TRUMP ACCUSES IRAN OF JEOPARDISING PEACE DEAL | w/ Prof David Gibbs

[00:00:00]to see you. Good to see you, uh, David.

[00:00:02]Good to see you, everybody. Welcome to the Global Gambit. And this is a a late afternoon stream. We're joined here by Professor David Gibbs, a returning guest to the program to look at what seems to be a very contradictory, perhaps deliberately so, or in my opinion, just because, well, there is no consistency here.

[00:00:26]Do we have a deal or do we not have a deal? That's the That's the question today after Donald Trump yesterday called off his air strikes, the intended third day of, you know, pressure campaign as some people call it. Um, now stating just few hours later that the deal is imminent. uh signs or suggestions reports that the Pakistanis were reactivating a few memes I saw on X regarding that sort of the the Pakistanis reactivate their peace efforts and that the Iranians will be visiting Karachi Islamabad and so on to uh to get this deal over the line but in the subsequent hours just literally the past two three hours as I've been following this the uh the Trump administration is now uh accusing the Iranian ions of leaking uh the supposed details of this deal which again just to remind everybody this is aou it is a memorandum of understanding which means it has no legally binding substance it is a hey we agree to do some stuff we've just formalized about agreeing to do that stuff instead of just talking about it through tweets and threads um but there's my rather sort of uh ad hoc opening there David what's your assessment of the latest and of course what we've seen over the past week or few days uh that have led up to this moment.

[00:01:51]>> I I think what you're seeing is that Trump may be recognizing that he has no choice but to capitulate. This would mostly be settled if it's settled at all. It's going to be settled in Iranian terms. That's my guess. Iran does hold the upper hand here. I think partly because they're willing to endure more punishment than the United States. They see this rightly as an existential issue for them in terms of the existence of their form of government, the Islamic Republic and also possibly the Iranian state, the possibility the Iranian state could be broken up. There's been some talk about that as a possibility. And so from their standpoint, they're fighting for their lives and they're willing to go all the way as far as they have to go to protect themselves. Um, and so I I think they're the ones who are going to make the the most strenuous demands here.

[00:02:39]Uh and again assuming there is any kind of agreement um you know we're talking about an MOU as you noted this is a preliminary agreement in other words the agreement before the agreement um and there's a whole series of incidents where the United States under Trump and previous presidents have broken agreements. The United States has always seen it its right to break agreements. There are all sorts of um international laws the United States has signed the United States violates on a regular basis. Uh Trump of course has been famous for that but previous presidents have pretty much done the same thing. Um problem the Iranians face is that there has to be even to settle a war there has to be some minimal trust with the other party that when you sign an agreement they will honor the agreement and the Iranians have very little basis for that kind of trust even that minimal trust given America's record that the United States and Israel have undertaken two wars both undertaken in the context of negotiations um you know the Last one of course involved the decapitation of Iran's leadership, the killing of Iran's top leaders. Uh from the Iranian standpoint, um they would have no reason uh to take seriously anything the United States says. Um and so they may well have concluded that they're going to settle this on the battlefield and that any agreement would only be temporary because that's how it's been in the past. You know, I'm not saying this with any sympathy for the Islamic Republic because I have no sympathy for the Islamic Republic. I'm just say looking at it from their point of view. And from their point of view, I think that's how they would see it. Um, so the question would be, would Trump be willing to make, you know, to settle the war on terms that are likely to be very humiliating for him and be perceived as a feat defeat for the United States because that really is the only way this war is going to end, if it ends at all.

[00:04:35]>> Yeah. I mean, look, I I appreciate you being measured in that because I think some people hear you being crit, not you, but one being critical of one side and then they're like, "Oh, okay. So, you fully support the other side."

[00:04:47]There's a there's a deliberate intention to make things very binary in geopolitics, which I find very lazy and and intellectually dishonest. But in this regard, you know, I the Islamic Republic is one of the most deplorable uh regime systems in modern history. um and the way that they treat their own people is uh is beyond reprehensible.

[00:05:12]But we cannot deny that at least in this specific context, the imp the the inconsistency, the unpredictability, the the the seeming unwillingness of Trump to pick a lane if you like and stick with it is um is is is the real problem here. So to me, uh, you know, what what do you think is going on in Trump's head in in this case? What is he just he can't make up his mind? He doesn't want to commit because he feels it's still going to be seen as a loss, or is it he he literally is just out of his depth?

[00:05:49]>> Well, he clearly is out of his depth. I don't think he really has any appreciation for foreign policy. doesn't really have the stamina or the ability to really think strategically. Uh he's he's very impulsive. It does seem to me like he's he's he's the phrase between a rock and a hard place in the sense that he got into this war expecting a quick victory. The Israelis assured him that they'll be able to decapitate the Iranian leadership and they would do that successfully and the regime would crumble and you'd have an easy victory.

[00:06:20]It'd be just like Venezuela for him.

[00:06:22]Another win, an easy win. And Trump believed that against the advice of his own intelligence services. The first part of that of course worked. The Israelis did decapitate the leadership.

[00:06:31]But the Iranians evidently were far more capable than he realized and they planned for that kind of decapitation and they're able to survive that decapitation. And now he's faced with the fact that on the one hand um he can't win this war and and if he stays in it much longer, it's going to cause a major economic downturn. I think there's a good chance it's going to do that anyway. Even if we end today, it may do that. But there's a much greater economic risk if it continues the war.

[00:06:58]Uh possibly a very severe economic downturn. Who knows? Maybe something like the 1930s even. He has to be aware of that danger. And so I think he's eager to get out on that account. On the other hand, any exit he makes from this war will have to be considered a defeat for him because the whole idea is he was going to go to war and change the government in Iran and Iran is going to emerge from this war by almost any standard more powerful than before because it will always have the possibility of closing the straight of Hormuz that Pandora's box has been opened and once you open Pandora's box you can't close it again. And so he he's facing the prospect of either economic catastrophe with no prospect of of success, military success, or acknowledging military defeat and humiliation, including personal humiliation. Those are his choices. If I were him, I would choose the latter because that's a safer option, the less destructive option, including less destructive from his point of view. Um, but it's a very bad option. There are no good options from his standpoint. And so I think those are the set of choices he's facing. and we will see what he does.

[00:08:10]Sorry, I can't hear you, Peter. I think there's some problem at your end.

