Will Trump 'blink first' and end the war? | ABC News Daily podcast

Added: 2026-05-05

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[00:00:12]>> One of Australia's most baffling missing persons cases. [music] >> In 2007, four people vanished.

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[00:00:48]Donald Trump went into the war with Iran thinking it would [music] be over quickly. Now, more than 7 weeks later, with a ceasefire about to end, [music] there's still no obvious off ramp.

[00:01:02]With uncertainty surrounding a second round of peace talks in Pakistan.

[00:01:06]Today, a former Iran negotiator in the Trump administration, Nate [music] Swanson, on what the US president needs to do to end the war and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

[00:01:18]I'm Sam Holly on Gadigal land in Sydney.

[00:01:21]This is ABC News Daily.

[00:01:25]>> [music] [music] >> Nate, we first spoke to you at the start of the war in Iran on day one. That was more than 50 days ago now. So, has it been going as you would have predicted?

[00:01:46]Uh in some respects, yes, but in most respects, no. I mean, I think it was not totally surprising that Iran escalated so quickly based on the scope and size of the initial US and Israeli attack.

[00:01:58]But never I think would I have ever have guessed that it would go this long and that it would be still so messy 50 days in without a clear idea of how exactly this ends and and and and really still even at this point what the objective is.

[00:02:13]>> Now, up until July last year, you were on Trump's Iran negotiating team.

[00:02:19]So, just tell me back then, were you articulating what the risks of going into this war would be? And was he listening? Well, I'm a career civil servant across multiple administrations and as you noted with the Iran team at the end. I do not have a personal relationship with President Trump by any measure. Never briefed him unlike other presidents. But to his team, you know, when I was still there, I think they were genuinely interested in diplomacy.

[00:02:48]But obviously there was a willingness to to use force that was kind of unique from other administrations. You know, I think in his first term, you know, he did the strike that killed Qassem Soleimani. And then, you know, before I left, there was the midnight hammer operation that you know, we did in connection with the Israelis. So, I mean, Trump was clearly more comfortable using force than than other US presidents.

[00:03:09]>> Mhm. And I think yeah, he didn't really fully understand >> [sighs and gasps] >> the risks associated and and how a conflict could go bad so quickly. And so, that is kind of unique to the president and I think you know, he has a very very small inner circle and I think they're all fairly confident this would be easy, which was a mistake.

[00:03:28]>> [music] >> Yeah. All right. Well, a two-week ceasefire has been in place, but the Strait of Hormuz has been an ongoing problem. And I mean, events have hardly been peaceful, have they? With the US attacking an Iranian cargo ship.

[00:03:46]A nighttime mission in the Arabian Sea.

[00:03:49]US Marines boarding an Iranian flagged cargo ship after its engine room was fired upon. Vacate your engine room.

[00:03:56]We're prepared to subject you to disabling fire.

[00:04:00]Did you predict any of this in relation to the Strait of Hormuz that has become such a massive problem for the entire world? Yes [clears throat] and no. I mean, I thought this Iran would would lash out at the Gulf and try to shut down the Strait. I think what surprised me was really at the first outset is that Iran was able to get, you know, their own exports out for really up until the last two weeks, you know. So, for the first 6 weeks of the war, they basically kept, you know, traffic for from the Gulf out, but you know, their own exports of oil to China were still basically happening. So, I think to me that was quite shocking and it was quite significant. And I think also, you know, the Strait has always been this theoretical threat that, you know, the US and others have been worried about, but it was never a practical reality.

[00:04:47]And Iran made it a reality, you know, in almost instantly in the first, you know, 24 to 48 hours. And I think it's really proving to be in many ways much more effective than any of their other means of deterrence.

[00:05:01]It's quite [clears throat] a bit more effective than the proxies. It's quite a bit more effective than their nuclear program. And really even their missile program to some extent. So, I mean, it's really been a you know, a huge boon for Iran to be able to utilize this this power, this new power in ways that are really quite unforeseen and quite effective. So, I think it's going to have long-lasting implications, unfortunately.

[00:05:22]>> [music] >> And because of that Strait of Hormuz and Iran's seemingly upper hand in it, it considers that it's winning this war.

