Debate With Country Catholic on Trinity & Procession - Jay Dyer

Hinzugefügt: 2026-05-05

[00:00:00]Um, so I watched the Tim debate and I don't think Tim's really representing their position well. So I kind of want to see how you're going to move if it's represented the way I think probably Ibaro would represent it. So uh, if you'll give me like 30 seconds, I'll lay out what I think they're saying.

[00:00:23]>> Okay.

[00:00:26]So in Catholic thought the trinity is explained by eternal notional acts in God generation um spiration.

[00:00:34]Each act has an active side and a passive side and each terminates in its proper effect.

[00:00:41]So >> well first of all that I mean that's problematic from the outset >> okay >> because it's not the capidosian teaching it's not constant number one >> the persons are not notions or notional effects or notionally distinct >> yeah for my this seems to be like almost like some type of logical prior it's like a logical framework they use for verbalizing this stuff and it seems to have some type of priority involved in it where like logically you kind of start with this essence that >> of course yeah >> doesn't do these powers but it kind of has the logical capacity to do them. They're always actualized but in their way of explaining the trinity. I guess in their head they're kind of doing the one torch lights another torch which lights another torch type of thing in their head. But um so they that is what they say that >> okay but I asked Tim Gordon uh if the the son has the power of cause because he said the father is the cause and he's giving that power of causing to the son and so if that's what shows equality between the father and the son then what is the spirit's power to cause and it's not a cause passive spiration is not a cause but he actually said it was a cause he made that mistake >> spoke there I don't think he I think he should have, you know, admitted to misspeaking there.

[00:02:10]>> Okay. Well, I mean, you've read the mystige, right?

[00:02:12]>> Yeah.

[00:02:13]>> Okay. So, what in the mystigy in any way lines up with this tomistic idea of notional distinctions with it? It almost sounds like a um it's an appropriation of the Austinian idea of the psychological analogy of the trinity that the father is the mind, the son is the will. uh or the the son is the father is the mind, the son is the speech, and the spirit is the will. But they're trying to appropriate that for uh these relations within a within a glob. So they have this idea that the trinity is this essentialist monad or or god is an essentialist monad and then within this monad there are these relational distinctions. But the best critique of this is when Losi, have you read Losi's uh I can't remember if it's Easter uh mystical theology or the uh the vision of light book?

[00:03:05]>> Uh I've read bits and pieces of mystical theology, but I haven't read the other.

[00:03:09]>> Okay, the other one is necessary because he has a great critique of uh person is relation and that's the that's what this toistic idea is grounded in that persons are the relations between the two or between.

[00:03:23]>> Yeah. So when I was talking with Ibara, he says essentially there's I don't know why they state this principle other than arbitrarily. So maybe you can help me figure out why they say this, but he essentially says all things are equal except where relative opposition, you know, the I just shared the papers that critique relative relations of opposition. It's there's a lawsy paper that critiques it and even Kongar who's a Roman Catholic has a paper saying that this development that Thomas has out of Augustininian ideas is not the Capidosian teaching.

[00:03:58]>> Yeah. Well, I agree with you that it's not the Capidosian teaching, right? But I also don't think this is the view that Tim put forth in the debate to you, right? like he he was trying to clearly but I mean the notion of passive uh you know spiration or beetting has nothing to do with causation.

[00:04:19]>> Okay. But I mean that's a medieval scholastic invention. There's nothing about passive spiration in any of the church fathers to my knowledge. So this is this is something that they've made up to make sense of what it means to have a power to because again if if the spirit lacks this power then what does he have? Well, he has the power of spir, but spiration is what picks him out. How could he have spiration? Oh, well, it's passive. What does that I mean, to me, it's just a nonsense term. Doesn't mean anything.

[00:04:47]>> Well, to me, what they're trying to say there is that like in their mind, the son doesn't beget because his personal property is to be the effect of the generative act of the ess of the father, I guess, because the essence doesn't actually generate according to lattering four. Again, I mean their their position equates a relation with a person. Okay. Aquinus says persona at relatio person is relation. So this is a fundamental blunder because they think person and nature are identical. They don't think they're really distinct. Orthodoxy thinks they're really distinct.