[00:08:14]>> Yeah, I'm on mute. I I put myself on mute sometimes because there's a little bit of noise, but no, I mean, what I'm simply saying is how many times can we go round and round in this memory go round? Uh it just seems to me will the Iranians at one point just get fed up and be like, look, we're done. I mean part of the reason that this whole uh escalation happened the this uh violence occurred was because they made it very clear that Lebanon is a red line for them. Now the discussions over the um over the hormuz and the nuclear enrichment is is just that they are the terms that will be discussed later on from theou but Lebanon is not something that's ever really been up for discussion and as far as I can tell is an absolute uh predeterminant for any progress to be made. Um what do what's your thoughts on that? Do you think that well actually I'll just annunciate uh expand on that just simply by saying that the Iranians for the first time really acted on behalf of a third party which is a complete shift away from their standard policy. I think this was a piece treaty of the Quincy Institute wrote um who we have on the show quite often he made in a separate piece which sort of expanded what I was thinking already. Um so I don't know take me take me through your thoughts on that element. Well, I one thing about Iran is that they're very repressive internally.

[00:09:32]That's true. But they've never really shown that much inclination towards military aggression.

[00:09:38]Um and so what I see is that Hezbollah is their forward line of defense. That's how they regard Hezbollah. And um you're right, they haven't uh at this point brought as a condition for ending the war um a third party in which is Israel's conduct in Lebanon. They hadn't made that a condition previously. I think what it reflects is Iran is showing greater confidence. They're much more confident their position than they were before and so they're making strenuous demands including demands not only with regard to them but also with regard to their ally Hezbollah and with regard to the sovereignty of Lebanon.

[00:10:11]And um no doubt they're presenting themselves I think with some success.

[00:10:15]And the first place is Goliath against David. And no matter what you may think of the Islamic Republic, there's always a human tendency to give some small cheer to David in this situation. Excuse me. They're David. I said they were Goliath. The United States is Goliath clearly and they're David. And uh there's no doubt about that. And uh that's how it looks to the public worldwide, including people who don't like them. And so I I think basically they're they're playing on that fact.

[00:10:41]They're on the verge of defeating Goliath. And so um they um are willing to basically go further than they have before in terms of one condition now is Israel cease its military activity in Lebanon. One big question here is can the United States restrain Israel? Is it willing to restrain Israel first of all?

[00:11:00]And second of all, even if it's willing, is it able to do so? Um, you know, that that could be a deal killer from the standpoint of the Iranians, and that could be a major impediment to settling this war.

[00:11:12]Yeah, it's well, let's be honest, the the the trigger and and what's I find interesting, David, is that regardless of who you're speaking to, we try to be diversified in in in who we in in interview or engage on on the platform.

[00:11:27]And I've spoken to everyone from Americans to British to Iranians to whatever everything. But it seems to me it's difficult to find pro-Israeli voices willing to be challenged. Now don't get me wrong, that's not a critique of the entire state. It's not a critique of everybody who is sort of sympathetic to Israel's position, but I just find it difficult for them to be willing to talk about it. There seems to be a slight reluctance like because they don't there is a recognition to your point that some people have a a sympathy for the the David character or Iran in this case. But um yeah, all of this largely comes down to the ultra nationalist government's desires to conduct military operations in Lebanon, which is a red line for the Iranians and that trickles down to launching, you know, exchanges with the Americans, etc., etc. So, how does one re in the Israeli government or Netanyahu specifically?

[00:12:22]>> Well, there's the US has definitely leverage and the leverage is financial support. All right. Political support and military support which the United States has been giving to Israel on a pretty massive scale since the early 1970s. It began under Nixon where the United States would on a permanent basis give Israel substantial subsidies to the tune of several billion dollars a year and more in times of emergency like in the recent war um and other types of support as well such as supporting the security council of the UN etc. So the US definitely has some leverage over Israel. Israel would not be able to conduct itself with the degree of aggress aggressiveness and expensiveness if they did not have the United States backstopping them. If we're on its own, it would not act the way it's acting.

[00:13:08]And so what the United States could do is it could simply condition US support on Israel acting differently and for example withdrawing from Lebanon or at least ceasing any further move in Lebanon. They could do that. A better move in my view is simply cutting them off from military support and economic support and treating them at arms length like any other country. That's another option. Um, as everyone knows, Israel has a lot of influence in the United States. Part of it is indeed the Israel lobby described accurately I would say in the book the Israel lobby Shimemer and Walt distinguished academics. I think it's deeper than that. that I've said in other programs, as I would see it, US foreign policy establishment, especially the element of it known as the neoconservatives, have long seen Israel as a model of what America should be like. And they see Israel as showing the way for how America should conduct itself in foreign affairs. This gives Israel this ideological admiration for Israel, gives Israel enormous prestige in Washington, in power circles, and I think that's a big source of Israel's influence as well. uh you have almost the melding of Israel and the United States at the ideological level through neoonservatism and whatever the cause um there's no doubt Israel does have a lot of influence over American foreign policy and this is >> this is declining because public support for Israel is declining public opinion polls are very clear on this it's declining not only among Democrats but among Republicans very striking decline by the way been among evangelical Christians long a rockhard base of support for Israel and very large in the US population. The US is a very religious country and evangelicalism is very influential and until now it has been rock solid in its support for Israel and that that rock solid character is cracking and younger evangelicals are not so supportive of Israel anymore. Um I think part of it is very simple. Everybody, including the evangelicals, can see the videos of civilians being killed by the Israelis uh all over the Middle East, particularly in Gaza. And I I I think that is having an impact. Um it's having an impact on Israel support, which is in decline. Uh Israel is in Israel is down, but not out. And uh they still have considerable influence in Washington.

[00:15:28]And Trump evidently has up till now not been willing to cross them. I do wonder if the point is being reached though where Israel's ability to dictate policy to influence policy to the extent that it has is waning and I I think the day may be approaching where the US is going to simply distance itself from Israel and Israel will be forced by circumstance to act differently.

[00:15:49]>> Really? So you think we're reaching the point of legitimate rupture in the Israeli American relationship?

[00:15:58]>> Well, I try and avoid wishful thinking.

[00:16:00]I used to believe in it. I find it didn't work very well. So I I I tried to swear off wishful thinking and I could be expressing wishful thinking here. Um I think the wishful thinking aside, I think that we're definitely seeing some evidence of that happening. Um and I think it's it's it's happening before our eyes and it's going to be very difficult increasingly for both parties to fully defy their voting bases. I mean you have elites and then you have masses. We do have elections in America.

