Sir Olly Robbins reveals he was 'PRESSURED' by No.10 over Mandelson scandal

Added: 2026-05-05

[00:00:00]congratulating him on it. The access um but but it was all subject to to vetting and and the question question I want to ask is what kind of pressure additional to that were you put under in relation to the vetting?

[00:00:16]>> Thank you chair and before I answer your question which I promise I will it was not a I'm afraid I don't think at the point of his appointment and four days thereafter it was actually a given that he would be vetted. Um again if you look at the documents submitted under the humble address uh there is no um there is no stipulation um from number 10 that he should be vetted. Uh the welcome that was sent to him immediately afterwards doesn't say uh welcome to the foreign office subject to vetting.

[00:00:46]>> Uh the announcement put out on the 20th of December says that he will be out early in the new year. It does not say subject to vetting.

[00:00:54]>> The contract does though. The cotchment of employment, >> the contract issued to him after he was vetted >> says that he must maintain his clearance. So did mine.

[00:01:03]>> Okay.

[00:01:03]>> Um that is that is an absolutely standard stipulation.

[00:01:07]>> But nothing about this appointment actually as far as I've seen in writing stipulates it. There was then a debate um between cabinet office FCDO about how to make sure that he is sent out to post with the appropriate clearance. Um and that took several days. Um and uh a position taken from the cabinet office um was that there was no need to vet Mandlesson. He was a member of the House of Lords. He was a proving counselor.

[00:01:38]The risks um that attending his appointment were well known and had been made clear to the prime minister before appointment. Now in the end, the FCDO insisted and put its foot down. I understand my predecessor uh had to be very firm in person but um that was a live debate at the point of announcement and I think it's important to make that clear to the committee >> and that again should be minuteed those discussions should have been minutesed and it should be u they should be part of the humble address disclosure >> well given your absolutely understandable focus on scrupulous accuracy that's before my time but I'm sure there will be papers >> yeah and who was the debate uh between who in the cabinet office do you know?

[00:02:20]>> I don't know for sure. Um the uh the briefing I had on arrival was that there had been a position taken from the cabinet office that as I say uh some of Madison's status meant that vetting might be unnecessary and that that had been a discussion for several days after the press notice. It had been resolved before Christmas and resolved in the FCDO's favor. And I I only mention it chair because I think to say now that it was always clear that his appointment was subject to vetting uh is something that the the committee should um should consider whether that's something they need to take more evidence on.

[00:02:54]>> So before we move on then you're not you're not sure who it was in the cabinet office. But can I ask this? Was it was it uh was it a politician or was it um civil servants?

[00:03:03]>> I I don't know. I was not imposed at the time. All I understand is that there was a live debate I think at at official level but I couldn't swear. Okay.

[00:03:13]Um so additional to that was there was there um other pressure put on you or put on the foreign office?

[00:03:21]Um I think throughout January honestly um my my office uh the foreign secretary's office were under constant pressure. Um there was a uh there was an atmosphere of uh constant chasing. Um when will this >> daily phone calls?

[00:03:41]>> I I I couldn't say for certain. Daily um but I mean certainly very frequent from um private office to private office. Has this been delivered yet? Um never any interest as far as I recall in weather but only an interest in when?

[00:03:57]>> So when you say private office to private office, are you saying private office of number 10?

[00:04:03]>> Yes, I am.

[00:04:04]>> And who are we talking about there then?

[00:04:06]Are we talking about Elsa Terry?

[00:04:09]I'm I'm not going to say, chair, I'm I may no longer be a civil servant, but uh I didn't come here today to put to scapegoat other civil servants. I came here to make sure the committee understood the circumstances.

[00:04:20]>> No, I understand that. I understand that, but I also want to know who the source of this is and I want to be able to get as much evidence as possible to be able to identify who the source of the of the uh the pressure was. I mean, from what you know, let's see if I can ask you this way. From what you know, what was the source of the pressure?

[00:04:38]>> Um, well, I've said I think that um the the vector I was most conscious of was from number 10 private office >> and of and and the number 10 private office is not sort of is a is a is a means by which others um ensure that things happen. So behind the number 10 private office, who are we talking about putting pressure on the foreign office via the private office?

[00:05:08]>> That's thank you for asking it that way, chair, because that's the reason I do not want to name other officials in number 10. I think uh that the private office would only have been feeling this pressure themselves if they were under pressure.

