Impact of MAGA on European right-wing "Ideologically close but interests NOT RESPECTED”

[00:00:00]The last 6 8 months of Trump's foreign policy has created a major contradiction there.

[00:00:08]So, ideological similarities one thing, national interests are another thing.

[00:00:15]And there is a tension there for many national conservative European parties that feel ideologically close to the mega movement, but feel that their nation's interests are not respected by the American foreign policy.

[00:00:37]>> [music] >> Welcome everyone [music] to the Trump report. I'm Amy Kellogg here today with Giovanni Orsina, who is the head of the political science department at Luiss University in Rome.

[00:00:55]Dr. Orsina, thank you for joining us.

[00:00:58]>> Thank you very much for having me. It's a pleasure to be here and discuss this complicated topics.

[00:01:05]>> Yes, let's go straight to Giorgia Meloni, the Prime Minister of Italy. She and President Trump have had a bit of a problem of late. They seem to be getting along. Uh their interests overlapped quite conveniently for a long time and it's been less in the news right now, but how would you rate US-Italy relations at the moment?

[00:01:33]>> At the moment, I would rate US-Italy relations uh as reasonably or decently good. The relate the personal relations between Meloni and Trump are clearly quite bad. So, I would separate the personal relations between the two heads of the executive power and the relations between the two countries. As a matter of fact, when uh Meloni and Trump clashed or rather Trump actually was particularly let's say aggressive with Meloni and Meloni tried to avoid that in any possible way. Then behind the scenes, a number of mechanisms started getting in gear in order to safeguard the relationship between the two countries. But certainly the personal relationship between the two persons uh uh have taken their toll.

[00:02:32]And right now the the the American ambassador to Italy, Tim McCarthy, is doing a kind of, you know, good goodwill tour around Italy.

[00:02:44]And this is quite strange using his personal yacht. Uh which is a huge yacht. Uh so in a rather, let's say, not particularly traditional diplomatic way, but he's trying to keep the relations uh on the best possible footing.

[00:03:03]>> Do you think Italians appreciate this yacht trip around your around Italy and a chance to interact with the ambassador or do you think that it's a bit tone deaf at a time when a lot of people are feeling this big divide between the rich and the poor. I don't know. I know there have been some protests in in Venice, but I've also heard he's been very well received in other parts of Italy. How do you see it?

[00:03:30]>> Well, uh the thing in itself is the American ambassador going around Italy and meeting the local administrators, persons from the business community.

[00:03:41]Now, that can be bad in itself. So this is a sign of interest, a sign of attention. And I think this is uh reasonably well received by the elites that are meeting Ambassador Ferrita. Certainly, there are parts of the public opinion that are very hostile to that, and this is the left wing, more or less populist, using both left-wing arguments and populist arguments.

[00:04:10]But, most of the Italian public opinion, I think, is just not aware that this is happening at all.

[00:04:16]So, this is not particularly covered in newspapers. I do not know about television, but my my take is that most of the public opinion doesn't even know that this is happening at all. So, it is also very difficult to ascertain to what extent this is having an impact at large among the public opinion. Certainly, the opinion polls are telling us that the rating of President Trump among the Italian public opinion is quite low.

[00:04:44]It's very low, I would say, and that's certainly uh a thing, even though, again, the image of the US is not necessarily entirely overlapping with the image of the president.

[00:04:57]>> Why is Trump so unpopular in Italy?

[00:05:02]>> Well, essentially, uh because uh he has been perceived as someone who is having a very very assertive, one could even say aggressive, and quite unilateral foreign policy.

[00:05:17]And that has been received by the Italians as, well, is not doing our interests. He's not He's, you know, defending the American interest, which might possibly be even legitimate, but, you know, as Italians, this is create This is not helping us and may even be creating problems to us. I mean, I think a number of things should be taken into account.

[00:05:45]Uh Greenland certainly was not perceived as a popular move by the European public opinion in general.

