Middle East War? The Path and Outcome of Tensions in the Gulf 📱

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[00:00:32]Hello everyone. We are here in the Middle East war. the path and outcomes of tensions in the Gulf hosted by the pal and welcome uh actually today uh we have three attendee uh Dr. Alib from Qatar University, Dr. Kh Alna from the United Arab Emirates University and Dr. Mashup Zi from uh from Middle East Council of Global Affairs would be with us today. Uh Mashup Zi has not attended yet that that's why we will start uh the presentations of the general evaluation and general uh broad picture giving of the Dr. Alib and Khaled Al- Nazini.

[00:01:24]Uh actually um let me start in a that way. Uh actually do you think uh the emerging regional order is strengthening the US and Israeli influence in the Middle East and Gulf as general or the it creates a new opportunities for the China and uh also Russia for expanding their role in the conflict. uh actually uh let's start with that and after that uh when Zi has when when he comes we will he will attend us. Thank you. Who wants to start in the first phase? Actually in my list Alib is the first one. Let's start uh let's start to give broader picture of the goals right now in >> Okay. Thank you very much. I'm very delighted to be with you and with your distinguished uh guests and audience. Um before I answer your question I would like to give some notes if I may then we can answer that question. So uh I I believe that first we should distinguish between two parallel wars uh that are going on at the same time. We have the Israeli US war against Iran and also we have another war which is the Iranian war against the GC countries. So uh I think that uh right now we are in a kind of quagmire where the Iranians have uh not much to lose anymore after the devastating Israeli US military operations against Iran and also on the other hand the um US administration or Trump in particular is uh running out of options. So uh basically the Iranians want to save their face by a kind of acceptable deal. Uh on the other hand as we know Trump is untraditional president and he would like to also project the image of a victorious president. So he wouldn't allow Iran also to save uh face. That's why he's pressuring them hard to agree on a an agreement that would make him at least media wise victorious. I think that uh two particular issues are currently um under pressure. First, the uranium issue because this is like a uh in fact it's a delayed uh nuclear bomb.

[00:04:09]Uh so unless the Americans make sure that this uranium is out of Iran, the problem will uh persist regardless of the whether they would reach an agreement or not in the coming few days.

[00:04:22]And number two, the issue of straight of hormones. I think that uh the Iranians uh committed u a big mistake by weaponizing the straight of hormones especially against the GCC countries because we if if you take a look uh on the most affected countries or nations from this uh measure you will realize that it is the GCC countries. I mean uh also the Iranians are suffering a lot after uh Trump actually um copied their strategy and uh used that used it against them by also uh imposing a blockade against the Iranian exports of oil and we all know that Iran mainly depends on energy exports and uh its economic and financial situation is very problematic even before the the war starts and with the war starting I think that they had like around $20 billion in financial reserves, foreign reserves. So by imposing a blockade, they will run out of uh those reserves very soon and uh the situation will be even worse. So um both sides are looking uh for an agreement before um things get tougher.

[00:05:44]However, uh each each side is trying to save face, if I may, especially the Iranians. Uh meanwhile the on the other uh you know um side of the Gulf, the GH states particularly uh Saudi Arabia and Qatar are involved indirectly uh in efforts to deescalate the situation and try also to facilitate an agreement uh between the conflicting parties especially US and Iran through the Pakistani efforts. However, I believe that we have one big problem is related to the Iranians because currently we don't know who's who's actually ruling Iran because uh regardless of uh um how the agreement would be finalized, you need someone to sign on that and at the current situation we know that uh theoretically there is a new supreme leader but we we uh couldn't see him until now and even he couldn't if he's still alive or I'm not sure or effective. We also didn't hear any voice recordings for him. So all what we see is a signed statement and anybody could have you know wrote that statement. Probably a commander in the IRGC can do the this job also. And we have a internal split in the political elites of this is very obvious. I mean the usually play the the game of good cup bad cup. That's very well known. But aside from that, there is also a significant I think uh eruption between between the the elites and uh there is no agreement on how they can move forward which is uh I mean I think complicating the situation for everybody including the Pakistanis and the Americans. Meanwhile, the Israelis are quite happy uh with the situation.

[00:07:33]They don't want any kind of agreement between us and Israel. And at the same time uh uh at the same time also um uh they are ready for escalation against the Iranian regime. Um meanwhile countries like Qatar and Kuwait I think they are the most affected ones in terms of financial and economic situation because they are um significantly dependent on the uh exports through straight of Hormuz and because the the the strait is closed so uh we have zero exports from Kuwait and and and uh and Qatar. This is not to say that other countries are not affected especially UAE and Bahrain also because of the amount of targeting uh uh from the Iranians. uh uh meanwhile Saudi Arabia is managing it situation by bypassing straight of Hormus through Red Sea exports and uh some even reports saying that Saudi Arabia was able to actually uh record uh financial gains by exporting oil with high prices. So this is the general situation right now. Um, fast uh uh forward to your question, I think that it's still very early to determine how this the the the security architecture will emerge in the postwar period. Uh I think that um many countries uh and observers are disappointed by the performance of China in this crisis. I think that also um unfortunately uh and this is ironic because the Iranians have been asking the Americans to leave from the region and to close uh their military bases. But this particular war of Iran against the Gist states uh actually um allowed the Americans to expand their influence in the region paradoxically and also closing straight of Hormos and attacking uh energy facilities of the G states allowed the US to become for the first time in 100 years the number one export of oil in the world. And also likewise LG also many countries currently are currently depending on the US for LNG uh exports.

