⚡️LAVROV CHANGES TONE! Urgent statement on war — Putin issues sudden order to Russians

Added: 2026-06-03

[00:00:00]But there are many people around Putin that are still very very supportive of of him and and so it's it's hard to know exactly the dynamics inside the Kremlin.

[00:00:10]Um but to your point too, as with the case with all authoritarian leaders, they surround themselves with yesmen and so they do um have a tendency to lose touch with what the reality is on the ground if they do not have people actually telling them the truth. And so it is a concern obviously that Putin could make misjudgments, could make um decisions that are actually incredibly um bad for Russia that could elicit a response from the United States in the West that he does not intend. Um but for now, it does appear that he's still operating under the assumption that um it would be deeply foolish to to cross any kind of strategic threshold, either by crossing a nuclear threshold anywhere or by escalating the war horizontally into a NATO state. Hello and welcome to the 24 War and Politics YouTube channel.

[00:00:57]Today we will be discussing new threatening statements from Pescov and Lavrov, the retreat of Russian troops from two Ukrainian regions, and what Putin may do next as he finds himself increasingly cornered. Our guest today is Rebecca Hrix, senior fellow at Hudson Institute and the director of its Keystone Defense Initiative. Rebecca, it's great to see you.

[00:01:18]>> Great to be with you.

[00:01:20]>> Thank you for participation in our program. Uh the Kremlin is threatening systematic largecale strikes against Kev while Piskov and Lavrov are actively delivering these messages both to the media space and to various countries including the United States. What does this kind of Kremlin rhetoric indicate and who are these signals intended for?

[00:01:42]>> Well, I think um they're intended for the Western audience. The Russians are always looking for a communication strategy that frankly frightens the West from their continued support to Ukraine.

[00:01:56]And so you'll see this uptick in rhetoric from senior Russian officials or those close to to Putin um in order to again to deter further support from NATO countries or to to cause there to be a greater risk aversion um and fear of potential escalation on the part of the West. Now I will say um it hasn't worked over the last uh I would say year or so. uh western aid continues to flow into Ukraine, but Ukraine has also changed the equation by building up their own domestic military capabilities. So, it makes these kinds of threats a lot less effective knowing that Ukraine can rely so much more on its own weapons production capabilities.

[00:02:42]>> Uh Zilinski says that Russia still has one major advant advantage on the battlefield, ballistic missiles. Ukraine critically lacks air defense systems capable for uh for intercepting such missiles. Zilinski has written a letter to Trump and Congress describing the situation. Um in your opinion, amid the intensification of Russian strikes, could the United States provide Ukraine with more air defense systems and missiles for them? So, first of all, I would just say I was just in Ukraine for a week very recently and so I I experienced the constant drone strikes, the missile strikes on Kev. I was in Kev and had to take shelter multiple times and so I understand something of the reality that Ukrainian people are constantly living under this threat of both drones and missile strikes. Of course, Ukraine has been extremely successful in defending against uh the drones, but of course, the missiles, as you mentioned, are they create a real problem, which is why Ukraine needs Patriot weapon systems provided by the United States and the interceptors that that go along with them. And this is something that the United States can can provide, continues to provide. And I want to iterate just how important this system is. It's yes, it has this military capability to intercept obviously these these missiles from Russia, but it also has the effect of giving the Ukrainian people confidence that they can continue on with their lives. They can send their children to school. They can go to work and that is vital so Ukraine can continue its economic um sustainability so that it can pour into its own military industry to continue to defend itself and push back the Russian invaders. So these these missile air defend uh systems, air defense systems are essential for Ukraine's survival and I do believe that the United States is committed to providing this particular weapon system to Ukraine.

[00:04:44]>> Uh the armed forces of Ukraine report that Russia has become begun retreating in two regions, the Nepropovk oblast and Zaporia oblast. If Ukraine's currently localized successes on the battlefield uh became more systematic and geographically broader, what steps could Putin resort to?

[00:05:03]>> Well, um and that's, you know, for him uh to consider. You can think that there has been some concern um in the United States and in other European capitals that if Putin um gets to the point where he believes there's no way out for him to claim any kind of military victory that he could resort towards mo more overt threats against NATO countries or he could cross the nuclear or threaten to cross the nuclear threshold of course with a with a low yield uh or regardless of the yield of nuclear weapon somewhere in the region or at least threatened to.