[00:05:55]You know, the superpower that is essentially bullying a smaller country like Denmark, and you know, putting a move of something that is not particularly perceived by the Italian public opinion, but that is considered anyway connected to Europe.

[00:06:14]Uh the tariffs is another is another element, and also the the the tariff policy of Trump has been perceived or presented to the Italian public opinion as a potential problem to an export-led economy such as Italy is an export-led economy, is exporting a lot to the US, and of course this kind of policy has been perceived as a potentially damaging policy to Italy. Final and foremost, of course, Iran as something that was perceived as very unilateral, and also presented to the Italian public opinion, but most of the opinion makers in Italy, and that also must be taken into account, as something that was dangerous, not necessary, and with the closing down of the Strait of Hormuz as something that would be mostly damaging to Europe.

[00:07:09]So, something that was made by the Americans unilaterally without considering that the negative effects would be paid by the Europeans without consulting the American the the the European allies, this was certainly not well perceived by the Italian public opinion. Again, most of the Italian opinion makers were opposed to it, and this must also be taken into account.

[00:07:35]But, public opinion seemed responsive to this kind of interpretation of how the thing that had been played.

[00:07:45]>> I saw a quote from the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio today.

[00:07:50]I don't think he said it today. He may have said it yesterday.

[00:07:53]Recently.

[00:07:55]That it's not the United States job to protect shipping on the entire planet forever.

[00:08:03]Meaning. Or apropos of the US wanting some support. For its operations.

[00:08:11]In the Strait of Hormuz, presumably.

[00:08:14]How?

[00:08:16]How would that comment be perceived or how has it been perceived?

[00:08:21]By Europeans.

[00:08:25]>> My answer would be that.

[00:08:30]On on the one end, they would say, "Okay.

[00:08:35]We got the picture. You are no longer willing to.

[00:08:41]Defend Europeans. And I think that at least part of European public opinion would be ready to admit.

[00:08:49]That Europeans have been to a certain extent say piggybacking on American back. I mean essentially exploiting.

[00:08:58]The American defense defense system. And it is very slowly passing on among European public opinions that Europe must do most. Must do more than it has been doing so far. By the way, this is an important thing. We started from Meloni. The Italian public opinion is the most reluctant everywhere in Europe in shouldering the burden of the defense.

[00:09:26]Italy does not think it should defend itself.

[00:09:30]Does not think that there are major dangers.

[00:09:34]It essentially thinks that no one is threatening it or most of the Italian public opinion don't think that they should defend themselves. All opinion polls are very clear on that and this is part of the trouble for Meloni because Meloni is essentially on the one hand she wants to answer the American demand for Europe to shoulder the burden of defense. On the other hand, she must look after her own public opinion and in Italy who are going to vote next year. So it is very difficult to tell a reluctant public opinion right now we need to spend more on defense and the opposition is very ready to use these arguments saying you are going to you are spending on defense, you are not spending on welfare, you are not spending on health and using these as a main propaganda point during the elections. So Meloni is in is in a very difficult position for this but other European countries certainly are far more aware that they need to spend more on defense and uh you know, take their own share. So this sentence by Rubio by many would be met with would be said, "Okay, we we got it."

[00:10:51]And to a certain extent you are right.

[00:10:53]On the other hand, I think that many Europeans would also answer, "Look, yes, but at the same time I mean, you can speaking of arm woods, many would answer, "Well, you created the problem there." So that was not a problem before the end of February when you started the war. So if you create a problem, then you cannot ask us to shoulder the problem and you still create the problem without asking us anything about that. I wouldn't say permission, but without even telling us that you're going to do this, well, then this is going to get more complicated.

[00:11:37]And I think this is part of the contradictions in Trump's administration. On the one hand, this idea we want to retreat and put Americans first. On the other hand, a number of quite aggressive foreign policy initiatives.