[00:05:26]So they think that if that's if person and nature are actually identical, then what how would we distinguish them? And I don't think they understand hypoatic properties. You're calling them personal properties. But that's why they would go to there's no there there's literally no reason why you would do relations of opposition unless you had a struggle with trying to distinguish the persons.

[00:05:48]Even Augustine when you read on the Trinity, he struggles with how to distinguish them. And he he does in one point admit that yeah, it does seem like the father is the principal cause. But because he's given cause to the son explicitly, he then has to figure out a way. Well, I can't distinguish the persons strictly with cause because that's something that father and son have. So, I need another way to actually distinguish these persons. And he talks about relative opposition. I'm going from here. I think he does, but more specifically, Aquinus builds on it and flushes it out even further. But the problem with relative opposition is that number one, God is equally triad as much as he is monad. He's not there's no diad at all. To have relative opposition requires a diad. This is a critique that's made in God history dialectic volume one. I didn't make this up. It's his critique. But beyond that, and it also gets into Petristic ways of number theory and how they counted counting by division. That's why you you don't have in the in the in the creed it says one and undivided because the petristic means of counting was particularly for the trinity in terms of his nature he's undivided but the persons are divided right how do I get father and son well I divide the father the father is not the son it doesn't mean that you're actually me you're not doesn't mean you're literally dividing them it just means counting by division so persons are counted by division the essence excuse me by identity the essence is counted by division that's why the decreed says one and undivided. Are you familiar with this?

[00:07:20]>> Yeah.

[00:07:20]>> Okay. So, it's >> I'm not trying to go off topic. I'm said there's a reason why I'm saying this.

[00:07:25]And in ambigu, Maximus talks about the petristic way of counting and he talks about monad diad triad. Okay? That's how you count petristically when you're doing like when you're when you're picking out the persons, you have to pick. This was this was the Jake debate when we had to do the LPT. Anyway, those are all separate topics that I mentioned in passing in the debate. But the main issue is that the whole reason why there's a problem is because they think that person and nature are identical in the trinity. They're only notionally distinct. Aquinus says that explicitly.

[00:08:01]Augustine says, >> "No, they wouldn't admit to that in a debate, right?" Like, >> no. No, it's not. It's not controversial.

[00:08:06]>> Oh, so you think if I ask you or nature in person the same thing, he'll tell me, "Yeah."

[00:08:11]>> Yeah. He's he's said that in the past on record.

[00:08:14]>> Aquinus says they're r they're notionally distinct.

[00:08:19]>> Yeah.

[00:08:20]>> So now they want to say okay well how are we really going to distinguish the persons then if person and nature are identical but only from the human vantage point conceptually distinct. How do we distinguish them? It can't be on the basis of relation to origin. That's the orthodox view because that would mean hypoatic properties. Right.

[00:08:39]>> Yeah. Because the son also has the power to cause. So cause can't be the thing that picks out the father because two people have cause. Okay. So how do we distinguish them? Relative opposition, relations of opposition. The father is not the son, not the spirit. The son is not the spirit, not the father, etc. It's stupid because that is a quality that all three share. All three share not being the other two. It's really stupid.

[00:09:04]>> Yeah.

[00:09:05]>> And a person is not a relation. A person is a subject.

[00:09:10]A relation is a predicate. That's Loski's critique of this nonsense.

[00:09:17]>> Okay. And how did did Aquinus just kind of look at Aristotle's, you know, metaphysical categories and go, hm, I think relation is probably the best one I can use here. Or is there some other basis that he was?

[00:09:32]>> I don't think it had anything to do with Aristotle.

[00:09:34]Well, I mean, he's looking at his he's looking at his categories, right? And he's like going, "Relation is the best thing that I can use here at the metaphysical level of the trinity to explain the distinctions, right?"