[00:16:26]We still have those things. We still have open discussion to some extent. we have the first amendment that protects somewhat open discussion. Um I think more than in Europe, I'm happy to say.

[00:16:36]Um but um uh and that basically means at some point uh it may be more and more difficult for the Israelis to to sustain this kind of American backing. One of the reasons the Israeli lobby has been so influential is the public has supported Israel strongly. The public opinion poll showed that over decades. A part of that of course is the effectiveness of maybe one might say pro-Israel propaganda depending on your point of view. Um but um whatever the reason it's waning and what it it's waning to this extent. Um I I think it will have an effect on policy.

[00:17:12]>> So the latest I'm seeing here is that the Trump administration is uh is sething or Trump is seething uh what he considers to be a uh what's the word? a um a violation uh of the of the talks. Um he's accused the the Iranians of simply saying um oh wait actually no we've got an update now the Iranian foreign minister says an agreement with the US has never been closer uh is that coded interesting so we're seeing Iranian foreign minister the Islamabedu has never been closer pending its finalization the media should refrain from oh this comes directly from Aragoti in the past half an hour so um yeah the Islamabad memorandum. Oh, this is a positive sign everybody. This is quite a big Let me let me bring this up so that we can all read it. Yeah. So, the Islamabad memorandum of understanding has never been closer pending its finalization. Interesting.

[00:18:11]He uses the American zed kid getting below. The media should refrain from entering speculation about its content.

[00:18:18]In line with our responsibility and transparent approach, all details will be shared with the public in due course.

[00:18:23]Interesting. So, Trump doesn't want that um for some reason. Clearly, clearly I mean I'm I'll just sort of share my reaction to that, David, and then obviously you can get your yours in as well, but that seems to me like Trump really doesn't want to share the details too much because it's pretty damning for the United States. Would you >> Yeah. Yeah. That's that's not um that's not a favorable condition for the for the Americans. So So So what's the tactic here then? The Iranians have always been intending to to to follow through with this deal and they're just playing hard ball even in the final moments.

[00:19:00]>> I'm sure they're playing hard ball. They have every reason to play hard ball because I believe do believe they have the upper hand. Um and um they probably will want to nail down as many things as concretely as possible again because there's a strong presumption on their part the United States would do everything they can to walk away from the deal and they're going to try and make it as hard for the US to do that as possible.

[00:19:22]And um I think Iran would be okay with the idea of the agreement not going through and simply continuing on the battlefield because I think in the end they have every reason to expect they will prevail on the battlefield. United States will crack before they crack. Um and so I don't think they'll take any deal that isn't very favorable to them.

[00:19:42]And the fact that Trump seems so reluctant to share it publicly at least so far I I think underscores that it's likely to be very unfavorable from his standpoint. I mean, let's face it. The United States went into this war expecting that we were going to get what is it? Unconditional surrender. He said he wanted unconditional surrender from the Iranians. Doesn't sound like he's going to get that, does it?

[00:20:02]>> Well, no. He actually wanted regime change, right? That that that's >> he wanted regime change. At one point he talked about destroying what is it?

[00:20:09]Iranian civilization. Charming wayization in Asia, much like happening in Europe.

[00:20:17]>> That's right. And so he um so he's made all sorts of extravagant claims about his intentions and there's no doubt at a minimum the United States wanted regime change at a minimum as did Israel and um at a maximum perhaps um I don't know killing everybody in Iran certainly talked that way. Um whatever the case he's not going to get anything like a military victory here. is going to get something much closer to a military defeat um or at the very least a a settlement that'll favor Iran to a significant extent.

[00:20:50]Now, the obvious question is the nuclear issue and to what extent Iran is willing to compromise on that. I'm I'm very surprised that Iran is even willing to discuss the nuclear issue at this point because from their standpoint, I would have expected they would have made every effort to simply acquire a deployable nuclear weapon as their only real option to defend themselves. Let me say I think that would be a disaster for world security and I most definitely don't favor that option. But I'm saying from their point of view, I would have expected them to do that by now, just given they've been attacked multiple times by Israel and the United States. And they may reasonably conclude that the only way they can defend themselves is to acquire deployable nuclear weapons and delivery systems as North Korea has done. Um, and um, so I I'm surprised that they seem to show some flexibility on that issue. We'll see how far they go with it. Um, that could very well be a sticking point because I it could be that Iran has already made a decision. They're going to go for a nuclear weapon and they're simply not going to accept any restrictions on their acquisition of nuclear technology or nuclear material and that this may be a real problem to a final agreement with the United States.

[00:22:02]I don't know. Um, uh, we'll see. I suppose the fact that they're even willing to keep that open as an issue surprises me.

[00:22:11]>> Yeah. So Lindsey Graham said in the past hour as well that the so-called deal he's very h glad to hear that the so-called deal is fake because the deal as described by Iran would be awful.

[00:22:22]President Trump and our military deserve a lot of credit for making Iran the weakest they've been since 1979 through a combination of highly effective military strikes and a crushing blockade. However, we must remember the Iranian regime has killed 42,000 of their own people and their leadership are radical religious Nazis.

[00:22:40]Uh, as to any potential deal, it must be compared to the JCPOA. I'm hopeful that it would be vastly different. The idea of a 300 billion reconstruction fund, given who is in charge of Iran, seems to be tonedeath.

[00:22:52]It would be akin to the Marshall Plan for Germany with the Nazis still in charge. Um, goodness me Lindsey Graham's really even more even more hellbent on sort of absolute war um and destruction than he has been in the past several years, I think, at this point. um how he can seem to sort of think that the US has leverage in this I I don't really understand. Um I don't know what do you make of these people when they >> um when they when third party individuals like do they have information that we're not privy to or it's literally just bluster and trying to jeopardize it from the outside sort of thing. I >> I think Lindsey Graham is just engaging in wishful thinking. I think so much of what the United States is doing has been doing has been based on just on wishful thinking that the idea is we've decimated Iran's military, we destroyed their air force, destroyed their navy.

[00:23:44]Um I think what this obscures is that Iran clearly what they've invested in is missile technology. Most of which is underground and most of which not all of it but most of which has remained intact. Uh that's indeed what US intelligence has shown. And so destroying their tiny navy and I don't even think we've done that. they still have these speedboats they can use or submarines that are under um you know that are highly protected. So I I I think a lot of this is just wishful thinking and not realizing that Iran is fighting a different kind of war from what we're used to and that uh their missile systems are quite formidable far more than we expected. Uh and there's really nothing we can do about it by all indications and um you know I think Linds I can give you a bit more information David if that's cool. Um, no. According to CNN, so this is citing a UN US official. New dates have emerged about this MOU uh following Iran's release of their version of the deal. I mean, we've been here before, right?