[00:09:59]So this this is this is if you if you look at from this perspective you will notice that the Iranian attacks against these countries actually benefited the Americans and I don't think the the Iranians calculated the the situation this way. Uh anyway, this is what I have right now and I will be uh open to answer your question later in By the way and meanwhile Mui has attended you attended with us. Thank you for attending. Let me uh start a little bit more. uh in the right now the attendant attendants are giving a broad uh explanation broader picture about the Gulf region what right now what are what is the things what's happening in the Gulf especially right now ali will start with his presentation then I will turn back for a great question about the Iran especially.

[00:11:10]>> Thank you very much uh Dr. Aisha for the introduction and thank you very much also for the invitation and pleased to be here with some former colleagues uh from Qatar Dr. Mahjub and Dr. Ali. I think Dr. Ali has uh elaborated significantly into so many issues that uh issues facing the Gulf nowadays. Uh but I would like to start with giving uh some kind of a background picture about uh the evolvement of security architecture in the Gulf because there is like as uh Dr. Ali has concluded his uh presentation with that it is very difficult nowadays to u foresee uh an a security architecture in the region uh a security cooperation between the gulf.

[00:11:59]This is because the the problem in the gulf and the way has the way it has started is that there was a perception there is different perceptions toward Iran. How each of the Gulf states perceived the Gulf, how each Gulf state perceived Iran since the 1970s is very much different.

[00:12:20]And this is the root of the problem because we have reached to a level that there is a lack of security architecture or cooperation between the Gulf state is that because Oman has a different perception toward Iran uh Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE. UAE uh faces the biggest issue because Iran has occupied three islands uh which has made the relationship very much limited between the UAE and and and and Iran. uh this differences in the perception toward Iran has not helped Gulf states evolve or develop a policy a one policy towards Iran since the 1980s 1990s and even uh in in the last 15 or 20 years when we see Iran with the proxy wars Gulf countries and UAE and Saudi Arabia in particular in Yemen and so on and so forth have uh helped them come up with a united or or one policy and This different or differences in the perception uh have also led to uh what we call it in the international relations perception is that is this threat from Iran if it is perceived is it real or is it imagined because some Gulf countries have thought that the threat from Iran is only imagined you know it's not real and therefore why do we have to always think that we need to prepare much in terms of military spending Gulf states have been spending so much in military because they were expecting if any escalation with Iran it will lead to a such conflict. So there was anticipated scenario of that whatever is going to happen in the region in one way or another Iran will target the US allies in the region. All right and this is what we are seeing. So uh the the the some scholars argued that the the Gulf countries had exaggerated about their perception towards Iran. In fact there was no exaggeration. the re the threat is real and it has been there since the 19 19 end of 1970s when Iran has promised to export the revolution.

[00:14:25]This have scared the Gulf countries which led them to spend more money on the on the military and this is what we have seen 10% or 15% of military of GDPs in the Gulf have gone into military um and therefore uh in the last 20 years we have seen each Gulf states have a different foreign policy all right am has a different foreign policy has different UAE um which eventually led to conflict between the GCC there was an intra GCC conflict which have uh not helped the Gulf states to develop a clear security architecture or organization something similar to the NATO if you would like to say so the conflict in the in the Gulf have exposed the Gulf states more it's not if one would say that well what did this do this war have uh done in particular it is actually um have exposed the Gulf countries to the real security issue dilemma that they have been facing. The main issue that the Gulf states have always been talking about is that there is a security dilemma and also has proved that the Gulf states are not disconnected from the rest of the Middle East. So the the the Gulf state there was also domestic perception and so also among some uh policy analysts in across the region that oh UAE is far from the the epicenter of the conflict in the Middle East or Oman or Qatar and therefore we are not uh you know connected and therefore we don't have to act in accordance but this has proved clearly that the region is interconnected and and whatever happens in any part of the region it will in one way or another affect the Gulf states and therefore the Gulf states over there have adopted a different strategies because of this threat perception all right threats from Iran or other uh actors or non state actors in the in the region they have always been you know uh bandwagoning uh or hedging but most likely if the terms clear for others that states in the in the past 15 years have adopted a strategic hedging that because of uncert uncertinity in the region. The region lacks clarity. We are we don't know what's going to happen tomorrow in the region and therefore the Gulf states have adopted the hedging strategy which led them to diversify security partners.