[00:09:48]>> No, he's pulling from Augustine where Augustine using Greek dialectics consider the possibility of relational opposition from neoplatanism. It's nothing to do with Aristotle. Augustine is pulling from on the Trinity and opposition. Uh, and could you cash these out as distinct through not being the others, which is again not being the others is not a subject. I mean I mean it it doesn't tell you anything. Like you could say, is it true to say Jay is not the chair? Jay is not the bench. Jay is not the shelf. Yeah, those are all true, but they don't tell you who Jay is. They don't tell you. They're just negative qualities that don't identify the subject. That's why the or the Capabidosians say it's the father that is the principal source and origin of the godhead not the essence the father and that's why the creed picks out monarchical trinitarianism says I believe in one god the father above all right >> and that's why his hypothetic property can't be shared with the son so the whole error starts from confusing nature and person thinking that they're only notionally distinct not really distinct and uh granting the hypothetic property of the father to the son because they don't start their trinitarianism.

[00:11:00]They're they're confused and they come up with all these wild and crazy ideas to make this by the way you understand that in some places Aquinus actually says I'm pretty sure I can pull out sum countries and tish he actually says the procession of the holy spirit is from the essence he goes even further it's abu troquay I believe well how does that how does that job with latteran 4 because it's very clear that there's a supreme reality that doesn't beuette doesn't spyate isn't you know it's very clear in ladan that it doesn't do any of those things >> I Again, I think you're looking for uh harmony and consistency amongst situations and confu and confusion.

[00:11:38]I'm serious. I mean, Aquinus contradicts himself because early Aquinus doesn't have any position of the the monarchy of the father and people have written about this. Later Aquinus then seems to correct that and admit, okay, actually no, the father is the beginning point of the godhead. So, how do you make that work? I I mean, they're inconsistent, man.

[00:12:00]Yeah, I guess to me sometimes it sounds like they're trying to say the same things as us. They just >> of course they're humanist scholastic terms that are >> so this by the way this uh if you want to see where Aquinus says this it's in Sumocondrogen Tace book four and it's so he raises the question is the spirit spirated from the divine essence and uh You'll notice in section three he uses the human mind analogy. The Holy Spirit is the love of God. So that he collapses energy and or attribute and person. By the way, you know, they all I mean, the easy way to refute them is, you know, they teach that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the will of God, which is Aryan.

[00:13:13]>> You know, they teach that.

[00:13:15]>> No, I've heard you mention that, but I've never dug very deep in on that that argument. So, >> um All right. Well, I was just kind of curious how it it's interesting because your move seemed to be to cut me off at notional acts and essentially say that's ahistorical for a a Christian viewpoint.

[00:13:35]That that seemed to be your first move when I started speaking. So there there's analogies that are made uh in Tertullian or some of the apologists to find ways to explain the trinity like okay the trinity is like the father's like the mind the son is the the word and the holy spirit's like the will or the breath right >> and what happens is that when Augustine writes on the trinity he he does a lot of speculation and he admits that he says I I'm doing a lot of speculation here and he tries to come up with all these ways to make the trinity rational um cogent. Um he tries to find trinities in nature, little trinities everywhere to try to make the doctrine sensible. He pulls heavily explicitly from uh Plutinus, right? So he goes to the Anids and I can't remember if it's book four or five, but like some of the sections of on the Trinity are literally just copied and pasted sections of Plutinus out of the Aniads, which is wild, too, by the way. Um, so it's a it's a work that's designed to make the best case for the trinity and the most rational case. And one of the things he does is he tries to come up with models of the human analogy or the mind or or distinctions within the mind to make the trinity work too. So when Aquinas and later people pull from this, they're pulling largely from on the trinity when they try to make the case that there's all of these different ways to to make the trinity work. Orthodox Christianity only goes with the Capidoshian Constantinople one model. That's why you see Fodius really really just repeating them. We don't do all these like creative analogies type moves. And that's the that's the only way you could even get this idea of like I mean the trinity like the son is not a notion in the father's mind.