[00:24:41]Correct me if I'm wrong, but we've been here before like in early May, a month ago, six weeks ago, when there was a a a suggested outline of the when theou first beganing to began to be developing uh speed and we could actually have some kind of substance to what it would be filled out with. Now we've gone back and forth over with the details ever since, right? But like it seems like we're in this deja vu yet again where there where details of theou um are being disputed. Uh but anyway, but per the US official, the deal includes an Iranian commitment not to fund terror groups abroad, the destruction and removal of the enriched uranium, the dismantling of Iran's wider nuclear program, the reopening of the strius, and the release of frozen U Iranian assets and funds contingent on their compliance with the deal.

[00:25:31]>> I'd be very surprised on a number if Iran agreed to a number of those things in particular. First of all, the uh nuclear um demands again It would the NRI's interest as they see it to have access to the poss at least the possibility of nuclear weapons for self-defense. Again, I don't by any means endorse that. I'm just saying I would guess that's probably how they would see it. More importantly, I think the straight of Hormuz that really is their real nuclear weapon. That is is their main source of influence is the straight of Hormuz. I think what they would like to do is keep control of the straight of her for an extended period of time, several years perhaps, to raise funds to reconstruct their country uh from the damage that has been done by the two wars. They're not going to get reparations from the United States.

[00:26:18]That's as far as I could tell an impossibility. But short of reparations, of course, they can have their famous toll booth in the Persian Gulf and they can raise funds that way. That's also just a source of influence for them to let the United States know that they're not to be trifled with. I'd be very surprised if they give that up under any circumstances. Not anytime soon. And from their standpoint, again, I I I I think you can make a strong case that they're entitled to that based upon the need for reconstruction for reconstruction funds. Um the nuclear issue is again I I I certainly pray and hope that they will not get nuclear weapons because that would be very bad for world security. But again, from their standpoint, it would not surprise me if that is where they're going with this.

[00:27:00]>> Well, I I've got a question on on the nuclear element, David, but do you mind if we indulge in watching a 45se secondond clip of how many times Donald Trump has said a deal is close? Cuz I think this is beautiful.

[00:27:13]>> We were very close to a deal.

[00:27:15]>> I think it's close to over. Yeah. I I mean, I view it as very close to over.

[00:27:18]>> It's looking very good that we're going to make a deal with Iran and it's going to be a good deal. This process should go very quickly. We're going to end that war very quickly. They want to make a deal so badly. We think we're close to a deal and that's okay.

[00:27:31]>> We're in the final throws of what will be a very very good deal.

[00:27:36]>> Today makes 39 times.

[00:27:39]>> So CNN reporting there that it's 39 times. I had it written down somewhere.

[00:27:43]I think it was I think I had about 26 times that I've been going through, but I have a life and I wasn't going to go through every piece of media to find it the word deal when he said it. But wow.

[00:27:54]39 times. Um it just >> Can I just Can I just interject something? I I I always thought I mean this sincerely that one of the main sources of Trump's appeal has been he's very funny. Um and um you have to admit when you hear him say again and again that we're close to a deal. We're close to a deal. There's a certain almost maybe unintended humor in it that's entertaining at a certain level. Um the problem with it of course is this is serious business here. Uh very serious indeed. And it's very hard for Trump to have any credibility about anything given his past record of verbal in discipline which which he's famous of course.

[00:28:31]>> But I find it interesting David because you know you chat with some similar colleagues who have quite differing views uh I think on on different parts of the conversation. But somewhere where you've differed which I think is interesting and what I wanted to ask you before we watch that very in entertaining montage is over the nuclear element. So, we've had Larry Johnson on the program quite a few times, and him and I had a a quite blunt uh back and forth a week or so ago about the propensity for Iran to have a nuclear weapon. Now, according to Larry, uh he had a source that was unconfirmed um that critical bit I think there, but still uh unconfirmed from a source that Iran had nuclear capabilities and would be willing to demonstrate their capacity to use them. not to use them but to demonstrate them underground. And I was uh pushing back and challenging that >> uh I'm I'm pretty sure that no nation state including the Russians and the Chinese would welcome a nuclear capable Iran. Uh and a lot of the audience who are very um supportive of Larry or appreciate his perspective uh heavily criticized me for that or didn't like the fact that I was challenging Larry on that point. But then you come and mention just now that you think it would be a very bad idea as well. So I'm kind of interested to because I think you and Larry have some similar perspectives on things but on this you clearly divert.

[00:29:55]So I'd be very interested to understand your uh your perspective on that.

[00:30:00]>> Well the problem you have with nuclear weapons, we have nine nuclear powers now. Iran if they develop them would be 10. is that anytime any country has nuclear weapons, there's always, even in the best of times, some small chance they'll be used uh due to an accident, to a miscalculation, due to who knows what. And that over time, the risk grows and the more nations that have nuclear weapons, the greater the risk. I personally find it astonishing that we haven't used them in combat since Hiroshima Nagasaki over 80 years. I find it very unlikely the next 80 years if we continue this way we'll we'll continue without nuclear weapons being used in combat and I find that extremely alarming and so um it's better to have nine nuclear powers merely nine than to have 10 for that reason okay having 10 increases the risk okay it also sets a precedent if Iran develops nuclear weapons it could have a cascading effect you could get other countries in the region Turkey perhaps um Saudi Arabia developing them. Then in East Asia, you could get several in, you know, in Europe, Germany, Poland, Sweden might develop them independently. All of these things and uh the more proliferation we get, the greater the risk to humanity.

[00:31:11]And let's be very clear, these could wipe out the human race. I'm very concerned about that. One of the things I'm an older guy, I remember the Cold War, and during the Cold War, uh people were very constantly frightened.

[00:31:22]Children, I grew up as a child frightened of nuclear war. That was very normal. children were afraid of nuclear war. It was part of the culture. What I find astonishing is that since the end of the cold war, we've almost lost our fear of nuclear war. There's very little talked about uh the extraordinary danger that's posed by this. And so, it's on that account that I very definitely would not favor Iran developing a nuclear weapon. Let me make an additional point though about nuclear proliferation. Everything the United States has done since the end of the Cold War has been to promote nuclear proliferation. Let me be very clear on this.