[00:16:47]So improved relations with Russia, with China, other powers in the region and also at the same time they have uh invested at the domestic level uh to to develop an defense industry because they don't trust any security partner. They say whatever is going to happen today with any other country in in the US or European powers uh doesn't guarantee to the Gulf that you know these states will come and because the case of Qatar is very clear. Why did the United States did not help the Qataris or help them intercept or dedict the uh fighter jets that uh came all the way from uh from Israel. So the region um or this war in particular exposed the also the weakness if one might say of these this regional security architecture. Um elaborating on what has Dr. Ali concluded is that this region is very much interconnected and whatever is going to happen to Kuwait will happen to other Gulf state. the problem that this also this war has exposed to the to to the regions that why the Gulf states cannot cooperate in terms of security um uh it's going back to the very first point that that I have raised is that how does the Imirati or Omani perceive the issue of Palestine or Lebanon for example how do they perceive Israel each state has a different perception um uh towards so many conflicts in the region we have so much differences between the GC CC than before. One would say, well, we have uh a common threat nowadays, Iran attacking the Gulf state. Yes, these states might think that okay, we might react the same, but we adopt different strategies. So, each Gulf country will have a different strategy to respond to these attacks from uh Iran. And there is no one collective strategy that bring all the Gulf countries u together. Unfortunately, one has to say that there is yes there is a fragmentation the the war has exposed and clearly uh opened the discussion is that why the Gulf countries have a different foreign policies and and strategies. Is it because of the leadership perception towards events in the region? Is it because the region is uncertain? We don't know what's going to happen tomorrow. We don't there lack of a trust between actors in the in the region. So to conclude uh one I would like to say is that fragmentation is very much a a a feature of the Gulf politics nowadays and uh because of this war and I think this despite the negative sides of of this war it might open the door for a possible uh clear security organization or cooperation in the long term but once they have a united or one clear policy towards all issues in the region.

[00:19:40]Thank you Al-Mazin. Also, Dr. Hal al-Mazini has published a book, an introduction to golf politics from a Cambridge University Press right now. So, he is a true person for uh so for someone who wants to understand golf as a region and golf politics as well. Uh >> if I may say Dr. Aisha also uh the book is co-edited so uh yeah leading scholars from the region and and outside >> also uh probably I did not attend I did not take the other writer's name uh if you want to mention I would be pleased >> yes no it's it's the book is co-edited with someone called Christian Alexander and the contributors are from the region and outside the region so it is an excellent introduction for those who are interested to to know more about the Gulf uh especially newcomers to the uh to the topic. I don't want to take much of time but just wanted to say a few >> professor welcome one more again. Uh if you want you can start the broad framework in the golf right now then I will ask questions.

[00:21:08]I cannot hear >> now. Okay.

[00:21:14]>> Uh good good evening.

[00:21:16]>> Um thank you Aisha so much for the invitation. It's pleasure to >> um to be with you and it's pleasure also to meet Dr. Khaled again after few years.

[00:21:27]>> Hope you are doing well Khaled and also Ali. Um uh just a quick note um I hope uh kh someone can review the book for the journal of gulf studies uh which I'm I found and edit uh I will be happy to publish a book review of your book >> I hope you find >> we send you a free copy >> no if you have someone he can he or she can um do a review and send it to us immediately >> definitely definitely thank you very much >> we'll be we'll be happy to publish it in a matter of two three weeks.

[00:22:02]>> Thank you. Um well I I want I want to focus actually on where is Iran stands now on on on this um and what what's happening um when it comes to the uh Iran uh relations um with the uh Gulf region actually not within the Levant as a whole within the Arab as we call it the Levant um Historically in the last 500 years, Iran uh what this more than five wars uh started with child Iran war with Ottomans and then moved to uh wars with Russia um uh with are more than one war more than I think in 150 years wars they call it and then they got uh two treat two treaties Golthan and Chiran and um then the British and and and Russia when they invade Iran 1942 in within the sec first second world war and then the Iraq Iraq Iran war. What is the common and what what is what is really interesting about those wars?

[00:23:18]Number one um in all of those wars militarily uh Iran was defeated.

[00:23:25]Um the Ottomans was was basically def has uh had defeated the uh Safavidites and after 100 maybe 100 plus years they signed agreement or treaty called Zohab treaties. But what is the major outcome politically? Safavidid Empire was able to to remain as a empire 220 years after more than 150 years wars with Russia uh at that time uh and um Iran lost 80,000 uh kilometer square um from its own land until now and signed what so-called child treaty In 1828, uh the Kajari uh uh uh Sha was able to remain in power until or or dynasty they they remain in power until uh 1924. So basically more than uh 95 years.

[00:24:34]Um those two comments I wanted to highlight that wars never uh uh led to uh to the the collapse of regimes in Iraq.

[00:24:47]Actually wars contributed to the lung uh uh to to the regime to stay longer. Um and that that was in the case of Iran Iraq war. I mean the more than 40 years if Iraq war was not there I think the regime was uh was about to to to collapse in early 1980s.

[00:25:10]So um wars uh are useful to the Islamic Republic of Iraq. Uh they uh did not uh you know they try to avoid it for years.