[00:05:20]>> Yes. Did you answer the question?

[00:05:23]>> I don't know.

[00:05:26]So, we do know that Morgan Mweeny was a protetéé of Peter Mandlesson's and we know that he was um he was very keen on Peter Mandlesson getting the job and we know that he resigned saying that it was all his fault and that he had that he had advised the prime minister to appoint Peter Mandles and took it on the chin, took the blame. So, was it him?

[00:05:49]>> I I'm afraid when I said I don't know, I meant it. I don't know. Um what I I told the committee what I do know which is that the foreign office was being chased very frequently and I don't hold the private secretaries responsible for that.

[00:06:03]>> And was there any direct communication between anyone in number 10 and you?

[00:06:09]>> No.

[00:06:10]>> So there was no one ringing you on your mobile phone or WhatsAppapping you or sending you any messages?

[00:06:16]>> No. And your phone is presumably something which has been handed in as part of the humble address and and will be able to be investigated.

[00:06:24]>> Certainly will.

[00:06:25]>> I'm just told that once someone has finished being a civil servant that their phones are wiped and that they're reused. So could you just give us an undertaking to make sure that doesn't happen.

[00:06:34]>> My my phone for the relevant period was downloaded before I left government.

[00:06:39]>> Very good. Very good. Okay. Um so so it's private office to private office.

[00:06:47]Nobody contacting you directly but again as far as you're aware record a record was taken of the contact between private office and private office.

[00:06:57]>> I'm sure there are records of interactions between us. I couldn't swear to what those are or how many of them there are but you'll have to ask the government that I'm afraid. No, but if it's a private office, it's your private office and and so number 10 is contacting your private office and your officials are telling you we've had another phone call. We've had what in what other way were you getting pressure?

[00:07:21]>> I'm talking chair, remember I'm talking about the whole of January here.

[00:07:24]>> The first three weeks of which I was not in post.

[00:07:27]>> Were you actually in the foreign office?

[00:07:29]>> You weren't in post.

[00:07:30]>> I had a handover week the week before I took up the position.

[00:07:34]>> Right. um where Philillip told me a bit about the job and I sat in a room some distant from his and read a lot of papers.

[00:07:42]>> Did he tell you that you were going to get a lot of pressure?

[00:07:44]>> He described to me the the steps and the atmosphere that I've described to you.

[00:07:49]>> Yes. Okay. So, during the two weeks in January that your your your office is getting pressure, we've heard about phone calls. What else is there? Are there emails as well?

[00:08:01]>> I don't think so. Um I this is a I think the the natural thing in many ways uh which is that a private secretary wanting to know what's going on wanting feeling under pressure themselves to deliver is ringing up and saying where are we on this can we make it happen can you deliver get on with it >> yeah I mean it's it's right isn't it that that that there should be official records um kept accurately and information should be handled as openly as possible within the legal framework according to the you know the code. So there should be a record of all the phone calls that are made.

[00:08:37]>> I think if I'm sorry if the modern civil servant made a record of every phone call that they received, they would do nothing else. Chair, so I doubt there's a record of every phone call. I'm sure there is a trail that explains that there was regular contact.

[00:08:51]>> I thought that genuinely civil servants couldn't buy a cup of coffee without making a record of it.

[00:08:55]>> I I don't seem to be able to buy a coffee without someone following me down the road chair.

[00:09:01]Yeah, it'll pass.

[00:09:03]But uh but no, but but but seriously, it is part of the part of the code, isn't it? To keep accurate official records and handle information as openly as possible within the legal framework.

[00:09:13]It's it's a really important part of this to to keep records. And I hear what you say, not every phone call, but phone calls from number 10 saying, "Get on with it. We we want to appoint Peter Mandlesson as as ambassador to the United States is an important phone call. Even if it does happen every day, >> it it is, but if it's not telling the department anything new, then there might be no need to record it each time that you receive it.

[00:09:37]>> The need to record it is to show the extent of pressure that the foreign office was being put under by number 10.

[00:09:44]>> Well, as I say, I think that um when you take evidence from the government, they will be able to describe that period to you. Um and I've tried to do my best to do so when I was only in post for one week of January.