[00:15:29]>> Well I don't think that's what they're I I'm not entirely sure what they mean by a notional act. Well, again, it's what they mean is the so they they try to say like >> you can make an analogy again between um a mind and a word, right? Like like the mind produces the word and because the the Bible in in John 1 use this analogy, right? like they go too far with absolutizing these distinctions. But I mean, excuse me, these analogies, but um >> so you don't think um like I tried moving this way on my brother and it's a trying to catch you a little bit, right?

[00:16:08]But like um what if they ask you a question at first where they're like uh can God's actions go beyond their intended bounds? Something of that nature. And then when you clearly they can't right then they're just going to tell you that the read reason beetting terminates where it does and doesn't cuz one of our charges against them right is like why doesn't the sun or the spirit also beget or spirate.

[00:16:38]um if that's a power of the essence and they they their answer seems to be that like because of relative opposition is there's this movement from the f it's almost like a line there's a movement from the father to the son and that terminates in its proper effect and then because spiration is not at odds with that the way paternity is it continues onwards and then terminates in its proper effect.

[00:17:12]>> Okay. What is the termination of spiration?

[00:17:15]>> The termination of spiration is the person of the spirit in their view.

[00:17:20]>> Okay. Then then how do two people have the power of cause?

[00:17:25]>> Well, the act of spiration moves through the sun. Not and I'm saying this as they would, right? Like not as if the sun were a secondary cause, but because the son receives the divine essence complete, including the notional power to spirate, but he does not originate the power that belongs with the father who's principle without principle, and he exercises it together with him.

[00:17:51]>> Okay. So, is there one cause or two causes in the triad?

[00:17:56]Well, they want to say that because he's exercising the same exact power as the father that there's only one. That's what they want to say. I don't know if that actually works logically, >> but and again to reiterate Fodius's point, does the spirit have that power?

[00:18:14]>> Does the spirit have the uh >> you said that the son has the exact same power as the father according to them?

[00:18:22]>> Does the spirit have that exact same power?

[00:18:24]Yeah. Okay.

[00:18:27]The ones that are kind of cleaved off by what in their mind is a logical necessity between two d between a diad, right? There's an opposition there.

[00:18:39]>> I don't understand what that means.

[00:18:40]Again, if the father has the power to produce a person and that's what it means to be the principal cause and the son also has that power, who is the spirit also then a cause of?

[00:18:55]>> I I don't think they believe he's a cause.

[00:18:58]>> Yes, they do. The the council of lions and Florence say that the father and the son together are a single principle of >> No, no, I don't believe they think the spirit is a cause of a divine person.

[00:19:08]>> I know that they don't. That's what I'm asking is if >> the power of the father is to cause the son and that's what it means to be a cause and the son has the same power then why does the spirit lack that?

[00:19:22]>> Well, the spirit lacks that because there's two notional powers in their logical scheme and essentially because God's actions terminate and in their proper effects and are properly actualized from eternity. They think that essentially there's like this logical movement within the trinity and in each step you lose portions, right?

[00:19:48]You begin with paternity.

[00:19:49]>> I mean that that right there should tell you that like this is nonsense. You lose portions of this power as you move through the trinity. That's insane. Like >> well that well like relative opposition bars those from continuing onward in their logical movement, right? Like >> I I mean how does that even follow?

[00:20:08]Relative opposition is just a way to try to distinguish something from being not the other two.

[00:20:13]>> How how does it follow from that that there's this diminishing power of causing as it moves through the trinity?

[00:20:18]It's just >> well like it's not possible for my son to be me, right? Like I beget my son, but it's not possible for him to be me the begetter, right? But >> the question is not does he produce you?

[00:20:30]The question is does he have the power to produce?

[00:20:35]By the way, is a person a notional power or a subject? This just this is just insane. Like all this is just like gibberish. Total gibberish nonsense. I don't even know why anyone would find this convincing.

[00:20:46]>> I do think it's odd to metaphysically reduce a person to a a relation rather than having its own.

[00:20:52]>> It's not just odd, it's like it makes no sense. The word the word person is a subject. A relation is a predicate. So grammar should tell you that that doesn't make any sense.

[00:21:03]I'm serious. Go read I appreciate your questions, but if you read Losi, he just says it's not it's not even grammatically correct.