[00:11:54]And this is, I think, part of the difficulty for the Trump administration to find a coherent foreign policy. And, you know, this is opening up a possibility for Europeans to say, "Well, yes, but we can look after the seas, but not fix problems that you have created without even asking our opinion first."

[00:12:20]>> Has the MAGA movement had a big impact on European political parties, would you say, either in a positive or negative sense? I mean, what has been the effect of the rise of MAGA in the United States here in Europe?

[00:12:36]>> Well, I think that there are right-wing political parties that have been using the connection with the MAGA movement uh as an instrument to legitimize themselves.

[00:12:49]Certainly, Meloni has played that card.

[00:12:54]Now, I just, you know, very shortly, the background. I mean, Meloni was the leader of a party that polled 4% and that was only 10 years ago, not 30.

[00:13:08]And that party had a problem with its history because it was the heir of a party that had neo-fascist roots. Now, I've never thought that Meloni was a neo-fascist. Meloni was a conservative. Her party was fully legitimate, but she had this this this story certainly that was there.

[00:13:33]And when a party has a story with the name fascism, well, you know, abroad people are not very sophisticated and they say, well, you know, this is a party with its roots in fascism and that's it. So, she had a major problem to legitimize herself.

[00:13:52]And she has been using a lot this label of conservative to legitimize herself both in Europe, but also exploiting her connections with the Republican movements and of course with the Republican Party in the US that was being transforming itself uh into, you know, being somehow occupied by the MAGA movement. So, that certainly was an element. She used her American connections to legitimize herself. To be fair, she used her American connection 360°, meaning that she used a lot also her connection with the Biden presidency in order to legitimize herself. But certainly that was an element. That was an element with Orbán, for instance, certainly.

[00:14:42]Possibly with the Polish Law and Justice Party. So, a number of parties were using the American connection in order to strengthen and legitimize themselves.

[00:14:54]Certainly the last six eight months of Trump's foreign policy has created a major contradiction there.

[00:15:04]So, ideological similarities one thing, national interests are another thing and there is a tension there for many national conservative European parties that feel ideologically close to the mega movement but feel that their nation's interests are not respected by the American foreign policy or not taken into account enough by the American foreign policy.

[00:15:35]And this is creating quite deep contradictions in the European right starting with the Italian right.

[00:15:45]>> The war in Ukraine has brought Europe together in many ways and and strengthened NATO in in many ways.

[00:15:56]Um Trump has been different. Trump has stepped back from Ukraine.

[00:16:02]And somehow it feels like the UK is after Brexit becoming closer again with Europe.

[00:16:09]How do you see the the bonds in Europe and including the United Kingdom uh strengthening or or evolving with this war raging in Ukraine?

[00:16:23]>> No, this has been a a major game-changer. I was saying before that European public opinions with the partial exception of of the Italian one are now far more conscious of the needs uh to defend themselves and to build some form of European defense.

[00:16:43]And uh certainly this has been an outcome of the Russian aggression to Ukraine. That's that's very clear.

[00:16:50]Uh and uh Europe has answered. You know, with with Europe, you you never know. Uh it answered quite well to the pandemic.

[00:17:03]I would say it has answered quite well to the Ukrainian conflict.

[00:17:08]It did not answer particularly well the Middle Eastern question, the Gaza question, very divided. So, it's it's a a mixed bag. And Europe sometimes is successfully moving together, otherwise less so. On Ukraine, certainly that has been a major element of cohesion inside the European Union and between the European Union European Union countries and the United Kingdom.

[00:17:35]Uh So, positive reaction, positive elements, and certainly something that has sped up and you know, accelerated and deepened the the cooperation in Europe.

[00:17:51]That said, I think a lot still remains to be done. A huge lot remains to be done. I mean, the first element is that of course uh Trump's administration has been very ambiguous to Ukraine, but bottom line has kept helping the Ukrainian defense.