[00:31:56]Um, Moar Gaddafi in Libya had a nuclear research program that he agreed to give up. I believe it was in 2003 if I'm not mistaken. It was around 2003, early 21st century. He gave up his nuclear research program with a tacit agreement that the United States and Britain would not try and overthrow his government. All right.

[00:32:17]Well, as we all know, they did overthrow his government and he was tortured to death. There's even a video somewhere out there of him being tortured to death. And I think many people looked at the Libya case and said Gaddafi was a fool to have trusted the Americans and the British. He would have been much smarter to have developed deployable nuclear weapons and they never would have overthrown him. He wouldn't have been tortured to death. And other countries will look at that and say, "We will not make that mistake." You see, that's an incentive for countries to proliferate because after all, we don't want to be attacked by the Americans like that. Uh they attack anybody. They attack people at will and given that fact given the extraordinary aggressiveness of the United States and the US is an exceptionally aggressive country. I can go into that much more so than any other country on the planet that you need nuclear weapons as the only thing that will particularly look at North Korea. North Korea's nuclear weapons and the Americans leave them alone. And so based on the twin cases, the counterposing of Libya on the one hand, which failed to develop nuclear weapons, and North Korea on the other hand, which did develop nuclear weapons, that's a clear incentive to proliferate.

[00:33:21]The United States has given every incentive to countries around the world to proliferate. And that is enormously dangerous for international security.

[00:33:30]I'm surprised it gets so little attention, honestly.

[00:33:33]>> Well, no, I was going to say the same.

[00:33:34]We, as I say, we've hosted quite a few different uh people. We've had um a couple of experts on nuclear um doctrine from the um Belf Center managing the atom at Harvard. We've had a couple from Japan, South Korea, more western orientated I guess you'd say. But the commonality is the common point is that there is a real uh normalization again of proliferation for nuclear weapons.

[00:34:00]the the public sentiment amongst the Japanese and South Koreans is really growing high and that's because >> not only because of the push factor from North Korea uh but from the pull factor from Trump as in pulling away and unwillingness to come to their a much like we're seeing with Taiwan. We've got an interesting video coming out later today with an expert on Chinese and US relations everyone. So keep a look out for that. But um yeah, I I it's just I guess to to to be uh to to offer a counterpoint though, David, why why should the countries that have nuclear weapons be the ones to hold them? Why can't Iran get one? Why is it not within their rights? Who who can dictate for a sovereign nation whether or not they should have nuclear weapons?

[00:34:41]>> Uh that's certainly how the Iran certainly some people in Iran would see it that way. I don't doubt that. Uh and I could see the logic of that. The problem with it is is as I said this is a threat to the human race and people underrate that threat and it's just so obvious. In a matter of just a few minutes we could uh um see the end of the human race basically. Uh it is exactly what we're talking about here.

[00:35:03]And that does not seem worth the risk to me. No. And I don't think it's even risk. I think over time if one looks at it dispassionately it would have to be a probability. Eventually these weapons will be used if if something isn't done.

[00:35:16]I I think again that's something that's received remarkably little attention even though logically the end result of this has to be nuclear war at some point. I mean um it's astonishing we've gotten this far without that happening and I can't imagine another 80 years taking place with a nuclear armed world without nuclear weapons being used in combat.

[00:35:38]That seems an improbable outcome to me.

[00:35:41]Given that, it'd be better, I think, to move towards some kind of multilateral nuclear disarmament. And there's no effort whatsoever to do that, as far as I can tell. There used to be a large-scale public movement in favor of disarmament with hundreds of thousands of people in the United States, Europe, all over the world. It's nothing like that anymore. It's it's it simply evaporated. And again, I I think the lack of interest in this problem, the the fundamental nature of this problem is remarkable to me. You know, we talk about there's much talk about climate change as a existential threat. I I think they're right. I I I think people who dismiss this are very foolish, but uh very little discussion of the even greater threat from nuclear weapons. And again, given the alarmist tone I'm adopting, and I I think a justifiably alarmist tone, I would view very dimly the idea of any country that is not nuclear now developing nuclear weapons.

[00:36:34]And that goes for Iran as well. It does not increase security in the long term.

[00:36:38]It decreases security.

[00:36:40]>> But how can it though, David, if it's a deterrent? If if if the Iranians have a nuclear weapon, even if they're not able to launch it, but they can use it as a dirty bomb. Is that not enough of a of a means to be like, "Leave us alone, America and Israel. Stop trying to interfere in our domestic affairs. Stop trying to destabilize the entirety of the Middle East. Get rid of your bases.

[00:37:01]You know, give some sovereignty back to our to our nation states." Yes. Okay. We can talk about um proxies and Iran's interference, but I'm just being I'm playing a certain role for this, right?

[00:37:12]Why why why would we ever assume as Iranians that that's acceptable? In the short term, of course, everything you're saying is correct. There's no doubt uh that that's true. And people who, you know, point to Iran as they'd be smart to develop nuclear weapons. They would make all the arguments you're making as which, which as I said, have impeccable logic. The problem with it is the longer term prospect is annihilation of the human race. Uh and to me that just does not seem worth it. Um we're talking about first of all Iran leading to a new wave of nuclear proliferation with more and more states developing nuclear weapons. Each time that happens we increase the risk of nuclear war of the nuclear weapons being used in combat.

[00:37:50]Each time a new country develops nuclear weapons it does that and it encourages still further countries to develop nuclear weapons. And again, I don't see logically how this could go on over a period of time, over a long period of time, without nuclear weapons being used in combat, without nuclear war taking place. And if we get a full-scale nuclear war, that would be the end of civilization. To me, that doesn't seem worth it. No.

[00:38:18]>> Okay. No, that's fair enough. Um, no, that's fair enough. I I think that as I say, a lot of people seem to not give enough weight to what it actually means to get a nuclear weapon or capable.

[00:38:30]>> Exactly. They don't give the way they don't give full weight to what that means. That's absolutely right.

[00:38:34]>> Well, I personally think that as I say, I don't support the war in Iran at all.