[00:09:56]>> Okay. Okay. Um can I ask you this? Um so let's move on to uh the 28th of January um when you UKSB um recommended deenied and that Peter Mandlesson they identified was um his appointment his his uh he was a man of high concern.

[00:10:19]It's you you recognize those two phrases as being applied to Peter Mandlesson.

[00:10:23]>> Uh I I don't actually chair, but we can come on to that in a second.

[00:10:27]>> Okay. Um well, we understand that those two things were were what UKSV um concluded about Peter Mson. Um now any questions I ask you about this now are not to be interpreted as questions about what is the content of that vetting.

[00:10:44]Right? I don't want to hear about what was in it. I want to know what happened as a result. But what I want to ask you is you had a meeting with the director of security, Ian Collard, and I understand that you you're saying that he presented you with the findings. You didn't actually read them yourself.

[00:11:00]>> That's correct. Perhaps I could describe this meeting to you if that would help.

[00:11:04]>> And again, is there a note of it?

[00:11:06]>> There is a note of the decision. The meeting itself um of course involved uh the team describing to me some of the issues and the way in which they proposed to manage them. It wouldn't have been appropriate to record that in detail. The decision of what we agreed we would do and the ways in which we would manage it is uh is recorded and is available in the foreign office >> and that and and that record is part of if I can call it a DV bundle. So there's the so there's the UK SV paperwork and then there's paperwork from the foreign office and so those two there's a part one and part two and so it's part of that bundle but it isn't the record that you're talking about is not a freestanding document.

[00:11:52]Um, I think I know what you're driving at, but may I describe this in my own words, chair? Um, that there has been a good deal of misunderstanding about this process, if I may say so.

[00:12:03]>> For the foreign office and for several other departments, um, UKSV does not fail a candidate.

[00:12:10]>> Nor does the department No, I know, and apologies, chair, but others have, and nor does the foreign office overrule UKSV.

[00:12:18]The relationship between the two is set out in guidance and has been set out to this committee and in parliament. And so the outcome of the vetting process is what is decided by the foreign office on the basis of the UKSV findings and our own assessment of the risk and whether we can manage them. And so what the meeting I had with uh the director uh in on the 29th of January, it was an oral briefing. No documents were presented to me, nor did I particularly expect them to be. I have never seen a UKSV document. Um, I was briefed that UKSV considered Mandlesson a borderline case and that they were leaning towards recommending that clearance be denied, but that the foreign office security department assessed that the risks identified uh as of highest concern by UKSV could be managed andor mitigated.

[00:13:12]I was also told that the risks did not relate to Manson's relationship with Jeffrey Epstein and that I was told that UKSB acknowledged I don't know in what way but acknowledged that the foreign office might wish to grant clearance with appropriate risk management. So we talked about what that appropriate risk management might be and the grant of clearance the record of that decision internal uh uh records the grant of clearance and also the mitigations. I don't really follow why you wouldn't know the contents of the UK SV um and their concerns or even that they had said that there was high concern about Peter Mandelson. Um if you can I don't understand how you can not know that if you are considering what the mitigations are. You can't have the mitigations without knowing what the problem is.

[00:14:03]>> The risks were explained to me but I have not seen the underlying documentation. That's what I'm saying.

[00:14:08]Chair.

[00:14:11]>> Um, so >> perhaps sorry I mean that that obviously strikes members of the committee as as odd but >> well yes >> in in in all my years as a civil servant, many of them as a relatively senior one. I have never seen a UK SV document um other than the ones I filled in myself. And um that doesn't surprise me. Um the the government makes very clear in public guidance that for anybody to be briefed outside the vetting security process, for anybody to be briefed on the information into or findings of a UK SV process has to be for I think I quote wholly exceptional circumstances >> and this is a wholly exceptional circumstance surely.

[00:14:55]>> No. Um what I was told was absolutely within normal parameters of a set of findings from UKSV and the department assessing those they were they were issues that the department felt it had long experience and deep capability of assessing and coming up with a plan for how those could be managed and clearance granted that you know the that is not unusual in this process. Um, chair, it was unusual. I admit that I was briefed on it. I wasn't surprised to be briefed on it given the prominence and the profile of the case, but the the underlying interaction between UKSV and the Foreign Office and the decision-making process was entirely standard. When you were given your oral briefing, you claimed that you were given the impression that Peter Mandelson was a borderline case and not a case of high concern or one that was where whereby the UKSV was recommending denial of vetting.