[00:18:09]I mean, Ukraine could not defend itself without the American intelligence support, with the satellite support. So, the United States has been playing a a an ambiguous role with a number of openings to Putin and to Russia, but at the same time it has kept backing and the backing of the Americans, as far as I know, has remained crucial to support Ukraine.

[00:18:37]And at the same time, the Europeans have been very strongly cooperating on thinking about strengthening the NATO European element inside NATO. And And we see that the NATO is still So, my my argument would be it is not very clear what is the institutional box in which the Europeans want to build a common defense. Is this the the three or the five or the volunteers that are working on an intergovernmental level. Is this the European Union? Is this the European side of NATO? This remains very unclear and as far as I know it remains very unclear how you are going to manage the procurement of the weapon system, which means uh where you're going to produce the weapon system because this is a major game that is connected also to where the investments are going to go inside Europe. So, there is still, I think, a huge lot to do and there is still a lot of dependence, as far as I know, I'm not an expert in military issues, a lot of dependence on on the American side on a lot of key elements. Uh but certainly, I think that Ukraine has been a major element bringing together the Europeans and certainly a major element reconnecting or strengthening the connection between the UK and and and the countries of the European Union.

[00:20:22]I would say Europe. I've never thought that the UK was not part of Europe, I mean.

[00:20:26]>> [laughter] >> The uh vice president certainly has criticized Europe for allegedly having freedom of speech problems. And that's become a bit of a MAGA talking point that Europeans have been muzzled in some way, that they can't speak their minds.

[00:20:48]How do you perceive that and how do you think Europeans have perceived that criticism?

[00:20:54]>> I think they've perceived it in very political terms, which means that the right-wing side of public opinion has found more than a grain of truth in what Vance was saying, while the let's say center-left has been, you know, outraged by what was perceived an attack on the European way of life. And also, you know, a lecture to Europe about liberal democracy by an American administration, which that part of public opinion perceives as attacking liberal democracy in the United States. So, essential, you know, look who's talking. That was the That was the answer. My take as an analyst is that I think that what we are essentially witnessing is a major conflict on what it means to be the West.

[00:21:57]Uh and this is my my understanding of this. So, uh to put it It's It's It's a It's a moral, scholarly, and and complicated argument, but my the short and simple version of this is the West is a place with its own tradition, its own story, its own geography.

[00:22:19]Uh one can could never say that India belongs to the West or I don't know that Kenya belongs to the West. So, it's a place with a story. At the same time, the West has also very strong universalistic tradition. So, the idea is that West Western values are not just Western, but are universal values.

[00:22:41]The rights of the individual, free speech, democracy, these are not just for the Westerners, these are for everyone. Now, what we are looking today, I think, is a crisis of this identity and a major conflict about whether the West should be perceived as a universalistic endeavor or more safeguard its own specific roots. And I think that the conflict between the US and Europe is very much a conflict on these uh which is also a conflict between left and right. The left-wing progressive opinion says, "We Our values are for everyone and we cannot close ourselves and defend ourselves against a wider world." Whereas the right-wingers say, "No, we need to defend our traditions and values at home first."

[00:23:37]And essentially what Vance was saying is, "You Europeans are watering down your tradition, your legacy. You are forgetting your legacy. Uh whereas we ought to defend it." And I think this is the major conflict, but it is also very much of a left-right conflict. Uh and it's I see it part of our our problem.

[00:24:03]>> Does Vladimir Putin appeal to a lot of right-wing parties and and um uh would you say to the MAGA movement? I mean, is that a is that a fair assumption or is it frankly a bit of posturing because they could these people could never live in Russia under Vladimir Putin.

[00:24:24]>> Well, Putin certainly has been a an important reference point for a part of these let's say hard-right conservatives looking at Putin as some kind you know, someone who's was defending the values of tradition, even though in that case one would say of Western tradition.