[00:05:38]Now, we saw an increase in nuclear threats from the Russians earlier on in the war when Ukraine started making great strides militarily. So, it would not surprise me if we heard this kind of rhetoric again coming out of Russia. But again, that's why I think it's so important for the United States as the leader of the NATO alliance to just make it very clear that we will not tolerate those kinds of threats, that NATO remains a nuclear alliance, and that it stands ready to deter the Russians and to compel the Russians back down, not to make these incredibly irresponsible threats. Um but again uh Ukraine's success on the battlefield I think is resonating here in the United States when we can see that Ukraine is is not helpless that this war is not inevitable that the Russians will prevail in some sense. Ukraine has demonstrated incredible military profess proficiency, adaptability on the battlefield and it's very encouraging to see Ukraine be so successful in recent days.

[00:06:35]>> And actually another option available to Putin is uh a general mobilization and I would like to talk to you about this. A general mobilization at this point appears to be an extremely unpopular decision. Frankly speaking, we remember the partial mobilization of 2022 when Putin was operating under far more favorable conditions. Yet even then he realized that the mobilization had to be scaled back. How could he deal with this issue now?

[00:07:04]>> Well, you raise a great point that what Putin does not want to do is he does not want the war to be felt across the Russian population. So he has sought to keep it sort of isolated and he has sought to as he um conscripts some Russian men uh to provide monetary incentives to to those Russian families in the event that the Russians are killed on the battlefield. This is a highly lethal war. The Ukrainians are killing tens of thousands of Russians regularly and and so uh clearly this is a concern for Putin about the effects on the broader population. So, as you say, he does not want to have uh widespread mobilization because then you're going to really bring this war home to the to the everyday Russian. And so, I think that's something I think you're right, that's something that he would like to avoid. But it's always an an option that he has should the Ukrainians continue to be so successful on the battlefield.

[00:08:00][snorts] >> Um, what sentiments currently dominate Russia's military political establishment? Could business elites, intelligence services, and the military persuade Putin not to think even deeper into this war, but instead start thinking about how to exit it safely?

[00:08:18]Um, I I don't think that that's probably the most likely scenario. I think that Putin is the one who's ultimately going to have to decide that this war has been bad for him. It's been bad for Russia. I think objectively that's true. NATO has grown in size because of Russian's aggression against Ukraine with the addition of two new NATO countries.

[00:08:38]That's bad for Russia. Um NATO is now rearming in a way that we have not seen.

[00:08:44]Uh the Germans, the French, the Brits, espec especially the Germans are taking a lead on this. Um Ukraine is now has greater national solidarity. Um it has shown incredible resilience across the population, has pushed the Russians back out of its territory. Now, Ukraine has essentially become something like the drone capital of the free world. And I think that the United States and other NATO countries need to take advantage of that. So, I mean, any angle you look at it, this has not been a good decision on Putin's part for this um unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. But this is going to have to be that the war is going to have to end when Putin makes the decision that he needs to find some kind of offramp for himself. he can contrive of one at any point. It's I think the the aim of Ukraine and its backers to compel Putin to make that decision.

[00:09:39]>> Uh actually it looks like that um pose or a respit in this war is inevitable. I would like to ask you what could a pause in the war realistically look like?

[00:09:51]Well, I mean, if you want if you're talking about an actual ceasefire that the Russians abide by, um, you know, we we've only seen tiny shortlived glimpses of that. Anytime the United States has sought to pressure both countries to abide by a ceasefire, President Zinsky has agreed to it. Ukraine has said that we will abide by a negotiated ceasefire.

[00:10:13]It's the Russians that have used the ceasefire to essentially um regroup and then take aim again at Ukrainian uh ci civilian infrastructure. We saw this obviously during the cold winter that Russia I would say I would call it as weaponized the cold against the Ukrainian civilian population. So we have not seen Russia act in good faith when there have been ceasefires.

[00:10:38]However, I would not rule it out that the United States could compel with our NATO allies an agreement where we at least pause the war and give Ukraine a break. And so, I think that the Ukrainians are are clearly wanting that.

[00:10:53]They're they're they're ready to stand in good faith and um abide by one. And I think that that should be a priority for for all of Ukraine's backers is to finally get pressure Russia to abide by a ceasefire.

[00:11:05]uh you have already mentioned potential Russian aggression against uh NATO but actually I have a question with with I would say another angle. Many experts argue that the only thing preventing Russia from attacking the Baltic states in is the fact that Russia is bogged down in Ukraine. Putin is spending all of his resources here in Ukraine. How realistic do you consider the scenario in which after ceasefire agreement in Ukraine, Moscow launches some form of conflict against NATO's eastern flank?

[00:11:38]So I I would describe it this way. I do think that that Ukraine really is the country that is preventing Russia from its ultimate goal, which is to weaken and splinter NATO. And so I think to the extent that Ukraine prevails, it does protect the rest of Europe and especially, you know, the NATO alliance.