[00:15:53]>> That's correct. I was I was told, let me be completely precise, I was told, I think that UKB were leaning towards recommending against but accepted it was a borderline case.

[00:16:07]Okay.

[00:16:08]>> And I think it's important to say this when when we're dealing with documents and releases of documents, inevitably things look quite black and white. My understanding is, you know, the personnel security team in the foreign office and the vetting team in UKSV are interacting about literally hundreds of DV cases a day. We are a DV by default department as you know chair. That means we have thousands of people uh who hold DV in the foreign office, many of whom are renewing their DV, new people arriving requiring DV. We are one of the biggest customers for DV service.

[00:16:43]>> And I hear you. I understand this. But this really was exceptional. I mean, there isn't any other DV case where you were getting daily phone calls from number 10. I mean, this was different.

[00:16:52]You were being put under pressure. And I just find it, if you don't mind me saying, remarkable that you got completely a different view of of what UKSV were saying about this than that which I understand is written down.

[00:17:09]>> I I I respectfully I disagree, chair. The the the department security team are extremely professional, experienced people. They have a live dialogue with UKSV. The risks that were identified were ones that they felt they understood well and could manage.

[00:17:26]>> Okay. Was there anything in the in the DV that was not already in the public realm? Was there anything that had been identified that we didn't already know all of us?

[00:17:36]>> As I wrote to you this morning, chair, and I'm sorry if this begins to come back to your opening remarks, but I may no longer be an official, but I don't think I can open that box. The this system absolutely depends on candidates for vetting knowing that the government will completely respect the confidences that they share.

[00:17:57]>> Yeah. No. No. So don't don't tell me.

[00:17:58]Don't Okay. So if there was anything that wasn't already in the public realm, just tell me that there was something that wasn't already in the public realm.

[00:18:05]Don't tell me what it was. Just tell me, oh yeah, there was something else. Um but sorry, can't tell you.

[00:18:12]>> I'm I'm afraid I'm not prepared to do that, chair. What that leads to is of course then an absolute storm of questions as to what that issue was. I'm >> not going to ask you a storm of questions like that's been trust my last question after this.

[00:18:24]>> I'm sorry chair. I don't I trust you.

[00:18:25]I'm not sure that the whole of the rest of the world will hold off from wanting to know.

[00:18:29]>> Okay. All right. Um and uh and where is the note of these meetings?

[00:18:35]>> The decision that was reached in the meeting was recorded the following day.

[00:18:39]and your thought process and the reasons that you decided what you did you didn't make a separate note of.

[00:18:45]>> No.

[00:18:46]>> So it's all on the DV documents.

[00:18:49]>> Um it's the the outcome of the consideration by the foreign office is recorded in the decision that was issued the following day. Apart from your meeting with Ian Collard, did you have a meeting with anyone else about about before you made the decision that you came up you came to about giving Peter Melson um clearance subject to mitigations?

[00:19:14]>> So it was just that meeting with Ian Collard. No other meeting >> correct >> and the decision was made there and then >> the decision is always formally made by the personnel security team. They are, this is a bit of jargon, although it's also plain English. They are the decision maker for the foreign office.

[00:19:31]And so the the the um minute recording the foreign office decision says ESND have decided to grant clearance.

[00:19:40]>> And is it was there anybody else in that meeting apart from you and him?

[00:19:44]>> Um I think at least one member of Ian's team was there, but I couldn't swear to it.

[00:19:48]>> And would their job be to make a minute take a minute of the of the discussion?

[00:19:53]Um I hope not chair because um the issues we discussed should not have been recorded at um the tier of classification that would be available >> even if it was then put into the DV documents.

[00:20:05]>> Um they will have recorded the decision back in the secure system we use with UK SB.

[00:20:11]>> And did you tell anybody once you'd made that decision >> that did I tell anybody that pans have been granted DV clearance? Yeah.

[00:20:20]>> Um I'm sure I will have told um probably the foreign secretary and probably number 10, but um to be honest, it would have been implicitly clear within a day or two anyway because we'd always said he would not be sent on posting to Washington without it.

[00:20:36]>> Yeah, you're getting you're getting a lot of pressure. You're getting maybe daily phone calls. So surely somebody you would have crossed your mind, I'm going to ring X, who you're not prepared to tell me who it is, and tell them for heaven's sake, get off my back. I've cleared him.

