Подкуп избирателей и «алиевский» референдум

[00:00:00][music] Welcome to a new edition of Week in Review. In today's episode, we'll focus on two main topics. First, let's look at the results of the recount after the parliamentary elections and see what has changed and what has remained the same.

[00:00:17]Secondly, let's talk about what will likely be the main political issue of the next two years: the constitutional referendum demanded by Ilham Aliyev. Let's start with a recalculation of the voting situation around Gagik Tserukyan's party. On election night, according to the Central Electoral Commission, Tserukyan's party fell short by approximately 50 votes to overcome the four percent threshold, which is the threshold that gives a party the right to enter parliament. If the party had overcome this flaw, it would have received about five parliamentary mandates, which would have significantly changed the balance of power in the new parliament. During the recount, the party claims, an additional 135 votes were discovered in its favor. However, immediately after this, the Central Election Commission annulled the results at three polling stations where Tsarukyan's party had performed significantly above the national average, receiving approximately 250 additional votes. In two cases, the reason was that after 8:00 p.m. the state organized voting for military personnel at these polling stations. In the third case, the reason given was the absence of a ballot from one of the small parties. Moreover, all of these violations were related to the actions of the state or the electoral administration, and not to the actions of voters or the opposition. However, it was precisely these circumstances that were used to cancel the voting results. As a result, Tsarukyan’s party’s indicator now stands at 3.989%.

[00:01:44]The decision is being challenged in court. Moreover, if we read the legislation carefully, in such situations a repeat voting procedure should be scheduled. The logic of the law is simple: citizens should not be deprived of their votes because of the state's mistakes. It was necessary to schedule a repeat vote, as far as I understand, within two weeks after the elections. However, the authorities categorically refused to do this. How can this be characterized?

[00:02:11]Frankly, it’s hard to call this anything other than an attempt at electoral fraud. And we are not talking about Gagik Tsarukyan himself. Tsarukyan's personality is secondary in this case. The main thing is the procedure. If his party does enter parliament, the ruling party will not only fail to secure enough votes to amend the constitution, but will even lose the constitutional majority of over 60% needed to appoint judges and make a number of key political decisions. Today, we are witnessing a situation in which a party that received less than 50% of the votes can, through manipulation, gain more than 60% of the seats in parliament.

[00:02:52]Now let's move on to the constitutional referendum that Aliyev is demanding.

[00:02:56]Let me remind you of the background. The 1991 Declaration of Independence of Armenia contains a mention of the reunification of Artsakh with Armenia. The Constitution of Armenia refers to the declaration of independence.

[00:03:08]However, the provision on wrestlers is not included in the text of the constitution, so the entire current discussion appears quite absurd. How can such a question be put to a referendum? Initially, the authorities expected to receive about 70 seats in parliament. Now, most likely, they will not have such a majority. There are two options: either get 70 votes from deputies and put the issue to a referendum in parliament, or collect about 350,000 citizen signatures. Many people mistakenly believe that constitutional amendments are part of the agreed seventeen-point peace plan. This is wrong. There is no such clause there. This is an additional demand that was put forward later and, in fact, became a tool for delaying the signing of the peace agreement. Moreover, this requirement contradicts one of the key provisions of the peace process itself, the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state.

[00:04:02]Another interesting thing is that. Even if the referendum takes place, the changes will be accepted. There is no guarantee that Aliyev will sign a peace agreement after this. It is quite possible that five more new requirements will appear then.

[00:04:17]For the next two years, the authorities will try to convince us that this is not Aliyev’s referendum, but this is not true.

[00:04:24]So the question arises, why does Ali insist on this demand at all? There are several reasons. First, use this issue as an excuse not to sign a peace agreement. Second, to force Armenian society to humiliate itself by fulfilling the demands of a dictator whom the majority of people in Armenia do not accept. And thirdly, to create a very dangerous political trap for Armenia.

[00:04:47]What is this trap?

[00:04:49]Firstly, the responsibility for the lack of a peace agreement will be shifted to Armenia, and not to Aliyev’s refusal to sign the document. Secondly, Aliyev understands perfectly well that if citizens realize that the referendum is being held precisely at his request, there is a high probability that they will reject it.

