China's Pacific Missile Shock Explained

[00:00:05]Hello and welcome to another edition of the China Global South podcast. A proud member of the Cynica Podcast Network.

[00:00:12]I'm Eric Olander. Today we're going to head to the South Pacific. This is a region that has been very much the focus of great power competition for the past year, but things in the past, I'd say four to 6 weeks have escalated tremendously. If you haven't been paying attention to what's been going on in the South Pacific and in the Pacific island community countries, uh we have a lot to talk about today. We're going to focus on three issues in particular. Still a lot of fallout from a Chinese missile test that took place earlier this month.

[00:00:44]A missile launched from the South China Sea and landed in the South Pacific.

[00:00:49]We're going to talk about that. Also, Pacific Island countries are moving very quickly now to forge new security partnerships. We're going to do a quick rundown of all of those because China is very much at the center of some of those concerns. And then finally, the Papa New Guinian government closed Taiwan's representative office in Port Mosby and we'll get an assessment of that. And for all of this, I am thrilled to have for the first time on our show, Jang Dong Ha, who is our senior research fellow at ANU's Department of Pacific Affairs and also CGSP's non-resident fellow for the Pacific. Dunwa, thank you so much for taking the time to join us.

[00:01:30]>> Thank you, Eric. Thank you so much for having me here.

[00:01:34]>> Wonderful to have you. Uh we had the pleasure of meeting each other last year when I was in CRA, and so it's wonderful to have you on the show for the first time. You've been doing some excellent writing for us on uh any number of issues affecting China in the South Pacific. Let's start with this question of the missile launch. Let me just kind of set it up a little bit. On July 6th, a PLA Navy ballistic missile submarine launched what many analysts believe was either a JL2 or a JL3 missile from the South China Sea. Now, if you're not familiar with these two missiles, a JL2 is an intercontinental ballistic missile, uh, nuclear capable, but that goes for under has a range of about under 10,000 km, whereas a JL3 is an ICBM that has a range longer than 10,000 km. We're not exactly sure which one uh this was, but people think it was either a JL2 or a JL3. The missile flew approximately 7,300 km before it landed in the South Pacific nuclear free zone and that's what unnerved quite a few people. This was China's first publicly confirmed fullrange submarine launched strategic missile test into the Pacific and a lot of people feel that it was trying to demonstrate a more mature sea-based nuclear deterrent. If you did not hear our conversation with our other non-resident fellow Derek Gman, who we talked about this, one of the points that he brought up was that China doesn't have a lot of places where it can actually conduct these kinds of tests. As we've mentioned on previous shows, it couldn't have sent the missile towards California. that would have understandably upset and unnerved the United States. Had it gone north uh over Korea and the Korean Peninsula and towards Japan, that would not have been uh a responsible thing to do. That would have unnerved those powers. And so, in many ways, the only place it had to test fire this was South. Now, seven Pacific Island countries criticized China for the test. Solomon Islands Prime Minister Matthew Wallace, who also serves as chair of the Pacific Islands Forum, he said, quote, "We don't want anybody, China, America, anybody testing ICBMs in the Pacific Island region. Be our friend, but don't threaten us."

[00:04:00]Touvalu's Prime Minister Felit Teo said the launch was contrary to the Pacific's long-standing commitment to peace and a nuclear-free region. And Papa New Guinea Prime Minister James Morat invoked the region's history and he said, quote, "Our region has lived through war, nuclear testing, and military activities imposed upon us by larger powers. We do not want history repeated." Now, Dong Ha, you wrote an article, a column for us on the CGSP website, what to know about the Chinese missile test. tell us what was your reaction to this test and what should we know about what the Chinese were trying to achieve?

[00:04:42]>> Sure Eric thanks for answering this question. I think the this is talking about the Pacific and talking about the China Pacific relationship. This is one of the latest development and also now has become very very sensitive now nowadays and and also it's important because it's going to have uh this my personal f is going to have very significant significant implications on the Chinese relationship with the regime and and actually China I did I did some check China did did uh have this time of test previously And the last one was in September 2024 which was launched uh uh from Hain that's landbased test rather than this was the first submarine based test.