[00:38:39]I hate the IGC. I hate the Islamic Republic, but I equally do not think that the United that they should have a nuclear weapon. Not because I think the Americans and others sort of have the moral right to do so. we should have no none of them but I don't think getting more is the answer and and to pivot this towards something that I've been meaning to get your take on it's a sort of similar question I've been asking to a few different guests which is simply in my perspective I think that the Iranians have given the the Trump administration have given the Iranians the biggest strategic clarity that they've had in years in in decades even which is simply for a long time the emphasis has been on the nuclear rebell as the nuclear option right but actually what their biggest nuclear option is is the straight of Hamuz is geography because they didn't realize even more just how much of a potential pressure point it was and that's because of the exorbitant privilege and the exorbitant duty uh that the United States carries as the reserve currency uh backbone of the global order uh and so I think if the Iranians really wanted to like in a complete and utter armageddon kind of sense like just completely disarray the global economy because I think they've been restraining themselves a little bit, then they could they could flip that switch in a in a similar way that you would be sort of, you know, hyper what's the word? Um, metaphorically pressing the red button for a nuclear weapon, right? Do you what's your thoughts on that?

[00:40:03]>> Well, I I think what you're saying is a source of optimism for me because I think you're right that they may view um straight of horror movies as their nuclear weapon. Other people have said this and I I think it's absolutely correct that hopefully they will decide that gives them so much leverage.

[00:40:16]it gives them so much power and so much it's it's such a formidable defense against attack uh that they don't need actual nuclear weapons if they have this figurative one in the straight of Hormuz. Um and so that that that's the optimistic possibility. The pessimistic possibility is they'll do both. They'll have both the straight of Hormuz as their nuclear weapon and they will also develop an actual nuclear weapon they can deploy in combat. I hope I'm wrong about that. uh and I hope they stick with just the straight of hormuz because the straight of hormuz that um I do see an optimistic aspect to this and that I do see and I again I say this as an American citizen I do see the most destabilizing force in world politics today has been American foreign policy not just under Trump but also under the Democrats. Uh the US is a very aggressive country with a very aggressive record. It has a greater record of aggression since 1945. And I include the Cold War, even relative to the Soviet Union, a greater record than any other country in in that in that time frame. Um, and I I can give some specific examples if you'd like, but um I think the record on this is absolutely clear-cut. I mean, other countries have been aggressive, have done very nasty things, including, of course, the Soviets, the uh the Russians, um the Iranians domestically certainly uh have done very bad things. But I I think the scale of what the United States has done globally exceeds that of any other country. And the good news here is I think this could be a blow against American egemany from which it cannot recover. Um and I think this could be the end of American egemany. We could be moving towards multipolar multipolar world. And I would see that as there there are risks to a multi multipolar world. Let's be clear about that. But I think the risk is less than continuing with USGY. And I think that a multipolar world would be a good thing. Um and because I I I just say what the United States has done is has been so destabilizing the move into something else would likely be better.

[00:42:21]>> But come on, David, let's be honest. is preposterous. Multipolarity doesn't work, does it?

[00:42:27]>> That's a theory. If you study at international relations in political science, as I did, that's what that's what they tell you in the seminars. I I think the problem you do have here is that so much of realism is based on what America has done and American conduct and the natural aggressiveness of countries. I think mostly references America's record here. Uh if you look at the Soviet Union during the cold war, mostly I would say they acted defensively. That's my read on it. And mostly when they acted aggressively, it was in response to a US provocation. I can give look at Cuba. I mean, in Cuba's case, basically they didn't start giving arms and support to Castro until the United States tried to overthrow the government. They put nuclear missiles in Cuba after the US put nuclear missiles in Turkey on their borders. The whole Cold War was like that. The Soviets were always one step behind the United States. And I think realism likes to portray this as symmetrical. They were they were both symmetrically aggressive.

[00:43:20]But I don't think the record shows that at all. I think so much of international relations theory is predicated on a conception of human nature and a conception of how countries act that is based on what America has done since 1945.

[00:43:35]Um I think even if one sees that as naive, I think this is the problem here is well well let me stop for a moment and and get your response to that because I just I've just included a lot there.

[00:43:47]Well, what response to what you know aspect of that?

[00:43:51]>> Any aspect of what I just said, most of which is very controversial.

[00:43:55]>> I mean, you said a lot there which I myself have not. How would you summar if you could summarize it for me in a point? uh well that basically that the conception of multipolarity as a bad thing is based on the idea uh that there's a natural tendency of countries to be aggressive and if the United States basically withdraws and becomes less aggressive countries like China and Russia will become more aggressive and I think that's based upon a view of history that is mostly based upon American aggression and so much of the idea of um the natural tendency of countries to act aggressively is based on on the United States, which I think has been uniquely aggressive since 1945.

[00:44:34]Um, and I I think that I think there's an overrating here of the natural tendency of countries to act aggressively and the assumption that if the United States withdraws, China and Russia will be just as aggressive or more so. Um, I don't think it's very much in the record of evidence to support that.

[00:44:54]Look, I I think that well, I was having this conversation with my father just a few days ago because I was catching up with him. He lives outside of the country now, but he's he's Russian and he's a physicist and he looks at the world very much in that way and the role of forces and physics and he was telling me a story once where he uh he had the opportunity to ask a question to Maline Norbrite in the early 2000s and this was before the idea of multipolarity really became popular. The US was in its primacy. It was a uniolar world. China was rising. Russia was sort of figuring itself out, but there was no uh competent power on the same level as the United States. But he was arguing about, you know, what does a bipolar world look like? Um or could we lead to multipolarity? It's inherently un unstable. Uh and it leads to a a greater sort of bottom line either. And it's not just him who said that. There's theories out there that have argued that multipolarity in its purest form does over time gravitate towards a degree of bipolar nature just because polls are are such an important element uh in power and distribution of power and and what I think maybe makes it slightly difficult to predict now is the role of AI of advanced technology um what we thought was going to be the uh never- ending integration and globalization of the world that's clearly on the reverse shifting towards regions and just a just an overall fragmentation. So in my mind I think that whilst you can have multipolarity um it I don't know if it's in I don't think I think it's more likely it's bipolar or tripolar because it depends Russia let's just be blunt right what are the polls it's the United States is the big power then China is the other major one Russia could hypothetically be a major power if it wasn't doing its own damage of to break you know there was that match I think Trump shared before where the US is inherently in charge of the western hemisphere, China's in charge of Asia and then sort of Russia in theory would be managing sort of Europe and and that sort of thing. Um but that's not the case because Europe Putin has burnt any bridges with Europe at this point and Russia could have been a great power if it actually invested in itself instead of undertaking foreign wars abroad and inherently destroying the economy and all this sort of stuff. So, um, Putin's effort to sort of glorify and re-establish the Russian state as a major power have have clearly not worked. You can't deny Russia.

[00:47:33]>> I don't agree with that. I don't agree with that.