[00:05:34]Yeah, I think there are certainly quite a few within the Iranian administration who believe they're winning the war. And I think there's definitely some merit to it, right? I mean, it's different than US or a Western definition of winning, right? They don't need to defeat the US or defeat Israel militarily. They just need to survive. And they're fighting an asymmetric war. So, every day that goes on that the Iranian regime holds, that the, you know, Islamic Republic is still the face of the country, then, you know, that that's victory. And so, they've they've done that and they've they've shown that you know, that that there's no immediate fall coming and and in some ways they're stronger than they were. So, yeah, I think that defines them in victory and I think they also are you know, emboldened by the Strait as this new security guarantee that they really have lacked since Hezbollah was, you know, so thoroughly defeated in in 2024. So, it it's a new thing and I and you can understand why Iran feels that way. But at the same time, they have been pummeled militarily. I don't think there's any point denying that, you know, I mean, I don't can't remember what the total number of strikes between US and Israel were. But you know, it's like well over I think 15 or 25,000 strikes. I mean, so it is, you know, this long-lasting damage that Iran has suffered. But you know, kind of paradoxically, they've >> [snorts] >> been hit so hard militarily, been pummeled militarily, but they've like reestablished deterrence. So, you can understand why some in Iran feel like they've they've won so far. Mhm. All right. Well, Donald Trump, of course, Nate, has been acting erratically. He keeps switching from saying a deal is possible, negotiations are underway, to then saying he's going to blow up every bridge and power plant in Iran. And now, of course, again, there's these conflicting messages about this latest round of peace talks in Pakistan. What do you make of all of that? Well, the president is unique. I can't say that that this is typical US president behavior in terms of how they act. You know, the implications of it on Iran are unclear. I think they they don't know how to react to this. I think they ultimately feel though that it's a sign of weakness on the US side. You know, if you take the day that he threatened to wipe out, you know, a civilization.

[00:07:50]That very same day then, you know, Iran basically didn't change their position and the president announced a peace deal by the end of the day.

[00:07:59]So, from their perspective, you know, they did nothing. Trump basically folded and basically agreed to Iran's framework for talks. It reinforces their own their own strategy. And so, you know, and and that's to their advantage, I think.

[00:08:12]Yeah, and Iran says it doesn't trust Trump. It sees these peace talks, it's reported, as a way to make it surrender.

[00:08:21]And the two sides, they're so far apart, right? When it comes to a lasting peace deal and the conditions of that. Yeah, no, absolutely. I think Iran's not going to surrender or capitulate. I mean, that that much has been made clear through the history of US-Iran relations, but really even just this, you know, 18 months or so of Trump's administration.

[00:08:40]You know, the entire premise has been that, you know, the US is the dominant military power, has all the leverage, Iran's capitulate, and they haven't. And they didn't before the war, they haven't during the war, and they're not going to at the the peace talks now. And so, I don't think you're going to ever see in in the near future Iran, you know, negotiating a way that Islamic Republic. But I don't think that's what these talks in Islamabad are about. I think it's a much [clears throat] much narrower scope. And I do think it is in the interest of both parties to to end the war, to deescalate, and maybe find some, you know, mutual ground here. So, I think that is possible, but, you know, it's not going to change who Iran is.

[00:09:17]Mhm. Well, just on a side note, Nate, and interestingly, Trump had said that J.D. Vance wouldn't be attending these talks in Pakistan, but then Iran seemed to demand that he had to be there or they wouldn't be there. What do you make of this role that J.D. Vance is playing at the moment? Well, well, two things on that. So, the first is just there's a lot of posturing going on on both sides.

[00:09:40]Oh, will they be there, won't they be there? And I think that's mostly noise.

[00:09:44]For the most part, it's just trying to get the strongest position going into talks. For J.D. Vance's role, I think Iran doesn't trust, you know, Witt Coffin Witt Coffin particular, but Witt Coffin Kushner in in tandem. You know, that twice now Iran has been negotiated with Wycoff and a war started or attacks started. So, for them I think they perceive Vance to be uh less supportive of this war, which I think, you know, I think it's probably accurate and that has a lot of US media reporting that and more motivated to end this cuz this does not fit with the ideology that he has espoused, which is kind of an America first, no, you know, silly wars abroad. So, I do think J.D. Vance is uniquely positioned within the administration to want this to end. I think Iran recognizes that and I think it's also a reflection that [music] they just don't trust uh Wycoff anymore.