[00:05:34]Okay. So that's what's important. It's not the missile that's been tested because as you point out a JL2 or JL3 has been tested but from a landbased launcher whereas this was the first time from a submarine.

[00:05:44]>> Yeah. And this this test is uh uh is important to me and as I uh for a few reasons as I mentioned in my uh short paper written for the global for your blog one is uh to me it has sorry we can we can perceive this issue this launch from three perspectives ever mentioned in the article once more short-term or sorry not short-term that's one is the the immediate trigger of this the launch To me that is is one of the that is Australian Australia and Fiji the two countries they sign an important agreement. Yeah. They called the ocean of peace alliance the treaty or agreement and based this agreement the two countries will of defend each other >> and they signed that on the same as the test.

[00:06:38]>> Yeah. Yeah. So the Chinese this test was conducted just a few hours after that.

[00:06:43]So to me this is not a coincidence. This is just a kind of the trigger. China wants to send a clear message to the parties involved. Yeah. Especially to Australia and traditional uh the traditional powers or tradition demand partners that it is against to this type of the agreement signed between Fiji and Australia.

[00:07:06]And also >> can I ask you a question? I'm sorry. Can I ask you a question there? Sorry to interrupt you. Sure. Um but people we've asked people about this and one of the things that they said was that the you know these tests they take months if not years to develop and to schedule and that there was no way last year at this time that they could have known that Fiji and Australia were going to sign a pact on the same day as this test and so other people attributed that to mere coincidence. What's your take on that? I think you're on the one hand you're right this type of test will take the mouse of preparation on the other hand the Chinese side may they have already know that the two countries Australia and Fiji they're going to sign an important like the security agreement yeah and then once this is confirmed that two countries sign then the Chinese side the the PLA they started the they started the the launch have and uh so going back to what I said the immediate trick could be this uh this important agreement between Austria and Fiji but then this is just a part of those as you mentioned the those important developments between Australia and the Pacific Pacific countries not just Fiji as you said mentioned earlier Australia has also signed the similar important and the uh security uh not security important agreement bilateral agreement with some of the of the other Pacific island countries such as uh Vadu such uh such as the Naru and Touvalu. This is just a part of this government and my and my feeling that the Chinese government is very very unhappy with this type of the the arrangement and the Chinese side believe that all this time development aims to isolate the China aim to contain the Chinese growing influence in the Pacific. I say I say this because of the we all know that nowadays the Pacific region is a part of the Indo-Pacific that's part of the the great part competition the Pacific region is at now is at the center of this the great power competition between China and the traditional powers including the United States Australia Japan New Zealand and some of the U and also European countries. Yeah, >> I guess my question and the part that I was so surprised about was that China has spent the better part of 10 years and you were a diplomat in the region many years ago and you were part of this trying to you know strengthen its ties in in among Pacific island countries and it's invested a lot of diplomatic capital a lot of humanitarian assistance it's built stadiums and then it went went ahead and did this and you saw the reaction from so many Pacific island countries that it felt to me like it was just lighting on fire so much of that goodwill that they had built up over the better part of 1020 years and it felt like a soft power mistake on China's part and then remember China did not come out publicly to reassure uh Pacific island countries about its intent instead what it did is The narrative in Beijing from both state media and Communist Party media was all about, well, the United States has done this testing for years, so we should be able to do it, too. And it completely ignored the concerns of Pacific Island countries. I guess that was a surprise to me that that didn't do it that they that they didn't seem to pay a lot of attention to the needs of Pacific island countries and the response that they would get from this. Otherwise, I don't think that they would these P Pacific island countries would have responded so negatively in the media to the test.

[00:11:08]What's your take on that?

[00:11:10]>> Sure. Sure. I think this uh this is a a very important question and uh uh to me uh I think uh a few points let's say to to share with you. Well, first I think the uh we have seen that the that's more generally uh uh more broadly about the the shift of the of the oil of the involvement of the Chinese foreign policy especially on President Xiinping we has become more let's say from the Chinese perspective they said this is more uh uh more active or more proactive and the but and from the traditional powers perspective the Chinese foreign policy underin presidential champions become more a. Yeah. So this is the first point that is also more broadly and also which is the general context that foreign policy Chinese foreign policy on President Xinping has become has changed. It's for now focus on more on the you know the Chinese terms.