[00:25:22]They tried to uh not to move towards the war after the war with Iraq. They tried to avoid any kind of engagement, direct enga direct military engagement until the intervention in Syria. Uh but even there they try to justify that it happened because of the invitation of the Syrian regime.

[00:25:45]But all of those military intervention and uh the role of their alliances in the region, Iran was trying not to be engaged militarily uh you know in a direct military engagement that why because basically they learned the lesson from Iran Iraq war that wars uh in contemporary time are costly. They are different with the previous time.

[00:26:08]However, the two sudden events, the two shocks happened in the region, the Arab uprising and the 7th of October, according to the Iranian, they were not welcomed events. Number one, Arab uprising have led to see uh to to see Iran as a as as a a country as a regime which is oppress basically encourage oppressed regimes instead of seeing the Islamic Republic as as country which actually protect oppressed people. So Arab uprising was not in favor of Iran uh politically and cost Iran the image and militarily and contributed to the decline of its regional role as it happened on the in the uh December 8 of 2024.

[00:27:00]the 7th of October have contributed to the fact that Iran became a target and and a special target to the Israelis with the support of the Americans in the time where is someone in the White House or or or uh who is you know in favor uh of facing Iran and Iranian intervention in the region and I mean Trump in this context.

[00:27:31]So all of those developments basically were against Iran politically. I mean if Iranian were asked about 7th of October uprising the answer will be no we don't need these those events because they cost them and they will cost they will contribute to the uh I would say a major role to the fact that Iran is declining regionally.

[00:27:53]Now um in what happened in in in uh summer 2025 um and pre that after the uh attack to the consulate of Iran in Damascus was or has been perceived by Iran as a decline of war. Uh and then uh the 12 days war uh Iranians assessed on August 2025 that another war is coming and they call it the third imposed wars because they consider the first one is the Iraqi Iran war, the second one the 12 days war and this this one the third uh imposed wars and imposed wars to the Iranian means that the regime has distanted itself from wars. However, it is basically force uh uh on them and that's the reason they they sell it to their public as a source of legitimacy for defending the nation, defending the regime and the Iranians to support uh uh the regime as well.

[00:28:58]Um in this context uh they were preparing themselves the strategy Iran has decided in September 2025 that in case that the country is attacked they will raise the cost from the first minute of the war and that is based on a reports uh um some of them leaked uh by the uh parliament's uh strategic center um that uh the region the world uh cannot um allow this war to happen.

[00:29:38]They tried to convey the message to different countries so the countries to convey it to the Americans and the Americans can convey to the Israelis.

[00:29:46]However, all of this did not work. The war started in in 28th of October in 28th of February. Um and um the the um the war itself um was not surprised to Iran but what was surprised is uh to the world is how Iran responded.

[00:30:11]basically Iran after a matter of 30 minutes attacked uh Gulf region, Gulf countries uh with the claim that they are military bases and continue to do so and then uh uh basically blocked the straight of Hormuz. Uh those two actions uh they were pre-planned. Uh they are not something they decided all for the minute. they were decided by even the the former supreme leader with his military uh leaders.

[00:30:46]So what does what does that mean to Iran? Iran Iran tried to according to their own narrative they try to um maintain uh the solidarity within the regime um try to prove that the regime uh is strong. people they will not act act against the regime and they will be defending the regime even if the American and the Israelis wanted something else.

[00:31:15]And number two uh Iran tried to tell the world that the decision to uh block or close the straight of hormones can be repeated in other places and here talk about Babel Mandib. Not only that, they try to send a message to different countries like Indonesia, like uh China.

[00:31:37]Why not trying this? Why not, you know, doing something on that? So you can in the future if someone pressure you, you can use your uh straight against uh the others. So basically they they they did what I call it piloting using the straightforward as I I call it an atomic bombs. actually it's important than their nuclear uh program because by doing so uh the American has failed to convince the NATO neither the country nor the organization they they did not contribute to any role Europeans did not contribute to any role and basically Iran was and America itself uh defeated or failed on what so-called um freedom project one they they failed to open the um straight um and basically Iran is controlling that as as far as they know the The whole issue about fees and kind of things has a message. I think Iranian has interest to get as much as they can money. They want sanction removal. They want um uh they want their their oil to be sold normally. They produce 2.4 million per barrel a day. They want it to be sold and they wanted their uh money abroad to uh be back and so they can tackle the issue of restructuring uh after the war. the the lost according to the some numbers more than $350 billion um the the damage basically by the Israelis and the Americans um and this basically does not include the nuclear uh facilities uh in particular. Now I will conclude with that um um Iran uh uh the regime uh leadership has been assassinated I mean but the regime is still uh strong. Is there any division different views? Yes, there are different views. Um, is there is is the problem about division and between people or it's about the the decision? It's about the decision. The regime is facing a real challenge about changing direction. It's like a pilot on on 39,000 uh feet and he was asked there is a crisis or there is you know turbulences and he has to make decision.

[00:33:41]So Iran now is about making decision and none of those people who are in power now is strong enough. The uh the current one the current one he was not planned to be supreme leader. He's he's not capable militarily. He's not capable uh I would say sorry politically and also religiously. He's he's a person who was part of the intelligence of the uh revolutionary guard. Um and he was basically doing business for his father.

