Inside the Middle East crisis: Trita Parsi on Iran, Israel and US foreign policy

Added: 2026-05-23

[00:00:00]Iran and the United States say there's been progress in talks aimed at ending the conflict, but some hurdles remain, including disagreements over Iran's enriched uranium stockpile and proposed tolls in the straight of Hmuz.

[00:00:13]Pakistan's army chief Aimir is heading to Thran to continue mediation efforts between the two sides. Joining us now from Washington DC is treaty. He's the co-founder and executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Trina, great to have you with us again.

[00:00:31]>> Thank you.

[00:00:32]>> So, there's been a great deal of back channel discussions going on with Pakistan acting as the mediator and as we've been reporting the Pakistan army chief Aimir is heading to Thran to try and get this deal done. Uh you say that you are slightly more optimistic right now that there could be a deal in the works. What's behind your optimism?

[00:00:54]>> I think on one of the most critical issues which is the stockpile. Uh I detect a bit of a shift on the Iranian side. Uh it's not done yet of course but it all very much depends on what the US is willing to put on the table. But we've gone from a situation in which at first they were taking a very categorical position when it came to the stockpile to a more flexible position.

[00:01:17]But it all depends on what the US puts on the table. That in of itself is a very significant development. Whether that is sufficient for a deal remains to be seen. Uh but it was one of the main sticking points that now has loosened up and may no longer be uh that type of a sticking point.

[00:01:36]>> You say you detect there may be some flexibility on this issue. There's been a lot of reporting on this. I mean, we heard just a few days ago that Iran's supreme leader had issued a directive um that the country's stockpile of highlyenriched uranium must stay in Iran. Uh part of that was also the fact that Iran would uh dilute the strength of the uranium or down blend it as it's referred to. Uh so why do you when you say there's a bit of flexibility now?

[00:02:04]What happens?

[00:02:06]Well, first of all, I'm not so sure that that Reuters report is entirely correct.

[00:02:11]Reuters have often time been reporting things that has been appears to have been fed to it by those who are seeking to sabotage uh negotiations.

[00:02:20]Um what based on my conversations with folks on the Iranian side, there is a clear red line when it comes to shipping out the stockpile to the United States, which is what the US had first demanded.

[00:02:32]However, there is growing flexibility and willingness to consider other options that could bring about the shipping out of the stockpile to other places. It is important to remember that in the JCPOA, the Iranians did ship out 98% of their stockpile. So, this is different from the enrichment issue in which the Iranians have been absolutely consistent for more than 20 years. They will never give up enrichment. It is a clear bright red line. stockpile is not as um uh cemented of an issue. They have shown flexibility in the past and they can show flexibility in the future. What I believe is out of the question for the Iranian side is that it will be shipped out to the US.

[00:03:18]>> Now the other big point of contention is the status of the strait of Hormuz and whether Iran can have sovereignty over that straight. Uh Iran announced a controlled maritime zone in the straight and established the Persian Gulf straight authority which will control the ships that can transit through the waterway as well as we understand pay some kind of a fee or a toll. Uh Iran has also published a map in which it shows the area over which it would have control. Um is Iran effectively establishing facts on the ground here?

[00:03:53]It is establishing facts on the ground as we speak, but simultaneously we're seeing far more ships going through the straits than we have in the last previous weeks. So, I think there's a lot of double signals that are being sent. Some of them are clearly being part of the negotiating strategy and tactics. I think it is clear the Iranians are not going to give up the strikes entirely, but there may be various forms of solutions that are acceptable both to it and to the United States and potentially to some of the regional states. From the American standpoint, it appears that the this is not as strong of a red line for the Americans as for instance the stockpile is. That doesn't mean that the United States is going to just bend over and accept Iran's control. The US seems to be pushing for a regionalized mechanism that ensures that the region is in control of it rather than just Iran or just Iran plus one other GCC states. Um it doesn't appear quite yet that regional states uh GCC states are on board and part of the problem right now I believe is actually between the US and those states when it comes to this issue but reality is the United States cannot open the strait militarily at an acceptable cost and as a result has to accept something else and the Iranians on the other hand also need to show some flexibility because if they go for their maximum position they will not only generate a lot of other opposition to them, including the fact that they will likely not be able to get any sanctions relief, which is more valuable in the long run, but also it will really fuel incentives, economic incentives to build as many bypasses to the straight of Hormuz as possible, which then in the long term or even in the medium term diminishes the importance of the trade, which ultimately is to the detriment of Iran.

[00:05:41]Now talking about the region uh I mean you've pointed to the fact that there are many regional countries in addition to Pakistan that are involved uh in trying to find a peace settlement in trying to come to some kind of agreement. Those countries include Qatar, Turkey, Egypt, Oman and Saudi Arabia as well. Uh what is the significance of this regional involvement? What does it tell you? I mean when you compare it to the JCPOA in which this was led by the P5+1 um European and and eastern states but uh no country participating really from the region. This is dramatically different. You have Turkey as you mentioned, Egypt, Qatar has played a very critical role behind the scenes and on top of that you also have now China playing a very critical role behind the scene, a very silent role. But in my view, it is appears to be emerging as a silent indispensable diplomatic power in the region. But nevertheless, it doesn't seem like it is really feasible to get a longlasting and durable deal without the Chinese on board. And the Chinese are playing that role behind the scenes. It is Europe who is just completely missing and even though it is noticeable, it is not felt because Europe's irrelevance is now becoming normalized.