[00:12:01]And so I I believe that is true. At the same time, Russia is engaged in hybrid warfare against NATO countries already.

[00:12:10]We've seen Russian ships break undersea cables between NATO countries. We've seen the Russians engage in hybrid warfare against the Baltic nations against Poland. And we've seen assassination attempts um on the part of Russia against even German military manufacturing company officials representatives who are supporting weapons and supplying weapons to Ukraine. So I mean I think that there already is something like a hybrid warfare that I would even argue gets a lot closer to a hot war. It's just sort of below the threshold that's requiring NATO to have an overt explicit response.

[00:12:45]So, I think that Russia's goal is to is to break the Western alliance. And so, Ukraine's success certainly helps prevent that. But I do think that there's always a risk that the Russians may open another front if they believe that the United States is not going to fully back the NATO alliance. I think that would be a severe miscalculation, but that doesn't mean the Russians wouldn't try.

[00:13:10]Uh and actually also you have mentioned um nuclear threat from Russia from Russia but I would like to specify uh yeah we know that another option available to Putin is a tactical nuclear strike. Uh how likely do you consider such a scenario? So I don't consider it likely and I I do think it's important you know whenever you hear the word tactical nuclear weapon that obviously any nuclear use inside Ukraine would have strategic implications and um and so uh any kind of employment of nuclear weapons I think would cross a a red line for the United States and NATO and u we the United States I don't speak for my government but I can say as an American who focuses on these on these issues in my own um uh expertise is that the United States has long held the position that it's in our interest to have zero nuclear use in warfare at all to maintain the nuclear peace. So that doesn't mean that that that the Russians do not uh engage in nuclear uh threats.

[00:14:12]Um they they do and I think that the United States and NATO should take them seriously, not discount them as a bluff, but to always carefully and responsibly communicate to the Russians that we would make the Russians regret that decision. That's the that's the heart of deterrence. And convincing the Russians of that, I think, increases our chances of preventing Russia from actually ever doing that.

[00:14:36]>> Um I will explain why I ask you about this. uh because it seems that Putin is losing his sense of reality. I mean in the sense of that he increasingly misinterprets what is actually happening uh under such conditions. Uh is a palace coupoop in the Kremlin possible in your opinion?

[00:14:56]>> Um I mean my honest answer is that would take a true um internal Russian expert to know that. My understanding from talking to those who who are um suggests that you know it it is a possibility, but there are many people around Putin that are still very very supportive of of him and and so it's it's hard to know exactly the dynamics inside the Kremlin.

[00:15:19]Um but to your point too, as with the case with all authoritarian leaders, they surround themselves with yesmen and so they do um have a tendency to lose touch with what the reality is on the ground if they do not have people actually telling them the truth. And so it is a concern obviously that Putin could make misjudgments, could make um decisions that are actually incredibly um bad for Russia, that could elicit a response from the United States and the West that he does not intend. Um but for now it does appear that he's still operating under the assumption that um it would be deeply foolish to to cross any kind of strategic threshold either by crossing a nuclear threshold anywhere or by escalating the war horizontally into a NATO state.

[00:16:04]>> Uh I have one more question about Europe. uh after the United States stepped away from the trilateral negotiations and Russia loudly abandoned them as well uh Europe offered to take the lead in uh continuing the peace process in the format of the EU, Ukraine and Russia. Uh we know that Putin has I would say little respect for Europe and does not view it as an authority comparable to the United States or China. So uh do you believe in the prospects of such a negotiation format new negotiation format?

[00:16:36]>> I don't. Obviously this decision is ultimately up to Ukraine and and if Ukraine decides that it's that it is in its interest to have the Europeans taking that role uh that would be their own sovereign decision. I I agree though with the assessment that it's not actually going to probably be very fruitful. that it's much more helpful if the United States uh seeks to compel an end to the war on terms that are good for Ukraine because Ukraine's interests um on ending the war align with US interests. And so my hope is um there may be another opportunity for the United States to uh to come at this terrible war um with fresh eyes uh in the near future to to help Ukraine um do what is necessary to convince the Russians to end the war. Really, it's the the Ukraine has stood ready truly to end the war at any time. Ukraine is the country that's being invaded. Ukraine is the is the country that just wants to defend its homeland. And it's the Russians that have been um engaging in this war of aggression totally um unnecessarily. And so until the Russians decide that the war stops, unfortunately, I think it's it's just going to take the United States to to turn up the economic pain on the Russians and demonstrate that we do have US solidarity with Ukraine. I think that's going to be the the best and shortest path to finally see an end to this terrible war.

[00:18:03]Rebecca, thank you very much for this fruitful discussion and have a good day.

[00:18:08]>> Thanks. Thanks for having me.