[00:34:08]Uh so he's not a man of of of politics.

[00:34:11]Um I think the the the the establishment decided him to be the supreme leader uh just to to move on the the current stat situation. I will not be surprised if he's been changed in any stage after or after the day uh or or after the you know this war ends. Um number three and final point um I think um Iran Iran uh now seeks with this kind of discussion with the Americans uh to maintain uh the an important idea uh regime should survive. Um and uh they they are capable uh as according to the Iranian uh uh politicians they are capable to fix their relations with neighboring countries. um uh um as as as long as Americans is uh out it doesn't mean they're out of the region but out of the scene politically. Thank you.

[00:35:10]>> Thank you Dr. Maj.

[00:35:13]Now uh I will ask another question to you actually because you know uh for the years Iran has projected an influence through the through a network or proxies as we call or partners across the region >> and uh when you are when you look the current situation do you think that the US and Israel have managed that uh network weakening it It's it's >> weak right now.

[00:35:47]>> Look, um the center of that network was Syria. Uh and and the minute Syria is out, I think that was the first step of weakening the uh uh the um alliances of of of Iran. the uhahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahah has been weakened by the assassination process but also the strength ofahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahah is the fact that it it it is one of the representative of shia in Lebanon regardless it military w because the nature of sectarian identity of of of Lebanon that's the reason why why survive uh uh the the the I would say the status quo but it doesn't mean that Hezbollah is is in a in in a good situation in a good I would say power uh considering what happened to his but uah I think managed to survive um if you look at Houthi I think Houthis um geography does not help them uh I think they're all theological and um in term of religious background ground. They are not really uh close to the uh to Iranian Shia uh uh identity. Uh and I think there is a lot of effort done now as far as I know by Saudis to distant from Iran. If this works, it means will be will not be anymore part of of Iran's network.

[00:37:24]Who remains basically if you talk about Gaza Gaza look at the situation there is nothing happened. I think Iran will continue to talk politically about uh its own network. I think they try now to stop I think the strategy of Iran now and that's the reason they talk about Lebanon now and they insist on Lebanon on any future agreement between Iran and America. They insist on Lebanon that the war should stop just because they want to stop the drain. I call it uh uh the drain of defeats. Uh because they feel they they were defeated and they tried to stop this using the current uh uh war. Um I don't think so Iran is capable to play any further roles considering the fact that economically it will be weakened.

[00:38:13]It is weak now and also um the priorities will be changed uh uh according to the current uh situation and looking at the past as well Iran post any conflict any any state I mean in the last 500 years normally the uh uh the government or the regimes they enter phase of reforms and those reforms basically change the priorities of the government. This is what happened to Safavidits. This is what happened to Kajar. uh and I think also this is what happened to uh Bahabis uh and normally this did not lead uh to fix the regime or the situation within the regimes actually a few years the regime uh uh did uh fall. So it may not help the regime to survive for a long time. But the the important point if the regime finish this war without uh resources, financial resources, I think the the scenario of the Americans and the Israelis likely to happen maybe with some uh uh few years later.

[00:39:16]>> Yes. Uh thank you. Thank you for your answer. And now I want to continue with Khaled Khalini.

[00:39:27]We know that the Gulf States have largely tried to stay out of the conflict. I mean the direct confrontation but yet we have still seen the critical energy resources infrastructure of the infrastructure facilities are come under threat. So what does this tell us about the future of the Gulf security according to your point of view and how might countries just like the Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates adopt their security strategies uh going forward?

