US and Saudi Arabia announce landmark nuclear deal | DW News

[00:00:00]Is this the beginning of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East? The US and Saudi Arabia signed a landmark nuclear deal on Wednesday. The US Energy Department says this multi-billion dollar partnership will help develop Saudi Arabia's civilian nuclear program over decades. But critics of the deal worry that if Saudi Arabia is able to develop its own nuclear capabilities and even enrich uranium, the already volatile Middle East could be on a course towards nuclear proliferation and an atomic arms race.

[00:00:35]Now, this deal is what's known as a 123 agreement, a reference to section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act, and this defines bilateral nuclear cooperation between the US and another nation. And normally, among its guidelines, countries are required to adhere to safety standards from the International Atomic Energy Agency. Countries that purchase nuclear material from the US must not use it for military purposes.

[00:01:03]And if so, the US has the right to demand the return of its atomic material.

[00:01:08]And let's get the perspective of Cena Azodi. He's an assistant professor of Middle East politics at the Elliot School of International Affairs at the George Washington University. It's good to have you with us. Um, now the US has similar agreements, one to three agreements with many other countries.

[00:01:26]What's unique about this one?

[00:01:30]Well, the long-standing policy of the United States has been no domestic enrichment in countries that don't already have it. And the policy started in 1974.

[00:01:41]And ironically, when Iran and West Germany back then signed a nuclear agreement, the Americans were quite upset and dissatisfied with West Germans for allowing Iran to ultimately have enrichment. So, the long-standing policy of uh United States has been no domestic enrichment in developing nations especially in the Middle East because of the risk of proliferation just a few years ago when the US signed an agreement a nuclear agreement with the UAE the United Arab Emirates uh the US demanded that they forego domestic enrichment under uh soil because of the very same the gold standard agreement the 123 agreement that you were just uh mentioning. So this is quite new uh that the United States is allowing uh Saudis to have uh domestic enrichment.

[00:02:37]>> Why does Saudi Arabia want a nuclear program?

[00:02:43]>> Well um nuclear programs are a long-term investment for the developing of countries. uh most advanced industrial countries you still use nuclear uh energy um to rely less on fossil fuel.

[00:03:00]This is a program that the Iranians also started. Um um so that's one main reason and second I think with the issue of enrichment that Saudis are demanding is that they want to have the option of at some point going for the nuclear weapon because countries that can enrich uranium on their soil uh theoretically are capable of producing nuclear weapons because that uranium enrichment or the other path to the bomb which is plutonium reprocessing is most of the work I would say 80% of the work if a country decides to develop nuclear weapons >> right and and working with the US what's in it for the Americans >> I would say a lot of investment um and the money that comes to the United States we have to keep in mind that um nuclear reactors are quite expensive um um and it would help uh President Trump to say that I'm bringing a lot of investment to the US nuclear industry. There's a lot of investment coming um so on and so forth. But we also have to keep in mind that if about a year ago, there were some reports that the Saudis had demanded that in return for normalizing relations with Israel, the US would allow them to have domestic enrichment. So this could be actually part of that uh I want to say quick proco understanding as well.

[00:04:29]>> Right. Looking in the region, what would a country like Iran, for example, be thinking when it sees this deal, considering all the scrutiny that it has faced on its nuclear program?

[00:04:43]Well, u they'll see it as a quite frankly a hypocrisy of the United States because Iranians have been asking for decades that they want to have domestic enrichment and the US position on Iranian nuclear program is that the MPT doesn't allow or or does not explicitly allow uh uranium enrichment. And now that seeing that the US is giving it to uh uh Saudis, it could uh really entrench them in their current position that they have that they will not give up on uh domestic enrichment and they have a very good excuse that how come Saudis can enrich uranium and not us. So it would really harden Iranian position.

[00:05:26]On the Israeli side, I think we've already seen that the Israeli uh officials, the former prime minister uh criticized the agreement, saying this is a failure um um for the Israelis because because it it could position Saudi Arabia um where it could again theoretically uh develop nuclear weapons if it chooses to do so.

[00:05:51]And Cena, let's listen to former prime minister and now chairman of the Together party, Naftali Bennett.

[00:05:58]>> The proposed nuclear agreement taking shape with Saudi Arabia and the US over Israel's head is a severe strategic failure that endangers our security. The enrichment of nuclear material on Saudi soil could lead to a regional nuclear arms race and a dangerous loss of control.

