11]On the one hand, there are the case-ists and those who support the fascists, the classes, the right wing, the rational classes, traders, etc., and on the other hand, there are the left wing and the independentists and peripheral nationalists, Catalans, Basques, and Galicians. The Galicians suffered little because they endured the military uprising from practically the first day it occurred. The Catalans resisted until the end. In fact, it was the last piece of land that Franco conquered. They were the last to surrender, and they surrendered because they had no other choice.

[00:58:08]But if we look at the other side from the other point of view, that is, Spaniards against Catalans, the composition of the sides is different.

[00:58:24]On one side are the Catalan separatists and some Catalan nationalists who were not separatists, but were with the separatists only. And on the other side, everyone else, including the Spanish leftists who were fighting with the right wing.

[00:58:52]The President of the Republic, Manuel Lazaña, was radically opposed to the independence of Catalonia.

[00:59:05]The President of the Council of Ministers, Juan Negrín Canario, a Canarian doctor, was belligerent against the independence of Catarina.

[00:59:18]Moreover, he even went so far as to say that if the outcome of the war was to be that the Catalans would gain independence; he said it in a more vulgar way, but that was it.

[00:59:32]If the outcome of the war was that the Catalans gained independence, he would hand over power to Franco. In other words, what Catalan separatists say is that, as far as Spain is concerned, the left and the right are the same. As far as Catalonia is concerned, the Spanish left and right are the same. You're right.

[01:00:03]And of course, the result of the story to this day, which is already the third part of my already long intervention, for which I ask for your mercy and to whose most unanimous support I avail myself, this third part means that it must be said that the swords, as always, are raised.

[01:00:37]Spain cannot solve the problem of Catalonia by force, which is what it always tries to do. Now, whether the Catalans manage to become independent from the Spanish by exercising their right to self-determination remains to be seen. It may not seem so at the moment, but the capacity of peoples to impose their dreams and objectives should not be underestimated. If you look at history, you'll see that worse things have happened. What is certain is that the patterns of history that I have modestly tried to explain to you remain unchanged.

[01:01:44]If Spain has been an independent political entity since the end of the 15th century, as some say, I insist, not all, if Spain was born with the Catholic Monarchs, then in these 500 years there has been practically no president. of the Catalan government.

[01:02:17]accidentally General Prim, who was from Reus, ah, and in a revolutionary situation, and two presidents of the Republic, of the first republic, well, actually three, if I apply myself, I don't know if you press me, who were Francesc Pi Margal and Stanislau Figueras.

[01:02:46]two Catalans. There's a third one, uh, whose name was Salmerón, I think, right? I don't remember now, but he wasn't Catalan, he was from southern Spain, but he was a great admirer of the Catalans.

[01:03:11]In short, Spain has never been governed by Catalans.

[01:03:17]Catalans have been systematically excluded from decision-making, which has always been the domain of a traditional Castilian Spanish oligarchy that imposed itself, as seen in the war of 1936 to 1939, by force of arms.

[01:03:50]So, in my humble opinion, and of course open to all kinds of questions, contradictions, and criticisms, this is my personal contribution to this very lively and permanent issue of Catalonia within the Spanish State.

[01:04:17]Thank you so much.

[01:04:24]Thank you very much, my dear Ramón. It is an excellent historical exposition of the Catalan problem and what the scenario you see at this moment is. I have four questions that were sent to me and I'm going to read them to you.

[01:04:48]The first one says, Spain territorially delimited New Spain into 17 states. Today there are 32 states. That is, after 200 years, 15 states were created in what is now Mexico.

[01:05:04]And well, that geographical tension is expressed today in the type of federalism, says this fictional person, and your concept of a multi-member state caught their attention. And the question is, what is your opinion of federalism today with what you defined as the plurinational state? I don't know if you want me to read them all or if you'll answer them one by one, as you say.

[01:05:34]Almost better this way, right? One by one.

[01:05:37]One by one. Okay.

[01:05:38]Yes. Look, I understand that federalism is a positive legal form of organizing political power. There are two ways to be a federal state.

[01:05:56]H via aggregation, that is, states that were previously independent become federated, as in the case of the United States, or via disaggregation.

[01:06:08]States that were all dependent now become federated, as in the case of Australia.

[01:06:17]Well, federalism is a perfectly normal form of political organization.

[01:06:27]It is up to the people to decide whether they want to organize themselves in federal or centralist terms, whether they have reasons to be a federal state or not.

[01:06:45]It's a question that's open to the public.