[00:12:12]Yeah. It it has abandoned the the which is taking a low keeping a low profile the foreign policy. That's the hide and bide your time.

[00:12:23]>> Hide and buy and wait for wait for your tie. Yeah.

[00:12:25]>> Wait for your time to make.

[00:12:27]>> Yeah. So this is the first point that is the Chinese foreign policy that has changed. Yeah. So this is number one. And then number two, this is also my personal uh the personal view. I think this uh this launch could also reflect that's another general issue that is between the relationship between the foreign affairs. I'm talking about the Chinese ministry of foreign affairs and also the Chinese military that is the PRA as you know this these two ministries they're important a very important ministries in China and the relationship similar to other other the Chinese the relationship among the Chinese the other ministries the relationship could could be quite tricky sometimes the cooperate sometimes compete for for influence and it is not it is not a secret that the Chinese P they have more influence Yeah, in the Chinese the the domestic politics. Yeah. So, so I guess I guess for uh uh on this M sorry the Mr. Lance I I I guess that could be uh this just could be reflect some kind of let's say the um the particular relationship between these two ministries in MFA which means that the P and one who make the division regardless of the the views or advice from the P but of course this just my personal this is my guessing but I think to to like extent maybe is the true yeah so is certainly the tensions between the PLA and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are not unique to China.

[00:14:03]We have the same tensions in the United States between the Pentagon and the State Department. They have different agendas.

[00:14:09]>> Um, let me just read from what you what your essay that you wrote for us. You wrote, "China's missile test relates to the long-term geostrategic competition between China and traditional powers.

[00:14:22]Ideological and strategic mistrust between the two sides has deep roots. uh but it has become more pronounced under Xiinping whose foreign and security policy has placed greater emphasis on military readiness, national resilience and a more assertive diplomatic posture.

[00:14:40]So you're telling us that's how we should frame this missile test is within that larger context of how she is structuring foreign and security policy.

[00:14:49]Yeah, I think not from a Chinese perspective that is a right that is uh especially for the for president and for his government that he encourage the Chinese diplomats and also the BA to get ready. Yeah. Do not shy from fighting to have different views to express the Chinese the police. Yeah. in whatever terms and also in the then linking this to the g great power competition we have seen that this this g power competition has developed and has continued to developed let's say in the past 10 years it's quite interesting and as as I said I was a former practitioner working in the pacific region and then and and then then I had a career change and started to do my PhD at AU so national university and And at that time that's about uh uh I started my in 2013 at that time it's very interesting at that time people from I'm I'm talking about governments from China from traditional powers they were still interested in cooperation yeah and that's why the my PhD thesis focused on the trilateral or tri trilateral or triangular aid cooperation between China and the traditional donors now things has changed change completely. No one talking about or no one talking about the cooperation or coordination and more is talking about the competing or competition and competition for influence in the interpacific region.

[00:16:18]It's very interesting. This is but but this has already become the general context and my view is that there's no sign that neither side China or powers they were back from this competition.

[00:16:34]Yeah. Yeah, they will continue to compete whether in the security sector, whether in the placing policing sector, placing corporation. That's a very sensitive but also a very important sector for China nowadays in the Pacific region. Yeah.

[00:16:48]>> Well, let's talk about the great powers who have been competing in the in that region for a long time. The and this is something that Pacific island countries have complained about for years. uh the traditional powers the US, Australia and to some extent New Zealand had many cases disengaged. Uh in fact the US didn't have embassies in many of the countries and the Chinese kind of came in and filled a void. This is the same thing we've seen in other parts of the world as well particularly in Africa where the US and Europe traditional powers and foreign powers have uh were you know have disengaged in many respects and China took advantage of the opening. Now we see the United States once again losing interest in this region. But Japan is playing a bigger role. New Zealand uh in fact the New Zealand foreign minister was just up in Japan uh last week and they forged a pledged closer security ties. Prime Minister Takichi was down in Australia and they were talking about closer security ties. You talked about Australia, Fiji and those security ties that are getting closer. So, are we seeing a change in who the major powers are with the United States potentially, you know, retreating again and Japan stepping in with a bigger role and Australia and New Zealand obviously being a much more assertive? How's the security layout work now?