[00:24:47]Well, you know, there's a lot of number of question marks there. Certainly one could say of Christian tradition, but this would open up the great problem of to what extent what is the relationship between the West and Christianity and this will lead would lead us you know in very complicated areas. Certainly Putin was a reference point there and I think that this still is a major problem when you when we think about right-wing movements in Europe.

[00:25:19]The real problem for many of these right-wing movements is beside their ideology is that they are pro-Russian. They some of them have been financed by Russia. Maybe some of them still are financed by Russia.

[00:25:37]Certainly they do not think that defending against Russia is a major is a major point or a major problem which of course opens up the problem of what is their national conservatism?

[00:25:52]What is a national conservatism that is not perceiving the need to defend the nation against potential foreign threats and again opens up the question of what is the tradition that they are defending because if you are defending the Western tradition well certainly individual rights and democracy are part of that tradition and I you know it's difficult to say that individual rights and democracy are upheld nowadays in Moscow. So that opens up a major a major issue. I think that this is part it's it's a very complicated web of contradictions. It's also very difficult to for instance in Meloni's case you know to pick one example because also examples are very different. Meloni for instance is clearly a Western oriented national conservative.

[00:26:45]So for her national conservatism is about defending the Italian national interest within the wider interest of the Western alliance and looking at the Western values.

[00:27:02]Western values that are interpreted are the values of a place with a history and not as universal values. So, these are the Western values of the northern Atlantic, of the great revolutions of the 17th and 18th century, of the Western alliance. These are our values. We need to defend them, but certainly for Meloni, these values are including liberal democracy. And this is the reason why she was very clear on the need to defend Ukraine against the Russian aggression. So, in Meloni's case, I would say this is more clear in this direction.

[00:27:47]Other other people who are also in alliance with Meloni in the supranational political sphere are more complicated, above all in their relationship vis-à-vis Russia. And one could say, I was saying it before, Trump's Trump's, let's say, attitude to Putin has been at best very ambiguous.

[00:28:10]>> Giovanni, Democrats in particular have been pretty outraged by the amount of money that the Trump family has made since President Trump started his second term in office. What have Italians made of that?

[00:28:27]>> As far as I they've perceived it we because once again, you know, you do not know I mean, certainly the newspapers have been writing about this a lot, but how, you know, Italians have have never read very much Italians. I mean, Italians uh traditionally the circulation of newspapers in Italy has been lower than in other countries for historical reasons. When Italians became literate, you know, the radio and the television were already around. So, they started informing themselves through the radio and television. So, historically speaking, Italians have not been reading have been reading newspapers less than other Western countries. Now, newspapers are in in trouble everywhere.

[00:29:16]They are in great trouble in Italy. So, I'm not so sure to what extent Italians would be aware of this.

[00:29:24]Uh certainly, uh most of them would not appreciate.

[00:29:31]Uh well, for a number of reasons, not least that uh well, there has been a lot of debate in Italy in the last 30 years about the mixture between private interest and public money. I mean, we about we have had a number of scandal about bribes. We have had Berlusconism and Berlusconi. So, all and Italians are very much aware that there are problems there.

[00:30:03]Uh many right-wing Italians were very ready to pardon Berlusconi.

[00:30:10]But, you know, I'm not so sure they would be as ready to pardon Trump, which is perceived as far away as, you know, Berlusconi was very good at communicating with Italian people.

[00:30:23]Trump is not communicating with Italian people because he is not an Italian [clears throat] politician. So, for for a number of reasons, I would say this would not be particularly well particularly well perceived.

[00:30:38]>> Giovanni Orsina, I'm going to let you go at this point because we've been speaking for half an hour now. So, I thank you very much for sharing all of your thoughts and your insight and and hope to talk to you again very soon.

[00:30:52]>> Thank you very much. It was It was a pleasure for me and uh also looking forward to talking to you very soon.

[00:31:01]>> Thank you.

[00:31:03]>> Thank you.