[01:06:49]The concept of a plurinational state is amusing.

[01:06:56]It's funny. Because? What does that mean?

[01:07:02]which is a state within which several nations coexist.

[01:07:09]If I remember correctly, the first Constitution that was approved in Bolivia during the time of Evo Morales defined Bolivia as a plurinational state, but then asserted that it was a unitary state. So in that case, plurinationality literally means nothing.

[01:07:37]The matter is complicated because now I 'm thinking, look, ah, one of the reasons why we could move forward with this idea of shaping plurinational states, which they don't have, because the gentleman who asked the question is right, federalism is one thing and plurinationalism is another.

[01:08:04]Federalism may be good or bad, but we have a lot of federal states and they are all fairly reasonably organized. Things can be changed, of course, everything can be changed, of course, but clearly, the plurinational aspect is not clear, it is not known how that would be articulated.

[01:08:26]And to give an example of how difficult it is to articulate something so ethereal that sounds so much like political propaganda as the plurinational state.

[01:08:40]Two observations.

[01:08:41]First, a plurinational state is a state in which several nations coexist, but there is a dominant one.

[01:08:52]There is one that imposes its language on the others, there is one that imposes its culture, its religion, its whatever, on the others. If so, it is not plurinational.

[01:09:04]Switzerland is a federal and multinational state.

[01:09:08]Each part, each canton speaks its own language.

[01:09:15]None of this, "Hey, here there's an official language which is English, and then here you can speak Welsh and there you can speak, uh, Scottish or Gaelic."

[01:09:31]Here you can speak, you have to speak Spanish and you can also speak Catalan, or here you can speak Spanish and you can speak Basque, right? In the Swiss cantons, one language is spoken, the language of the canton.

[01:09:49]Clear.

[01:09:51]So, first question. In a plurinational state, no single nation can be dominant.

[01:10:00]Decision-making bodies must all be collective and balanced.

[01:10:11]But I'll ask a second, slightly more complicated question; I hope I don't get too confused. This problem of nationalities within states was raised acutely, as is well known, and you know better than I do, from the First World War and the points of President Wilson, one of which was the principle of self-determination of peoples. In other words, every nation has the right to a state. That was a minefield for Europe, where there were states that had several nations and nations that were divided among several states. If you push me and it doesn't seem ridiculous to you, eh, Europe had reached the level of Africa after decolonization.

[01:11:05]One of the things that the former colonizers are accused of is that they ended up dividing Africa according to lines of their pure whim.

[01:11:17]They separated nations, they united nations, they did whatever they pleased. That was happening in Europe too. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was not alphabet soup.

[01:11:28]And then there in the Austro-Hungarian Empire a curious theory arises because it is where the most important political philosophers in matters of nationalism were, those who made the most contributions.

[01:11:43]Specifically, Bruno Baua, who was the father of Austrian nationalist thought, had a concept of nationalism that might shock you. He said, "In reality, the national minority doesn't need territory; what it needs is people.

[01:12:11]It is, therefore, a nationalism of people."

[01:12:18]Of course, that's appropriate for Central Europe, where different ethnic groups move from one territory to another, but they don't have their own territory.

[01:12:30]This is also a very curious problem.

[01:12:32]Going back to my earlier point about the Jewish question, the Jews had no land, no territory; they had to go and find it wherever they could. They had no language. In the end, what defined the Israeli nation?

[01:12:55]The will to be a nation, the firm purpose of being a nation, and the capacity to take the risks that this always entails.

[01:13:09]Because a state, a nation, a group of people who consider themselves members of a nation, doesn't get a state for free.

[01:13:22]That has never happened.

[01:13:24]So this second aspect, the nation as a group of people, is probably... What can be accepted when the gentlemen of Eve Morales's Constitution say that Bolivia is a plurinational state?

[01:13:40]It means that there are groups of different nations with different cultures, but all within the same homeland. And that none of them should even think about asking for independence.

[01:13:54]Of course, that's what a Plurinational State means. We have it here too.

[01:14:00]Here, I say in Catalonia and in Spain, these leftists—you know, those who consider themselves the true leftists—there's always someone in politics who considers themselves the real something. Well, the true leftists say that Spain should become a plurinational state. Does that mean they're willing to recognize that Catalans can become independent if they want? Not a chance, as they say here. It's not the same kind of plurinationalism as Bolivia's.

[01:14:43]Spain is a plurinational state, but above all, it's a Spanish state.

[01:14:49]So, this is the answer, which has been a bit long, but it has allowed me to clarify some concepts.