[00:18:08]>> I I think the actually I do not uh Yeah, you're right.

[00:18:15]Australia and New Zealand they they are and they will continue to be the two let's say two most important regional regional powers in the in the Pacific.

[00:18:24]Yeah. And uh and but the I think talking about the the let's say the influence of the traditional powers the influence and the focus of the traditional powers regime we can say they have some kind of the division with labor. Yeah. And uh the US, the United States, they focus more on the northern part of the Pacific. Yeah. And uh that's the the Micronesia sub region. Yeah. And so that's why that's that's their focus and they will continue to be their focus.

[00:18:56]And the vast majority of the US aid program, the US aid money is spent in this part of the separation. That's in Micronia Micronesia separation of the Pacific. And for Australia, it has very close relationship with the Melanesia separation. Those countries has the uh those are large Pacific countries has more populations. Countries such as the Solomon Islands, Papon Guini and also Vanuato and also Fiji. It's very interesting is that below to both the uh Melanesia and the Polynesia but for New Zealand they are more focused on the the on the Polynesia the separation and New Zealand has a very close ties to countries like Koko Islands newway Samoa Tonga. Yeah. And so these these countries Australia, New Zealand and United States will continue to focus on the Pacific region especially their uh uh their area of traditional influence.

[00:20:03]>> I'm sorry but but have you seen a change in the US posture since Trump has come back into office? Because under Biden there was a lot more drive to become more present in the Pacific. But what's it like under Trump?

[00:20:15]>> Yeah. Right. Yeah. Right. Yeah. Yeah.

[00:20:16]Right. under Trump is more let's say focus on the American first and focus us on let's say in terms of uh they focus on more the on trade instead of aid yeah that's a more general policy and also again the even on uh even on the under the the Trump administration United States will continue to develop very strong security relationship with the Micronesia the sub region especially countries that the three countries had that as the compact of the free association relations with the United States which was renewed to about two years ago. Yeah. Mash martial islands Palao and who else? The FSM fed of Micro India. Yeah. But this is also related to the the the the more broad geostic competition in in the Pacific region especially in the Pacific. Yeah. And if you're talking about Japan, you're right. Japan is a very important the let's say the traditional power, traditional divine partners, you know, uh uh in the regime.

[00:21:24]Yeah. And >> but they've been a traditional development partner, but are we seeing a more a more emphasis on Japanese security partnership with Australia, New Zealand, and Pacific Island countries?

[00:21:36]Are we going to start seeing Japanese warships and military engagements more in this region?

[00:21:41]>> Uh that's not so bright. I think that's one of the latest development that is more more coordination and more cooperation between as say between either allies or like-minded states.

[00:21:52]Yeah, that is between the US allies like the US, Australia, New Zealand with Japan and also with India. This is we what we call the the closer relationship uh closer relationship and closer coordination between like-minded states in the context of geostic competition.

[00:22:12]Yeah. Well, you've talked about now three members of the Quad, India, Japan, and Australia. The United States is the fourth member of the Quad. They're a little bit of a variable in the Quad, but it's interesting that you raised this trilateral cooperation with India, Japan, and Australia. Uh let's get a a statement from from Chinese Foreign Minister Wangi. 2 weeks after the test, Solomon Islands foreign minister, uh, Rick Kuni Pula Puloa went to Beijing and this was the first public meeting with a Chinese between a Chinese diplomat and a Pacific Island diplomat since the test.