[00:10:38]>> [music] >> Well, Knight, [music] what's your assessment? Do both parties want an off-ramp >> [music] >> at this point and is there actually an off-ramp that can be offered up?

[00:10:55]>> Yeah, I mean, my baseline assessment is that it is in the interest of both parties to end this war and so I think they should be able to figure it out.

[00:11:04]There are a couple options for that.

[00:11:06][music] You know, I think Iran's perspective, I think they care about three things. I think they care about not getting attacked every 6 months or so and I think by establishing the Strait of Hormuz as a, you know, a deterrent, as a security guarantee, I think they've actually ensured that outcome. So, I think that was really important. I think second, Iran wants to monetize the Strait of Hormuz and I think the third thing that they just kind of in the last few weeks decided they care about is Lebanon. So, they've basically made those their three key demands.

[00:11:33]>> [music] >> And the US, I think our primary goal, which is to open up the Strait of Hormuz. And so, you know, of course, the Strait was open at the beginning of the war, so that's, you know, kind of makes you question what the objectives were, but I do think that is our top objective now.

[00:11:50]Now, that is a political problem for the president. If the only thing you achieve out of a war for 50 days is cause a major crisis for the global economy is to say, "Hey, we ended the war in basically the same spot we started." So, I think as a result of that, he wants something different that he can that can help him create this narrative that he's accomplished something. So, part of that is, you know, degrading Iran's military, but now I think he's trying to achieve something on the nuclear fronts. He wants a suspension of Iran's enrichment program and he wants to deal with the highly enriched uranium that's in Iran.

[00:12:22]So, I think Iran's preference would probably be to not deal with the nuclear program, but I think they're open to dealing with it if they can get more in return.

[00:12:30]And so, I think this is where you see the haggling over the frozen assets, potential sanctions relief, things of that sort. So, I do think there is a landing zone ultimately for this, but for me, the president should be judged not on necessarily what he gets, but, you know, hopefully I'm not I'm not overpaying. You know, if we end up with a situation where Iran has basically a toll booth running through the Strait of Hormuz, that's a huge strategic loss for the US and for the world. So, I think, you know, >> [music] >> we we really don't want that to happen and so that, you know, I think he should be careful about what he's trading away to make sure it looks different. But time is running out for really for both sides. Like neither side can do this indefinitely >> [music] >> and so I think Iran's calculus is that he'll blink first, but but you never know.

[00:13:17]So, just tell me, Knight, do you think that we could actually be close to the end of this war or is there a chance that it could still escalate? I mean, Donald Trump has never ruled out sending troops in. I think both are possibilities. The problem with sending troops in is it really doesn't change the mil- I mean, it's problematic on multiple levels, but the biggest problem is it doesn't really change Iran's calculus. Iran will just respond in kind by, you know, hitting Gulf energy, you know, hitting more tankers in the Strait or in the in the Persian Gulf. So, like that doesn't really change anything.

[00:13:48]There's no military objective.

[00:13:50]The only thing that really changes Iran's calculus is massive ground troops, you know, like Iraq 2003.

[00:13:59]But that's incredibly unwise and I don't think the president will do that.

[00:14:05]Now, look, are we going to have a deal by Wednesday evening in in Islamabad?

[00:14:11]I I'm skeptical. I think there's still, you know, it seems like there's still pretty significant differences and and gaps, but I think do think you could have something close to a framework and if needed a uh extension on the ceasefire as well as shaky and rocky as that ceasefire is.

[00:14:30]Knight Swansen is a former Iran negotiator in the Trump administration and a former director for Iran at the National [music] Security Council during the Biden presidency. He is now a resident senior fellow and director [music] of the Iran Strategy Project at the Atlantic Council.

[00:14:49]This episode was produced by Sydney [music] Peed. Audio production by Sam Dunn. Our supervising producer [music] is David Kogan.

[00:14:58]I'm Sam Holly. Thanks for listening.

[00:15:02]>> [music]