[01:14:58]Thank you. Look, the second one says, "Mexico in the 19th century, a state as Yucatán separated from the country, but there has been no other independence process in the 20th and 21st centuries, neither in Mexico nor in any country in Latin America. What is your opinion regarding what is happening in Europe? Spain, England, the Flanders region.

[01:15:24]What is your opinion, my dear Ramón?

[01:15:28]Ah, interesting question. By the way, that bit about the Flanders region reminds me that I forgot to mention Belgium among the multinational European countries, which is practically a country made up of two other countries, or even three, because there are people who say that Brussels is also a country, that there are the Flemish on one side, the Balhons on the other and in the middle is Brussels, which is also a third country.

[01:15:59]Yes. H yes. This thing about Yucatán in the 19th century is also somewhat reminiscent of the experience of the First Spanish Republic of 1873, and the so-called [revolution] is probably coincidental with what happened in Yucatán, I don't know because I know practically nothing about the independence, about that attempt at independence in Yucatán. But in Spain, yes. In Spain there were cantonalist attempts to become independent, but only of cantons. Yes.

[01:16:38]H Cartagena. Cartagena declared itself independent, and Murcia. Uh, there was even one, I do n't remember exactly, that almost seems like a joke, but he wrote a letter to the President of the United States asking to be recognized as the first state of the United States. Yes, from one point of view. From a pragmatic point of view, it might not be a bad idea, huh? Because of course, if your standard of living is, well, you swallow the "well, I don't know, this is a joke" thing. Yes. And then regarding Latin America, of course, the thing is that the history of Latin America is relatively recent, since independence occurred at the beginning of the 19th century, right? And it has a very traumatic political history. Many countries have had revolutions against revolutions, endless dictatorships, constitutions, and so on. They are a good reflection of Spain, by the way, because they more or less have the same ideas, the same history, and the same points of view. Yes. Um, I don't know, it's just that I imagine there is n't a sufficient base to mobilize a significant sector of the population to advocate for a change in the legal and political model of the State or to advocate for the independence of their country. Where this occurred, it already connected the countries. I mean, for example, the conflict between Colombia and Venezuela is of that nature. The birth of Panama is of this nature, that is to say, the conflicts Uruguay eh eh eh eh eh this Republic, I don't know what the Argentine friends call it, but Uruguay is basically the same in relation to Argentina, right?

[01:18:55]That is, conflicts that could have led to claims of what the 19th-century Italians called irredentism, that is, unsatisfied nationalism, independence that has not achieved its goal.

[01:19:14]Those problems that could arise at the time of the birth of the Latin American republics were already resolved at that moment of birth. I'm looking ahead, in the years to come, in the centuries to come, circumstances may arise that could fuel this kind of claim, but I doubt it because I don't see a great cultural and linguistic homogeneity, and certainly not a very strong religious one.

[01:19:56]and cultural in general.

[01:19:59]And where could an impulse of an independent nature come from that cannot, let's say, be justified territorially? Well, from a situation that frankly I don't see, but that everything is possible in Granada, they used to say in my country, they used to say everything in my time. Everything is possible in Granada, which would be a political articulation of the indigenous minorities, which practically feeds something of this at the bottom of Bolivian plurinationalism, this of recovering, uh, politically articulating the native populations, etc. I have nothing against it because I suppose that anything that recognizes people's rights is good, whatever it is, recognizing rights is good, but it does n't seem viable to me to move people who have certain cultural conditions.

[01:21:27]determined to a radically different situation.

[01:21:33]In other words, I do n't see it as being within the perspective of indigenous populations, just as I don't see it in North American Indian reservations.

[01:21:54]Their incorporation into a cultural world of states, nations, collective rights and duties in the contemporary world seems very difficult, if not impossible, right?

[01:22:15]Thank you. There is a contemporary question that I think is very important to ask you. I'm staying, friend. They ask, he says, within the context of political innovation, regardless of whether the rules of the European Union allow it. He mentions the case of Manuel Valz, the French prime minister who aspired to be mayor of Barcelona.

[01:22:41]Could you explain this process to me?

[01:22:44]Well, in the end he lost, obviously, but could you explain how a Frenchman, a French politician, could be a candidate for mayor of Barcelona?

[01:22:55]Excuse me, could you repeat the question? I've lost the first part.

[01:22:59]Yes. Um, how can we explain this phenomenon if it's within the current political innovation in Barcelona, ​​in Catalonia, the candidacy of Manuel Valls, former French prime minister?