[00:06:17]There is truly no way to predict what the Middle East will look like in a decade or two. Which is why what we need is fewer centrifuges in the Middle East, not more. This failure joins a series of diplomatic failures centered on one key issue. Israel is losing influence over its own fate.

[00:06:36]>> Is Napali Bennett right about this? Uh could could this lead to a nuclear arms race in the region? Could other countries actually be prompted into pursuing their own enrichment programs?

[00:06:50]>> Well, Iran already has domestic enrichment capacity. Now Saudis want to have it. Emiratis were forced to uh forego it. But at some point m they may decide that if um the US is giving it to Saudi Arabia, why not them? Perhaps other countries that uh export nuclear technology, Russia, Germany, uh France might be willing at a reasonable at a good price. Of course, uh they would be willing to sell uh enrichment. So, but again, the the problem is the Saudis have said that if Iran develops nuclear weapons, they're going to follow suit, too. And then you're going to have three countries in the region with nuclear weapons. then that would be that would be a a detrimental uh effect on US policy in the region and the broader nonprololiferation uh regime that for years have been able that has been able to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.

[00:07:52]>> All right, just to sum up though, Cena, um where where do you see all of this?

[00:07:56]How do you see all of this unfolding?

[00:07:58]Where do you see it going?

[00:08:01]Well, again I I think this is uh even right now I think this is not a good development uh because for example the US is not at has not asked the Saudis to uh sign the additional protocol of the MPT which provides intrusive the mechanism for intrusive inspections. So that's one thing. Uh Iranians implemented it for a while and now they're not implement implementing it.

[00:08:28]But overall, I think this is a wrong decision. Um, it it contradicts the long-standing US policy, non-prololiferation policy in the Middle East, and I think it could harden Iranian position, as I mentioned earlier, on insisting that it it needs to have domestic enrichment.

[00:08:47]>> Cena Azori, thank you very much for speaking to us.

[00:08:52]>> Thank you for having me.

[00:08:55]Kelsey Davenport is director for non-prololiferation policy at the Arms Control Association. Good to have you with us, Kelsey. Uh, what's your initial reaction to the news of this agreement?

[00:09:10]>> Well, the US agreement that's been negotiated with Saudi Arabia is deeply concerning for several reasons. It appears that the United States is abandoning longheld norms for non-prololiferation that have enjoyed bipartisan support, including the requirement that Saudi Arabia allow more intrusive International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards inspections.

[00:09:35]In addition to eroding the safeguards requirements for this deal, the United States also appears prepared to allow Saudi Arabia to have domestic uranium enrichment. Even if the United States operates the uranium enrichment facility in Saudi Arabia, which the deal suggests, there's still a risk that Saudi Arabia could obtain access to this technology, could nationalize the facility, and that provides Saudi Arabia with the materials and the technologies that would also be necessary to produce the fistal material for nuclear weapons.

[00:10:12]So, from a non-prololiferation standpoint, it's deeply troubling.

[00:10:18]Are you saying that the bilateral safeguards in this agreement will not be sufficient?

[00:10:25]>> Well, it's unclear to date, you know, what this bilateral safeguards agreement will include. But what is clear is that it's only going to apply to the facilities where US Saudi nuclear cooperation takes place. That raises concerns about what may happen at sites outside of those cooperative facilities.

[00:10:45]If the International Atomic Energy Agency has concerns, for instance, about an illicit activity at a site that's not part of Saudi Arabia's declared nuclear program or covered by the bilateral safeguards agreement, will the agency have access? These are crucial questions that still remain um unanswered, but it also just sets a bad precedent to negotiate this bilateral safeguards agreement. I mean, other supplier states, Russia, China, you know, may follow suit and negotiate these one-off bespoke arrangements rather than supporting the International Atomic Energy AY's more intrusive safeguards mechanisms which have proved to be successful and which have long held international support.

[00:11:31]>> There are other agreements, one, two, three agreements. I mean, the US has a deal with the UAE, the so-called gold standard, which has seen the Emiratis rule out um enrichment altogether. Um what's the difference between that and this one?