[00:22:47]They made no public statement on the test, which I, you know, thought was a missed opportunity on the part of the Chinese, but okay. Uh, Chinese Foreign Minister Wongi said, and I quote here, that China's cooperation with the Solomon Islands, and this is probably more broadly across the Pacific Islands, quote, comes with no political strings attached. And uh, he also said that Pacific Island nations are independent and sovereign nations, not someone's backyard. And that's a reference to this great power competition that you have talked about. What should we look forward to going for the rest of the year? We have the Pacific Islands Forum coming up. That's a very important meeting. Security is probably going to be very high on the agenda. How do you think China, Taiwan, Japan, Australia, the US are going to factor in the Pacific Island forum that's coming up later this year.

[00:23:41]>> Yeah. Uh talking about I'm happy to give two comments on two issues. One is the mention because you mentioned some this is such an important relationship nowadays between China and Pacific region. Yeah. And second about the the Pacific Island forum. You're right. The so the this year's Pacific Forum Pacific Islands forum meeting summit will happen in a month's time. Yeah. The end between the end of the August and the early September and talking about security at that right I think the security will security issues will feature feature very prominently in this upcoming summit. Yeah. And why is why is that related to to the missile test and also the Chinese missile test and also to this fast evolving the security relationship between the region and the external players. Yeah. Not just not not just with the China but also with uh with the traditional powers. Yeah. As we mentioned the region the the reg traditional demand partners is uh deepening their cooperation is streng strengthening their security relationship with the region. So much has happened in let's say in the past uh in the past year in the past year including including what have has happened the uh in the past few months. Yeah. So security issue will feature prominently in the upcoming summit. It I think it is likely that the Pacific forum will release some important statements or document on this. Yeah. And I assume if they release some kind of the regional security statement you are focused that regional security be will be handled by the regional countries. Yeah. But for this regional countries they will include Australian and the New Zealand they are part of the Pacific family.

[00:25:40]Let's say yeah this is Australia this and then from from the Chinese perspective they they will continue to to to promote their their own version of the cooperation with the with the Pacific forum. Yeah, I'm not sure whether they are aware that since 20 2022 the Chinese government they have established seven they called seven cooperation centers between China and Pacific Islands focusing on seven different sectors such as the the emergency uh supplies and also agriculture profit reduction climate change and also the placing cooperation.

[00:26:22]>> Yeah. Now, do you think the missile test issue is going to set them back or by the time the summit comes, everybody's moved on?

[00:26:30]>> No, no, no. I I I think I assume according as some media has reported, I assume the leader, the regional leaders, they are still discussing on this. Yeah.

[00:26:41]And I I think it is uh there is a possibility that the region on forum they are going to release something.

[00:26:47]Yeah. uh about the about the regional security but I'm not sure whether they are going to name China in that or not.

[00:26:54]Yeah, >> probably not. Yeah, they're very good at being diplomatic about that.

[00:26:58]>> Yeah. Yeah.

[00:26:59]>> Very quickly before we go, one other big issue that confronts China in the Pacific Island area is Taiwan. It remains one of the regions where a cluster of countries still have diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Palao is among them. Um many of them very pro- US. So not surprising.

[00:27:19]But uh in on July 16th last week, Papa New Guiney's economic minister posted a very short statement that said, and let me just read from the statement here, the physical presence of Chinese Taipei, that's what a lot of people call Taiwan, will no longer be recognized or required within the jurisdiction of Papa New Guinea. Uh this came by surprise for a lot of people. Were you surprised by it?

[00:27:44]And what do you think was behind this decision right now?

[00:27:48]>> I think uh it's very interesting. Uh it's interesting but not surpris.

[00:27:55]Yeah. Because I know that the the time the Chinese government they have focusing on the time issue since it it developed a relationship with the region. Yeah. And this this relates to the Chinese the Chinese let's say motives or motivations in the Pacific region. And to me, I still have the same view that the Thai issue is one of the the one of the few priorities for for Beijing in the Pacific region because as you mentioned three countries in the Pacific region, they still recognize Taiwan including Masaland, Touvalu and Palao. So it's not surprising this and also even for those countries that has already uh had already had diplomatic relationship with China that are not means since we are remain unchanged.