[01:23:14]to the mayor's office in Barcelona. Uh, although the political rules of the European Union no longer require territoriality as in Latin America, as in Mexico, if you could explain this candidacy.

[01:23:29]Well, the first fact, of course, the first fact is that Manuel Bals is from Barcelona, ​​he was born in Barcelona, therefore, he retains his right to run for mayor. E has a bad reputation in Catalonia, bad among nationalists, but a very good reputation among non-nationalists.

[01:23:56]Sure, sure.

[01:23:58]Uh, he is accused of having behaved in a very racist manner towards some Gypsy families in France, etc. And in Spain, specifically in Catalonia, because he doesn't operate in Spain, he operates in Catalonia.

[01:24:18]In Catalonia, he has been a representative of the most right-wing and pro-Spanish faction within the parliamentary spectrum, and he has served to confirm one of the things I said in my presentation. It's not that I'm saying Manuel Bals is dedicated to proving me right, but I hope it's remembered that I did indeed say that Catalans think, Catalan nationalists think, and I also think that, as far as Catalonia is concerned, the Spanish left and right are the same; that is, both want to end the idea of Catalan independence. And this is what happens with Bals. He couldn't become mayor, but his votes were for him to vote, for the left to govern in Barcelona and not for a party that claimed to be pro-independence. Incidentally, Merge wasn't a separatist either; he was lying, but at least he said he was. Well, they left him out for saying he was pro-independence. and they left him out. Who is it? The sacred alliance between the left and the right regarding Catalan independence. This was the role of Manuel Bals and continues to be his role.

[01:25:53]Okay. And this is the last one, although you mentioned it briefly, the request for forgiveness that López Obrador demanded from Spain, he says, "What is your position that Spain should apologize to Mexico for what happened in the clash when Mexico didn't even exist?"

[01:26:14]uh as a country.

[01:26:19]Yes. Uh, uh, I understand that argument.

[01:26:22]I understand that argument. Hmm, I'm in favor of all countries that have had colonies not only asking for forgiveness, but doing more than just asking for forgiveness, because you can't eat forgiveness. And of course, to what extent do countries that have based their progress and wealth on the plundering of their colonies not have an obligation to at least make some restitution or compensation, not just by asking for forgiveness, which is all well and good to ask for.

[01:27:03]And then with respect to the specific case of Spain and Mexico or the rest of the Latin American countries, but especially Mexico it is complicated because of course, the one asking says that Mexico did not exist. Well, that 's the same thing. The atrocities were committed, the genocide was committed, the plundering was committed, it was either Mexico or hell, and it was wrong.

[01:27:41]Whatever was being stolen, it was called what it was called.

[01:27:47]Now the question is, who can ask the Spanish people to apologize?

[01:27:56]the Indians or their descendants and the settlers.

[01:28:04]This is a real problem.

[01:28:07]Indeed, I believe that the Spanish should apologize for the plunder and the conquest, the clash and whatever else. But to whom?

[01:28:21]To a man named Yupanki it is possible. It's possible for a man named Montezuma to be like that. I don't know why, of course, a man named García López, the Spaniards left, they were kicked out at the beginning of the 19th century, and those who stayed, what did they do?

[01:28:51]What did they do with the natives?

[01:28:57]Uh, they benefited, no, no, no, no, from the colonial structure.

[01:29:03]The colonial structure was, as all these third world scholars, uh, dependency theorists, etc., tell us. The colonial structure was a disaster for the development of Latin American countries, but nobody dismantled it.

[01:29:25]In other words, the owners changed, but the industries continued.

[01:29:30]And of course, then, asking for forgiveness, well, it seems reasonable to me, yes, but I wouldn't be, as the Spanish say, very arrogant, asking or forcing the Spanish to apologize, when I too should apologize, would n't I?

[01:29:59]He said, "I don't intend to—there's a gentleman here who says he'd like to know, but I don't have time to read it. If the people of Catalonia suffer from enforced disappearances like Mexico, is there a question, or some form of racial hostility that the people of Catalonia suffer?

[01:30:21]Yes, look, uh, they're two different things.

[01:30:25]Enforced disappearances.

[01:30:28]Well, no, it doesn't seem to be happening at the moment, at the moment, uh, it doesn't seem to be happening.

[01:30:36]The second part, yes, uh, contempt.

[01:30:41]Yes, look, there's an expression that's very interesting in Catalonia and that you don't hear much outside of Catalonia, which is called Catalanophobia.