[00:11:48]Well, the Emirati agreement required the UAE to adopt this more intrusive IAEA safeguards inspection regime and it required the Emiratis to forego uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing in perpetuity. So essentially it allowed the Emirates to develop a civil nuclear program but did not give it the means to produce nuclear fuel because those technologies can also be used to produce the core of nuclear weapons. But it will be interesting to see what the Amiradis do going forward because their deal allows them to renegotiate with the United States if another country in the region achieves more favorable terms which they could argue the Saudis have just achieved.

[00:12:36]>> Yeah, I mean I was going to come to that point that essentially this sets a a precedent [clears throat] or even a conundrum um not just for for the Emiratis but other states. I think the US is talking to to South Korea at the moment. Do you think that this sort of um changes the conversation when when um the US has to approach these other nations?

[00:12:58]>> Non-prololiferation norms were already eroding and the US has dealt a further blow with this Saudi agreement. You combine that with the South Korean agreement which is also, you know, now allowing South Korea to develop domestic uranium enrichment. And I think there's a real risk that future states that come to the United States seeking nuclear cooperation deals will also want these fistal material capabilities. That's extremely concerning. Uh but the more immediate effect I think is going to be on US negotiations with Iran. An effective nuclear deal with Iran needs intrusive International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring and inspections. But Iran is going to be far less likely to accept those mechanisms if Saudi Arabia is not subject to the same intrusive verification regime.

[00:13:55]Uh, Secretary of State uh, Marco Rubio said earlier, you know, along the lines something along the lines that the US had done its homework in the leadup to this deal. I'm just wondering what the the risk is if the US and Saudi Arabia were to have a falling out in the future.

[00:14:13]>> I think it's a real risk. If the US is operating a uranium enrichment facility in Saudi Arabia, how can it guarantee that that technology will not fall into Saudi hands if there's a fissure between the US and Saudi Arabia or if there's a change of government in Saudi Arabia? I mean, the US is betting on a continued close partnership with Riad to help sell this deal as an effective non-prololiferation agreement. That's not a bet I think the US is willing to take. And I'd also just note that when Secretary Rubio was in the Senate, he was a fierce opponent of allowing Saudi Arabia to gain enrichment technology. Uh particularly without the more intrusive IAEA monitoring and verification measures. Uh so Secretary Rubio knows better. He knows that this is not a strong and effective non-prololiferation agreement.

[00:15:11]>> Right. All right. Um, Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman has previously said the Saudis would actually build a bomb if Iran does. So, do you think this deal actually makes that threat more likely?

[00:15:22]No.

[00:15:24]>> Well, absolutely makes that threat more likely. Right now, Saudi Arabia's nuclear program is in its infancy. It has a small unfinished uh research reactor which doesn't pose much of a risk. But if Thran or if Saudi Arabia, you know, builds larger reactors, you know, works with the United States on this fuel cycle, getting the enrichment technology that better positions Riad to develop nuclear weapons, uh, if it makes the decision to do so. I mean, I'm not worried about a Saudi nuclear weapon in the short term. They don't have the infrastructure. They don't have the technologies necessary to build a bomb.

[00:16:06]But what I'm concerned about is that this deal will allow Saudi Arabia to move to the threshold of nuclear weapons, that it will have the technologies in place if it decides it needs to weaponize in the future. And in that scenario, there would be little to nothing that the United States could do to stop a determined Saudi push to to build nuclear weapons.

[00:16:30]>> And on that note, do you see this playing out even beyond in the region? a sort of wider nuclear arms race.

[00:16:40]>> I am worried that additional states are going to follow this Saudi model of trying to acquire the materials and capabilities necessary for weaponization under the guise of civil programs.

[00:16:53]Similarly, I think there's a reason to be concerned that other supplier states, you know, Russia, China, you may now be more willing to provide these types of capabilities without the more intrusive safeguards to states that are adversarial to the United States. So, in the long term, I think it significantly undermines international non-prololiferation norms. It significantly increases the risk of additional states moving to that nuclear weapons threshold and possibly weaponizing and it puts US national security interests in jeopardy.

[00:17:29]>> Kelsey Davenport from the Arms Control Association, we appreciate your time.

[00:17:34]Thank you.

[00:17:36]>> Thank you for having me.

[00:17:38]>> And would love to get your thoughts on what this means for the US, for Saudi Arabia, and for the Middle East. Let us know in the comments. I'm Tommy Olato.

[00:17:47]We'll see you next time.