[00:40:07]>> Thank you very much uh Aisha. I think uh this particular war uh if we we would like to look at the bigger picture has exposed the Gulf countries to the issue of that uh of two issues. One is the economic diversification and security cooperation. Two important aspect of this uh war that the Gulf countries dependent uh on oil uh will always put them under the spotlight that these countries without oil they will not be able to survive. So it is a question of survival and even now even when the war started Gulf states have all focused on uh survival even a point that was raised earlier by uh Dr. Ali is that uh Kadar and Kuwait have not exported any oil or gas for two months or since the start of the war. This poses a question of survival. It's not just a security. it is in in economic and political or national security. So the Gulf states even looking at Roman and sorry UAE uh Bahin and Saudi Arabia uh the economic aspect is extremely uh important and it is a question of survival. Now the probably the only one that is probably more advanced economically is the UE because oil contributes only 30%. And also UAE has managed to bypass the straight of Hormas and uh export oil through the port of Alfier and has increased the capacity from 1 and a half million to about 3 million barrel per day which is an astonishing because uh we never thought that there will be an an issue and what also angered Iran is that why the UAE is bypassing oil. they want to use the economic aspect as a tool of pressure on the Gulf states in order for these states to put pressure on the um United States. So the economic aspect is extremely important which leads us to discuss and talk about the uh the security architecture. If one would think about what are the security cooperation between the Gulf countries, they have something called the Al Jazzer Peninsula Shield U which has been used uh during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait but have not been really been materialized or been improved or developed uh in the last 30 or 35 years. The Gulf countries have tried in one way or another to uh develop a security uh you know partnership but we have seen more crisis between the GCC than uh cooperation. Uh so the potential of a security architecture is very weak. I don't think Gulf states will be able to uh build anything substantial nowadays. Maybe the ideas will float around, but in the long term, I think Gulf states once they understand that there are differences and the differences of foreign policies and differences of their behavior across all of the Middle East. If these are not resolved, they will never be able to develop any kind of security uh uh cooperation. They have to do it. They have a lot of common or commonality between them in order to resolve the issue of security. One clear example for them is that what happened in Qatar uh is a very clear example that uh the Gulf states they cannot rely on external powers because they don't trust external power 100%. Even if the US don't they you know they say that they trust the United States. Now nowadays they say all of the Gulf states think that well we need to diversify security partner we cannot just say 100% the US is going to help us with this uh security aspect as a security guarantors and therefore they are moving towards uh cooperating with other partners you know in outside the region in order to resolve this issue but the biggest issue is that why Gulf countries cannot fix their own security why don't they cooperate together. The Saudis have a domestic defense industry. UAE has a strong defense industry. Why don't they cooperate together to create something similar to the NATO? Uh, of course, this is something not easy to develop. But at least, you know, uh, the survival of one state is the survival of others. Uh, they cannot say that uh like what we what we've seen in the past three days in Kuwait. uh only uh issuing a statement condemning the attacks by Iran on inquit how long this going to happen how long the Gulf states can sustain say oh we're going to condemn you and say oh we are against what's happening we they have to retaliate they have to do something together but this requires security architecture a security cooperation between the the uh GCC states >> thank you I will ask uh uh same Um same not the same but a close question actually a lot to Alib Alib about the N security architecture is possible in the Gulf right now when he is looking the beyond of the current crisis. Actually, I wanted to ask do him if he see an opportunity to build a new regional security framework in the Gulf and if so, what would the would be the essential ingredients for the such system to work? because I know that he is just uh right now publishing a book about the Iran Israel revalry and its impact on the GCC states and its security right now and I think that it it would be published from the palgrave mcmillan. So I think it is the right address to answer that question and he stayed in in just in this place.

[00:46:19]So, Professor Adbakir, >> thank you very much. Uh, let me start by saying as uh Dr. Khaled said, I mean, since the formation of the G states, they never adopted a united policy towards Iran and this has been significant problem in coordinating their measures or their actions visav Iran especially in situations where the Iranians constitute uh a threat to these countries. So unless first they come to agree that there are lessons to be learned from this war and these lessons uh uh should bring the GCC countries closer to each other in terms of uh creating uh um not uh I wouldn't say because regional security architecture is a is a big framework and it needs a lot of uh uh significant investments of uh time, money, effort, diplomacy, and defense. But at least if they can agree on common themes or general rules on how to react collectively when they face a situation in which they are all threatened by uh uh foreign actor whether it's Iran or anybody else. So uh this is a a first condition uh in order to uh move forward uh and try to think of something bigger.

[00:47:55]Now uh I I I don't see this happening at the current moment uh for several reasons and uh I see actually uh as if three uh blocks are emerging out of the crisis we have I mean depending on or seeing the reactions of the GC countries with v the Iranian war against those countries we noticed that Saudi Arabia and Qatar tilted more towards uh indirect or implicit engaging uh to at least deescalate the situation and facilitate a kind of uh uh agreement.

[00:48:36]The rational behind such move is that we have two options. Either to adopt a defensive posture and try to absorb the Iranian targeting and the Iranian threat until the situation is been resolved and then we can rearrange our cards again because in a we are in a position to absorb uh significant uh uh hit by Iran.

[00:49:00]And the other option is to actually switch to offensive mode and also try to attack Iran. And the GC GC collective defensive force of the G states uh is is huge especially in terms of aerial power and uh fighter jets. Uh so if they adopt such um a posture they would definitely u you know harm Iran. But the question is would they be able to stop Iranians from attacking them? I don't think so.