[00:20:51]>> Um, honestly, Sherry, it's plausible, but I don't remember doing so.

[00:20:56]>> It's likely more than plausible that you would have rung somebody up immediately you'd made the decision and told them you'd made the decision.

[00:21:03]>> Um, it's also possible that I'm capable of bit of obstinency and people ringing me all the time asking me, >> I can I can understand you. I I I I get the vibe. But but um but nevertheless, I do not believe that you didn't tell someone and you know where I'm going next. Where's the note? Where's the note of the phone call? And who did you speak to to tell them that the decision had been made?

[00:21:27]>> I I don't think I made such a phone call. And if I did, it would have been simply to share the outcome of the process, which is that DV had been given.

[00:21:37]>> Right. So you might have discussed it with someone else and got them to tell whoever it was that was pushing pushing the foreign office as to what had happened.

[00:21:46]>> It's possible. But chair, honestly, I I I am trying to do my best to help you, but I think this is a bit of a red herring. The within within hours, as the humble address pack makes clear, Peter Manson was written to with a contract of employment and a posting letter to Washington, which the foreign office had always said he would only get once he passed DV. So it was absolutely clear.

[00:22:06]Not only that, within minutes of him of us recording our decision to grant DV, Peter will have received a DV certificate and it's entirely possible that man Manslson himself will have then told people it's been granted. I don't think I felt under any obligation to tell anybody.

[00:22:22]>> I think you are under an obligation to take to keep accurate minutes and notes of decisions that you make, of actions that you take and your reasoning. And I think that is quite clear from the civil service code that it is your responsibility to keep accurate official records and handle information as openly as possible within the legal framework.

[00:22:40]That you must not be um be influenced by improper pressure from others. That you must not ignore inconvenient facts or or relevant considerations when providing advice or making decisions. And that in order to be able to cover yourself, mind anything else, you know, given that's what the ministerial that the the the the uh the code says, that you would take a note in order to make it clear that you were not subject to undue pressure, that you were not ignoring inconvenient facts, that you were behaving properly, but you but it doesn't look like there has been any notes about any of this.

[00:23:16]>> Can I make two points? I I've been a civil servant for a quarter of a century. I could recite the code to you >> and I believe it uh you know along with probably the book of common prayer. It's one of the two things I kind of can hold in my memory and I've abided by it and you will find um when the records are finally opened you will find record of the decision. It is clear um what I what I am saying to you is that whilst there was an atmosphere of pressure um the department rigorously followed the process and we did so frankly as I understand it despite some in government believing it was not a process we ever needed to follow and I just ask you to to reflect for a second I don't think you know my life might have been considerably easier over the last two or three days if I wanted to come to this committee and said I was put under such pressure. I just agree to it. But that wouldn't be true. I was given a set of serious reflections on the risks raised by a bunch of professionals who had come across these risks before and thought the foreign office could manage them well. And at least the way I was briefed, that was a position that was implicitly understood by UKB. We then recorded that decision and we put in place the mitigations and clearance was granted >> because again the code does say that if you believe that you're being required to act in a way that conflicts with this code you should speak to your line manager which leads me to this. You mean your line manager would be Chris Wormold presumably.

[00:24:45]But is it right that you say that you just you never told him you never told him about any of the difficulties that you were facing any of the pressure you were facing? In fact, you didn't even tell him that that that that UK SV had had uh had said that Peter Mandlesson was a was a was a person of high concern and that developed vetting be denied.

[00:25:08]>> As I say, whilst I think the department felt under pressure, we were proud of the fact we'd not bowed to that pressure. Therefore, I didn't have a complaint to make to Chris because I was confident that we were handling it well.

[00:25:19]I should say on a lighter note, chair, I think by the time clearance was granted, I'd not yet had my introductory meeting with the cabinet secretary. So, um, these were very early days.

[00:25:29]>> Yeah. And it wouldn't be part of your meeting with him to say, well, we had a few wrinkles, but it doesn't matter. it was sorted out or you know or um we uh UK SV were pushing in one direction but the foreign office have through uh putting conditions on Peter Manson covered that or you wouldn't have been you wouldn't have been attempted to say that to Chris Wormold you wouldn't have been tempted to say that to Morgan Mweeny you wouldn't have been tempted to say that to anyone >> there absolutely not chair because my understanding of custom practice and guidance is that the the decision-making within the box of the vetting process must remain entirely confidential.

