Robert E. Lee's Shock Troops

[00:00:00]When people think of Roberty Lee's Army in Northern Virginia, most immediately think of Stonewall Jackson. Others think of James Longreet, Lee's dependable old warhorse. Jackson was the hammer. Long Street was the anvil. But after Jackson's death, another core quietly became the army's workhorse. Whenever Lee needed troops to march fast, plug a hole in the line, counterattack an enemy breakthrough, or launch an assault before the enemy had time to react, he often turned to AP Hill. I believe Hillscore became Roberty E. Lee's shock troops. Now, before we dive into the evidence, let's define what I mean by shock troops. Today, the term often brings to mind elite soldiers specially trained to storm enemy positions. So, I'll be using that same definition, as well as meaning that these troops were simply the ones trusted to carry out the hardest assignments. They were expected to move quickly, fight aggressively, and arrive where the battle was most desperate. They weren't necessarily better equipped or even better trained than everyone else. Their reputation came from where they fought and how often they were committed. If we look at AP Hill's military career, this reputation didn't begin when he became a core commander. It actually started much earlier. Hill's famous lot division earned its reputation during the seven days battles. While Stomal Jackson struggled to arrive on time during much of the campaign, Hill continually found himself thrown into difficult situations. At Mechanicsville, Jackson's delay forced Hill to attack heavily entrenched Union troops with little support. Although the attack suffered from peace mill assaults, Hill refused to give up and kept pressure on the federal line throughout the day. Over the next several battles, Hill improved drastically. Rather than directing his division from miles behind the lines, he stayed close enough to personally observe the fighting, he shifted brigades where they were needed most and constantly looked for opportunities to exploit weaknesses in the Union line.

[00:01:54]Roberty Lee noticed this aggressiveness, and it would become one of Hill's defining characteristics throughout the war. The pattern continued at Cedar Mountain. Stonewall Jackson entered that battle believing he could overwhelm Nathaniel Banks before additional Union troops arrived. Instead, Banks shattered Jackson's line. Confederate brigades began falling back, and for a brief period, the battle hung in the balance.

[00:02:17]It was Hill's light division that arrived at exactly the right moment.

[00:02:21]Without waiting for every brigade to form perfectly, Hill threw his men into the fight and stabilized the Confederate position before launching the counterattack that ultimately secured the victory. This would become something of a trademark for Hill. When things started to go wrong, his troops frequently became the solution. Only a few weeks later, during the second battle of Bull Run, Hills division again found itself carrying much of the burden. For two days, the lot division occupied the unfinished railroad cut while wave after wave of Union attacks crashed against its position. Hill repeatedly asked for reinforcements as his men exhausted their ammunition and suffered mounting casualties.

[00:03:00]According to numerous accounts, some Confederates resorted to throwing rocks at advancing Federals because they had little ammunition remaining. Jackson possessed reserves that could have eased the pressure much earlier, but he largely kept them in place until the situation became critical.

[00:03:16]Again, Hill's ability to withstand a numerous pressure without collapsing was witnessed. Then came Antidum. Perhaps no event better demonstrates Hill's emerging reputation than September 17th, 1862.

[00:03:28]While Lee's army desperately fought north of Sharpsburg, Hill's division was nearly 20 m away at Harper's Ferry. As soon as the surrender of the federal garrison was complete, Hill force marched his division toward the sounds of battle. The men covered the distance in remarkable time despite days of marching beforehand. When Ambrose Burnside finally crossed Antidum Creek and threatened to cut off Lee's line of retreat, Hill arrived at almost the last possible moment. His brigades entered combat as they reached the battlefield, driving the Union 9th Corps backward.

[00:04:00]Had Hill arrived even 30 minutes later, Lee's entire army may have faced disaster. Again, Hill had become the answer to an emergency. When Stonewall Jackson died following Chancellor'sville, Lee reorganized his army into three core. Some historians have questioned whether Hill was ready for core command, especially after Gettysburg and Bristo Station. Those criticisms certainly have merit. Hill made mistakes, particularly early in his time as a core commander. But if we focus solely on those mistakes, we miss the larger pattern. Lee continued trust in Hill with some of the most dangerous assignments of the war. Gettysburg offers an excellent example. On July 1st, 1863, it was Hills Corps that initiated the fight in west of Gettysburg. Now, I know there's debate over whether Henry Heath violated Lee's intentions or whether Lee expected a larger engagement. Anyway, Heath's division absorbed tremendous punishment before Pender's division entered the fight. Together they and Yule's corps pushed the Union 1st and 11th Corps back through Gettysburg and onto Cemetery Hill. The second and third days would prove far less impressive for Hill.

[00:05:05]Miscommunication with Long Street and poor health affected his performance.

[00:05:10]But one disappointing battle should not erase the larger trend that developed afterward. In fact, I would argue he'll learn from Bristo Station more than almost any Confederate corps commander learned from a defeat. He rushed into battle without fully understanding the situation. Following Bristo station, Hill rarely repeated the same mistakes.