[00:49:36]So the the Iranians all what they need is just few drones or maybe some of the left missiles to attack and the G states are extremely vulnerable. So between these two uh options some GCC countries opted for the escalation and trying to resolve the situation. And uh we have another block which is actually and mainly um u constitutes uh constitute of Oman. Oman position was was really unique and I have to be honest it's pissed off a lot a lot of GCC states because the the Omanis um um um they tried or or their actions were seen as if they are appeasing Iran uh which was not good in such situation. So they did they didn't secure Oman at the end of the day because Iran was Oman was targeted and they couldn't contribute to resolving the situation because the situation is still there. So Oman was like in the middle of those two options which is something not good uh from manage perspective. And then you have UAE and UAE the perception that is is is that we should do something uh against the Iranian threats and targeting because yes I mean being defensive is something good but this is only if it is a limited situation. you cannot just like um allow the Iranians to attack you because at the end of the day if you show the Iranians that you can seriously respond and harm them then they would factor this in their calculations when they want to attack these states and the rational behind such uh perception is that the Iranians actually despite being attacked by Israel and the US didn't respond to the Israelis and the US they attacked the states because They know that these states would not respond against Iran. So the Iranians avoided being engaged with the real aggressors here which are the Israelis and the Americans because they know that attacking Israel and America will result in catastrophic destruction for Iran and they shifted the war towards the Gates because they are the weaker ring in this situation. So uh these three perceptions in the GCC or within the GCC are against are running against each other. So there are lessons to be learned uh I think uh and they have to calculate many issues in the postwar but aside of this issue I think on the regional level there are some efforts being especially led by Turkey to and include of course uh uh Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to try to establish this kind of regional security architecture. It's not an alliance. It's a kind of a flexible alignment that agrees on general rules in the region in a way that secures the interest of regional countries and uh make any kind of u uh let's say um u Israeli or American future attacks more costly and more problematic uh if such uh network exist in the region or any other country. So um in order to establish such alignment you need a lot of time a lot of diplomatic efforts and a lot of engagement. So far uh at least I think three uh meetings between the uh foreign ministers of these countries plus Egypt uh have been concluded and I think that they are progressing yes slowly but in a steady way. Whether they will reach an agreement or not will depend on how they will accommodate the threat perceptions because each of these countries has a priority when it comes to the threat perception. Also each of this country of these countries has its own calculation calculations in its sub regional um u domain. Saudi Arabia priority is the Gulf. Uh Turkey priority is Levant.

[00:53:48]Pakistan priority is South Asia. uh and and Egypt is North Africa obviously. So it's it's a complex situation. Uh I think the fact that these countries are sitting together on one table and trying to find a way to establish such alignment is in itself something positive but we should not just uh keep talking we should uh try to I mean transit from talking to something concrete on the ground. I think that there are some potentials in this sense.

[00:54:21]The military and defense cooperation between Turkey and many GC states including Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar are really advanced and they help also to strengthen the states in the future in terms of uh autonomy quest and in terms of being um uh diversifying their u regional international alignments.

[00:54:43]Also we have complimentary uh trade effort between Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

[00:54:50]we have Pakistan with with its of course international status and being a nuclear power is very capable to to contribute to this situation. So moving collectively uh in the face of any kind of foreign intervention or threat is uh is is a must I would say from now on and I think that these countries are aware of the situation and are trying to develop a mechanism that would be able to engage in such situation knowing that they tried I mean Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and somehow the Emiratis also because they moved collectively they were able to change the situation in Syria and they were able to convince the Americans to uh you know change the situation in Syria despite the Israeli rejection of this direction. So and this model was tried also in different sub regions and proved to be very effective.

[00:55:46]So why not uh uh developing it into something uh bigger. I think there are potentials but we need serious work on this front of course and once it's established it would be able to drag many countries like Qatar, like Kuwait, like Bahrain, like Jordan, like Syria, uh Libya and others to it.

[00:56:06]>> Thank you. Uh you know uh there has been a discussion about the Abraham accords right now and as a part of the broad broader regional settlement. So uh I would be pleased if all of you answer this questions in your point of view. Is the is this a realistic geopolitical project or more of the diplomatic bargaining tool? And what would you determine whether additional regional actors decide to join for decide to join to Abraham Accords?

[00:56:49]Are you asking me or >> all of you? Actually, if I'm asking all of you, I would be be I would be pleased if all of you answer this question.

[00:57:00]>> I I I'll start. I will start. Um I think I think the um the whole project um as far as I am following the story is it happened in the context of um uh I would say security arrangements in the region uh where um at that time uh Iran was a major u challenge or threat and there was a an also an American support to to have sort of alliances which can be developed and countries can be uh joined later.

[00:57:39]I think with after this war there will be a a question mark whether this should uh be the case continue some countries join or not assuming that Iran has been weakened. Um, of course, security uh, Israel has its own priority. Um, uh, and and still security um, priority will be will be on the table to Israel. Um, how the situation will be that depends on the final scene of this war uh, or this conflict. now. Um but I think uh the whole issues um of normalization with Israel uh they are now questioned uh in the light of this war. Where things will go it depend on how countries want to to decide uh how countries will look at the outcome of this uh war. But this includes even uh the outcome of um Madrid conference and Oslo and the Palestinian Authority project. all of those all of those you know projects including including Araba including all of those projects um uh Israel was was not um uh helping itself uh in recent years um and it becomes more than a a threat uh it it becomes more an ethical uh challenge uh uh even to the European uh states.