[00:26:10]>> But none of if you've put it in any of the ways I've suggested, you would not have been disclosing any of the content of that DV, you would just have been disclosing the fact that it had been passed but that there had been difficulties and surely that does not disclose anything of substance. That's all process.

[00:26:26]>> But I think it would have been chair I think it would have been me um just trying to shift responsibility onto others. It's absolutely clear the permanent under secretary is responsible for the security of the department. You know well from the work of this committee the foreign office is the most attacked government department as attacked as the rest of government put together. That was a heavy responsibility for my tenure as permanent under secretary. If I started sharing that burden with others and saying this was a bit of a tricky one um but but I think we can manage. What I'm doing is I'm offloading that responsibility. the responsibility ultimately was on me and I carried it out rigorously and to the best of my ability.

[00:27:06]>> If you widened the circle or if you made notes or if there had been you more paperwork, then wouldn't those have been disclosable under the Freedom of Information Act? And isn't the only reason that we even know that the that the UK SV had uh had said that developed vetting should be denied is because of the humble address. Otherwise, we would never have known and there would never have been any paperwork and there would never have been an audit trail. There would never have been a trail of decision-making. We would never have known.

[00:27:35]>> Um I think if you're saying to me, excuse me, chair, I think I'm following you, but that the that vetting documents are outside the Freedom of Information Act. That's absolutely true. And and I >> I think it's an incredibly important tenate of how the system works. You you cannot have a system in which the hundreds if not thousands of candidates for vetting think that at some point in the process a line manager's line manager's line manager who they've never met might choose to see their boss and say this was a bit of a tricky one. The UKSV documentation sort of erred against but don't worry I managed your breach of trust because that's not we we we support you completely on this. That's not a problem. The problem is the process. The problem is is that if there had been more paperwork, if you had discussed it with anyone, then it might have come out that there had at least been, to put it as mildly as possible, a wrinkle.

[00:28:31]>> I Excuse me, chair. you're you're a lawyer and I'm not. But my my understanding of the Freedom of Information Act is it's about the you know exemptions if they're available are about the nature of the material not about the type of communication. So I think if I had gone to somebody else talked about a vetting issue and that had been recorded it would have been covered by the same exemptions my point is I should never have done it and I didn't.

[00:28:56]>> Okay. Thank you very much. I'll pass on to Son.

[00:28:59]>> Thank you chair. Um colleagues I think are going to move on to other aspects but I just want to probe a little bit further on one or two of the answers you've already given. Um you've described to us the situation when you arrived in post the extent to which various steps had already been appointed due diligence the approval of the king the obtaining of Agrial. Were you surprised that all of those had been completed without the vetting process having been done?

[00:29:30]Um, thank you sir John. I in in the in the narrow sense I wasn't surprised because I've been following the news. So when I arrived in post I knew perfectly well that the prime minister had made his appointment that it had been announced and of course then in my handover with Philillip um he told me about Agramore and the other steps that you mention. As I look back, whilst the foreign office didn't see it, as I as I understand it at the time, I am also completely unsurprised by Simon Casey's advice to the prime minister of November 2024, um that if he wished to make a political appointment, it would be the safest course to achieve security clearance before making the announcement. And I think had I been in post, Philip will speak for himself, maybe he did, but had I been in post at around that time, that's what I would have advised as well. So you think it should have been obtained before those steps were taken?

[00:30:24]>> I think as as others have said um publicly in the last few days um this is unusual because most people appointed to ambassadorial roles already hold clearance.

[00:30:33]>> Um but that's a very very sensible position to be in and it's what I would have advised in this case too.

[00:30:39]>> Thank you. And you've also >> I should say I mean in the American context John as you may well be aware it's it's a particularly sensitive issue because the United States government is very hot on the clearances people hold and so it would have been a sensible precaution >> and actually had um approval not been granted and therefore uh the position had been revoked after Agri had already been obtained would that have damaged our relations with the United States in your Um I think it certainly would have had I mean I think it would have damaged them.

[00:31:15]Yes, John. I mean the the um you know the the process of getting Agramal was um taken at quite some pace and was delivered I think still technically uh just by one working day by the Biden administration. I think if um the uh the nomination had changed uh after that point, the incoming administration may well have commented on it publicly and it would yes have caused quite a quite an issue in the relationship.