[01:30:54]Spaniards don't know what Catalanophobia is, and when you tell them, 'Hey, there's something called Catalanophobia,' they say it's a lie.

[01:31:03]But come live in Catalonia and you'll see it clearly.

[01:31:09]Clearly.

[01:31:11]Catalanophobia is hatred of everything Catalan, hatred of the Catalan language, hatred of its customs, hatred of its culture, and the desire to To end it all. And right now, that's what's happening to a large part of the Spaniards who live in Catalonia, and to Latin Americans as well, because Latin American immigrants, of course, since they come speaking Castilian Spanish, expect everyone here to understand them. And look, the truth is that in Catalonia 100 years ago, less than 10% of the population spoke Castilian Spanish.

[01:31:50]People spoke Catalan.

[01:31:53]Catalan has been declining due to Spanish oppression and colonization by Spaniards, and so on. And now far fewer people speak it. But the language of Catalonia is Catalan, not Castilian Spanish. Castilian Spanish is an imposed language. Of course. So, Latin Americans come, they find it easy to speak Castilian Spanish, but they aren't doing Catalonia any favors; on the contrary, they are preventing Catalans from developing their own culture in their own language.

[01:32:33]I don't think Latin Americans come with bad intentions to harm Catalans, but I do think that many Catalans who are pro-Spanish and many Spaniards Those who are Catalanophobic do indeed have it. They do, and they want to destroy the Catalan language, Catalan distinctiveness, Catalan culture. In reality, they want to destroy Catalonia, but they ca n't because they live off it, they live off exploiting it.

[01:33:11]Of course. So, they are in a position that I would say is morally and aesthetically untenable.

[01:33:20]They live off the people they exploit, and therefore they want to destroy the people they exploit.

[01:33:31]And they do this through what is called Catalanophobia, which many people say doesn't exist. Well, it does exist.

[01:33:41]Of course it exists. The first thing a Catalan encounters when crossing the border of the Ebro River between Catalonia and the rest of Spain is a reaction of rejection as soon as they hear their accent. It 's almost, if I may say so, pedantic; it's similar to that episode in the Bible where the Israelites had conquered a territory opposite, I think it was the Ephraimites, I don't remember exactly, and They had them cornered and wanted to get rid of them.

[01:34:29]They controlled the border; they had a bridge that the Ephraimites had to cross if they wanted to leave and go somewhere else. And the Israelites were stationed on the bridge and would say to them, "You are an Ephraimite." " No, no, I'm not an Ephraimite. I'm an Israelite." "You're not an Israelite, you're an Ephraimite." " No, I'm not an Israelite. Now, say ' Shibboleth.'"

[01:34:54]And the Ephraimites didn't know how to pronounce the sound "yes," so they would say "Shibboleth," and that's when they would have their throats cut. So, this Catalanophobia is more or less the same. If the Spanish could, they would do the same to the Catalans. Since they can't do it to the Catalans, they do it to Catalan products, and every other day they're preaching boycotts of Catalan products themselves, products that are subject to market forces, because everyone knows, I say, that if a product in A free market prevails, so it's cheaper or better, I say. And what interests you as a customer is the best product at the best price.

[01:35:48]If that happens to Catalans, what sense does it make to boycott Catalan products? You're blinded by hatred. Yes, and that happens. That does happen in Catalonia, and it happens a lot. Yes, answering the question. Let's go.

[01:36:06]Well, I think that covers all the questions, my dear Ramón. We deeply appreciate your knowledge, your historical analysis, your clarity, and above all, as I said in the interview, your wisdom. And well, we're already organizing your visit to Jalapa. We're talking about it beforehand; we'll announce it to our compatriots, and it would just be a matter of scheduling with you and Celia, of course, your return to Jalapa after 25 years, my dear Ramón.

[01:36:41]Man, Jalapa. Yes, sir. 25 years. 25 years. The golden anniversary. That's the anniversary. Imagine. It will be a Pleasure. It will be a pleasure. Yes, yes, yes, yes. Because I don't have any conquering spirit or anything like that. No, no, but, but, but I adore Mexico. Yes, yes. And I think I know a lot about Mexico, not only its literature, its history, its culture, and so on, but also its people and its lands.

[01:37:21]It's in many places in Mexico.

[01:37:25]I love the capital.

[01:37:29]And you've been there, we've been there with you. Of course.

[01:37:33]Very good. Okay. Well then, at your service.

[01:37:37]Good night to you. Good night to you. Thank you.

[01:37:40]Good afternoon to you all. Okay, goodbye.