[00:59:15]Yeah, >> if you >> Yes, I just would like to also to echo what uh Dr. Mahub has said. uh but the original idea is has never been about that this Iraham Accord is about peace between Arab and and Israel. you know uh this is more of a convergence of strategic interest in the in the region and what we have seen that Bahin and and UAE uh you know signing this uh agreement is that because there is some kind of commonality with Israel in regards to to threat perception in the in the region reg Iran was one of the main reason why these states have you know the regional influence UAE has engaged in a war in in Yemen uh against the Houthis with Saudi Arabia and both UAE and and and Saudi Arabia have seen that Iran was the main uh supporter and and and you know of uh of the Houthis and therefore there is a threat to the Gulf security in the south from the Houthis supported by the Iranian and from the north also supported by the so there is this convergence of interest that there is this Iranian uh threat and also threats from drones because we have seen clearly attacks on Abu Dhabi few years ago uh that brought UAE closer to states where they have some commonality that what is the threat who are the main countries that's threatening Israel also you know this is how this the the the uh agreement was being perceived um there is also uncertaintity about uh def defense partners in the region I think UAE may We have seen that the technology the you know with cooperation or defense technology cooperation with RA was a core aspect of this uh agreement. So the core of this agreement is never about peace between Arab. The the intention was not that you know we are going to sign the Abraham Accord because this might lead to an an agreement because the issue has been going on for 60 70 years. It cannot be one simple agreement. It was Oslo agreement and so on and never been able to resolve the issue and this agreement cannot resolve the issue. It can maybe contribute but it cannot uh fully so what has this war in particular has done to this uh accord or agreement. I think it has to some extent might some countries say that yes uh it has exposed some Gulf countries that we have similar threats Iran being attacking Israel or attacking GCC state but as what Dr. have said I agree uh with that uh is that the perception about uh you know about Israel after after this war is going to be different. Is this agreement going to help? They are looking and perceiving Israel as a killing machine.

[01:02:22]You know the destroying we have seen in the last few days what they are doing in Lebanon. They have seen what they have done in in in uh in Gaza in so many countries in the region. Who is going to stop? Are we really willing and ready to cooperate with the state that only understand uh behavior or have a a realist foreign policy meaning that power is the most important aspect in their foreign policy not negotiation uh or any uh anything like that. So this is what I think the accord is uh can be interpreted in that way.

[01:02:56]>> Yes. Thank you. Thank you very much professor Ali Bakr.

[01:03:00]>> Yes. uh the way the Americans and the Israelis see uh Abraham Accords is uh a tool to integrate Israel politically and economically in the region. So uh this is the main goal from the American and Israeli perspective. In my opinion, it's not a realistic goal for uh many reasons. First, these agreements occur regardless of what uh people of the region thinks uh about Israel and in any agreement about any topic with any country unless there is a popular popular support for such agreements they will lack legitimacy and when they lack legitimacy they uh probably wouldn't survive. So this is number one. Number two, uh the reputation of the Israelis and especially Netanyahu at the current time is uh is is very bad and poisonous.

[01:03:57]So even if you have some governments that would even entertain the idea of uh joining Abraham Accords at the current moment, they wouldn't do this because this would actually bring them more problems than any kind of benefits out of such uh uh agreements. So that's why we I think we will not witness any such move especially from uh big countries in the region. Uh third, the Israelis never ever respected any kind of agreement, even the agreements that secure their own interests. And we have an we have an experience on this issue. Uh we have a 50 year or more I'm not sure what the years with with Egypt and and Jordan.

[01:04:41]And the Israelis never respected their agreements with these countries and they work restlessly to undermine them uh putting more even pressure on them. And in return those countries didn't gain anything out of such agreements. We have also the the we should not forget that also UAE when when it joined the Abraham Accords there have been some kind of expectation regarding some issues especially when it comes to the F35s and some Israeli promises that the Israelis wouldn't you know attack the Palestinians or expand the settlements in certain areas. Also the Israelis didn't respect their promises and uh ultimately u Abu Dhabi didn't receive the F-35s. So the Israelis are even even when you have some countries who genuinely want to uh join Abraham Accords, the Israelis don't look to them from this perspective. They see this agreement as a tool to to to be utilized and to you know um abuse uh those who join them. So uh for all these u um facts and other facts I I don't see this uh this happening especially if Natano is still in power and we saw that I mean lately he was just like u I mean u utilizing his visit to UAE and catching it for internal politics which is something totally insignificant from from the Imirati perspective and uh he also did the same with Saudi Arabia before when he visited NEO and he uncovered this situation for internal politics which resulted in uh uh you know rapture between the Saudis and that's when the Saudis decided that these these people are not serious we cannot go into any kind of agreement with them and there should be a set of uh long list of conditions if they want to be serious so I don't think this I don't think this this issue is survivable on the long term especially if Netanyahu is in power. Yeah, I hope I answered your question on this regard.

[01:06:55]>> Thank you. Thank you very much. Actually um today we have talked about the path and outcomes about the Gulf and we know that the GCC is the most affected region or most affected part of this war actually uh for he with being us here Mahubi mentioned about the Iranian perspective professor Alib mentioned about the regional security and its effects. Professor Khaled al-Mazai mentioned about the general tendencies and especially uh as especially the golf securityities. So I want to you thank thank all for being with us attending this section and uh I hope that we will be meet soon one more time once again. Thank you. Thank you very much.

[01:08:01]>> Thank you Aisha. Thank you so much.

[01:08:04]>> Thank you. Thank you.

[01:08:07]Thank you.