[00:06:57]>> The news website Axio published a report just a few days ago in which it said that President Trump had what was described as a very lengthy and difficult telephone call with the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu uh over that revised peace deal that was submitted by Qatar and Pakistan. According to Axios, Netanyahu was infuriated by the kinds of concessions that Trump was prepared to make to the Iranians to reach some kind of deal. So, the question is, does Israel still uh exercise some kind of veto over a final agreement or are we way past that? Now, >> it all depends on what Trump decides to do. When Israeli politicians have managed to play a veto card on American decisions, it is ultimately because the president of the United States decided that it was not worth fighting the Israelis. It's only with the permission of the American president that the Israelis actually have a veto.

[00:07:56]But if the president of the United States decides that this deal is too important, it's part of his legacy, it is crucial for the United States in terms of getting out of the economic challenges that it has created for itself and for the world, then I don't think there is much that the prime minister of Israel can do. He can pick a fight with Trump, but it would be a very foolish thing for him to do under the current circumstances because Israel is going into its elections. It's going to be held sometime between July and October. And Trump is still very popular in Israel. In fact, um it would be almost suicidal for Netanyahu to go in an allout fight publicly with Trump in the middle of these negotiations. And I think Trump in some ways hinted at that when he out of the blue suddenly started making comments about how popular he is in Israel and that if he wanted to run for any position in Israel, he would win those elections. I think these were signs to the Israelis that if any one of them try to pick a big fight with him, he can hurt them tremendously politically at home where their elections are going to be held.

[00:09:01]>> Right. So, can we assume then that if the United States signs an agreement with Iran, Israel would also be bound by the terms of that?

[00:09:09]>> Well, the Iranians have insisted that this needs to be a regional complete ceasefire. that includes Gaza, West Bank, certainly includes Lebanon. And there's many different reasons for this.

[00:09:22]One of them, of course, is that if those um conflicts continue, then they will eventually spread to other parts in the region and it will renew uh a conflict between Iran and Israel. So, if you truly want to have an end to this war, you have to end it everywhere, not just directly between the US and Iran, but also because it's a way of testing the United States. the Iranians want to see.

[00:09:43]Can Trump actually deliver on his promise of reigning in the Israelis?

[00:09:48]Because if he cannot, what is the value of a deal with the United States?

[00:09:53]>> If we look at the United States negotiating positions over the past few months, I mean, President Trump has come out with a series of conflicting statements. He threatens Iran on the one hand and then, you know, a little while later, he says a deal is near. He sets deadlines and he walks away from them.

[00:10:08]Um I mean what does this tell you about the US room for maneuver as these negotiations continue?

[00:10:17]Trump um in many ways has more room for maneuver than I think he's given credit for or perhaps he himself sees it because at the end of the day the American public who we will go back to and try to sell this deal to do not care as much about these issues of enrichment etc as they care about their immediate economic situation. the fact that a deal has been struck. If that deal entails a complete end to the fighting throughout the region, Trump can say that he has achieved peace. That will be very valuable in the eyes of most Americans.

[00:10:51]If he can say that we have lifted sanctions on Iran and the Iranians have agreed to let American companies into the Iranian market, that's the largest market that will open up for American companies since the fall of the Soviet Union. that is tremendously valuable, much more easy for Americans to comprehend than any details about stockpile and enrichment levels. So if he gets that type of a broad deal, even if he doesn't get what, you know, the Washington elite would like him to get on the nuclear issue, he will nevertheless be in a very strong position to sell the deal to the American public. But beyond that, given the fact that the Iranians appear to be agreeing to uh uh voluntarily suspending whatever the terminology is being used, enrichment for a couple of years, um uh and particularly if he managed to get the stockpile out, then he has achieved things >> that was not achieved in the JCPOA. So he can still also objectively make the case that he got a deal that was better than the JCPOA. Now, he's of course going to put much more on the table by in terms of sanctions relief. And there will be voices in Washington that will criticize him for lifting the sanctions, but those voices tend to be the ones who never view the sanctions as leverage.

[00:12:01]They didn't put them there in order to get a deal. They put them there to permanently punish Iran and ensure a permanent enmity between the two countries. There is no such constituency in the United States for that position except for in Washington DC itself.

[00:12:17]What kind of pressure do you think President Trump is under domestically to reach a deal very soon? I mean, we are seeing what's happening to the economy.

[00:12:23]Inflation is going up. We just heard that mortgage rates are going up as well. The stock markets are behaving uh very erratically. And of course, there's also international pressure because the entire globe is affected uh by what is taking place in the Persian Gulf right now. We just had a poll out actually by the Washington Post on Friday morning which said that uh public confidence in Trump's management of the economy is extremely low.

[00:12:46]No, Trump is plummeting in the polls everywhere except with his own base and he still has roughly 70 plus% support in his base. But that too has uh come down from highs at 80s or so earlier on in the conflict. But the economic indicators show that he does not have much time. We're talking about a 10-year yield that is going above 4.5. We're talking about a 30-year yield that bond that is now reaching 518. has never been this high since 2007 when we all remember what happened back then. So, he needs to get this done quickly before we enter into an economic territory in which he has essentially passed the Rubicon and there's no point of return.

[00:13:27]Um now of course he's going to speak in a manner as if he uh is immune to some of these things because he doesn't want to give the in indication to the Iranians that he is that vulnerable because that will fuel Iran's uh demands at the negotiating table. But on the other hand, the Iranians also need to recognize that if they miss the current window, they may end up in a scenario in which the American president no longer can put the type of sanctions relief that the Iranians want on the table because his political margins are going to be much much more narrow. Um, he will likely lose in the midterm elections. He will become a a lame duck president. Uh, much of his party may turn against him for a variety of reasons. So now and also you won't have elections in Israel which means that the kind of vulnerability the Israeli prime minister has from uh criticism from Trump right now may not exist 6 months from now. So all of them including Iran's own economic situations indicate that it lies in both of their interests to get this done as quickly as possible.

[00:14:28]>> Tracy, thanks for being with us. Thank you so much for having