[00:28:41]Yeah because country they can they can they can change signs between China and Taiwan. So that means for all the for the all the 14 countries that China sorry for the all for all the 14 sovereign states in the Pacific region China is working closely about their relationship with Taiwan whether these countries has already established or not has established relationship with Taiwan and for this PNG case I think it just demonstrates the uh I assume the Chinese side they have done a lot of work yeah a lot of lobbying and a lot of persuasion work behind under the table behind Another thing talking to the the PNG government this is wrong perspective is not surprising because the Chinese side has spent a lot of energy on this. Yeah.

[00:29:25]Talking to the senior officials governments in in PNG. And the second point I think it also could make a lot of sense. I was actually I was thinking about this in recent days. Yeah. And I assume this could be kind of the like because as as we mentioned the Australia and PNG they have develop a closer secular relationship the two countries signed like a mutual defense a treaty last year. Yeah. And the and also recently you mentioned recently the PNG prime minister also criticizes the Chinese the the missile test in the Pacific region. Yeah. And so on the security sides it is clear that the PNG governments they have already taken sides. Yeah. Leave your sides.

[00:30:11]>> Okay. So you know they've taken sides against China in this particular case.

[00:30:15]>> Let's say they have taken sides the uh Yeah. They have sided with Australia.

[00:30:20]Yeah.

[00:30:21]>> With Australia which is again counter to China's interest. So that's on the security side. But you're saying on the diplomatic side >> they're going to give an olive branch.

[00:30:30]>> Exactly. I think that that then for the pent government on are some other issues such as climate issue they can do more yeah to pacify China. Yeah. So this is my take on this.

[00:30:43]>> So just if I understand it's just an effort by PNG to create some balance in their relationship. So on the one hand closer security ties closer economic ties with Australia and on the other hand diplomatically to to be able to offer the Chinese something to say listen we also value you. Exactly. I think I think this my take and to me I think >> by the close the the type of office economic all type economic the office in PNG will not harm PNG. Yeah. And uh uh we we are not harm PNG significantly.

[00:31:21]Yeah. So uh yeah I'm let's say for the P government and also for some of the other Pan countries actually this happened this type of this type of issue that happened a few years ago Fiji government they also closed uh they also they closed their office in Taipei they they closed the the Fiji the office in Taipei. Yeah. To me, I think they are trying to give to give China something. Yeah. While they are developing a closer special security relationship with with the traditional powers. I think you said this kind of the banishing tactic.

[00:32:02]>> Yeah, that's very interesting. And again, there's nothing unique about what's happening in the Pacific Islands.

[00:32:08]We're seeing a lot of the same dynamic play out both in Latin America and in Africa. We saw that China is trying to constrain the space that Taiwan has to move in the international system. So remember the uh three Indian Ocean island states did not give overflight permission to President's plane to go to Eastatini. Also the South African government they forced the closure or the relocation of Taiwan's representative office from Ptoria to Johannesburg as did um this Nigerian government did the same thing moving it from Abuja to to Lagos. So again this is part of a pattern that we've seen.

[00:32:45]>> Exactly. And al also it's important know to know that the time issue has now become a one of the few top priorities for the Chinese government for punishing team. Yeah. So they need to they want to solve this let's this say they want to solve this time issue. Yeah. And diplomatically as you said they want to contain the time influence and space.

[00:33:08]Yeah. That's not surprising. That's not surprising. Yeah. The article is what to know about China's recent missile test in the South Pacific by our good friend and non-resident fellow for the Pacific Islands Jang Dang Hua who is also a senior research fellow at ANU that's the Australian National University's Department of Pacific affairs one of the sharpest minds on this topic Dha thank you again for taking the time to join us we really appreciate it >> thank you so much for having me >> well that'll do it for this edition of the China Global South podcast we'll be back again next week with another episode. And of course, if you want to follow all the work that Dungha and the team at CGSP around the world is doing, go to chinaglobals south.com. And of course, if you want to support the work that we're doing and get the daily digest that we produce that goes out to dozens of governments, research institutes, intelligence services, defense ministries, you name it. People interested in this topic are reading what our team is writing. Go to chinoglobal south.com/subscribe.

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[00:34:27]Well, that'll do it. We'll be back again next week. Until then, thank you so much for listening and for watching.