[00:47:34]>> Russia is a big power, but it's a big power because it has nuclear weapons. It has the biggest nuclear arsenal.

[00:47:40]>> I think I think you're overrating him.

[00:47:42]I'm sorry. Do you mind if you mind if I jump in on that? Is that okay?

[00:47:44]>> No, no. Just bottom line, in my opinion, great power theory is one of my main areas of focus, growth, and strategy.

[00:47:50]And in my opinion, I think that we can talk about multi-polarity, but you have to be very specific in what that means.

[00:47:59]A lot of people associate it with bricks. We associate it with the global south, but these are nebulous entities which have no clear leader. Modi has tried to represent the global south as a whole. But I think it's pretty clear there's other nations that don't want India, quote unquote, to be the leader of the global south. And also to be honest with you, India lacks a lot of potential. It's getting there, but it lacks a lot of things that China and America have or even Russia to an extent. So um I think you know bottom line we can talk about the principle of multipolarity but when you try to quantify it I think there's really only two actors in that case the G2 world as Trump visit to China. diag couple things is that basically what you're not seeing here all right is an arms buildup by Russia or China okay uh if you look at the key element here is military spending as a percentage of GDP in China I believe it's something like 1.7% uh within with the GDP approximately the same size of the United States depending on how you measure it um they're spending about half what we're spending on the military to me and they have I think only one overseas base compared to what is it 7 to8 800 for the United States. There's nothing in that record to suggest they're going to become a global power militarily. There's no military aggression in those numbers. To me, China seems like probably a status quo oriented country. They do want a sphere of influence basically in Southeast Asia, but I think a minimal one as far as I can tell. Um I doubt they would go so far as to invade Taiwan. a that would be militarily extremely difficult if not impossible to do at any kind of reasonable cost for them. Um invasions by sea are by their very nature extraordinarily difficult and China has very little experience in that kind of warfare and um they're just the military buildup they're doing is nothing close to what will be necessary for that. Uh I'm just not seeing any obvious aggression in terms of the level of military spending or their overseas presence. Russia, you know, Russia, of course, is well, first of all, I I think Russia's economy has actually doing quite well. You need to look at the data of the IMF. If you look at the IMF data, their economy has been growing. All right? There's nothing suggesting an economic crisis there. I think that is NATO propaganda. And again, easily refuted by looking at the IMF. Um, and uh there's nothing unsustainable about what they're doing in the Ukraine, economically speaking, uh, whatever else you may think of it. Uh, what they're not doing though is a massive arms buildup. uh their military spending as a percentage of GDP according to the CRI figures I believe is this year 6.5% of GDP which is um about double from what it was four years ago before the war started again that's that's not that huge considering they're fighting a major war if you look at the model people have of Russia is Germany in the 1930s we hear that again and again Germany in the 1930s Germany did a real military buildup Um I believe at the time of operation Barbar Roa, the invasion of Russia, um I believe military spending, I don't have the figures right in front of me, were somewhere in the range of 50% of GDP, German GDP. That's a country that's really engaging in aggression globally or regionally. All right. What Russia's doing suggests a much more modest objective. Um and I don't see any evidence that they have any any any intention or ability to invade Western Europe. There's also a logical problem here. People are always saying on the one hand, look at how ineffective Russia is. They can't even subdue a country on their borders, which is true. Um, look, look how weak they are. On the other hand, they're going to invade Europe any time now and they'll be pushing towards Paris at any moment. This is an illogical thinking we're getting here.

[00:51:44]And so, I think there's a tendency to grossly overstate the security threat presented by these two countries. As I would see it, the principal country here is China, not Russia. And everything I'm seeing is they want stability. What they have an interest in is stability. And they're showing nothing to me that I can see that is consistent with the idea of military supremacy or military dominance. And the whole idea here of multipolarity in this threatening way that you're discussing would suggest that China with this massive military buildup setting up military bases all over the world and they're just not doing that or showing really that much interest in doing these things. And so I think people overestimate the security threats that would come if the United States were to withdraw from the world.

[00:52:29]Um I think that um there's at least some possibility of a greater tendency towards nonmilitary resolutions of conflict. I think we have to take that risk just because the United States has been so aggressive and so destabilizing that I think anything that reduces American power in the world will be a positive.

[00:52:52]Yeah, look, I mean, we've kind of uh pivoted away a little bit from the the focus of the conversation. I just want to also emphasize that Donald Trump just re-shared or reposted Aragoti's post that I had read out about 10 minutes about. Um, so that's a big sign. I think we are genuinely on the cusp of this being pushed through across the line, which would be huzzah. Um but just on this interesting debate, I I'm proud to actually say to people watching that I I will be starting a fellowship in the coming few weeks on this kind of thing on big power pl big power plays, grand strategy, world order stuff and um you know I think you might have just initiated me to write my first uh piece of Substack on it as well, David actually. When is multipolarity not multipolarity maybe? Do you have a Substack at all? Because I am >> No, no, I'm too I'm way too primitive for that.

[00:53:47]on there. You have good engagement, I think, and people would love to read.

[00:53:51]>> I write books. That's how I communicate with the world. But anyway, >> you can write books on Substack as well.

[00:53:55]They just would might overload the site.

[00:53:57]But um no, I mean, look, I I think on this point very simply, um people are saying that the world isn't disintegrating or unintegrating, but it is. We're just seeing the initial phases of that. The 2010s was defined by an anti-globalist movement, an anti-globalization movement. COVID, World Economic Forum, neoliberalism, all these terms associated with uh why multipolarity is so popular, bricks is so popular because it represents a a rejection of the western or US-led order and approach to sort of foreign policy and building society. Um but as we say we need to and we're seeing the efforts to decouple to derisk uh French shoring near shoring all these terms and concepts are pretentious ways of just saying that you know the United States and China are always going to be integrated their two biggest economies cannot be but they're trying to limit how much they can be or protect themselves in certain areas and that is a reversal or at least a rejection of what globalization is. It's a globalization is the continued uh you know evolution of of systems and processes where barriers to trade to culture to movement are increasingly reduced and and we're not seeing that.

[00:55:14]The European Union in the past 10 years has surged there's a fantastic article in the economist just yesterday and the day before which talked about how hardlined the European Union has become against um immigration not on everything but on immigration. they tacked firmly to the right and I think that's a very interesting uh aspect immigration is an is absolute reflection of globalization and we're seeing a reversal of that so that's what I'd say to to people who are are countering but uh as to the great power competition thing I mean in my opinion yeah I I think that certain countries have certain things that they can offer and power is not a monolithic thing there are different areas like some people consider I don't know the the Swiss a diplomatic power because they are very good at uh engaging you know peace time or Qatar is a diplomatic power because they're the negotiators.