[00:05:30]Then came Ulissiz S. Grant. The overland campaign tested every Confederate commander in the eastern theater unlike anything they had previously experienced. Grant refused to retreat after battle. Instead, he continually sidestepped southward, forcing Lee to react over and over again. The wilderness opened with Hills Core bearing much of the initial fighting.

[00:05:51]Hill's men attacked through dense woods that shattered formations and made command almost impossible. By the end of the day, his core had driven the Union Army back, but had become thoroughly exhausted. The following morning, before Long Street could relieve him. Winfield Scott Hancock second Corps launched a massive assault that nearly destroyed Hill's line. Confederate soldiers streamed to the rear as federal soldiers surged through the woods. Hill didn't panic. He remained on the field, rallying troops wherever he could during the desperate fighting near the Widowtap field. Hill even helped work an artillery piece while waiting for Long Street's arrival. Long Street's counterattack receives most of the attention, and deservably so, but Hill's battered core had held together just long enough for Long Street to arrive.

[00:06:36]Again, Hill had occupied the most dangerous position in Lee's army. At Spennsylvania courthouse, Hill unfortunately became seriously ill with prostatitis. His illness limited his effectiveness during portions of the campaign, something beyond his control.

[00:06:51]Critics often point to this campaign as evidence that Hill was unreliable. I think that's unfair. Military commanders are still human beings. Illness affected generals on both sides throughout the war. Once Hill recovered, he returned to active command and immediately resumed lead and difficult operations. Cold Harbor demonstrates exactly that. Hills Corps occupied critical positions along Lee's defensive line and helped repel repeated federal assaults. By 1864 and 1865, however, the strongest evidence for my argument appears during the siege of Petersburg.

[00:07:25]This is where Hills core truly became Lee's fire brigade. Grant understood that capturing Petersburg required cutting the railroad supply lines into Richmond and Lee's army. That meant repeated offensives against different portions of the Confederate line. Time after time, Hills responded at Globe Tavern, at Ree Station, along the Bonton Plank Road, at Hatter's Run, Hill continually shifted his exhausted divisions to wherever Grant threatened to break through. Unlike earlier campaigns where armies marched hundreds of miles, Petersburg became a contest of constant emergencies. Every few weeks, another Union offensive developed against some vulnerable section of Lee's defenses. Again and again, Hills Corps found itself moving to meet the threat.

[00:08:11]His men were exhausted. Their numbers steadily declined. Supplies became increasingly scarce. Yet, Lee continued relying upon Hill. That says something.

[00:08:21]Roberty Lee certainly had opportunities to distribute these responsibilities among Long Street, Gordon, Anderson, and others. Instead, he'll repeatedly found himself at the center of the fighting.

[00:08:33]So why is that? I think there's several reasons. First, Hill moved aggressively, sometimes perhaps too aggressively.

[00:08:40]Unlike Long Street, who preferred deliberate preparation before attacking, Hill often believed speed itself created opportunities. While this occasionally led to mistakes, it also meant his core frequently arrived before the enemy expected. Second, Hill trusted his division commanders. Men like William Dorsey Pender before his death, Henry Heath, Cadmus Wilcox, and William Mahon understood Hill's aggressive style of command. They knew they might suddenly receive orders to march toward heavy fighting, and they generally responded quickly. Third, Hill possessed tremendous personal courage. Now, courage alone doesn't make someone a great commander. In fact, exposing oneself unnecessarily can become a liability. But he'll inspired confidence because his soldiers regularly saw him where the fighting was fiercest. Whether personally rallying troops, riding dangerously close to enemy fire, or helping serve artillery during desperate moments, he'll rarely ask his men to endure something he would not endure himself. His soldiers noticed. Lee noticed. Finally, Hill understood momentum. He recognized that hesitation often allowed the enemy to recover.

[00:09:50]Whether at Cedar Mountain and Tedum or numerous engagements around Petersburg, Hill repeatedly struck before Union commanders could fully reorganize. That aggressiveness became one of the defining characteristics of the Third Corps. Now, does that mean Hill was Lee's greatest core commander? I think it might be, but I'll leave that up to you. But I'm not arguing that Hill never made mistakes. Gettysburg, Bristo Station, and portions of the overlanding campaign clearly reveal his weaknesses.

[00:10:19]He sometimes thought like a division commander rather than someone responsible for an entire core. But none of that changes the larger pattern.

[00:10:27]Whenever Lee needed soldiers to march into danger, Hills corps usually received the assignment. Whenever a breakthrough threatened the Confederate line, Hills Corps often became the first response. Whenever Grant shifted south looking for an opening around Petersburg, Hills core frequently moved to meet him. That is exactly how commanders employ shock troops and their most dependable troops. Most people think of Stonewall Jackson's core or Long Street's core. But after Chancellor'sville, I believe AP Hills Third Corps quietly assumed another role entirely. They became the Army of Northern Virginia's emergency response force, its fire brigade, its shock troops.

[00:11:08]I hope you all enjoyed this video. Let me know what you think in the comments below. Do you think AP Hills CPS deserves this reputation or am I giving it too much credit? I'd love to hear your thoughts. Thank you all so much for watching. I'm Dr. Lucas Wilder. This is History Gone Wilder and I'll see you next time.