[00:31:46]>> Right.

[00:31:47]>> And the dismissive approach of number 10 uh which you describe in your letter, you say that that uh came from the fact all of these steps had already been taken. Was there anything further uh which indicated to you that number 10 really didn't regard this as anything more than a formality which had to be uh completed?

[00:32:08]>> Um to stay scrupulous John nothing I can bear personal witness to but certainly in my transition into the job I was briefed obviously about the uh the um debate there had been about whether to vet at all um and that all added to a picture.

[00:32:26]>> Thank you. Uh can I also ask a little bit more about the meeting you had on the 29th of J of January uh which resulted in the decision to give uh DV clearance. Um you've said that you were briefed uh about the contents of the report by UKSV but you didn't see it. Um now we understand and indeed the government has published the template decision making form in which there are three boxes at the end. A green one uh an amber one which says approved but remain uh remain valid concerns and the red one the final one clearance denied or withdrawn. Now we are told that the tick was in the red box clearance denied or withdrawn. Now that doesn't seem to me borderline. Were you aware that the tick was in the red box?

[00:33:18]>> Um, I have before the government chose to publish it, I've never seen a form like that. Um, and so if I may make two points to John, I certainly do not recall the way in which the UKSV findings were presented to me as being that definitive. As I say, um, it was brief to me that they were leaning against, I think, is the phrase I remember, >> but leaning leaning against is not the same as the decision. We we are told that the decision the recommendation rather from UKSV was clear. The recommendation was denial. It wasn't leaning. It was denial.

[00:33:58]>> Well, you asked me what I heard in that meeting and I'm I'm trying to remember to the best of my ability. Um the the other the other point which I think in the way you've asked the question you understand perfectly well but just in case that you know that that form is consumed differently in the foreign office and in half a dozen other departments than it is in other parts of the system. Those are recommendations and not decisions. And so what my team will have done, I'm sure, is break that down, go through the specific issues that have led UKSV to their concern and then make an assessment as to whether they can be managed. And that's what came to me.

[00:34:37]>> Your team did that. Um, the meeting you had was only with the director of security. So it would have been his officials who have broken it down and he would have reported to you the outcome of that process.

[00:34:51]>> Right.

[00:34:53]And a note was then circulated afterwards saying what the decision was.

[00:34:58]Did that note simply say it has been decided that Lord Mandlesson is to be granted clearance or did it say despite the recommendation of UK SV it has been decided?

[00:35:11]>> Um I think that that minute is um not a minute I can properly discuss. Sir John, I'm it's no longer sadly my document.

[00:35:20]Um, and as I said in answer to the chair's questions earlier, it's it's a it's a minute that certainly uh would give you the public but also our adversaries quite a strong sense of how we tried to manage that process. But in are you aware that anybody else other than you and the director of security who took that decision were aware outside that the decision went against the recommendation of UK SV?

[00:35:53]Um I so apologies for repeating myself but I I was told that it was borderline and that they were leaning against recommending against. Um I don't remember anybody at any stage saying anything different to me. Um certainly not about red boxes. Um, so I'm sorry. I don't know if that answers your question, but >> I'm afraid it doesn't quite go. My essentially my question is you took a decision in a meeting with just one other person present. Um, was anybody else aware after that meeting that the decision had been to overturn or to uh go against the recommendation of UKSV or was it simply reported we've had a meeting and we've decided that he should obtain clear it?

[00:36:42]>> Um, I'm I'm sure um the director and sorry I did answer the chair earlier. I don't think it was just the director in the meeting with me. I think there was at least one member of his team there.

[00:36:51]I'm sure they will have debriefed. to some extent on the conversation but um uh I don't know precisely what was said.

[00:36:58]>> Did you tell ministers at all or number 10 uh you told them the outcome of the of your decision um the outcome of the meeting but did you tell them about the recommendation made by UK?

[00:37:12]>> No. and and months and months later when in the immediate aftermath of Mandlesson's sacking um we were obviously thinking internally about how to respond to legitimate questions this committee and others had about that process and my recollection is in a in a way I wasn't surprised by the direction from number 10 was um you know we must make clear that these decisions were taken entirely independently of ministers and that they were not consulted other than to be told the outcome.