[00:05:06]Thirdly, this will inevitably provoke serious internal political confrontation in Armenia itself. And finally, if the referendum fails, Aliyev will be able to declare to the international community: "Look, the Armenians themselves voted against peace and chose war." This trap is perfectly clear to the current government. Nevertheless, it agreed to move along this path.

[00:05:27]In my opinion, this policy is dictated by fear, and under such conditions it appears to be an extremely irresponsible decision, bordering on criminal negligence. To pass changes in a referendum, it is not enough to simply obtain a majority of votes. There is an additional requirement: at least a quarter of all registered voters in the country must vote in favor of the changes. That's about 65,000 votes in favor.

[00:05:53]And this is where serious difficulties begin. Let me explain why.

[00:06:00]About 1.2 million people typically vote in national elections in Armenia. In the last parliamentary elections, the turnout was very high, almost 1.5 million voters. However, in elections and referendums that do not involve the election of parliament or government, turnout is traditionally significantly lower. Even if we assume a fairly high figure and a million people turn out for the referendum, about 65,000% of votes in favor will be needed to pass the changes. Achieving such a result will be extremely difficult. What advantages will the government have? First of all, financial resources. During the referendum campaign, the authorities will likely be able to spend tens, and possibly even 100 times more, than their opponents. There will most likely not be an organized movement against the referendum with comparable resources. The second advantage is administrative resources. We have already seen its use during parliamentary elections.

[00:06:53]The state apparatus is capable of providing an additional 5-10% of votes. The authorities will use all available organizational potential. The third circumstance is that the majority of Armenian citizens have little interest in constitutional issues. For many, it is just another legal document, the contents of which they are not very familiar with. In addition, the authorities may try to sweeten the referendum by including popular initiatives and social promises in the package of amendments to make the vote more attractive. If the situation becomes critical, attempts at falsification cannot be ruled out. Almost all constitutional referendums held in Armenia in the past have been accompanied by accusations of violations and fraud. It is possible that the authorities will try to use similar methods again. But there is another alarming scenario.

[00:07:44]We already saw some of its elements during the last elections. Most likely, the authorities will try to present the referendum as a choice between Artsakh and peace.

[00:07:54]The company's logic might look like this: either you vote for the people of Artsakh, or you vote for peace. It seems to me that many elements of this rhetoric have already been tested during the parliamentary campaign.

[00:08:05]What should the opposition do if it wants to win? First of all, turn this referendum into a vote of confidence in Nikol Pashinyan and Iham Aliyev. It will be quite easy to do this.

[00:08:18]Second. To unite the majority of voters opposed to the current government. We already saw the potential of such a union during the parliamentary elections.

[00:08:26]To win, it will be necessary to bring together both the pro-Western third-way opposition and the traditional opposition. On this issue, they may well find themselves on the same side of the barricades. A referendum is fundamentally different from a regular election. There is no competition between Robert Kocharyan and Samvel Karapetyan. There are no personalities with which to frighten voters. There is only one question: yes or no? And in such votes, the side that is against usually has the advantage. Because if people have doubts or don't fully understand the consequences, their natural reaction is to vote against the change. The most interesting thing is something else. By pushing through this referendum, the government can achieve what the opposition has failed to do over the past eight years. It can unite virtually the entire political spectrum of the country against itself around a very popular issue. In this case, the ruling party will be the only significant force openly supporting this project.

[00:09:27]What should be our reaction? In the history of every nation there are moments when there are no half-tones, when there is no room for nuances and complex explanations, when the question becomes extremely simple. In my view, this is an attempt to break us as a nation, and this is unacceptable. But what is even more unacceptable is that our own government is becoming complicit in this process. There can be only one answer.

[00:09:54]Absolutely not. In the coming years, as this company grows, decent people will do what they believe is right, while the unprincipled and unscrupulous will lie and mislead society, as they always have. I don't need to explain to you who will end up on which side of this line.

[00:10:12]Thank you for joining us for this week's Weekly Review.

[00:10:18]You [singing][music] and once more back to the wall we have been [music] attacked again.

[00:10:27]Which side are you on? Which side are you on again? Which side are [music][singing] you on? Which side are you on?

[00:10:43][music] We fought a million bottles [music] to defend our one right and we are going to have to fight again. And I ask you [music] here tight which side are you on? Which side are you on? Tell me which side are you on?

[00:11:07]Which side are you on? [music]