[00:56:04]You have n it's called niche diplomacy for people watching who aren't familiar perhaps. Um the the Italians are incredibly good at food diplomacy because everything's Italian and food and delicious but anyway sorry David I know you wanted to jump in.

[00:56:17]>> Well I I think that you know one of the things you're seeing I should mention here is you know the public does have some voice in this. At least we would hope they do. I think the public in the United States certainly and I think elsewhere as well is becoming tired of war. Um and this is was a major theme I would say in the rise of Donald Trump and that he amongst other things presents himself as anti-war. Um and he criticized the Democrats for being excessively pro-war and I remember that um you know Liz Cheney the daughter of Richard Cheney strongly endorsed Camala Harris and he was very critical of that.

[00:56:52]He called her a radical war hawk. He used a lot of language, by the way, that was reminiscent of the anti-war left, as ironic as that might seem. Um, and I there's no doubt that's one of the reason that one of his sources of support is the public um was um moving in that direction. I think that the Americans are very nationalistic, but I think that they we we collectively had had realized the costs of war, the damage the war on terror did to the United States domestically. For what it's worth, I teach in southern Arizona.

[00:57:21]I get a lot of military and former military personnel in my class and I've seen uh how bitter and angry a lot of returning military personnel were about their experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. I suspect that the kind of bitterness I saw in my classes I I think a lot of that translated into the make America great again movement which is it means America first, make America great, all that. It means many different things. It very flexible definition. One of the things I think it means is spending less money on overseas wars and more money domestically on raising living standards. Needless to say, Trump has gone completely against all of that has become at least as warlike as any other president that we've had and he's completely uh broken with any promises he made about being an anti-war president. Why he's done that is another matter and we can go into that in another discussion, but he has done that. But I think what is very important to emphasize is there's definitely an element in the American electorate, a large element, which is turning very strongly anti-war. And again, it used to be, this was on the left, but now we're seeing it on the right as well. Um, and I I think that that is going to have um a significant impact electorally in the United States. And um it may very well change US policy and make it more difficult than in the past to launch these kinds of aggressive wars overseas.

[00:58:45]Guns, guns versus butter. And I think people increasingly would prefer butter.

[00:58:51]>> That's one way to put it. But David, I guess uh to bring it back to the original uh discussion point, I'm just uh checking if there's any other major updates. Not seemingly right now. We're just going to have to wait and see what comes out. Um but what do you think? Are we going to see this deal signed? Uh and if not, why not?

[00:59:11]Um, it could go either way. Obviously, uh, as John Mirshimer said, it's been a bit of a roller coaster with what's been going on. And I think the roller coaster Trump Trump is completely fickle. He could change his mind just like that.

[00:59:24]Uh, and he could um just impulsively decide on another attack or he could decide basically to just walk away from the conflict or he could decide on a kind of um fig leaf of an agreement that is nevertheless a defeat for him. He could do any of these options. And so I' I'd be reluctant to make any predictions. Um my hope is that he finds some way of walking away from this conflict because it's been so destructive and likely become increasingly destructive to the world economy. But there's no guarantee of that because to do so for Trump would mean accepting humiliation and that seems to be something he does not want to do. So um I don't really have a clear prediction on that. What would be your prediction pod? Do you want to hazard a prediction?

[01:00:09]We've been through this so many times.

[01:00:11]If I'm honest, David, when this whole process began uh process of war, I sort of assumed that these sorts of things based on my experience of Middle Eastern exchanges, of course, though they're each different and this is the first time we've seen a war of the scale with the Iranians and Americans. It's it's D-Day for not zero hour for many people, right? This was the thing that people have been planning for imagining um for uh for decades. Uh I thought it would sort of wrap by maybe April May. I didn't the aerial campaign and the intensity of the first month of March was not possible. Mainly because the Americans don't have that amount of stockpile but also because they're split quite thinly. Um but also that's just because a war of this nature which is largely indirect, right? It's not like Ukraine and Russia where they're directly next to each other. um it it makes an aerial campaign very difficult to sustain and you never get regime change through just war campaigns uh from aerial campaigns. So um it's I would like to think that this is it at least for signing the MOU. I'm going to be very clear that I'm not saying that this is the end of any and all potential flare-ups. I think we could see potential strikes, but I I I think there's a genuine intent in this regard to to to get this over the line. Now, the Iranian IRGC I've just seen have posted something saying that, you know, we >> we will never get a nuclear weapon or we're not we're not intending to get a nuclear weapon, but we will gain absolute military control of the straight off moose. And I think that goes back to what I was sort of alluding to earlier in my question to you, which is simply I think the Iranians have learned that they don't have to be allin on the car on the nuclear warhead. They have more cards that they can play and the ultimate one, their joker if you like, is the straight of horses. I think it's really given the most strategic reconsideration or or or clarity on that and uh so I think yeah I I hope that we will see this signed but that definitely does not mean an end to any of this completely. uh one worries that in few months time we'll just be in the same position because what triggered all this it was Trump being uh fed up pissed off with the lack of peace talk progress over the nuclear file in February and so after the persuasion and uh you know encouragement by Netanyahu he's like yeah sure let's go screw it let's let's bomb them we we know where they're going to be we'll take them all out and decapitation strategy and they'll they'll capitulate and they'll collapse and we'll have a you know Happy days, uh, chicken dinner or whatever the expression is, right? And we'll go home.

[01:02:38]Um, so no, it's I just worry that we'll sort of be in the we'll just have deja vu in sort of September or October and be like, wait, Trump's getting pissed off again. The talks haven't gotten anywhere. Oh, no, he's not going to do it, is he? And the only difference might be the midterms. But I don't know. Does that make sense to you, do you think?

[01:02:56]>> Um, I I think what you're saying is is somewhat similar to what I'm saying is it could go either way.

[01:03:01]>> Yeah. Well, David, it's been an absolute pleasure. Always really enjoy our conversations and we'll definitely have to have you back. Maybe next week, as we said, I'd like to have a deeper dive about this the world the world order uh and something. So, everyone keep a lookout for that. We we'll be we'll talk about it offline, David. But everyone for watching. Thanks so much. Have a good evening, weekend, and hopefully positive lines. Enjoy the football. And of course, look out for that video about China, US, and economics coming up later on today. Very good.